判例译析 | 跨国公司应为海外侵犯人权行为负责？——雀巢公司诉科特迪瓦案

一审 | 骆佩贤 英国布里斯托大学LL.M.

二审 | 刘   寅 西南政法大学

编辑 | 罗   彤 西北政法大学

         王冰子 烟台大学

责编 | 李   薇 浙江工商大学

跨国公司应当为海外的侵犯人权

行为负责吗？

雀巢公司诉科特迪瓦的马里人

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe

备注：

正文中的引注被标成了灰色，为了不影响普通读者阅读所以中文译本中没有翻译或标识出来。

前言：

本案的核心争议点在于：雀巢公司是否应当为在非洲科特迪瓦的可可农场上发生的强迫劳动和儿童奴役行为负责。随着跨国企业的增多和全球扩张，第三世界国家与之伴随的问题也日益突出。虽然最高法院的裁决主要处理的是《外国人侵权法》（Alien Tort Statute）的适用问题和法院管辖权，但是这似乎呈现了当下的企业社会责任中一个显著的问题：企业究竟在什么程度上承担社会责任，它们又如何可能规避这些责任？

Summary:

On 17 June 2021, the United States Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision which held Nestlé liable for aiding and abetting child slavery under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The alleged forced labour in Ivory Coast could not be sufficiently linked to Nestlé's conduct in the United States, a nexus required to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts under the ATS. 

2021年6月17日，美国最高法院推翻了第九巡回法院关于雀巢公司根据《外国人侵权法》（ATS）应当为帮助和教唆童奴负责的判决。雀巢公司被指控的在科特迪瓦的强迫劳动与其在美国的行为之间没有充分的联系，而对于联邦法院根据《外国人侵权法》行使管辖权而言，这种联系是必须的。

Case Facts:

Côte d’Ivoire, or Ivory Coast, is a West African country responsible for the world's largest production of cocoa beans. Nestlé (the Petitioner) does not own or operate any cocoa farms in Ivory Coast, however the food giant buys, processes and sells cocoa from certain Ivory Coast farms. Nestlé also provides resources and financial funding to the farms in exchange for an exclusive supply of cocoa. This support includes 'training, fertilizer, tools, and cash'.

科特迪瓦共和国是一个西非国家，可可豆产量世界第一。雀巢公司（上诉人）在科特迪瓦没有拥有或经营任何可可农场，但这家食品公司巨头从特定的科特迪瓦的农场那里购买、拥有并售卖可可。为了能够独家供应可可，雀巢公司也向这些农场提供资源和资金。这种支持包括“培训、肥料、工具和现金”。

（图片来源于红星新闻）

Six Malian individuals (the Respondents) alleged they were trafficked into the Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa, including on some of the farms Nestlé have been affiliated with. The Respondents argued that Nestlé 'knew or should have known' the Ivory Coast farms were exploiting child slavery, specifying that Nestlé ought to have leveraged their economic advantage to eradicate forced labour in their supply chain entirely. The Respondents sought relief under the ATS, legislation originally drafted to enable United States Courts to 'hear claims brought by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' It was alleged Nestlé's actions 'aided and abetted slavery abroad'. This 'tort' has not been provided for under the ATS previously, indicating that the Respondents were seeking a judicially granted private right of action to recover damages from the Petitioner.

六个马里人（被上诉人）声称他们被贩运到科特迪瓦包括一些与雀巢公司具有密切联系的农场，作为儿童奴隶生产可可。被上诉人辩称，雀巢“知道或者应当知道”科特迪瓦农场正在压榨童奴，指出雀巢公司应当充分利用他们的经济优势以在供应链中彻底消除强迫劳动。被上诉人寻求《外国人侵权法》下的救济——这项立法最初被起草是为了“让美国法院能够听取外国人对违反了国际法或者美国签订的国际条约的侵权行为的主张。”据称，雀巢公司的行为“帮助并教唆了国外的奴隶制”。这种“侵权行为”此前没有被《外国人侵权法》规定，这表明被上诉人正在寻找司法授予的私人诉讼权，以从上诉人那里获得损害赔偿。

The Respondents alleged that 'every major operational decision' of the Petitioner originated in the United States.[6] The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's initial dismissal of the claims, finding that the domestic conduct alleged by the Respondents fell within the remit of the ATS.

