w*l
2 楼
想抄底的同学最好还是多存钱吧。
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/254354/the_dismal_outlook_for_the_us_and_global_economy_and_the_financial_markets
The Dismal Outlook for the US and Global Economy and the Financial Markets
Email PrintShare
Delicious Digg Facebook reddit Technorati Nouriel Roubini | Nov 11, 2008
Here is a below brief summary of many of the points that I have made for the
last few months on the outlook for the U.S. and global economy and for
financial markets:
The U.S. will experience its
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/254354/the_dismal_outlook_for_the_us_and_global_economy_and_the_financial_markets
The Dismal Outlook for the US and Global Economy and the Financial Markets
Email PrintShare
Delicious Digg Facebook reddit Technorati Nouriel Roubini | Nov 11, 2008
Here is a below brief summary of many of the points that I have made for the
last few months on the outlook for the U.S. and global economy and for
financial markets:
The U.S. will experience its
k*a
3 楼
以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
比较失望。
的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
比较失望。
r*1
4 楼
follow一下吧，显得重视这个公司。offer会来的。
w*l
5 楼
想抄底的同学最好还是多存钱吧。
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/254354/the_dismal_out
The Dismal Outlook for the US and Global Economy and the Financial Markets
Email PrintShare
Delicious Digg Facebook reddit Technorati Nouriel Roubini | Nov 11, 2008
Here is a below brief summary of many of the points that I have made for the
last few months on the outlook for the U.S. and global economy and for
financial markets:
The U.S. will experience its most severe recession since WWII, much worse
and longer and deeper than even the 1974-75 and 1980-82 recessions. The
recession will continue until at least the end of 2009 for a cumulative GDP
drop of over 4%; the unemployment rate will likely reach 9%. The US consumer
is shopped out saving less and debt burdened and now faltering: this will
be the worst consumer recession in decades.
The prospect of a short and shallow 6-8 months V-shaped recession is out of
the window; a U-shaped 18-24 months recession is now a certainty and the
probability of a worse multi-year L-shaped recession (as in Japan in the
1990s) is still small but rising. Even if the economy were to exit a
recession by the end of 2009 the recovery could be so weak because of the
impairment of the financial system and of the credit mechanism (i.e. a
growth rate of 1-1.5% for a while well below the potential of 2.5-2.75%)
that it may feel like a recession even if the economy is technically out of
the recession.
Obama will inherit and economic and financial mess worse than anything the U
.S. has faced in decades: the most severe recession in 50 years; the worst
financial and banking crisis since the Great Depression; a ballooning fiscal
deficit that may be as high as a trillion dollar in 2009 and 2010; a huge
current account deficit; a financial system that is in a severe crisis and
where deleveraging is still occurring at a very rapid pace, thus causing a
worsening of the credit crunch; a household sector where millions of
households are insolvent, into negative equity territory and on the verge of
losing their homes; a serious risk of deflation as the slack in goods,
labor and commodity markets becomes deeper; the risk that we will end in a
deflationary liquidity trap as the Fed is fast approaching the zero-bound
constraint for the Fed Funds rate; the risk of a severe debt deflation as
the real value of nominal liabilities will rise given price deflation while
the value of financial assets is still plunging.
The world economy will experience a severe recession: output will sharply
contract in the Eurozone, UK and the rest of Europe, in Canada, Japan, and
Australia/New Zealand; there is also a risk of a hard landing in emerging
market economies. Expect global growth – at market prices – to be close to
zero in Q3 and negative by Q4. Leaving aside the effects of the fiscal
stimulus China could face a hard landing growth rate of 6% in 2009. The
global recession will continue through most of 2009.
The advanced economies will face stag-deflation (stagnation/recession and
deflation) rather than stagflation as slack in goods markets, slack in labor
markets and slack in commodity markets will lead advanced economies
inflation rates to become below 1% by 2009.
Expect a few advanced economies (certainly US and Japan and possibly others)
to reach the zero-bound constraint for policy rates by early 2009. With
deflation on the horizon a zero-bound on interest rates implies the risk of
a liquidity trap where money and bonds become perfectly substitutable, where
real interest rates become high and rising thus further pushing down
aggregate demand, and where money market funds returns cannot even cover
their management costs. Deflation also implies a debt deflation where the
real value of nominal debts is rising thus increasing the real burden of
such debts. Monetary policy easing will become more aggressive in other
advanced economies – even if the ECB will cut too little too late - but
monetary policy easing will be little effective as it will be pushing on a
string given the glut of global aggregate supply relative to demand and
given a very severe credit crunch.
