Academia's Crooked Money zz - 未名空间MITBBS历史存档

国际科技财经博客移民网络热点娱乐民生时事公众号

Redian新闻

>未名空间

>Biology - 生物学

Academia's Crooked Money zz

Academia's Crooked Money zz# Biology - 生物学

w*a2012-01-06 08:01

1 楼

今天早上被ADT的警钟叫醒，因为事发突然，第一个动作是关掉警报（实在不应该，但
是怕吓到宝宝），去抱宝宝。和LG冲到大门一看，没看到人或是车子，但是门上的bolt
被转开了45度（门没开），于是打电话给ADT请他们叫警察。警察检查大门锁，说看不
出有人来过的样子，等他走后LG去门口外一看，才发现一把copy的钥匙掉在porch,而且
正是开大门的钥匙！我和LG当场头皮发麻，因为我们的钥匙都在，不知道谁竟然有我们
家里的钥匙copy，大剌剌拿钥匙开门进我们家! 我们发现钥匙后再次打911，但是警察
并不觉得发现钥匙有什么异常，还说他们一天接到一百多通911电话都是跟警钟有关，
叫我们不要大惊小怪。才搬进新家不到三个月就发生这种事，又是在一向很安全的小区
，实在是难以接受。
记得版上有人问close以后要不要换锁，很后悔当时为了省钱没去换，今天赶紧去Lowes
买新锁，希望不要再碰到这种事了!