被上诉人声称，上诉人的“每一项重大运营决策”都是在美国最初发生的。第九巡回法院推翻了联邦地区法院最初驳回起诉的决定，认为被上诉人声称的国内行为属于《外国人侵权法》的管辖范围内。

Discussions and Conclusions

1.Majority Opinion

Contention 1: Extraterritorial Application of the ATS

Petitioners and the United States argue that respondents improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. We agree. Our precedents “reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 337 (2016). First, we presume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Ibid. For the ATS, Kiobel answered that question in the negative. 569 U. S., at 124. Although we have interpreted its purely jurisdictional text to implicitly enable courts to create causes of action, the ATS does not expressly “regulate conduct” at all, much less “evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality.’” Id., at 115–118. Courts thus cannot give “extraterritorial reach” to any cause of action judicially created under the ATS. Id., at 117–118. Second, where the statute, as here, does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337. “[T]hen the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad.” Ibid.

本案上诉人和美国辩称，被上诉人不恰当地寻求了《外国人侵权法》的域外适用。本院同意这一论点。我们的先例“反映了分析治外法权的一个两步框架。”第一，我们假定一项法规仅仅能够应用在国内；然后我们通过提问“是否这项法规给予了一种清晰、肯定的指示”来推翻这种假定。关于《外国人侵权法》，Kiobel案(Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.)给予的回答是否定的。尽管我们已经解释该法有关纯粹管辖的内容隐含地使法院能够创造诉因，但《外国人侵权法》根本没有明确“调节行为”，更不用说“表明明确的领土外适用性”了。因此，法院无法给任何一种根据《外国人侵权法》产生的诉因都给予“域外管辖权”。第二，当一项法规如本案中一样不能在域外使用时，原告必须证明“与法规的重点相关的行为是在美国本土发生的。”“如此，即使其他行为是在域外发生的，在这样的案件中法规也可以被允许在国内适用。”

（图片来源于网络）

The parties dispute what conduct is relevant to the “focus” of the ATS. Respondents seek a judicially created cause of action to sue petitioners for aiding and abetting forced labor overseas. Arguing that aiding and abetting is not even a tort, but merely secondary liability for a tort, petitioners and the United States contend that “the conduct relevant to the [ATS’s] focus” is the conduct that directly caused the injury. See id., at 346 (a plaintiff who “does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality . . .therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury”). All of that alleged conduct occurred overseas in this suit. The United States also argues that the “focus” inquiry is beside the point; courts should not create an aiding-and-abetting cause of action under the ATS at all. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 182–183 (1994) (“[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant . . . , there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors” because that would create a “vast expansion of federal law”). For their part, respondents argue that aiding and abetting is a freestanding tort and that courts may create a private right of action to enforce it under the ATS. They also contend that the “focus” of the ATS is conduct that violates international law, that aiding and abetting forced labor is a violation of international law, and that domestic conduct can aid and abet an injury that occurs overseas.

双方争辩什么行为是与《外国人侵权法》的“重点”相关的。被上诉人寻求一种司法创立的诉讼理由以起诉上诉人帮助并教唆了海外的强迫劳动。上诉人和美国辩称，帮助和教唆甚至不是一种侵权行为，仅仅只是侵权行为的一种附属责任，而与《外国人侵权法》的“重点”相关的行为是直接导致损害的行为。本案中，所有被主张的行为都发生在海外。美国也辩称，关于“重点”的调查无关紧要；法院根本不应该在《外国人侵权法》下创立一种基于帮助和教唆的起诉理由。就被上诉人而言，他们认为帮助和教唆是一种独立的侵权行为，而法院可以根据《外国人侵权法》创设一种私人诉讼权并予以强制执行。他们还认为，《外国人侵权法》的“重点”是违反国际法，帮助和教唆强迫劳动是违反国际法的行为，而且国内行为可以帮助和教唆在国外发生的伤害。

Even if we resolved all these disputes in respondents’ favor, their complaint would impermissibly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. Nearly all the conduct that they say aided and abetted forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless let this suit proceed because respondents pleaded as a general matter that “every major operational decision by both companies is made in or approved in the U. S.” App. 314. But allegations of general corporate activity—like decisionmaking—cannot alone establish domestic application of the ATS.

