i*p
2 楼
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5733486-c42d-11e0-ad9a-00144fea
简而言之,大公司和asset manager手上有太多钱(4 trillion USD),他们只有不断
的买美国短期国债。这样把利率搞的很低。如果再考虑一些主权基金(更是没有好办法
投资),那就更容易理解了。
从这个意义上讲,股票是很便宜的。spy的yield都有每年1.8%。
Cash-rich investors choose crazy Treasury returns
By Gillian Tett
Why does money keep flooding into the short-term Treasuries market, or T-
bills? It is a fascinating question, given last week’s US rating downgrade
– and the fact that yields on three-month bills are now a mere 0.01 per
cent. There are plenty of explanations around: investors are searching for
safe havens; terrified about growth; worrying about deflation; chasing
momentum. Or all four.
But there is another factor investors should watch: what companies and asset
managers are doing with their spare “cash”.
Earlier this week, the International Monetary Fund quietly published a
ground-breaking paper on this issue, written by Zoltan Pozsar, a visiting
scholar and former central bank economist*. And while the analysis is
couched in dull, central bank language, the conclusions are utterly
fascinating, not just in relation to the current markets swings – but also
future systemic risks.
The issue at stake revolves around the “cash” which companies, asset
managers and securities lenders (such as custodial banks) hold on their
balance sheets. Two decades ago, these cash pools were modest, totalling
just $100bn across the globe, with individual companies typically holding
just $100m, or so. But in recent years, these pools have exploded in size,
as the asset management sector has consolidated and companies have
centralised their treasury functions. Institutional cash managers now
control between $2,000bn and $4,000bn globally, and Pozsar reckons on
average there is $75bn sitting at individual securities lenders, $20bn at
asset managers, and $15bn at large US companies.
That is startling. But what is more striking is where this “cash” has
ended up. Two decades ago, it typically was placed in bank accounts. But in
recent years, cash managers have started to avoid banks: in 2007, for
example, just 16-20 per cent of these funds were on deposit. Why? Pozsar
thinks the key factor was risk management, not yield. From 1990 up to the
crisis, US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation only guaranteed the first $
100,000 of any account. And while cash managers have tried to use multiple
banks, their cash pools are so large that effective diversification is
impossible. Thus they have hunted for alternatives that seemed liquid and
safer than uninsured bank accounts, such as repurchase deals (backed by
collateral), money market funds (often implicitly backed by banks), or
highly rated short term securities (such as triple A rated asset backed
commercial paper or mortgage bonds.)
Pozsar argues that this has created a big distortion in the monetary
aggregates (ironically, cash is only counted as M2 “cash” in the Fed’s
accounts if it is held in a bank.) He also thinks this pattern was a little-
watched factor behind the boom in shadow banking before 2007. He is
undoubtedly correct.
But the really interesting issue is what is happening now. After the 2008
crisis, the FDIC raised the insured account limit to $250,000, and that has
prompted cash managers to raise the proportion of funds they place on
deposit to 33 per cent. However, surveys suggest they will not go further –
meaning that trillions of dollars still sit outside the banking system.
This creates some potentially big systemic risks: as Pozsar notes, the
amount of institutional cash held outside FDIC-insured bank accounts – and
thus outside government umbrellas – is now two thirds of the size of the
money which is protected by the FDIC (up from just 5 per cent in 1990). This
could provide the source of another panic if a crisis hits, since it is
unsure whether banks could really protect, say, money market funds.
But the “vacuum” also affects asset prices. Since 2008, large parts of the
shadow banking world have all but collapsed. Thus cash managers are now
frantically searching for new places to put their “cash”. Some has flooded
into money market funds (which buy government bonds) or the repo world (
often backed by bonds); some money has entered the T-bill market directly.
Either way, the net result is a shortage of T-bills, particularly since
banks and clearing houses are also gobbling up T-bills for regulatory
purposes.
Hence the low yields. From an investment perspective, these returns may seem
crazy; but they are still attractive to cash managers because T-bills are
liquid – and, most crucially, seem less risky than uninsured bank deposits.