x*o2012-01-06 08:01

2 楼

当佛陀在舍卫城的时侯，增长国王率领军队，灭了释迦族。阿难尊者的妹妹、妹夫不幸
往生，留下两个小孩流落在迦毗罗卫城的街头。
有一位施主从舍卫城过来，看见沿街乞讨的孤儿，认出是朋友的孩子，就带他们到舍卫
城找他们的舅舅──阿难尊者。
阿难尊者了解到这两位外甥，父母双亡，无处可依，是特地来投靠他的，心里很忧愁。
其它比丘见阿难尊者闷闷不乐，便关心问道：「尊者为何心情如此沉重？」
尊者说：「这两个小孩是我妹妹的孩子，无依无靠，特来投靠我。但我是一个苦行僧，
自己无资生之源，三宝的财物他们不能享用，不抚养又不行，真不知该怎么办才好？」
比丘们劝阿难尊者：「尊者，还是好好照顾他们吧。世尊曾说过，如果对僧众作利益事
，可以对其布施，是不违因果的。就让这两个孩子为僧众洗钵、洗水果、供花，这是被
允许的。」于是阿难尊者便收留这两个可怜的孤儿。
平时，比丘们把剩下的饭菜布施给这两个小孩，阿难也将自己化缘来的饭食分一半给他
们，自己仅食用半钵。日子久了，尊者的身体越来越衰弱。世尊看到后，问其它比丘是
什么原因，比丘们照实说出事情的经过。
于是，世尊问阿难：「你收养的两个小孩要不要出家？」
「世尊，这两个孩子以后是要出家的。」阿难尊者回答。
世尊说：「阿难，这两个孩子如果出家的话，就可以享用僧团的财物。还没出家以前，
为僧团做些供花、供果等事，也是可以享用僧团的财物。」世尊这样开许后，这两个孩
子的生活获得改善。
过了一段时间，世尊问阿难尊者：「您那两个外甥为什么还没出家呢？」
阿难说：「世尊，因您早已规定：不满十五岁不能出家。他们尚不满十五岁，所以，还
未出家。」
世尊又问：「他们能在僧众晒粮时，做驱赶乌鸦的事吗？如果能作，那就可以出家了。」
「他们早就能做驱赶乌鸦的事情。」阿难很肯定地回答。
「若能驱赶乌鸦，七岁就可以出家了。」世尊开许后，二个小孩便一起出家，生活也变
得比较好。但是他们却因此变得懒惰，白天顾着玩乐，晚上长时睡觉，根本不闻思修行。
目犍连尊者看到这两个孩子放逸睡眠度日，就对阿难尊者说：「不该让这两个孩子虚度
光阴，应严加管教。」
阿难坦承因慈悲，管不动这两个孩子，于是便请求目犍连尊者代为教导。刚开始目犍连
尊者严厉督促这两个孩子，但渐渐也因过于慈悲，而无法再严格要求。
阿难尊者问目犍连尊者：「您现在怎么也娇惯这两个孩子？」
目犍连尊者说：「这两个孩子已经了解到我很慈悲，因而一点都不听话，实在拿他们没
办法。」
阿难尊者说：「您可以用方便法使他俩生起厌离心啊！」目犍连尊者答应了。
有一天，目犍连尊者带着两个孩子外出。尊者用神变幻化出一个很恐怖的地狱，并要这
两个孩子过去看。他们看见地狱里的众生正在遭受烧杀煎熬等各种痛苦，再转到一个非
常大的铁锅旁，锅里正煮着滚热的铁水，但却没有人在里头，他俩觉得奇怪，就问狱卒
：「为什么这个铁锅里只煮铁水，有什么意义？」
「因为阿难尊者的两个外甥，天天不修行，却享用僧众的财物；等他们死后堕入地狱，
将会受到铁水熬煮之刑，这个锅正是为他们所准备的。」狱卒说道。
听了以后，他俩非常恐惧，很快地回到尊者身边。尊者问他们看到什么，他们说：「尊
者，我们亲眼目睹地狱之苦，可怕极了。我们若再不精进闻思修，将来必定会堕入地狱
，现在我们很害怕。」