即使我们以对被上诉人有利的方式解决了所有这些争议，他们的起诉也不会允许《外国人侵权法》的域外适用。他们所说的帮助和教唆强迫劳动的几乎所有行为——向海外农场提供培训、肥料、工具和现金——都发生在科特迪瓦。然而，第九巡回法院审理了本诉讼，因为被上诉人辩称：“两家公司的所有主要运营决策都是在美国本土完成或者批准的。”但是对一般公司活动（例如决策）的指控并不能独立证明《外国人侵权法》的国内适用。

As we made clear in Kiobel, a plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS simply by alleging “mere corporate presence” of a defendant. 569 U. S., at 125. Pleading general corporate activity is no better. Because making “operational decisions” is an activity common to most corporations, generic allegations of this sort do not draw a sufficient connection between the cause of action respondents seek—aiding and abetting forced labor overseas—and domestic conduct. “[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 266 (2010). To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity. The Ninth Circuit erred when it held otherwise.

正如我们在Kiobel案中提出的那样，原告并不能仅仅通过指控被告“以公司形式存在”来辩护足以支持《外国人侵权法》的国内适用的事实。辩护一般公司活动也于事无补。因为进行“运营决策”对于大多数公司而言是一项非常普遍的行为，这种一般性的指控并不能在被上诉人寻求的诉讼理由——帮助并教唆海外强迫劳动——以及国内行为之间建立起充分的联系。“如果每当案件涉及到一些国内活动时，反对治外法权的假定就退回到自己的窝里，那这的确是一条胆怯的看门狗。”为了提供足以支持《外国人侵权法》在国内适用的事实，原告必须指控更多的国内活动，而非仅仅是一般性的公司活动。第九巡回法院不是这么认为的，所以它犯了错误。

（图片来源于红星新闻）

Contention 2: Creating a New Cause of Action?



Respondents’ suit fails for another reason, which does not require parsing allegations about where conduct occurred: We cannot create a cause of action that would let them sue petitioners.

被上诉人的诉讼因另一个理由而失败，这不需要对关于行为在哪里发生的指控做语句分析：我们不能创立一种诉讼理由让他们起诉上诉人。

……

Originally passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS provides jurisdiction to hear claims brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. If, for example, a treaty adopted by the United States creates a tort-related duty, federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear claims by aliens for breach of that duty.

《外国人侵权法》最初是作为1789年的《司法法案》的一部分通过的，它规定了法院的管辖权，以审理“外国人对违反了国际法或者美国签订的国际条约的侵权行为的”权利主张。例如，如果一项美国签订的国际条约规定了与侵权相关的义务，则联邦地区法院有权审理外国人由于他人违反了这项义务而提出的权利主张。

But the statute on its own does not empower aliens to sue. We have been clear that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724. Aliens harmed by a violation of international law must rely on legislative and executive remedies, not judicial remedies, unless provided with an independent cause of action. In more than 200 years, Congress has established just one: the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. That Act creates a private right of action for victims of torture and extrajudicial killings in violation of international law. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350.

但是该法规本身并没有授予外国人提起诉讼的权利。我们已经明确表示：“《外国人侵权法》是一项管辖权法规，不会产生新的诉讼理由。”由于他人违反国际法而受到损害的外国人必须依赖于立法和行政救济，而非司法救济，除非有一项独立的诉讼理由。在超过200年的时间里，国会已经建立了一项诉讼理由：《酷刑受害者保护法案》（1991）（The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991）。该法案为违反了国际法的酷刑和法外处决的行为的受害者创设了私人诉讼权。

Because that cause of action does not apply here, respondents ask us to create a new one. They suggest that a plaintiff is entitled to a judicially created cause of action absent compelling reasons to withhold one. But our precedents demand precisely the opposite rule.