For 2009 the consensus estimates for earnings are delusional: current
consensus estimates are that S&P 500 earnings per share (EPS) will be $90 in
2009 up 15% from 2008. Such estimates are outright silly and delusional. If
EPS fall – as most likely – to a level of $60 then with a multiple (P/E
ratio) of 12 the S&P500 index could fall to 720, i.e. about 20% below
current levels; if the P/E falls to 10 – as possible in a severe recession,
the S&P could be down to 600 or 35% below current levels. And in a very
severe recession one cannot exclude that the EPS could fall as low as $50 in
2009 dragging the S&P500 index to as low as 500. So, even based on
fundamentals and valuations, there are significant downside risks to U.S.
equities (20% to 40%). Similar arguments can be made for global equities: a
severe global recession implies further downside risks to global equities of
the order of 20-30%.Thus, the recent rally in US and global equities was
only a bear market sucker’s rally that is already fizzling out buried under
a mountain of awful worse than expected macro, earnings and financial news.
Credit losses will be well above $1 trillion and closer to $2 trillion as
such losses will spread from sub-prime to near prime and prime mortgages and
home equity loans (and the related securitized products); to commercial
real estate, to credit cards, auto loans and student loans; to leveraged
loans and LBOs, to muni bonds, corporate bonds, industrial and commercial
loans and CDS. These credit losses will lead to a severe credit crunch
absent a rapid and aggressive recapitalization of financial institutions.
Almost all of the $700 billion in the TARP program will be used to
recapitalized US financial institutions (banks, broker dealers, insurance
companies, finance companies, etc.) as rising credit losses (close to $2
trillion) will imply that the initial $250 billion allocated to recap these
institutions will not be enough; sooner rather than later a TARP 2 will
become necessary as the recapitalization needs of US financial institutions
will likely be well above $1 trillion.
Current spreads on speculative grade bonds may widen further as a tsunami of
defaults will hit the corporate sector; investment grade bond spreads have
widened excessively relative to financial fundamentals but further spread
widening is possible driven by market dynamics, deleveraging and the fact
that many AAA-rated firms (say GE) are not really AAA and should be
downgraded by the rating agencies.
Expect a US fiscal deficit of almost $1 trillion in 2009 and 2010. The
outlook for the US current account deficit is mixed: the recession, a rise
in private savings and a fall in investment, and a further fall in commodity
prices will tend to shrink it but a stronger dollar, global demand weakness
and a larger US fiscal deficit will tend to worsen it. On net we will
observe still large US twin fiscal and current account deficits and less
willingness and ability of the rest of the world to finance it unless the
interest rate on such debt rises.
In this economic and financial environment it is wise to stay away from most
risky assets for the next 12 months: they are downside risks to US and
global equities; credit spreads – especially for speculative grade – may
widen further; commodity prices will fall another 20% from current level;
gold will also fall as deflation sets in; the US dollar may weaken further
in the next 6 to 12 months as the factors behind the recent rally weather
off while medium term bearish fundamentals for the dollar set in again;
government bond yields in US and advanced economies may fall further as
recession and deflation emerge but, over time, the surge in fiscal deficits
in the US and globally will reduce the supply of global savings and lead to
higher long term interest rates unless the fall in global real investment
outpaces the fall in global savings. Expect further downside risks to
emerging markets assets (in particular equities and local and foreign
currency debt) especially in economies with significant macro, policy and
financial vulnerabilities. Cash and cash like instruments (short-term dated
government bonds and inflation-indexed bonds that do well both in inflation
and deflation times) will dominate most risky assets.
