Acrobat OCR处理的瓶颈# Hardware - 计算机硬件
r*1
1 楼
好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
感觉吗？不知道是
不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
感觉吗？不知道是
不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
B*y
2 楼
Allergy特别严重。家里好像经常有灰尘。
H*r
3 楼
rt
我知道我很迷信，ok
我知道我很迷信，ok
H*r
4 楼
下个月要回国, 想找人帮忙照顾我的狗. (可付费)
(头象不是她啊) 我的狗是最标准的那种BLACK/CREAM 的样子.
(头象不是她啊) 我的狗是最标准的那种BLACK/CREAM 的样子.
a*y
5 楼
Philosophical zombie
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious
experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object
, for example, it does not feel any pain. While it behaves exactly as if it
does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us
that it is in intense pain), it does not actually have the experience of
pain as a putative "normal" person does.
The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a thought experiment used in
arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind,
particularly arguments against forms of physicalism, such as materialism and
behaviorism.
Contents
1 Types of zombies
2 Zombie arguments
3 Criticism
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References and further reading
7 External links
Types of zombies
Philosophical zombies are widely used in thought
experiments, though the detailed articulation of the concept is not always
the same. There are, in effect, different types of p-zombies. What differs
is how much exactly they have in common with normal human beings. P-zombies
were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism,
such as behaviorism. According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in
terms of behavior: belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so on, are
simply certain kinds of behavior or tendencies towards behaviors. One might
invoke the notion of a p-zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from
a normal human being, but that lacks conscious experiences. According to the
behaviorist, such a being is not logically possible, since consciousness is
defined in terms of behavior. So an appeal to the intuition that a p-zombie
so described is possible furnishes an argument that behaviorism is false.
Behaviorists tend to respond to this that a p-zombie is not possible and so
the theory that one might exist is false.
One might distinguish between various types of zombies, as they are used in
different thought experiments, as follows:
A behavioral zombie is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human and yet
has no conscious experience.
A neurological zombie has a human brain and is otherwise physically
indistinguishable from a human; nevertheless, it has no conscious experience.
A soulless zombie lacks a soul but is otherwise indistinguishable from a
human; this concept is used to inquire to what, if anything, the soul might
amount.
However, philosophical zombies are primarily discussed in the context of
arguments against physicalism (or functionalism) in general. Thus, a p-
zombie is typically understood as a being that is physically
indistinguishable from a normal human being but that lacks conscious
experience.
Zombie argumentsMain article
According to physicalism, the physical facts determine all other facts; it
follows that, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical
facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal
conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished,
physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible, or that p-zombies are
the same as normal humans. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of
reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.
Most arguments ultimately lend support to some form of dualism—the view
that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of
property): the mental and the physical.
The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a
general modal argument against physicalism, such as that of Saul Kripke's in
"Naming and Necessity" (1972).[1] The notion of a p-zombie, as used to
argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel
(1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974).
However, the zombie argument against physicalism in general was most
famously developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996).
According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie
world: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking
conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that
is conscious in our world would be a p-zombie. The structure of Chalmers'
version of the zombie argument can be outlined as follows:
1.If physicalism is true, then it is not possible for there to be a world in
which all the physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but
in which there are additional facts. (This is because, according to
physicalism, all the facts are fully determined by the physical facts; so
any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is entirely
indistinguishable from our world.)
2.But there is a possible world in which all the physical facts are the same
as those of our world but in which there are additional facts. (For example
, it is possible that there is a world exactly like ours in every physical
respect, but in it everyone lacks certain mental states, namely any
phenomenal experiences or qualia. The people there look and act just like
people in the actual world, but they don't feel anything; when one gets shot
, for example, he yells out as if he is in pain, but he doesn't feel any
pain.)
3.Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by modus tollens.)
