If You’re Losing, Change the Rules (转载)# Stock
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【 以下文字转载自 Military 讨论区 】
发信人: dmjz (东门虎西门豹), 信区: Military
标 题: If You’re Losing, Change the Rules
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Fri Jul 10 11:11:28 2015, 美东)
IF YOU'RE LOSING, CHANGE THE RULES:
By October 3, 1979, silver hit $17.88 an ounce.4 The two major U.S.
exchanges, COMEX and CBOT, started to panic: They held a measly 120 million
ounces of silver between them, an amount typically delivered in a busy month
. With silver prices pushing to new heights as new buyers rushed in, the
exchanges became fearful that a default (inability to deliver) was imminent.
The silver rush continued to accelerate, led by the Hunt brothers and their
Saudi Arabian business partners. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (
CFTC), the government’s futures watchdog, had become seriously alarmed at
the prospects of a shortage on the exchanges, and tried persuading Bunker
Hunt to sell some of his silver.
The billionaire resisted, believing that silver was a long-term play with an
integral role in the future global economy. The CBOT, backed by the CFTC,
finally decided to put a stop to the Hunt brothers’ buying—by changing its
rules.
Margin requirements were suddenly raised, and traders could hold no more
than 3 million ounces of silver futures; those holding more were placed in
forced liquidation. Bunker Hunt cried foul, accusing exchange board members
of having a financial interest in the markets—an accusation that would
later be proven true.
Then, the U.S. Federal Reserve and its chairman, Paul Volcker, added to the
Hunt brothers’ troubles by strongly encouraging banks to stop making loans
for speculative activity.
When Silver Sneezed, Gold Caught the Cold
On January 7, 1980, the other major U.S. exchange, COMEX, changed its rules
also. Investors were limited to 10 million ounces in futures contracts, and
any amount above that had to be liquidated by Friday, February 18.6 On the
very next trading day, Monday, January 21, as silver reached a record high
of $50 an ounce, the Hunt silver hoard peaked at a mind-boggling $4.5
billion, (that’s $43.5 billion in Shadowstats CPI-adjusted 2011 dolars!)5
On the same day that silver hit $50 and silver futures topped out at $52.50,
gold’s price set a new record of $850 and gold futures peaked at $892.
COMEX, terrified that it would be forced into default, announced—with the
backing of the CFTC—that trading in silver would be limited to liquidation
orders only, eliminating any buyers.
With no new buyers, the price of silver could not go up. So this rule was
basically the same as saying, “Until this rule is lifted, the price of
silver will only go down.” Of course, silver began to plummet, and on that
same day so did gold.
Was it just a coincidence that gold and silver peaked at the same time?
Could it be that many large silver traders also held gold?
Wouldn’t the gold traders on the exchanges have known what happened to the
silver traders and said to themselves, “Oh my God…if they can do that to
silver, then gold is probably next”?
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27513.html
发信人: dmjz (东门虎西门豹), 信区: Military
标 题: If You’re Losing, Change the Rules
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Fri Jul 10 11:11:28 2015, 美东)
IF YOU'RE LOSING, CHANGE THE RULES:
By October 3, 1979, silver hit $17.88 an ounce.4 The two major U.S.
exchanges, COMEX and CBOT, started to panic: They held a measly 120 million
ounces of silver between them, an amount typically delivered in a busy month
. With silver prices pushing to new heights as new buyers rushed in, the
exchanges became fearful that a default (inability to deliver) was imminent.
The silver rush continued to accelerate, led by the Hunt brothers and their
Saudi Arabian business partners. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (
CFTC), the government’s futures watchdog, had become seriously alarmed at
the prospects of a shortage on the exchanges, and tried persuading Bunker
Hunt to sell some of his silver.
The billionaire resisted, believing that silver was a long-term play with an
integral role in the future global economy. The CBOT, backed by the CFTC,
finally decided to put a stop to the Hunt brothers’ buying—by changing its
rules.
Margin requirements were suddenly raised, and traders could hold no more
than 3 million ounces of silver futures; those holding more were placed in
forced liquidation. Bunker Hunt cried foul, accusing exchange board members
of having a financial interest in the markets—an accusation that would
later be proven true.
Then, the U.S. Federal Reserve and its chairman, Paul Volcker, added to the
Hunt brothers’ troubles by strongly encouraging banks to stop making loans
for speculative activity.
When Silver Sneezed, Gold Caught the Cold
On January 7, 1980, the other major U.S. exchange, COMEX, changed its rules
also. Investors were limited to 10 million ounces in futures contracts, and
any amount above that had to be liquidated by Friday, February 18.6 On the
very next trading day, Monday, January 21, as silver reached a record high
of $50 an ounce, the Hunt silver hoard peaked at a mind-boggling $4.5
billion, (that’s $43.5 billion in Shadowstats CPI-adjusted 2011 dolars!)5
On the same day that silver hit $50 and silver futures topped out at $52.50,
gold’s price set a new record of $850 and gold futures peaked at $892.
COMEX, terrified that it would be forced into default, announced—with the
backing of the CFTC—that trading in silver would be limited to liquidation
orders only, eliminating any buyers.
With no new buyers, the price of silver could not go up. So this rule was
basically the same as saying, “Until this rule is lifted, the price of
silver will only go down.” Of course, silver began to plummet, and on that
same day so did gold.
Was it just a coincidence that gold and silver peaked at the same time?
Could it be that many large silver traders also held gold?
Wouldn’t the gold traders on the exchanges have known what happened to the
silver traders and said to themselves, “Oh my God…if they can do that to
silver, then gold is probably next”?
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27513.html