由于该诉讼理由不适用于此处，因此被上诉人要求我们创设一个新的诉讼理由。他们认为，如果法院没有令人信服的理由拒绝这件事，那么一个提起诉讼的当事人有权利要求一个司法创立的诉讼理由。但是我们的先例恰恰要求的是相反的规则。

In Sosa, we “assume[d]” that the First Congress, which enacted the ATS, believed that federal courts, under general common law, “would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations.” 542 U. S., at 724…… At the same time, we stressed that this authority was narrow. We noted that there was “no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those [three] torts.” Ibid. And we suggested that future “development” of law might “preclud[e] federal courts from recognizing” new causes of action. Id., at 724–725.

在Sosa案中，我们假设颁布了《外国人侵权法》的第一届国会相信，根据一般普通法，联邦法院将承认有关违反国际法的特定侵权行为的私人诉讼理由。同时，我们强调这种权限是限缩的。我们指出，没有任何理由可以猜想国会除了这（三种）侵权行为之外有构想任何他例。我们表示，法律的未来发展可能会阻止联邦法院认可新的诉讼理由。

To guide our reasoning in the future, we described a twostep test that plaintiffs must satisfy before a court can create a cause of action under the ATS. First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated “‘a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory’” under international law. Id., at 732. That norm must be “defined with a specificity comparable to” the three international torts known in 1789. Id., at 725. Second, the plaintiff must show that courts should exercise “judicial discretion” to create a cause of action rather than defer to Congress. Id., at 726, 736, and n. 27; Jesner, 584 U. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 11–12).

…

为了指引我们未来的思考推理，我们描述了原告必须要满足的两步测试，在此之后法院才能够根据《外国人侵权法》创设一种诉讼理由。第一，原告必须证明被告违反了“一项具体、普遍和强制性的”国际法规范。该规范的具体定义必须与1789年已知的三种国际侵权行为相当。第二，原告必须证明法院应当实行“司法裁量权”来创设一个诉讼理由，而非遵从国会的意见。

To limit this stress on the separation of powers, our precedents have made clear that the second step of Sosa—which applies in any context where a plaintiff asks a court to create a cause of action—is extraordinarily strict. A court “‘must’” not create a private right of action if it can identify even one “‘sound reaso[n] to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of [the new] remedy.’”

为了限制这种权力分立的压力，我们的先例已经明确表明，Sosa案中的第二步——这在任何原告要求法院创立诉讼理由的情况下都可以被使用——是非常严格的。如果一个法院能够找到即使一个合理的理由认为国会可能会怀疑这种（新的）救济手段的有效性和必要性，那么它就“不得”创设一种私人诉讼权。

（图片来源于网络）

…

Regardless of whether respondents have satisfied the first step of the Sosa test, it is clear that they have not satisfied the second.

无论被上诉人是否满足Sosa测试的第一步，非常清楚的是，他们不满足第二步。

…

Although specific foreign-policy concerns may vary from case to case, our precedents are clear that creating a cause of action to enforce international law beyond three historical torts invariably gives rise to foreign-policy concerns. Ibid. (“foreign-policy . . . concerns [are] inherent in ATS litigation”). Because “[t]he political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns,” there will always be a sound reason for courts not to create a cause of action for violations of international law—other than perhaps for those three torts that were well established in 1789. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 18–19).

尽管具体的外交政策考量可能因案件而异，但是我们的先例很清楚的是，在三种历史上规定的侵权行为之外创立诉讼理由以执行国际法一定会带来外交政策问题。因为“政治部门而非司法部门有责任和制度容量来权衡外交政策问题，”所以在1789年规定的三种侵权行为之外，法院始终有合理的理由不创设关于违反国际法的行为的诉讼理由。

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.

上诉法院的判决被推翻，案件发回重审。

2.Dissenting Opinion

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.

Alito大法官持反对意见。

（图片来源于网络）

The primary question presented in the two certiorari petitions filed in these cases is whether domestic corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U. S. C. §1350. I would decide that question, and for the reasons explained in Part I of JUSTICE GORSUCH’s opinion, which I join, I would hold that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation. See also ante, at 8, n. 4 (SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Corporate status does not justify special immunity.