The argument is logically valid, in that if its premises are true, then the
conclusion must be true. However, philosophers dispute that its premises are
true. For example, concerning premise 2: Is such a zombie world really
possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation
is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description."[2] Since
such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is possible; and if such a
world is possible, then physicalism is false. Chalmers is arguing only for
logical possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument
requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they
probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."[3]
This leads to the following questions: What is the relevant notion of
possibility here? Is the scenario in premise 2 possible in the sense that is
suggested in premise 1? Some philosophers maintain that the relevant kind
of possibility is not so weak as logical possibility. They argue that, while
a zombie world is logically possible (that is, there is no logical
contradiction in any full description of the scenario), such a weak notion
is not relevant in the analysis of a metaphysical thesis such as physicalism
. Most philosophers agree that the relevant notion of possibility is some
sort of metaphysical possibility. What the proponent of the zombie argument
claims is that one can tell from the armchair, just by the power of reason,
that such a zombie scenario is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "
From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their
metaphysical possibility."[3] Chalmers claims that this inference from
conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not generally legitimate, but
it is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness.[4] Indeed,
according to Chalmers, whatever is logically possible is also, in the sense
relevant here, metaphysically possible.[5]
Criticism
A physicalist might respond to the zombie argument in
several ways. Most responses deny premise 2 (of Chalmers' version above);
that is, they deny that a zombie scenario is possible.
One response is to claim that the idea of qualia and related phenomenal
notions of the mind are not coherent concepts, and the zombie scenario is
therefore incoherent. Daniel Dennett and others take this line. They argue
that while consciousness, subjective experiences, and so forth exist in some
sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are; pain,
for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental
life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.
Dennett coined the term zimboes (philosophical zombies that have second-
order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is
incoherent[6]. He states: "Philosophers ought to have dropped the zombie
like a hot potato, but since they persist in their embrace, this gives me a
golden opportunity to focus attention on the most seductive error in current
thinking."[7] In a related vein, Nigel Thomas argues that the zombie
concept is inherently self-contradictory: Because zombies, ex hypothesis,
behave just like regular humans, they will claim to be conscious. Thomas
argues that any construal of this claim (that is, whether it is taken to be
true, false, or neither true nor false) inevitably entails either a
contradiction or a manifest absurdity.[8][9]
Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky claims that the argument is
simply circular. By proposing the possibility of something which is
physically identical to a human but has no subjective experiences, the
argument is implicitly assuming that the physical characteristics of humans
are not what produces those experiences. But that is exactly what the
argument was claiming to prove.[10]
Another physicalist response is to provide an error theory to account for
intuition that zombies are possible. Philosophers such as Stephen Yablo (
1998) have taken this line and argued that notions of what counts as
physical, and what counts as physically possible, change over time; so while
conceptual analysis is reliable in some areas of philosophy, it is not
reliable here. Yablo says he is "braced for the information that is going to
make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no real idea what form the
information is going to take."[11]
The zombie argument is difficult to assess, because it brings to light
fundamental disagreements that philosophers have about the method and scope
of philosophy itself. It gets to the core of disagreements about the nature
and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument,
such as Chalmers, think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if
not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal
of philosophical work. However, others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland, W.
V.O. Quine, and so on, have fundamentally different views from Chalmers
about the nature and scope of philosophical analysis. For this reason,
discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.
Under physicalism, it has been claimed that one must either believe that
anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie
– following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or
not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no
different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by Daniel
Dennett who argues that "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have
qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to
this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever
discover!"[7]. While it has been argued that zombies in an observed world
are indistinguishable from the observer (and therefore non-existent) under
the assumption of physicalism, it has also been argued that zombies are not
conceivable. It has been claimed under reductive physicalism, that when a
distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself
(assumed not to be a zombie), and noting that the concept of oneself under
reductive physicalism may ever only correspond to physical reality, the
concept of the hypothetical zombie can only be a subset of the concept of
oneself and will in this nature also entail a deficit in observables (
cognitive systems) thereby contradicting the original definition of a zombie
. This argument has been expressed by Daniel Dennett who argues that, "when
philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably
underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining
something that violates their own definition" [7].
[edit] See also Philosophy portal
Dualism (philosophy of mind)
Inverted spectrum
Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Map–territory relation
Mary's Room
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of perception
Physicalism
Qualia
Swampman
Subjective character of experience
Chinese Room
[edit] Notes1.^ However, note that Kripke's modal argument in "Naming and
Necessity" is against only one kind of physicalism: type-identity theory.