Or, put another way, faced with a choice between betting on the safety of
the US government, or its banks, cash-rich large companies and asset
managers are choosing the former. It is an entirely rational choice. But it
is also a powerful reminder of how profoundly distorted the US financial
system remains. And that is not a comforting thought; least of all in a
rollercoaster week.
简而言之,大公司和asset manager手上有太多钱(4 trillion USD),他们只有不断
的买美国短期国债。这样把利率搞的很低。如果再考虑一些主权基金(更是没有好办法
投资),那就更容易理解了。
从这个意义上讲,股票是很便宜的。spy的yield都有每年1.8%。
Cash-rich investors choose crazy Treasury returns
By Gillian Tett
Why does money keep flooding into the short-term Treasuries market, or T-
bills? It is a fascinating question, given last week’s US rating downgrade
– and the fact that yields on three-month bills are now a mere 0.01 per
cent. There are plenty of explanations around: investors are searching for
safe havens; terrified about growth; worrying about deflation; chasing
momentum. Or all four.
But there is another factor investors should watch: what companies and asset
managers are doing with their spare “cash”.
Earlier this week, the International Monetary Fund quietly published a
ground-breaking paper on this issue, written by Zoltan Pozsar, a visiting
scholar and former central bank economist*. And while the analysis is
couched in dull, central bank language, the conclusions are utterly
fascinating, not just in relation to the current markets swings – but also
future systemic risks.
The issue at stake revolves around the “cash” which companies, asset
managers and securities lenders (such as custodial banks) hold on their
balance sheets. Two decades ago, these cash pools were modest, totalling
just $100bn across the globe, with individual companies typically holding
just $100m, or so. But in recent years, these pools have exploded in size,
as the asset management sector has consolidated and companies have
centralised their treasury functions. Institutional cash managers now
control between $2,000bn and $4,000bn globally, and Pozsar reckons on
average there is $75bn sitting at individual securities lenders, $20bn at
asset managers, and $15bn at large US companies.
That is startling. But what is more striking is where this “cash” has
ended up. Two decades ago, it typically was placed in bank accounts. But in
recent years, cash managers have started to avoid banks: in 2007, for
example, just 16-20 per cent of these funds were on deposit. Why? Pozsar
thinks the key factor was risk management, not yield. From 1990 up to the
crisis, US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation only guaranteed the first $
100,000 of any account. And while cash managers have tried to use multiple
banks, their cash pools are so large that effective diversification is
impossible. Thus they have hunted for alternatives that seemed liquid and
safer than uninsured bank accounts, such as repurchase deals (backed by
collateral), money market funds (often implicitly backed by banks), or
highly rated short term securities (such as triple A rated asset backed
commercial paper or mortgage bonds.)
Pozsar argues that this has created a big distortion in the monetary
aggregates (ironically, cash is only counted as M2 “cash” in the Fed’s
accounts if it is held in a bank.) He also thinks this pattern was a little-
watched factor behind the boom in shadow banking before 2007. He is
undoubtedly correct.
But the really interesting issue is what is happening now. After the 2008
crisis, the FDIC raised the insured account limit to $250,000, and that has
prompted cash managers to raise the proportion of funds they place on
deposit to 33 per cent. However, surveys suggest they will not go further –
meaning that trillions of dollars still sit outside the banking system.
This creates some potentially big systemic risks: as Pozsar notes, the
amount of institutional cash held outside FDIC-insured bank accounts – and
thus outside government umbrellas – is now two thirds of the size of the
money which is protected by the FDIC (up from just 5 per cent in 1990). This
could provide the source of another panic if a crisis hits, since it is
unsure whether banks could really protect, say, money market funds.
But the “vacuum” also affects asset prices. Since 2008, large parts of the
shadow banking world have all but collapsed. Thus cash managers are now
frantically searching for new places to put their “cash”. Some has flooded
into money market funds (which buy government bonds) or the repo world (
often backed by bonds); some money has entered the T-bill market directly.