这些案件提交的两份调卷令中所提出的主要问题是，国内公司是否可以免受《外国人侵权法》规定的责任。我将会裁决这个问题，并且由于我加入的Gorsuch法官意见第一部分中解释的原因，我认为，如果根据《外国人侵权法》，一项特定的权利主张能够针对一个作为美国公民的自然人提起，那么类似的主张也可以对一个国内公司提起。公司地位并不构成特殊豁免权的理由。

The Court instead disposes of these cases by holding that respondents’ complaint seeks extraterritorial application of the ATS, but in my view, we should not decide that question at this juncture. It is tied to the question whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint, and in order to reach the question of extraterritoriality, the Court must assume the answers to a host of important questions. …… A decision begins to take on the flavor of an advisory opinion when it is necessary to make so many important assumptions in order to reach the question that is actually resolved.

相反，最高法院通过主张被上诉人的起诉需要寻求《外国人侵权法》的域外适用来处理这些案件。但是，在我看来，我们不应该这样裁决这个问题。它与原告是否被允许去修改他们的诉讼请求这一问题相关，而且为了解决治外法权的问题，法院必须假定一系列重要问题的答案……当需要做出如此多的重要假设才能得出实际要被解决的问题时，一项裁决开始有了咨询意见的意味。

（图片来源于网络）

To be sure, Part III of JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion and Part II of JUSTICE GORSUCH’s opinion make strong arguments that federal courts should never recognize new claims under the ATS. But this issue was not raised by petitioners’ counsel, and I would not reach it here. For these reasons, I would reject petitioners’ argument on the question of corporate immunity, vacate the judgment below, and remand these cases for further proceedings in the District Court.

可以肯定的是，Thomas法官意见的第三部分和Gorsuch法官意见的第二部分提出了强有力的论据，即联邦法院永远不应该承认根据《外国人请求法》提出的新的权利主张。但这一问题并非上诉人的律师提出的，我这里就不谈了。基于这些原因，我将驳回上诉人关于公司豁免权问题的论点，撤销以下判决，并将这些案件发回联邦地区法院进一步审理。

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说明：这来自《哈佛法律评论》2021年十一月的一篇文章《最高法院与亲商悖论》（The Supreme Court and the Pro-Business Paradox）中的一部分。它为我们提供了理解Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe这个案件的重要视角：法院如何理解公司，以及法院将其活动置于何种地位？公司应该承担什么社会责任，它们又是如何利用法律规避这些责任的？

In shaping and interpreting the law on rights and responsibilities, the Court continues to struggle not only with questions of what are corporations and whom do they serve — but also where are corporations? Adequate resolutions to these questions seem as far from grasp as at any time in the past. Corporations can transcend borders, change form to arbitrage or to take advantage of laws, outsource activity, and divide into subsidiaries around the world. Analogies between corporations and natural persons often fall flat as they do not capture these capabilities, the roles and relationships among corporate participants created by internal governance, and the related facts and values. Attempts to parse where corporate conduct occurred can become roadmaps for corporations to evade liability.

在制定和解释有关（公司）权利和责任的法律时，法院不仅要继续努力解决“什么是公司以及它们为谁服务”的问题，而且要解决“公司在哪里”的问题。与过去的任何时候一样，这些问题的解决方式似乎遥不可及。公司可以超越国界，变换形式以套利，或是利用法律，外包活动，在全球各地设立子公司。公司和自然人之间的类比通常会失败，因为它们没能理解公司的这些能力、内部治理所创造的公司参与者之间的角色关系，以及相关的事实和价值理念。试图分析公司行为在哪里发生可能会变成公司用以规避责任的路线图。

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Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Thomas ruled in favor of the corporate defendants on their latter argument, reasoning that “[n]early all the conduct [plaintiffs] say aided and abetted forced labor — providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms — occurred in Ivory Coast” and only “allegations of general corporate activity — like decisionmaking” occurred in the United States. The tight, matter-of-fact language dispensed with “generic allegations” of decisionmaking as “general corporate activity” that is “common to most corporations” and plainly insufficient for alleging a domestic application of the ATS.