So serious risks and vulnerabilities remain and the downside risks to
financial markets (worse than expected macro news, earnings news and
developments in systemically important parts of the global financial system)
will dominate over the next few months the positive news (G7 policies to
avoid a systemic meltdown, and other policies that – in due time – may
reduce interbank spreads and credit spreads). So beware of those who tell
you that we reached a bottom for risky financial assets. The same optimists
told you that we reached a bottom and the worst was behind us after the
rescue of the creditors of Bear Stearns in March, after the announcement of
the possible bailout of Fannie and Freddie in July, after the actual bailout
of Fannie and Freddie in September, after the bailout of AIG in mid
September, after the TARP legislation was presented, after the latest G7 and
EU action. In each case the optimists argued that the latest crisis and
rescue policy response was “THE CATHARTIC” event that signaled the bottom
of the crisis and the recovery of markets. They were wrong literally at
least six times in a row as the crisis - as I consistently predicted here
over the last year – became worse and worse. So enough of the excessive
optimism that has been proven wrong at least six times in the last eight
months alone.
A reality check is needed to assess the proper risks and take the
appropriate actions. And reality tells us that we barely literally avoided
only a week ago a total systemic financial meltdown; that the policy actions
are now finally more aggressive and systematic and more appropriate; that
it will take a long while for interbank markets and credit markets to mend;
that further important policy actions are needed to avoid the meltdown and
an even more severe recession; that central banks instead of being the
lenders of last resort will be for now the lenders of first and only resort;
that even if we avoid a meltdown we will experience a severe US, advanced
economy and most likely global recession, the worst in decades; that we are
in the middle of a severe global financial and banking crisis, the worst
since the Great Depression; and that the flow of macro, earnings and
financial news will significantly surprise (as during the last few weeks) on
the downside with significant further risks to financial markets.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/254354/the_dismal_out
The Dismal Outlook for the US and Global Economy and the Financial Markets
Email PrintShare
Delicious Digg Facebook reddit Technorati Nouriel Roubini | Nov 11, 2008
Here is a below brief summary of many of the points that I have made for the
last few months on the outlook for the U.S. and global economy and for
financial markets:
The U.S. will experience its most severe recession since WWII, much worse
and longer and deeper than even the 1974-75 and 1980-82 recessions. The
recession will continue until at least the end of 2009 for a cumulative GDP
drop of over 4%; the unemployment rate will likely reach 9%. The US consumer
is shopped out saving less and debt burdened and now faltering: this will
be the worst consumer recession in decades.
The prospect of a short and shallow 6-8 months V-shaped recession is out of
the window; a U-shaped 18-24 months recession is now a certainty and the
probability of a worse multi-year L-shaped recession (as in Japan in the
1990s) is still small but rising. Even if the economy were to exit a
recession by the end of 2009 the recovery could be so weak because of the
impairment of the financial system and of the credit mechanism (i.e. a
growth rate of 1-1.5% for a while well below the potential of 2.5-2.75%)
that it may feel like a recession even if the economy is technically out of
the recession.
Obama will inherit and economic and financial mess worse than anything the U
.S. has faced in decades: the most severe recession in 50 years; the worst
financial and banking crisis since the Great Depression; a ballooning fiscal
deficit that may be as high as a trillion dollar in 2009 and 2010; a huge
current account deficit; a financial system that is in a severe crisis and
where deleveraging is still occurring at a very rapid pace, thus causing a
worsening of the credit crunch; a household sector where millions of
households are insolvent, into negative equity territory and on the verge of
losing their homes; a serious risk of deflation as the slack in goods,
labor and commodity markets becomes deeper; the risk that we will end in a
deflationary liquidity trap as the Fed is fast approaching the zero-bound
constraint for the Fed Funds rate; the risk of a severe debt deflation as
the real value of nominal liabilities will rise given price deflation while
the value of financial assets is still plunging.
The world economy will experience a severe recession: output will sharply
contract in the Eurozone, UK and the rest of Europe, in Canada, Japan, and
Australia/New Zealand; there is also a risk of a hard landing in emerging
market economies. Expect global growth – at market prices – to be close to
zero in Q3 and negative by Q4. Leaving aside the effects of the fiscal
stimulus China could face a hard landing growth rate of 6% in 2009. The
global recession will continue through most of 2009.
The advanced economies will face stag-deflation (stagnation/recession and
deflation) rather than stagflation as slack in goods markets, slack in labor
markets and slack in commodity markets will lead advanced economies
inflation rates to become below 1% by 2009.