2.^ Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.
3.^ a b Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.
4.^ Chalmers (2004) argues that we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that for
phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference
(or between primary and secondary intentions)." That is, for phenomenal
concepts, conceivability implies possibility.
5.^ Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67-68.
6.^ Dennett 1995; 1999
7.^ a b c Dennett, 1995, p. 322.
8.^ Thomas, 1998.
9.^ http://www.imagery-imagination.com/zom-abs.htm
10.^ http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p2.html
11.^ Yablo, 2000, §XV.
[edit] References and further readingChalmers, David. 1995. "Facing Up to
the Problem of Consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no.
3, pp. 200–219. Online PDF
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hardcover: ISBN 0-19-511789-
1, paperback: ISBN 0-19-510553-2
Chalmers, David. 2003. "Consciousness and its Place in Nature", in the
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.),
Blackwell. Also in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings,
D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford, 2002. ISBN 0-19-514581-X, Online PDF
Chalmers, David. 2004. "Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, no. 1. Online text
Dennett, Daniel. 1995. "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", Journal
of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 322–326. Online abstract
Dennett, Daniel. 1999. "The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?",
Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture. Online text
Kirk, Robert. 1974. "Sentience and Behaviour", Mind, vol. 83, pp. 43–60.
Kripke, Saul. 1972. "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language
, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, pp. 253–355
. (Published as a book in 1980, Harvard University Press.)
Nagel, Thomas. 1970. "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review, vol. 79,
pp. 394–403.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review,
vol. 83, pp. 435–450.
Thomas, N.J.T. 1998. "Zombie Killer", in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak, & A.C
. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson
Discussions and Debates (pp. 171–177), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Online
Yablo, Stephen. 2000. "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts
", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 81, pp. 98–122. Online text
[edit] External linksOnline papers on philosophical zombies, by various
authors, compiled by David Chalmers.
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical zombie entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Skepdic entry on p-zombies
A Qwantz comic on the subject of philosophical zombies
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie"
Categories: Zombies | Philosophy of mind | Epistemology | Internalism and
externalism | Thought experiments in philosophy
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious
experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object
, for example, it does not feel any pain. While it behaves exactly as if it
does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us
that it is in intense pain), it does not actually have the experience of
pain as a putative "normal" person does.
The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a thought experiment used in
arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind,
particularly arguments against forms of physicalism, such as materialism and
behaviorism.
Contents
1 Types of zombies
2 Zombie arguments
3 Criticism
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References and further reading
7 External links
Types of zombies
Philosophical zombies are widely used in thought
experiments, though the detailed articulation of the concept is not always
the same. There are, in effect, different types of p-zombies. What differs
is how much exactly they have in common with normal human beings. P-zombies
were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism,
such as behaviorism. According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in
terms of behavior: belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so on, are
simply certain kinds of behavior or tendencies towards behaviors. One might
invoke the notion of a p-zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from
a normal human being, but that lacks conscious experiences. According to the
behaviorist, such a being is not logically possible, since consciousness is
defined in terms of behavior. So an appeal to the intuition that a p-zombie
so described is possible furnishes an argument that behaviorism is false.
Behaviorists tend to respond to this that a p-zombie is not possible and so
the theory that one might exist is false.
One might distinguish between various types of zombies, as they are used in
different thought experiments, as follows:
A behavioral zombie is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human and yet
has no conscious experience.
A neurological zombie has a human brain and is otherwise physically
indistinguishable from a human; nevertheless, it has no conscious experience.
A soulless zombie lacks a soul but is otherwise indistinguishable from a
human; this concept is used to inquire to what, if anything, the soul might
amount.
However, philosophical zombies are primarily discussed in the context of
arguments against physicalism (or functionalism) in general. Thus, a p-
zombie is typically understood as a being that is physically
indistinguishable from a normal human being but that lacks conscious
experience.
Zombie argumentsMain article
According to physicalism, the physical facts determine all other facts; it
follows that, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical
facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal
conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished,
physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible, or that p-zombies are
the same as normal humans. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of
reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.