Either way, the net result is a shortage of T-bills, particularly since
banks and clearing houses are also gobbling up T-bills for regulatory
purposes.
Hence the low yields. From an investment perspective, these returns may seem
crazy; but they are still attractive to cash managers because T-bills are
liquid – and, most crucially, seem less risky than uninsured bank deposits.
Or, put another way, faced with a choice between betting on the safety of
the US government, or its banks, cash-rich large companies and asset
managers are choosing the former. It is an entirely rational choice. But it
is also a powerful reminder of how profoundly distorted the US financial
system remains. And that is not a comforting thought; least of all in a
rollercoaster week.
d*f
3 楼
【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
预算的每月开支如下:
Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
Cell phone: 100
Auto insurance: 150
Car Gas: 100
Electricity:650 (全部用电,数字是前owener说的)
Water+trash 200
Cable和internet: 200
Grocery: 1000
Dinning out: 300
Medical: 200
Child care: 1000
每个月总开支10k左右,基本上每个月可能会有500到1000的节余。
前四项的数字应该比较准,比较保守,apr按高的算,properties也算的比较高,因为
现在住的是apt,其他的都是没有经验的估计。child care的话家里老人可以给看到一
岁半,小孩5岁就可以上公立的pre-k,现在才几个月大。房子是全砖的,5-6年新,所以
没有留房子维护的major expense。诸位住在house里的看看这些数字合不合理?估计撑
到小孩上了大学就行了。
发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
预算的每月开支如下:
Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
Cell phone: 100
Auto insurance: 150
Car Gas: 100
Electricity:650 (全部用电,数字是前owener说的)
Water+trash 200
Cable和internet: 200
Grocery: 1000
Dinning out: 300
Medical: 200
Child care: 1000
每个月总开支10k左右,基本上每个月可能会有500到1000的节余。
前四项的数字应该比较准,比较保守,apr按高的算,properties也算的比较高,因为
现在住的是apt,其他的都是没有经验的估计。child care的话家里老人可以给看到一
岁半,小孩5岁就可以上公立的pre-k,现在才几个月大。房子是全砖的,5-6年新,所以
没有留房子维护的major expense。诸位住在house里的看看这些数字合不合理?估计撑
到小孩上了大学就行了。
c*o
4 楼
大家申请485时都申请1-131AP吗?
i*n
5 楼
搞对冲基金有前途吗?
downgrade
【在 i**p 的大作中提到】
: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5733486-c42d-11e0-ad9a-00144fea
: 简而言之,大公司和asset manager手上有太多钱(4 trillion USD),他们只有不断
: 的买美国短期国债。这样把利率搞的很低。如果再考虑一些主权基金(更是没有好办法
: 投资),那就更容易理解了。
: 从这个意义上讲,股票是很便宜的。spy的yield都有每年1.8%。
: Cash-rich investors choose crazy Treasury returns
: By Gillian Tett
: Why does money keep flooding into the short-term Treasuries market, or T-
: bills? It is a fascinating question, given last week’s US rating downgrade
: – and the fact that yields on three-month bills are now a mere 0.01 per
downgrade
【在 i**p 的大作中提到】
: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5733486-c42d-11e0-ad9a-00144fea
: 简而言之,大公司和asset manager手上有太多钱(4 trillion USD),他们只有不断
: 的买美国短期国债。这样把利率搞的很低。如果再考虑一些主权基金(更是没有好办法
: 投资),那就更容易理解了。
: 从这个意义上讲,股票是很便宜的。spy的yield都有每年1.8%。
: Cash-rich investors choose crazy Treasury returns
: By Gillian Tett
: Why does money keep flooding into the short-term Treasuries market, or T-
: bills? It is a fascinating question, given last week’s US rating downgrade
: – and the fact that yields on three-month bills are now a mere 0.01 per
w*g
6 楼
电一月650有点夸张,其他好象还算靠谱,如果是阿拉弯曲的话。
★ 发自iPhone App: ChineseWeb 11
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
★ 发自iPhone App: ChineseWeb 11
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
c*o
12 楼
我的意思是说好象条件很苛刻,不如签证好用
H*7
13 楼
不剪草?草地喷头永远不坏?家里都不需要工具?小孩玩具全是捡的?
