The Currency Crisis--ZT from Jason Kelly# Stock
r*l
1 楼
军版前一阵子都说53的咋咋，现在这里又开始歧视40+的了。下一步是不是开始歧视30+
的了？
这些小朋友们就没想过你们有一天也会老吗？
的了？
这些小朋友们就没想过你们有一天也会老吗？
d*y
2 楼
Simon Johnson at Project Syndicate says the brewing currency wars are not
just China's fault, though it "certainly bears some responsibility." He
mostly blames "Europe's refusal to reform global economic governance,
compounded by years of political mismanagement and self-deception in the
United States. ... the US has run record current-account deficits over the
past decade, as the political elite -- Republican and Democrats alike --
became increasingly comfortable with overconsumption. These deficits
facilitate the surpluses that emerging markets such as China want to run --
the world's current accounts add up to zero, so if one large set of
countries wants to run a surplus, someone big needs to run a deficit."
Paul La Monica at CNN is worried about the dropping value of the dollar, and
says the Fed may be going too far. He wrote, "If the dollar gets so weak
that the likes of China and Japan pull out of the US debt market and other
nations find that there's no incentive to invest here, then [a nightmarish
future where the dollar has essentially no value and China gets tired of
backing worthless US debt] could become reality." He quotes Anthony Welch,
co-manager of The Currency Strategies Fund, saying, "The dollar had been
rallying earlier on a flight to perceived safety. Now the behavior of the
dollar is a function of our economic policies, which people can argue are
not really that sound."
Hossein Askari and Noureddine Krichene don't mince words when placing blame
squarely on the shoulders of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. They
wrote in Asia Times that the "Fed is promoting monetary competition
throughout the world [and] each central bank is counteracting with monetary
expansion" to the point that "central banks are now entangled in currency
manipulation and competitive currency devaluation. Central banks are
striving to depreciate their currencies to get a competitive edge for their
exports and fuel their economic recovery, while monetary anarchy spreads
around the globe."
They remember that in 2007-2008, "Bernanke's loose monetary policy fueled
unprecedented commodity price inflation. But Bernanke put the blame on China
and on oil producers. So far in 2010, the price of crude oil has jumped by
27%, of corn by 63%, of wheat by 84% , of sugar by 55% , and of soybeans by
24%. Without the Fed's unprecedented loose monetary and near-zero interest
rates, it would have been highly unlikely for commodity prices to increase
at these alarming rates."
They remind us that monetary policy produces real-world consequences,
something that is too often lost in the academic debates at the top:
The frightening food price inflation has raised the specter of another food
crisis and food riots. High commodity inflation is an indicator of scarcity
of real capital and very low savings for sustaining economic growth and
employment creation. High food and energy prices are instantly transmitted
to retail prices. Consumers suffer dramatic losses in their real incomes and
are forced into scrimping on food, and in the case of consumers in the US
to relying on food stamps. Since liquidity for commodity price inflation is
abundant and cheap, food price inflation could run up, stall world economic
growth and spread social unrest.
While we worry about food price inflation, the Fed with its obsession on
core inflation dismisses any talk of inflation. Fed governors should do
their family grocery shopping and then talk. They should talk to ordinary
Americans and see what they say about food prices after each visit to the
supermarket.
They warn that the Fed is on a path that history has shown to ruin national
banking systems:
The present policy course of the Fed could ruin the banking sector no matter
how perfect the regulations. A regime of near-zero interest rates and
abundant liquidity will expose banks to high risks. As in Japan, banks [will
] get bitten only once, and become reluctant to follow the course set by the
central bank -- to lend and assume high risk.
Policymakers in the US have to face up to the limits of monetary policy. A
return to sustained economic growth cannot be achieved by simply adopting
near-zero interest rates and cheap liquidity. Such a policy, even if it
succeeds, is most inefficient and creates distortions and asset bubbles. It
will ruin the banking sector, as it has done in the recent and distant past,
and will create a high degree of exchange rate instability and disorder in
international finance and international trade.
They consider the situation to be so serious that world governments must "
arrest the devastating monetary expansion initiated by central banks. The
stance called for by G-20 summits to unleash money unorthodoxy has turned
out to be self-defeating. Governments have to agree on some form of monetary
targeting and renounce interest rate setting. A monetary conference is
urgently needed."