Most arguments ultimately lend support to some form of dualism—the view
that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of
property): the mental and the physical.
The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a
general modal argument against physicalism, such as that of Saul Kripke's in
"Naming and Necessity" (1972).[1] The notion of a p-zombie, as used to
argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel
(1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974).
However, the zombie argument against physicalism in general was most
famously developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996).
According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie
world: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking
conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that
is conscious in our world would be a p-zombie. The structure of Chalmers'
version of the zombie argument can be outlined as follows:
1.If physicalism is true, then it is not possible for there to be a world in
which all the physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but
in which there are additional facts. (This is because, according to
physicalism, all the facts are fully determined by the physical facts; so
any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is entirely
indistinguishable from our world.)
2.But there is a possible world in which all the physical facts are the same
as those of our world but in which there are additional facts. (For example
, it is possible that there is a world exactly like ours in every physical
respect, but in it everyone lacks certain mental states, namely any
phenomenal experiences or qualia. The people there look and act just like
people in the actual world, but they don't feel anything; when one gets shot
, for example, he yells out as if he is in pain, but he doesn't feel any
pain.)
3.Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by modus tollens.)
The argument is logically valid, in that if its premises are true, then the
conclusion must be true. However, philosophers dispute that its premises are
true. For example, concerning premise 2: Is such a zombie world really
possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation
is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description."[2] Since
such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is possible; and if such a
world is possible, then physicalism is false. Chalmers is arguing only for
logical possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument
requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they
probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."[3]
This leads to the following questions: What is the relevant notion of
possibility here? Is the scenario in premise 2 possible in the sense that is
suggested in premise 1? Some philosophers maintain that the relevant kind
of possibility is not so weak as logical possibility. They argue that, while
a zombie world is logically possible (that is, there is no logical
contradiction in any full description of the scenario), such a weak notion
is not relevant in the analysis of a metaphysical thesis such as physicalism
. Most philosophers agree that the relevant notion of possibility is some
sort of metaphysical possibility. What the proponent of the zombie argument
claims is that one can tell from the armchair, just by the power of reason,
that such a zombie scenario is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "
From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their
metaphysical possibility."[3] Chalmers claims that this inference from
conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not generally legitimate, but
it is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness.[4] Indeed,
according to Chalmers, whatever is logically possible is also, in the sense
relevant here, metaphysically possible.[5]
Criticism
A physicalist might respond to the zombie argument in
several ways. Most responses deny premise 2 (of Chalmers' version above);
that is, they deny that a zombie scenario is possible.
One response is to claim that the idea of qualia and related phenomenal
notions of the mind are not coherent concepts, and the zombie scenario is
therefore incoherent. Daniel Dennett and others take this line. They argue
that while consciousness, subjective experiences, and so forth exist in some
sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are; pain,
for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental
life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.
Dennett coined the term zimboes (philosophical zombies that have second-
order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is
incoherent[6]. He states: "Philosophers ought to have dropped the zombie
like a hot potato, but since they persist in their embrace, this gives me a
golden opportunity to focus attention on the most seductive error in current
thinking."[7] In a related vein, Nigel Thomas argues that the zombie
concept is inherently self-contradictory: Because zombies, ex hypothesis,
behave just like regular humans, they will claim to be conscious. Thomas
argues that any construal of this claim (that is, whether it is taken to be
true, false, or neither true nor false) inevitably entails either a
contradiction or a manifest absurdity.[8][9]
Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky claims that the argument is
simply circular. By proposing the possibility of something which is
physically identical to a human but has no subjective experiences, the
argument is implicitly assuming that the physical characteristics of humans
are not what produces those experiences. But that is exactly what the
argument was claiming to prove.[10]
Another physicalist response is to provide an error theory to account for
intuition that zombies are possible. Philosophers such as Stephen Yablo (
1998) have taken this line and argued that notions of what counts as
physical, and what counts as physically possible, change over time; so while
conceptual analysis is reliable in some areas of philosophy, it is not
reliable here. Yablo says he is "braced for the information that is going to
make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no real idea what form the
information is going to take."[11]
The zombie argument is difficult to assess, because it brings to light
fundamental disagreements that philosophers have about the method and scope
of philosophy itself. It gets to the core of disagreements about the nature
and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument,
such as Chalmers, think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if
not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal
of philosophical work. However, others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland, W.
