老巴解释为啥股市不如以前赚钱了# Stock
G*Y
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摘自05年的信，按当时的估计，花街每年拿走了美国企业20%的增长。
如果这个估计正确的话，如果没有花街吸血，美股应该是现在6倍的价格？！
To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all
American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We
’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family –
generation after generation – becomes richer by the aggregate amount
earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually.
Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves
steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone
grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family
and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying
certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers –
for a fee, of course – obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The
Gotrocks still own
all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the
family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of
American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade
, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by
the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is
their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so
well at this new “beatmy-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers.
These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself
he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a
manager – yes, us – and get the job done professionally.” These manager-
Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers
may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper
still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes
of Helpers.
The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing
professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the
worse. The solution? More help, of course. It arrives in the form of
financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the
Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this
assistance. By now its
members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-
pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right
consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the
consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that
their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems
lost, a fourth group – we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers – appears. These
friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are
occurring
because the existing Helpers – brokers, managers, consultants – are not
sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,”
the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money.
Brimming with selfconfidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent
payments – in addition to stiff fixed fees – are what each family member
must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers
are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy
names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure
the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its
wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark
Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation,
the family decides to pay up.
And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would
go in their entirety to owners – if they all just stayed in their rocking
chairs – is now going to a swelling army of Helpers.
Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under
which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or
lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses – and large fixed
fees to boot – when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally
crooked).
A sufficient number of arrangements like this – heads, the Helper takes
much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the
privilege of doing so – may make it more accurate to call the family the
Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may
well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the
burden of paying Helpers may cause American
equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if
they just sat still and listened to no one.
Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work
of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a
bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the
movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been
traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the
Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion
increases.
如果这个估计正确的话，如果没有花街吸血，美股应该是现在6倍的价格？！
To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all
American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We
’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family –
generation after generation – becomes richer by the aggregate amount
earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually.
Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves
steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone
grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family
and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying
certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers –
for a fee, of course – obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The
Gotrocks still own
all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the
family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of
American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade
, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by
the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is
their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so
well at this new “beatmy-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers.
These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself
he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a
manager – yes, us – and get the job done professionally.” These manager-
Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers
may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper
still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes
of Helpers.
The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing
professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the
worse. The solution? More help, of course. It arrives in the form of
financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the
Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this
assistance. By now its
members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-
pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right
consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the
consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that
their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems
lost, a fourth group – we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers – appears. These
friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are
occurring
because the existing Helpers – brokers, managers, consultants – are not
sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,”
the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money.
Brimming with selfconfidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent
payments – in addition to stiff fixed fees – are what each family member
must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers
are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy
names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure
the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its
wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark
Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation,
the family decides to pay up.
And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would
go in their entirety to owners – if they all just stayed in their rocking
chairs – is now going to a swelling army of Helpers.
Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under
which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or
lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses – and large fixed
fees to boot – when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally
crooked).
A sufficient number of arrangements like this – heads, the Helper takes
much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the
privilege of doing so – may make it more accurate to call the family the
Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may
well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the
burden of paying Helpers may cause American
equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if
they just sat still and listened to no one.
Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work
of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a
bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the
movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been
traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the
Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion
increases.