Expect a few advanced economies (certainly US and Japan and possibly others)
to reach the zero-bound constraint for policy rates by early 2009. With
deflation on the horizon a zero-bound on interest rates implies the risk of
a liquidity trap where money and bonds become perfectly substitutable, where
real interest rates become high and rising thus further pushing down
aggregate demand, and where money market funds returns cannot even cover
their management costs. Deflation also implies a debt deflation where the
real value of nominal debts is rising thus increasing the real burden of
such debts. Monetary policy easing will become more aggressive in other
advanced economies – even if the ECB will cut too little too late - but
monetary policy easing will be little effective as it will be pushing on a
string given the glut of global aggregate supply relative to demand and
given a very severe credit crunch.
For 2009 the consensus estimates for earnings are delusional: current
consensus estimates are that S&P 500 earnings per share (EPS) will be $90 in
2009 up 15% from 2008. Such estimates are outright silly and delusional. If
EPS fall – as most likely – to a level of $60 then with a multiple (P/E
ratio) of 12 the S&P500 index could fall to 720, i.e. about 20% below
current levels; if the P/E falls to 10 – as possible in a severe recession,
the S&P could be down to 600 or 35% below current levels. And in a very
severe recession one cannot exclude that the EPS could fall as low as $50 in
2009 dragging the S&P500 index to as low as 500. So, even based on
fundamentals and valuations, there are significant downside risks to U.S.
equities (20% to 40%). Similar arguments can be made for global equities: a
severe global recession implies further downside risks to global equities of
the order of 20-30%.Thus, the recent rally in US and global equities was
only a bear market sucker’s rally that is already fizzling out buried under
a mountain of awful worse than expected macro, earnings and financial news.
Credit losses will be well above $1 trillion and closer to $2 trillion as
such losses will spread from sub-prime to near prime and prime mortgages and
home equity loans (and the related securitized products); to commercial
real estate, to credit cards, auto loans and student loans; to leveraged
loans and LBOs, to muni bonds, corporate bonds, industrial and commercial
loans and CDS. These credit losses will lead to a severe credit crunch
absent a rapid and aggressive recapitalization of financial institutions.
Almost all of the $700 billion in the TARP program will be used to
recapitalized US financial institutions (banks, broker dealers, insurance
companies, finance companies, etc.) as rising credit losses (close to $2
trillion) will imply that the initial $250 billion allocated to recap these
institutions will not be enough; sooner rather than later a TARP 2 will
become necessary as the recapitalization needs of US financial institutions
will likely be well above $1 trillion.
Current spreads on speculative grade bonds may widen further as a tsunami of
defaults will hit the corporate sector; investment grade bond spreads have
widened excessively relative to financial fundamentals but further spread
widening is possible driven by market dynamics, deleveraging and the fact
that many AAA-rated firms (say GE) are not really AAA and should be
downgraded by the rating agencies.
Expect a US fiscal deficit of almost $1 trillion in 2009 and 2010. The
outlook for the US current account deficit is mixed: the recession, a rise
in private savings and a fall in investment, and a further fall in commodity
prices will tend to shrink it but a stronger dollar, global demand weakness
and a larger US fiscal deficit will tend to worsen it. On net we will
observe still large US twin fiscal and current account deficits and less
willingness and ability of the rest of the world to finance it unless the
interest rate on such debt rises.
In this economic and financial environment it is wise to stay away from most
risky assets for the next 12 months: they are downside risks to US and
global equities; credit spreads – especially for speculative grade – may
widen further; commodity prices will fall another 20% from current level;
gold will also fall as deflation sets in; the US dollar may weaken further
in the next 6 to 12 months as the factors behind the recent rally weather
off while medium term bearish fundamentals for the dollar set in again;
government bond yields in US and advanced economies may fall further as
recession and deflation emerge but, over time, the surge in fiscal deficits
in the US and globally will reduce the supply of global savings and lead to
higher long term interest rates unless the fall in global real investment
outpaces the fall in global savings. Expect further downside risks to
emerging markets assets (in particular equities and local and foreign
currency debt) especially in economies with significant macro, policy and
financial vulnerabilities. Cash and cash like instruments (short-term dated
government bonds and inflation-indexed bonds that do well both in inflation
and deflation times) will dominate most risky assets.