V.O. Quine, and so on, have fundamentally different views from Chalmers
about the nature and scope of philosophical analysis. For this reason,
discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.
Under physicalism, it has been claimed that one must either believe that
anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie
– following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or
not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no
different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by Daniel
Dennett who argues that "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have
qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to
this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever
discover!"[7]. While it has been argued that zombies in an observed world
are indistinguishable from the observer (and therefore non-existent) under
the assumption of physicalism, it has also been argued that zombies are not
conceivable. It has been claimed under reductive physicalism, that when a
distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself
(assumed not to be a zombie), and noting that the concept of oneself under
reductive physicalism may ever only correspond to physical reality, the
concept of the hypothetical zombie can only be a subset of the concept of
oneself and will in this nature also entail a deficit in observables (
cognitive systems) thereby contradicting the original definition of a zombie
. This argument has been expressed by Daniel Dennett who argues that, "when
philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably
underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining
something that violates their own definition" [7].
[edit] See also Philosophy portal
Dualism (philosophy of mind)
Inverted spectrum
Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Map–territory relation
Mary's Room
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of perception
Physicalism
Qualia
Swampman
Subjective character of experience
Chinese Room
[edit] Notes1.^ However, note that Kripke's modal argument in "Naming and
Necessity" is against only one kind of physicalism: type-identity theory.
2.^ Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.
3.^ a b Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.
4.^ Chalmers (2004) argues that we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that for
phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference
(or between primary and secondary intentions)." That is, for phenomenal
concepts, conceivability implies possibility.
5.^ Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67-68.
6.^ Dennett 1995; 1999
7.^ a b c Dennett, 1995, p. 322.
8.^ Thomas, 1998.
9.^ http://www.imagery-imagination.com/zom-abs.htm
10.^ http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p2.html
11.^ Yablo, 2000, §XV.
[edit] References and further readingChalmers, David. 1995. "Facing Up to
the Problem of Consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no.
3, pp. 200–219. Online PDF
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hardcover: ISBN 0-19-511789-
1, paperback: ISBN 0-19-510553-2
Chalmers, David. 2003. "Consciousness and its Place in Nature", in the
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.),
Blackwell. Also in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings,
D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford, 2002. ISBN 0-19-514581-X, Online PDF
Chalmers, David. 2004. "Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, no. 1. Online text
Dennett, Daniel. 1995. "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", Journal
of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 322–326. Online abstract
Dennett, Daniel. 1999. "The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?",
Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture. Online text
Kirk, Robert. 1974. "Sentience and Behaviour", Mind, vol. 83, pp. 43–60.
Kripke, Saul. 1972. "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language
, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, pp. 253–355
. (Published as a book in 1980, Harvard University Press.)
Nagel, Thomas. 1970. "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review, vol. 79,
pp. 394–403.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review,
vol. 83, pp. 435–450.
Thomas, N.J.T. 1998. "Zombie Killer", in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak, & A.C
. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson
Discussions and Debates (pp. 171–177), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Online
Yablo, Stephen. 2000. "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts
", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 81, pp. 98–122. Online text
[edit] External linksOnline papers on philosophical zombies, by various
authors, compiled by David Chalmers.
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical zombie entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Skepdic entry on p-zombies
A Qwantz comic on the subject of philosophical zombies
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie"
Categories: Zombies | Philosophy of mind | Epistemology | Internalism and
externalism | Thought experiments in philosophy
s*9
6 楼
对网上下载的300多页PDF扫描文件进行OCR处理(从图形转换为文字)，用的是Adobe
Acrobat 9内置的OCR处理功能，硬件为4核心CPU，8G内存，Win7x64。
结果处理过程中CPU占用只有25%左右(4个core都在工作，load也较均衡)，硬盘也几乎没有读写，共花了40分钟完成，难道
是内存不够快？
Acrobat 9内置的OCR处理功能，硬件为4核心CPU，8G内存，Win7x64。
结果处理过程中CPU占用只有25%左右(4个core都在工作，load也较均衡)，硬盘也几乎没有读写，共花了40分钟完成，难道
是内存不够快？
I*e
7 楼
英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
a*t
8 楼
I like the sharper Image's Ionic Breeze. It works without
noise and does not need filter replacements.