Not that it would do any good. Bill Wetherell, Chief Global Economist at
Cumberland Advisors, wrote in his market commentary on last weekend's annual
meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors in Washington the
following upbeat report: "No one expected these meetings to produce an
agreement on global foreign-exchange coordination or even first steps in
developing a substantive action plan to address the situation. But the
meetings fell short of even these limited expectations."
What went wrong? Efforts were "hijacked by the mounting hostility between
the US and China over China's resistance to a more rapid appreciation of
their currency, on the one hand, and the very loose monetary policy and near
-zero interest rates in the US and elsewhere in the advanced world, on the
other." He finds that there is no "shared analysis as to what are the most
important risks to the global recovery and the required policy responses."
Ahead of the November G20 summit in Seoul, he expects that "the already high
volatility in the currency markets will increase, interventions in these
markets will also increase, and the 'global musical chairs' process will
continue."
Martin Wolf says bluntly that the US will win. He wrote in the Financial
Times that "the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter
is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite
ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create.
What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world's surrender: the
needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the
world."
He shared the following charts (and two others) showing why the Fed is
worried that the US is following in Japan's footsteps, which have taken it
into a 21-year recession -- and counting:
He concluded that "the adjustments ahead are going to be very difficult; and
they have also hardly begun." His closing words:
Instead of co-operation on adjustment of exchange rates and the external
account, the US is seeking to impose its will, via the printing press. The
US is going to win this war, one way or the other: it will either inflate
the rest of the world or force their nominal exchange rates up against the
dollar. Unfortunately, the impact will also be higgledy piggledy, with the
less protected economies (such as Brazil or South Africa) forced to adjust
and others, protected by exchange controls (such as China), able to manage
the adjustment better.
It would be far better for everybody to seek a co-operative outcome. Maybe
the leaders of the group of 20 will even be able to use their mutual
assessment process to achieve just that. Their November summit in Seoul is
the opportunity. Of the need there can be no doubt. Of the will, the doubts
are many. In the worst of the crisis, leaders hung together. Now, the Fed is
about to hang them all separately.
just China's fault, though it "certainly bears some responsibility." He
mostly blames "Europe's refusal to reform global economic governance,
compounded by years of political mismanagement and self-deception in the
United States. ... the US has run record current-account deficits over the
past decade, as the political elite -- Republican and Democrats alike --
became increasingly comfortable with overconsumption. These deficits
facilitate the surpluses that emerging markets such as China want to run --
the world's current accounts add up to zero, so if one large set of
countries wants to run a surplus, someone big needs to run a deficit."
Paul La Monica at CNN is worried about the dropping value of the dollar, and
says the Fed may be going too far. He wrote, "If the dollar gets so weak
that the likes of China and Japan pull out of the US debt market and other
nations find that there's no incentive to invest here, then [a nightmarish
future where the dollar has essentially no value and China gets tired of
backing worthless US debt] could become reality." He quotes Anthony Welch,
co-manager of The Currency Strategies Fund, saying, "The dollar had been
rallying earlier on a flight to perceived safety. Now the behavior of the
dollar is a function of our economic policies, which people can argue are
not really that sound."
Hossein Askari and Noureddine Krichene don't mince words when placing blame
squarely on the shoulders of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. They
wrote in Asia Times that the "Fed is promoting monetary competition
throughout the world [and] each central bank is counteracting with monetary
expansion" to the point that "central banks are now entangled in currency
manipulation and competitive currency devaluation. Central banks are
striving to depreciate their currencies to get a competitive edge for their
exports and fuel their economic recovery, while monetary anarchy spreads
around the globe."
They remember that in 2007-2008, "Bernanke's loose monetary policy fueled
unprecedented commodity price inflation. But Bernanke put the blame on China
and on oil producers. So far in 2010, the price of crude oil has jumped by
27%, of corn by 63%, of wheat by 84% , of sugar by 55% , and of soybeans by
24%. Without the Fed's unprecedented loose monetary and near-zero interest
rates, it would have been highly unlikely for commodity prices to increase
at these alarming rates."
They remind us that monetary policy produces real-world consequences,
something that is too often lost in the academic debates at the top:
The frightening food price inflation has raised the specter of another food
crisis and food riots. High commodity inflation is an indicator of scarcity
of real capital and very low savings for sustaining economic growth and
employment creation. High food and energy prices are instantly transmitted
to retail prices. Consumers suffer dramatic losses in their real incomes and
are forced into scrimping on food, and in the case of consumers in the US
to relying on food stamps. Since liquidity for commodity price inflation is
abundant and cheap, food price inflation could run up, stall world economic
growth and spread social unrest.