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
c*o
16 楼
You have a pending application to adjust status, Form I-485, and you seek
to travel abroad for “urgent
humanitarian reasons” or in furtherance of a “significant public benefit,
” which may include a personal or
family emergency or bona fide business reasons
Humanitarian reasons include travel to
obtain medical treatment, attend funeral services for a family member, or
visit an ailing relative.
Educational purposes include, but are not limited to, semester abroad
programs or academic research;overseas assignments, interviews, conferences,
training, or meetings with clients
to travel abroad for “urgent
humanitarian reasons” or in furtherance of a “significant public benefit,
” which may include a personal or
family emergency or bona fide business reasons
Humanitarian reasons include travel to
obtain medical treatment, attend funeral services for a family member, or
visit an ailing relative.
Educational purposes include, but are not limited to, semester abroad
programs or academic research;overseas assignments, interviews, conferences,
training, or meetings with clients
f*n
18 楼
只要你是I-485 pending,就符合AP的条件。没有人会管你去做什么东西。AP是经常拿
去vacation的。
去vacation的。
b*2
19 楼
二个人有一个baby
这是哪里的方言?
这是哪里的方言?
t*o
39 楼
全家用ringplus, cell phone 0
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
t*o
40 楼
话说为了下一代就直接上私校吧
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
【在 d********f 的大作中提到】
: 【 以下文字转载自 Living 讨论区 】
: 发信人: Hjms (hjms), 信区: Living
: 标 题: 求拍醒,大家看看这个能撑下去吗?
: 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sun May 22 18:59:08 2016, 美东)
: LD看中一个房子,好学区,房子较新,我觉得太撑,但LD觉得看了不少房子了,即使
: 撑为了下一代也值得。我们大概算了一下账,大家帮看看这个现实不现实:
: 1现在是二个人有一个baby,每一个月税后到手11k左右,已经去掉了一家的health
: insurance和401k,401k因为要买房没有放满。
: 预算的每月开支如下:
: Mortgage + property tax: 6200 (30年fixed apr 4.125%)
t*u
45 楼
为啥不用太阳能!
f*e
51 楼
小儿归去须读之
手持琅性br />
一舸春深指鄂君
伸舒轶出元气外
包羞忍耻是男儿
子规枝上月三更
来似蝗虫争奈何
手持琅性br />
一舸春深指鄂君
伸舒轶出元气外
包羞忍耻是男儿
子规枝上月三更
来似蝗虫争奈何
s*y
60 楼
re
d*4
61 楼
好私校>好公校>一般私校
好私校也要考,录取比例很低
一般私校除了烧钱,并没有什么卵用,而且差区还有课后玩伴问题
所以,综合下来好公校还是性价比高
[在 reknaz (拖把套) 的大作中提到:]
:你没理解我说的。
:为了上好学区的公校,房子要两到三倍价钱,多出的那部分相应的 tax 就差不多私校
:学费了,这还没考虑房贷的差别,就是说上公校并不一定比上私校省钱。除非三四个
孩子以上,老中孩子不上私校很多并不是因为钱不够。可我也不清楚为什么,就是跟风?
:No species lasts forever.
好私校也要考,录取比例很低
一般私校除了烧钱,并没有什么卵用,而且差区还有课后玩伴问题
所以,综合下来好公校还是性价比高
[在 reknaz (拖把套) 的大作中提到:]
:你没理解我说的。
:为了上好学区的公校,房子要两到三倍价钱,多出的那部分相应的 tax 就差不多私校
:学费了,这还没考虑房贷的差别,就是说上公校并不一定比上私校省钱。除非三四个
孩子以上,老中孩子不上私校很多并不是因为钱不够。可我也不清楚为什么,就是跟风?
:No species lasts forever.
u*n
62 楼
来阿拉斯加啦
s*u
64 楼
赞夫人不买鞋包衣服化妆品。我假设结余是准备给孩子报课外班用的。
相关阅读