So serious risks and vulnerabilities remain and the downside risks to
financial markets (worse than expected macro news, earnings news and
developments in systemically important parts of the global financial system)
will dominate over the next few months the positive news (G7 policies to
avoid a systemic meltdown, and other policies that – in due time – may
reduce interbank spreads and credit spreads). So beware of those who tell
you that we reached a bottom for risky financial assets. The same optimists
told you that we reached a bottom and the worst was behind us after the
rescue of the creditors of Bear Stearns in March, after the announcement of
the possible bailout of Fannie and Freddie in July, after the actual bailout
of Fannie and Freddie in September, after the bailout of AIG in mid
September, after the TARP legislation was presented, after the latest G7 and
EU action. In each case the optimists argued that the latest crisis and
rescue policy response was “THE CATHARTIC” event that signaled the bottom
of the crisis and the recovery of markets. They were wrong literally at
least six times in a row as the crisis - as I consistently predicted here
over the last year – became worse and worse. So enough of the excessive
optimism that has been proven wrong at least six times in the last eight
months alone.
A reality check is needed to assess the proper risks and take the
appropriate actions. And reality tells us that we barely literally avoided
only a week ago a total systemic financial meltdown; that the policy actions
are now finally more aggressive and systematic and more appropriate; that
it will take a long while for interbank markets and credit markets to mend;
that further important policy actions are needed to avoid the meltdown and
an even more severe recession; that central banks instead of being the
lenders of last resort will be for now the lenders of first and only resort;
that even if we avoid a meltdown we will experience a severe US, advanced
economy and most likely global recession, the worst in decades; that we are
in the middle of a severe global financial and banking crisis, the worst
since the Great Depression; and that the flow of macro, earnings and
financial news will significantly surprise (as during the last few weeks) on
the downside with significant further risks to financial markets.
m*e
6 楼
同失望，非常地，不明白为啥媒体一致叫好，怀疑他们有没有真去电影院熬两个半小时
看完电影。
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
看完电影。
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
f*r
7 楼
那是主要follow HM?
谢谢
【在 r**********1 的大作中提到】
: follow一下吧，显得重视这个公司。offer会来的。
谢谢
【在 r**********1 的大作中提到】
: follow一下吧，显得重视这个公司。offer会来的。
c*9
8 楼
this Roubini guy might have loss his ass in stock market.
s*t
9 楼
其实是被pike搞砸了，一部稍显离奇的家庭惊秫片被她弄成B级恐怖片了
这个片子至少比狼人去年的prisoners强一些，那个更夸张
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
这个片子至少比狼人去年的prisoners强一些，那个更夸张
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
n*n
10 楼
同问，我也on-site一周了，焦虑不安啊。。。。
m*e
11 楼
啊 我超爱Prisoner 无论演员编剧音乐都比Gone Girl强n个数量级
不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
【在 s****t 的大作中提到】
: 其实是被pike搞砸了，一部稍显离奇的家庭惊秫片被她弄成B级恐怖片了
: 这个片子至少比狼人去年的prisoners强一些，那个更夸张
不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
【在 s****t 的大作中提到】
: 其实是被pike搞砸了，一部稍显离奇的家庭惊秫片被她弄成B级恐怖片了
: 这个片子至少比狼人去年的prisoners强一些，那个更夸张
f*r
12 楼