从此，这两个孩子日以继夜地精进修学，若在早上没吃饭前，想起地狱的痛苦，就不想
吃了；若是在饭后，忆起地狱的惨景，便将食物全部吐出。就这样，茶饭不思地精进修
行，渐渐地变得体衰无力，面色萎黄。阿难看了觉得很难过，便去询问目犍连尊者其中
的缘由。
目犍连尊者说：「大概是他们见到地狱的景象，吓得不敢吃饭吧！」
阿难尊者担心这样下去会拖垮两个孩子的身体，又请求尊者想办法以善巧方便安慰孩子。
过了几天，目犍连尊者告诉他们要到一个好玩的地方去，两个孩子又跟着尊者出游。尊
者幻化出一个美妙的天堂，再叫他们去看。他们看到很多的天子和天女以珠宝装饰自己
，过着快乐美好的生活，心里很羡慕这种天人的生活。接着，他们看到两个狮子座，旁
边有很多天女围绕，还演奏各种乐器，供养美丽的鲜花。
两个小孩便问：「为什么这两个狮子座上没有天子呢？」
「阿难尊者的两个外甥，因为害怕下地狱受苦，每天精进修行。以这样的功德，未来会
转生天上，这两个狮子座是为他们准备的。」众天女告诉他们。
他们听了非常高兴，心想：「如果现在能精进修行，以后还可以转生天上。」于是，欢
天喜地回到尊者身边，把天上的事告诉尊者。
尊者慈悲地说：「你们已亲眼看到天上与地狱的苦乐，你们一定要精进修行啊！」
此后，两个孩子特别精进修持，他们终于发现，无论生于地狱、饿鬼、傍生、人、阿修
罗或天人中，皆没有任何安乐可言，一切都是有漏法，三界轮回犹如火宅，一切的本质
都是苦的，因而生起真实的出离心。于是，他们更加精进修持，最后灭尽三界烦恼，证
得阿罗汉果位。证果后，他们以神通飞到各处采集鲜花、水果等来供养僧众。
僧众感到这两个小孩很稀有，都觉得他们非常了不起。有些年长的比丘看到仅七岁的小
孩就有这样的功德与境界，自觉惭愧，也开始努力精进修行，很多比丘因而也成为阿罗
汉。
这时，比丘们请问世尊：「世尊！这两个孩子以什么样的因缘，能在七岁的时候就证得
阿罗汉呢？请世尊为我们开示。」
佛陀告诉他们：「这是缘于他们前世的愿力。很久以前，贤劫人寿二万岁迦叶佛出世的
时候，有五百位青年人在花园里看见佛陀率领僧众出游鹿野苑的情景，都生起无限的欢
喜心，很多人觉得如来出世的机会难得，因而想发心出家；有些人则认为应趁年轻好好
享受人生，等老了再出家；还有些人觉得可以等到生儿育女后再出家。后来，这五百位
青年人一直忙于生计，日久年老，逐渐雕零，皆没有机会出家。剩下最后的两位老人，
眼见伙伴一个个地死去，才醒悟：『年轻时我们就发心出家，现在已年迈体衰，再不出
家，恐怕再也没有机会。』故而，他们将自己的财产上供下施后，跟随迦叶佛出家。
佛陀规定新出家的人必须承侍先出家的上座，因此二位老人虽较年长，但仍必须作很多
事情，有些僧人更借机欺负他们。其中一位老人很生气，另外一位心胸比较开阔，便对
生气的伙伴说：『不要生气啦！如果我们早点出家就不会发生这种事，错还是在我们。
』于是，生气的老人诚恳忏悔，没有受到报应。
他们在临死前发了一个愿：
『我们一生在佛的教法下出家，令佛生起欢喜心，希望以这些功德，未来能在释迦佛出
世的时候，童贞入道，灭尽烦恼，成为阿罗汉。如果出家的年纪太小，希望佛陀能为我
们特别开许。』
比丘们，当时在迦叶佛前出家的两位老人就是现在的这两个孩子。因为他们前世的愿力
，所以今生能在我的教法下，以七岁之龄得到我的开许，让他们出家，获证阿罗汉果。」