Thomas法官为最高法院中的八位法官撰写了（Nestle案的）意见，他就公司被告后来的论辩作出了有利于它们的裁决，推理道：“他们所说的帮助和教唆强迫劳动的几乎所有行为——向海外农场提供培训、肥料、工具和现金——都发生在科特迪瓦”，而只有“关于一般性公司活动的指控——比如决策”才发生在美国本土。这种紧凑、实事求是的语言摒弃了对公司决策的“一般指控”，将其视为“大多数公司普遍进行的一般公司活动”，并且认为这显然不足以主张《外国人侵权法》的国内适用。

This conception of corporate activity is quite perplexing, however. A fundamental tenet of corporate law is that the board of directors is vested with authority to manage the affairs of the corporation. It acts as a collective body through decisionmaking. The board of directors may properly meet in person or convene via technological means, whether inside or outside of its state of incorporation — the location of such a board meeting makes no difference as a matter of corporate law; what is important is that there is a decision of the corporation. All other decisions and operations flow from the board’s authority by delegation — from the board to the CEO and then all the way down to the employee or agent at the lowest rung. Therefore, to look at the lowest rung of corporate activity — agents on the ground — and dismiss the decisionmaking at the top as insignificant turns the ordinary understanding of corporate activity on its head. Although tools and cash might have a tangible presence in a location, that does not make the decisionmaking that got them there any less important. Nor is there difficulty in attributing the decisionmaking of a U.S. corporation to the United States. And decisionmaking can provide assistance that constitutes aiding and abetting in various contexts. Boards also have oversight duties to monitor their organizations for legal compliance — an obligation with significant complexity for multinational corporations that are coming under increasing scrutiny by regulators, shareholders, and other stakeholders around the world. As section II.B explores in more detail, the Court’s reasoning thus fundamentally misconstrues or understates the significance of the corporate decisionmaking structure that is integral to the corporate entity and one of its defining features.

然而，这种企业活动的概念相当令人困惑。公司法的一个基本原则是董事会被赋予管理公司事务的权力。通过决策，它作为一个集体机构发挥作用。董事会可以适当地在线下召开会议或通过技术手段召开会议，无论是在其注册州境内还是境外——根据公司法，此类董事会会议的地点没有区别；重要的是这里有一项公司的决定。所有其他决策和运营均来自董事会的授权——从董事会到首席执行官，然后一直到最低级别的员工或代理人。因此，只关注公司活动的最底层——当地的代理人——并认为高层的决策无关紧要，这完全颠覆了人们对公司活动的一般理解。尽管工具和现金可能在某个地点有形存在，但这并不意味着让它们到达那里的决策变得不那么重要。将美国公司的决策归咎于美国也不难。而且，决策可以在各种情况下提供帮助和教唆。董事会还负有监督其组织遵守法律规定的职责——对跨国公司而言，这项义务非常复杂，因为它们正受到世界各地监管机构、股东和其他利益相关者越来越严格的审查。正如部分II.B更详细地探讨的那样，法院的推理从根本上误解或低估了公司决策结构的重要性，而该结构是公司实体的组成部分及其定义特征之一。

（图片来源于网络）

Further, generic allegations of corporate decisionmaking might understandably raise pleading concerns, but it is unclear how plaintiffs who were trafficked and enslaved as children on cocoa farms can be expected to pinpoint exactly who at the corporation was involved in the decisionmaking. Tort victims do not have “the tools at hand” that are available to corporate shareholders, who have the right to request corporate books and records to investigate corporate wrongdoing before filing suit. The circumstances might allow for inference, given the well-known pervasiveness of child labor on cocoa farms in Ivory Coast and the cocoa prices that reflect this practice — and that is exactly what the plaintiffs’ complaint highlights. From these facts, it would admittedly be more difficult to infer knowledge or reckless tolerance of human trafficking and child slavery rather than unforced child labor. The Court did not attempt to distinguish between human rights abuses, however — it only made the empty statement that alleging “general corporate activity — like decisionmaking” is not enough. It also did not specify whether, or what kind of, specific corporate activity might suffice to establish domestic application of the ATS.