just ask nicely for progress and ensure them that ur still interested
s*t
13 楼
我是说从漏洞这个角度来说
【在 m***e 的大作中提到】
: 啊 我超爱Prisoner 无论演员编剧音乐都比Gone Girl强n个数量级
: 不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
【在 m***e 的大作中提到】
: 啊 我超爱Prisoner 无论演员编剧音乐都比Gone Girl强n个数量级
: 不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
f*r
14 楼
thank you for the nice point
【在 f*********r 的大作中提到】
: just ask nicely for progress and ensure them that ur still interested
【在 f*********r 的大作中提到】
: just ask nicely for progress and ensure them that ur still interested
B*a
15 楼
我也很爱prisioners～光影的运用也很赞！也是看完后堵得慌的片子。。。
不谈悬疑，只谈观后感。mist是最绝望的。
【在 m***e 的大作中提到】
: 啊 我超爱Prisoner 无论演员编剧音乐都比Gone Girl强n个数量级
: 不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
不谈悬疑，只谈观后感。mist是最绝望的。
【在 m***e 的大作中提到】
: 啊 我超爱Prisoner 无论演员编剧音乐都比Gone Girl强n个数量级
: 不过青菜萝卜各有所爱 粉丝们各自咽咽吐沫 洗洗睡吧～
s*i
16 楼
面完后的感觉怎样？感觉好吗？
y*n
17 楼
Prisoners 最后那两声哨子不就是导演于心不忍给了观众一丝希望么
惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
我觉得mist算不上多绝望
只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
【在 B*********a 的大作中提到】
: 我也很爱prisioners～光影的运用也很赞！也是看完后堵得慌的片子。。。
: 不谈悬疑，只谈观后感。mist是最绝望的。
惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
我觉得mist算不上多绝望
只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
【在 B*********a 的大作中提到】
: 我也很爱prisioners～光影的运用也很赞！也是看完后堵得慌的片子。。。
: 不谈悬疑，只谈观后感。mist是最绝望的。
P*e
18 楼
我是看完了mist有点受不了
但是无论prisoners还是gone girl 我都没啥特别感觉 总觉得缺了点什么
Prisoners 最后那两声哨子不就是导演于心不忍给了观众一丝希望么
惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
我觉得mist算不上多绝望
只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
【在 y****n 的大作中提到】
: Prisoners 最后那两声哨子不就是导演于心不忍给了观众一丝希望么
: 惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
: 电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
: 我觉得mist算不上多绝望
: 只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
: 当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
但是无论prisoners还是gone girl 我都没啥特别感觉 总觉得缺了点什么
Prisoners 最后那两声哨子不就是导演于心不忍给了观众一丝希望么
惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
我觉得mist算不上多绝望
只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
【在 y****n 的大作中提到】
: Prisoners 最后那两声哨子不就是导演于心不忍给了观众一丝希望么
: 惊悚片这个类别里，绝望的片子挺多的
: 电锯惊魂，万能钥匙，活埋，七宗罪，伊甸湖等等
: 我觉得mist算不上多绝望
: 只是导演展示了一把世事无常而已
: 当然以上各片都非常好看，prisoners尤其是近几年惊悚片的翘楚
k*a
19 楼
prisoners在角色和戏剧冲突上要丰富的多，宁死不屈的智障，多方怀疑有点神经质的
侦探，有宗教情结又只相信自己的爹，还有最后才暴露出来的冷血老太太。
gone girl看完就只记得神经病女主，小本这个角色毫无张力，还不如在《the town》
里。
侦探，有宗教情结又只相信自己的爹，还有最后才暴露出来的冷血老太太。
gone girl看完就只记得神经病女主，小本这个角色毫无张力，还不如在《the town》
里。
s*i
20 楼
小本的演出flawless, 传神极了。
没体会的可能没结婚或婚姻还不长。
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: prisoners在角色和戏剧冲突上要丰富的多，宁死不屈的智障，多方怀疑有点神经质的
: 侦探，有宗教情结又只相信自己的爹，还有最后才暴露出来的冷血老太太。
: gone girl看完就只记得神经病女主，小本这个角色毫无张力，还不如在《the town》
: 里。
没体会的可能没结婚或婚姻还不长。
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: prisoners在角色和戏剧冲突上要丰富的多，宁死不屈的智障，多方怀疑有点神经质的
: 侦探，有宗教情结又只相信自己的爹，还有最后才暴露出来的冷血老太太。
: gone girl看完就只记得神经病女主，小本这个角色毫无张力，还不如在《the town》
: 里。
c*i
21 楼
从 jersey girl 到 gone girl, 好莱坞版李亚鹏的演技显然并没有什么改善， 特别是
他空洞无神的眼睛及面瘫脸，与他的高智商极不相匹配，看了就让人顿生倦意。要不是
他的现任太太上访谈节目，我都不知道他在这部片子里有 full frontal. 他不是以后
还要像他前天后女友说的那样竞选总统吗？夭廋哦！
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
他空洞无神的眼睛及面瘫脸，与他的高智商极不相匹配，看了就让人顿生倦意。要不是
他的现任太太上访谈节目，我都不知道他在这部片子里有 full frontal. 他不是以后
还要像他前天后女友说的那样竞选总统吗？夭廋哦！
【在 k******a 的大作中提到】
: 以惊悚片讲故事又有很多漏洞，探讨婚姻心理又过于离奇。女主还是有些凌厉而又阴森
: 的气质的，小本就看起来不够复杂。
: 比较失望。
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