B*M2012-01-06 08:01

3 楼

讲的很实际啊
http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_i
Follow the money!” According to the film All the President's Men, this
advice from the shadowy informant known as Deep Throat guided Washington
Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in cracking the Watergate
conspiracy.
The strategy also serves Georgia State University economist Paula Stephan
extremely well in her illuminating and accessible new book, How Economics
Shapes Science. A leading expert on the scientific labor market, Stephan isn
’t looking to sniff out high-level government corruption. Rather, using the
“tool bag” economics provides for “analyzing the relationships between
incentives and costs,” she penetrates the financial structure of university
-based science, explaining the motivation and behavior of everyone from
august university presidents and professors to powerless and impecunious
graduate students and postdocs.
It's a remarkably revealing approach. Most of what the public hears about
the arrangements that govern research comes from reports by blue-ribbon
commissions, prestigious panels, and university-oriented advocacy
organizations. Such reports rarely use hard-headed economic analysis; rather
, the groups writing them tend to consist of top administrators at leading
universities, eminent faculty members in major science and engineering
departments, and high executives of large corporations -- “not,” Stephan
pointedly notes, “students and postdocs who could not find jobs.”
The documents that result from those high-end studies lean toward self-
congratulatory invocations of science’s role in advancing human welfare.
Their suggestions generally favor solving what ails universities by giving
them more of what they already have: funding, grants, graduate students, and
postdocs. But, warns Stephan with an astringency that she infuses
throughout the book, when “assessing recommendations, one should be leery
of those coming from groups who have a vested interest in keeping the system
the way it is.”
The consequences of cost and risk
The troubles plaguing academic science -- including fierce competition for
funding, dismal career opportunities for young scientists, overdependence on
soft money, excessive time spent applying for grants, and many more -- do
not arise, Stephan suggests, from a shortage of funds. In 2009, she notes,
the United States spent nearly $55 billion on university- and medical school
–based research and development, far more than any other nation.
The problems arise, Stephan argues, from how that money is allocated: who
gets to spend it, where, and on what. Unlike a number of other countries,
the United States structures university-based research around short-term
competitive grants to faculty members. The incentives built into this system
lead universities to behave “as though they are high-end shopping centers,
” she writes. “They turn around and lease the facilities to faculty in [
exchange for] indirect costs on grants and buyout of salary. In many
instances, faculty ‘pay’ for the opportunity of working at the university,
receiving no guarantee of income if they fail to bring in a grant.” Those
who land funding staff their labs with students enrolled in their department
’s graduate program, or with postdocs. Paid out of the faculty member’s
grant, both types of workers depend on the primary investigator’s (PI’s)
continued success in the tournament.
Universities, however, also face considerable risks. They must, for example,
provide large start-up packages to outfit new faculty members for the
competition. Newcomers generally have about 3 years to establish a revenue
stream -- to start winning “the funding to stay in business,” Stephan says
. The need to reduce risk explains universities’ growing penchant for
hiring faculty members off the tenure track and using adjuncts for teaching.
“Medical schools have gone a step further,” Stephan notes, “employing
people, whether tenured or nontenured, with minimal guarantees of salary.”
Where tenure once constituted a pledge to pay a person’s salary for life,
it now constitutes, in the acerbic definition I’ve heard from some medical
school professors, a mere “license to go out and fund your own salary.”
Risk avoidance has scientific as well as financial consequences. “The
system … discourages faculty from pursuing research with uncertain outcomes
,” which may endanger future grants or renewals. This peril is “
particularly acute for those on soft money.” Experimental timidity produces
“little chance that transformative research will occur and that the
economy will reap significant returns from investments in research and
development.”
As in all financial ventures, cost determines much of what goes on in the
laboratory. “Cost plays a role in determining whether researchers work with
male mice or female mice (females, it turns out, can be more expensive),
whether principal investigators staff their labs with postdoctoral fellows (
postdocs) or graduate students, and why faculty members prefer to staff labs
with ‘temporary’ workers, be they graduate students, postdocs, or staff
scientists, rather than with permanent staff.” Postdocs often are a PI’s
best staffing buy, Stephan writes, because their excellent skills come with
no requirement to pay tuition, which at top private institutions can run $30
,000 a year or more. Overall, the need to reduce risk and cost in the grant-
based system produces “incentives … to get bigger and bigger” by winning
the maximum number of grants and, because grad students and postdocs do the
actual bench work, to “produce more scientists and engineers than can
possibly find jobs as independent researchers.”
Many universities, meanwhile, took out large loans during flush times to
finance buildings and equipment intended to give them an edge in attracting
grants. They find their fiscal stability “severely threatened when funding
from grants plateaus, or does not grow sufficiently to keep pace with the
expansion. They face even more serious prospects when budgets decline in
real terms.” The nation’s enormous investment in biomedical research has
also “created a lobbying behemoth composed of universities and nonprofit
health advocacy groups that constantly remind Congress of the importance of
funding health-related research,” Stephan adds. This gives rise to
unceasing claims that no amount of science funding is ever enough.
Although one topflight report described this setup as “ 'incredibly
successful’ from the perspective of faculty,” Stephan observes, “it is
the Ph.D. students and postdocs who are bearing the cost of the system --
and the U.S. taxpayers -- not the principal investigators.” Undergraduates
also carry an increasing share of the load, she adds: Their tuition, often
paid with student loans, rises as more funds go to research. Their teachers,
meanwhile, increasingly are cut-rate adjuncts rather than the famous
professors the recruiting brochures boast about.
Finding solutions
Unsurprisingly, Stephan’s proposed solutions differ from those of the blue-
ribbon panels. She focuses not on the need to grow budgets or aggrandize
institutions but on the need to increase what economists call efficiency,
allocating scarce resources -- in this case, taxpayer money and the talents
and time of the nation’s able young people -- to produce the highest return
in desired goods: transformative science and sustainable, transformative
science careers.
Thus, she argues for producing fewer rather than more Ph.D.s, for requiring
all PIs to report the career experience of their Ph.D.s and postdocs as part
of “the outcome data for scoring proposals,” and for limiting the “
amount of faculty time that can be charged to grants, thereby dulling the
incentives for universities to hire faculty on soft money.” The latter
measure would have the added benefit of discouraging “universities from
putting up buildings on spec and filling them with faculty on soft money
positions.” Stephan also wants more attention paid to the potential
advantages and disadvantages of funding systems that support researchers
over time, as the Howard Hughes Medical Institute has done with great
success, rather than for specific, short-term projects. Importantly, she
notes, “universities and faculty members do not respond to recommendations
that lack teeth.”
The short space at my disposal allows me to present just a hint of the
penetrating discoveries waiting in this book: How and to what extent does
patenting enrich some faculty members and universities? What incentives
encourage universities to import increasing numbers of foreign students and
postdocs -- and to insist that there are shortages of both -- while a
growing surplus of native-born scientists struggle to find jobs that allow
them to pay off student loans? How do universities continue to attract
students into graduate programs despite poor odds of attaining the careers
they desire? Why does supporting scientists over time, rather than
individual grant-funded projects, appear to produce better science?
These and many other apparent quandaries yield to Stephan’s rigorous and
clear-eyed examination of the money trail. She conveys her findings in clear
, comprehensible prose. If you want to understand what is really happening
in American academic science today, here’s my advice: Read this
enlightening book.
Beryl Lieff Benderly writes from Washington, D.C.