While we worry about food price inflation, the Fed with its obsession on
core inflation dismisses any talk of inflation. Fed governors should do
their family grocery shopping and then talk. They should talk to ordinary
Americans and see what they say about food prices after each visit to the
supermarket.
They warn that the Fed is on a path that history has shown to ruin national
banking systems:
The present policy course of the Fed could ruin the banking sector no matter
how perfect the regulations. A regime of near-zero interest rates and
abundant liquidity will expose banks to high risks. As in Japan, banks [will
] get bitten only once, and become reluctant to follow the course set by the
central bank -- to lend and assume high risk.
Policymakers in the US have to face up to the limits of monetary policy. A
return to sustained economic growth cannot be achieved by simply adopting
near-zero interest rates and cheap liquidity. Such a policy, even if it
succeeds, is most inefficient and creates distortions and asset bubbles. It
will ruin the banking sector, as it has done in the recent and distant past,
and will create a high degree of exchange rate instability and disorder in
international finance and international trade.
They consider the situation to be so serious that world governments must "
arrest the devastating monetary expansion initiated by central banks. The
stance called for by G-20 summits to unleash money unorthodoxy has turned
out to be self-defeating. Governments have to agree on some form of monetary
targeting and renounce interest rate setting. A monetary conference is
urgently needed."
Not that it would do any good. Bill Wetherell, Chief Global Economist at
Cumberland Advisors, wrote in his market commentary on last weekend's annual
meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors in Washington the
following upbeat report: "No one expected these meetings to produce an
agreement on global foreign-exchange coordination or even first steps in
developing a substantive action plan to address the situation. But the
meetings fell short of even these limited expectations."
What went wrong? Efforts were "hijacked by the mounting hostility between
the US and China over China's resistance to a more rapid appreciation of
their currency, on the one hand, and the very loose monetary policy and near
-zero interest rates in the US and elsewhere in the advanced world, on the
other." He finds that there is no "shared analysis as to what are the most
important risks to the global recovery and the required policy responses."
Ahead of the November G20 summit in Seoul, he expects that "the already high
volatility in the currency markets will increase, interventions in these
markets will also increase, and the 'global musical chairs' process will
continue."
Martin Wolf says bluntly that the US will win. He wrote in the Financial
Times that "the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter
is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite
ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create.
What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world's surrender: the
needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the
world."
He shared the following charts (and two others) showing why the Fed is
worried that the US is following in Japan's footsteps, which have taken it
into a 21-year recession -- and counting:
He concluded that "the adjustments ahead are going to be very difficult; and
they have also hardly begun." His closing words:
Instead of co-operation on adjustment of exchange rates and the external
account, the US is seeking to impose its will, via the printing press. The
US is going to win this war, one way or the other: it will either inflate
the rest of the world or force their nominal exchange rates up against the
dollar. Unfortunately, the impact will also be higgledy piggledy, with the
less protected economies (such as Brazil or South Africa) forced to adjust
and others, protected by exchange controls (such as China), able to manage
the adjustment better.
It would be far better for everybody to seek a co-operative outcome. Maybe
the leaders of the group of 20 will even be able to use their mutual
assessment process to achieve just that. Their November summit in Seoul is
the opportunity. Of the need there can be no doubt. Of the will, the doubts
are many. In the worst of the crisis, leaders hung together. Now, the Fed is
about to hang them all separately.
z*e
3 楼
it开发人员应该明白
ui是改变最快的地方
所以ui开发猴越年轻越好
反过来，ui经验基本上不值钱
因为变化太快
反过来问问题，什么部分改变最慢？
data啦，db几乎会永远存在下去
然后nosql虽然也在用，但是改变很慢
所以为什么选择backend
有job security的考虑
很多公司的front end都是白人小本在搞
ui是改变最快的地方
所以ui开发猴越年轻越好
反过来，ui经验基本上不值钱
因为变化太快
反过来问问题，什么部分改变最慢？
data啦，db几乎会永远存在下去
然后nosql虽然也在用，但是改变很慢
所以为什么选择backend
有job security的考虑
很多公司的front end都是白人小本在搞
z*e
4 楼
歧视是客观存在的
你改变不了
所以都应该思考一下
你有什么是小本做不了的
甚至外包搞不定的
还有文科生不能做的
你改变不了
所以都应该思考一下
你有什么是小本做不了的
甚至外包搞不定的
还有文科生不能做的
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