此外，对公司决策的一般性指控可能会引起诉讼担忧，这是可以理解的，但我们不清楚的是，童年时就被贩运和奴役的在可可农场的原告如何能够准确地查明公司中哪些人参与了决策。侵权受害者没有可供公司股东使用的“手头工具”——而这些股东有权在提起诉讼之前索取公司账簿和记录来调查公司的不当行为。考虑到众所周知科特迪瓦的可可农场上劳工现象非常普遍，而且可可价格也反应了这一做法——这正是原告的申诉中所强调的，这种情况或许可以被证实。诚然，相比从这些事实中推断出非强迫性的儿童劳动，要推断出对人口贩运和儿童奴役的知情或疏忽大意的容忍要更加困难。然而法院并没有试图区分侵犯人权行为——它只是做出了空洞的声明，声称指控“一般企业活动——如决策”是不够的。它也没有进一步说明，具体的公司活动是否能够或者何种公司活动足够证明《外国人侵权法》的国内适用。

Moreover, the Court did not rule on the larger question it granted certiorari to address — Are U.S. corporations immune from liability under the ATS? The issue of corporate liability was a central focus of oral argument, with Justices repeatedly asking variations on Justice Kagan’s question: “If you could bring a suit against 10 [enslavers], when [they] form a corporation, why can’t you bring a suit against the corporation?” Justice Breyer similarly reimagined the Marbois affair of 1784, in which a French official had been assaulted in Philadelphia, as being done by a corporation instead of an individual and asked: “Why should that make a difference?”

此外，法院没有就其授予调卷令试图处理的更大问题做出裁决——美国公司是否免受《外国人侵权法》规定的责任？公司责任问题是口头辩论的核心焦点，法官们反复询问法官Kagan的问题的不同版本：“如果你可以对 10 个 [奴役者] 提起诉讼，当 [他们] 成立一家公司时，你为什么不能对公司提起诉讼？”Breyer法官同样重新构想了1784 年的马布瓦事件，在他的构想中，一名法国官员在费城遭到袭击——这是一家公司而非个人所为，他问道：“为什么这会有任何不同？”

In sum, instead of making clear that domestic corporations can be defendants and keeping the “engine of international human rights protection” alive in Nestlé, the Court narrowed the path to liability through its self-admittedly “convoluted” parsing of the location of corporate conduct and reasoning untethered to the legal and practical realities of how multinational corporations operate. A more nuanced treatment of the roles and duties of corporate boards and officers might have set the Court on a different path, but it instead overlooked their significance and continued to embrace an approach that limits the places that a corporation can be held to account for the consequences of its decisions. Battles ensued through concurrences about just how narrowly to construe actionable torts for any case going forward, after a series of cases that had already adopted an unnecessarily cramped understanding of the statute, even from an originalist standpoint. This is how corporate accountability shrinks or disappears.

总之，法院没有明确规定国内企业可以成为被告，也没有让雀巢的“国际人权保护引擎”继续运转。通过法院自己承认的对公司行为发生地点的“复杂”分析，也通过不受跨国公司运作的法律和实践的现实束缚的推理过程，法院缩小了追究公司责任的路径。对公司董事会和管理人员的角色和职责进行更细致的处理可能会让法院走上一条不同的道路，但法院却忽视了它们的重要性，并继续采用这样一种方法,从而限缩公司为其决定的后果所担负的责任。即使从原教旨主义看来，这一系列案件也对法规进行了不必要的狭隘理解。在此之后，争论随之而来，其焦点是如何狭隘地解释未来任何案件的可起诉侵权行为——而这就是企业责任缩小或消失的方式。

翻译原文：

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-416_i4dj.pdf

https://www.hrlc.org.au/human-rights-case-summaries/2021/8/30/nestl-v-doe-united-states-supreme-court-overturns-nestls-liability-for-child-slavery-in-cocoa-supply-chains-insufficient-domestic-conduct-to-invoke-the-alien-tort-statute

https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-135/the-supreme-court-and-the-pro-business-paradox/

《哈佛法律评论》2021年十一月的一篇文章《最高法院与亲商悖论》（The Supreme Court and the Pro-Business Paradox)原文链接：https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-135/the-supreme-court-and-the-pro-business-paradox/