R*r2012-01-06 08:01

4 楼

re-key

bolt
Lowes

【在 w*******a 的大作中提到】

: 今天早上被ADT的警钟叫醒，因为事发突然，第一个动作是关掉警报（实在不应该，但
: 是怕吓到宝宝），去抱宝宝。和LG冲到大门一看，没看到人或是车子，但是门上的bolt
: 被转开了45度（门没开），于是打电话给ADT请他们叫警察。警察检查大门锁，说看不
: 出有人来过的样子，等他走后LG去门口外一看，才发现一把copy的钥匙掉在porch,而且
: 正是开大门的钥匙！我和LG当场头皮发麻，因为我们的钥匙都在，不知道谁竟然有我们
: 家里的钥匙copy，大剌剌拿钥匙开门进我们家! 我们发现钥匙后再次打911，但是警察
: 并不觉得发现钥匙有什么异常，还说他们一天接到一百多通911电话都是跟警钟有关，
: 叫我们不要大惊小怪。才搬进新家不到三个月就发生这种事，又是在一向很安全的小区
: ，实在是难以接受。
: 记得版上有人问close以后要不要换锁，很后悔当时为了省钱没去换，今天赶紧去Lowes

d*r2012-01-06 08:01

5 楼

求摘要。

【在 x*********o 的大作中提到】

: 当佛陀在舍卫城的时侯，增长国王率领军队，灭了释迦族。阿难尊者的妹妹、妹夫不幸
: 往生，留下两个小孩流落在迦毗罗卫城的街头。
: 有一位施主从舍卫城过来，看见沿街乞讨的孤儿，认出是朋友的孩子，就带他们到舍卫
: 城找他们的舅舅──阿难尊者。
: 阿难尊者了解到这两位外甥，父母双亡，无处可依，是特地来投靠他的，心里很忧愁。
: 其它比丘见阿难尊者闷闷不乐，便关心问道：「尊者为何心情如此沉重？」
: 尊者说：「这两个小孩是我妹妹的孩子，无依无靠，特来投靠我。但我是一个苦行僧，
: 自己无资生之源，三宝的财物他们不能享用，不抚养又不行，真不知该怎么办才好？」
: 比丘们劝阿难尊者：「尊者，还是好好照顾他们吧。世尊曾说过，如果对僧众作利益事
: ，可以对其布施，是不违因果的。就让这两个孩子为僧众洗钵、洗水果、供花，这是被

T*i2012-01-06 08:01

6 楼

好文。顶！

isn
the

【在 B*M 的大作中提到】

: 讲的很实际啊
: http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_i
: Follow the money!” According to the film All the President's Men, this
: advice from the shadowy informant known as Deep Throat guided Washington
: Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in cracking the Watergate
: conspiracy.
: The strategy also serves Georgia State University economist Paula Stephan
: extremely well in her illuminating and accessible new book, How Economics
: Shapes Science. A leading expert on the scientific labor market, Stephan isn
: ’t looking to sniff out high-level government corruption. Rather, using the

m*f2012-01-06 08:01

7 楼

小钱不能省，还是换了放心
不过有ADT也蛮好的，呵呵

bolt
Lowes

【在 w*******a 的大作中提到】

e*e2012-01-06 08:01

8 楼

Which one makes you feel worse? There isn't enough money to go around or
there is enough money but just not for YOU?

isn
the

【在 B*M 的大作中提到】

i*a2012-01-06 08:01

9 楼

some people like to hide their keys outside the house in case they locked
themselves out. maybe the previous house owner also did that

T*i2012-01-06 08:01

10 楼

The current system is not self-sustainable, due to the positive feedback
behavior of the research system. So there will never be enough money.
Also please think about this scenario:
In the old days, most PIs usually have small labs. 1 technician and 2
graduate students will do the job. Usually the job is one project. Then the
sizes of labs keep growing. Now it is rare to see 2-3 people labs, except
for those of new APs'. However, for big labs, there are multiple projects,
most time unrelated, albeit under the same umbrella. So we have to ask
ourselves, do we need those big bosses as middle men? Can the same big labs
be separated into smaller labs and each only work on one project? And if so,
can the smaller labs, collectively, be as productive as the big lab? I know
there is no easy answer, and it may vary from case to case. But I do know
that the golden age of basic biological research was from 60s to 80s, which
ironically coincide with the fact that most labs are small at that time.

【在 e*******e 的大作中提到】

: Which one makes you feel worse? There isn't enough money to go around or
: there is enough money but just not for YOU?
:
: isn
: the

w*w2012-01-06 08:01

11 楼

HOME DEPOT rekey一下才$5，花小钱买个安心，不能省。

B*M2012-01-06 08:01

12 楼

The trend is to have bigger labs and collaboration, similar to business
Giants we call 托拉斯...
But the problem here is that PIs of big labs are not responsible for their
postdocs and graduates after their projects are done. Right now the PHDs are
oversupplied and flooded the job market.
One solution is that PIs create more long term positions for postdocs,
instead of temp.
Another solution is to have less PhD enrolled, to tight up the supply.A lot
of graduate schools don't like this idea of course...

the
labs
so,

【在 T****i 的大作中提到】

: The current system is not self-sustainable, due to the positive feedback
: behavior of the research system. So there will never be enough money.
: Also please think about this scenario:
: In the old days, most PIs usually have small labs. 1 technician and 2
: graduate students will do the job. Usually the job is one project. Then the
: sizes of labs keep growing. Now it is rare to see 2-3 people labs, except
: for those of new APs'. However, for big labs, there are multiple projects,
: most time unrelated, albeit under the same umbrella. So we have to ask
: ourselves, do we need those big bosses as middle men? Can the same big labs
: be separated into smaller labs and each only work on one project? And if so,