There have been lawsuits and complaints against this
product so you should do some reading and find out if this
is for you.
noise and does not need filter replacements.
There have been lawsuits and complaints against this
product so you should do some reading and find out if this
is for you.
H*r
9 楼
K, 还真有，刚发现了，不过很冷清
【在 H***r 的大作中提到】
: rt
: 我知道我很迷信，ok
【在 H***r 的大作中提到】
: rt
: 我知道我很迷信，ok
x*u
10 楼
置顶了
O*9
11 楼
你又修改乐
J*i
12 楼
4核CPU的话，有可能因为它只能利用一个核
l*r
13 楼
亚洲人与u欧美人口腔舌头喉咙的构造有细微区别吧，影响发音效果。
跟唱歌一个道理，体育也有同样的问题， 差别更明显。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
跟唱歌一个道理，体育也有同样的问题， 差别更明显。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
c*r
14 楼
想帮你，可惜学校宿舍不许养宠物。帮顶一下，要不转去Texas版问问？
a*y
15 楼
是啊，之前贴的总是有问题，中文的是google翻译的，烂
【在 O*********9 的大作中提到】
: 你又修改乐
【在 O*********9 的大作中提到】
: 你又修改乐
s*9
16 楼
4个core都在工作，load也较均衡
【在 J*******i 的大作中提到】
: 4核CPU的话，有可能因为它只能利用一个核
【在 J*******i 的大作中提到】
: 4核CPU的话，有可能因为它只能利用一个核
y*o
17 楼
前阵子那个被obama提名做judge的Goowin Liu，好像说他小时候父母就刻意不教他英文
。呵呵
。呵呵
a*y
18 楼
1. The idea of zombies
Descartes held that non-human animals are automata: their behavior is
explicable wholly in terms of physical mechanisms. He explored the idea of a
machine which looked and behaved like a human being. Knowing only
seventeenth century technology, he thought two things would unmask such a
machine: it could not use language creatively rather than producing
stereotyped responses, and it could not produce appropriate non-verbal
behavior in arbitrarily various situations (Discourse V). For him, therefore
, no machine could behave like a human being. He concluded that explaining
distinctively human behavior required something beyond the physical: an
immaterial mind, interacting with processes in the brain and the rest of the
body. (He had a priori arguments for the same conclusion, one of which
foreshadows the ‘conceivability argument’ discussed below.) If he is right
, there could not be a world physically like the actual world but lacking
such minds: human bodies would not work properly. If we suddenly lost our
minds our bodies might continue to run on for a while: our hearts might
continue to beat, we might breathe while asleep and digest food; we might
even walk or sing in a mindless sort of way (so he implies in his Reply to
Objections IV). But without the contribution made by minds, behavior could
not show characteristically human features. So although Descartes did
everything short of spelling out the idea of zombies, the question of their
possibility did not arise for him. The nearest thing was automata whose
behavior was easily recognizable as not fully human.
In the nineteenth century scientists began to think that physics was capable
of explaining all physical events that were explicable at all. It seemed
that every physical effect has a physical cause: that the physical world is
‘closed under causation’. The developing science of neurophysiology was
set to extend such explanations to human behavior. But if human behavior is
explicable physically, how does consciousness fit into the story? One
response — physicalism — is to insist that it is just a matter of physical
processes. However, the phenomena of consciousness are hard to account for
in those terms, and some thinkers concluded that something nonphysical must
be involved. Given the causal closure of the physical, they also concluded
that consciousness has no effects on the physical world. On this view human
beings are ‘conscious automata’, as T. H. Huxley put it: all physical
events, human behavior included, are explicable in terms of physical
processes; and the phenomena of consciousness are causally inert by-products
(see James 1890, Chapter 5). It eventually became clear that this view
entailed there could be purely physical organisms exactly like us except for
lacking consciousness. G. F. Stout (1931) argued that if epiphenomenalism (
the more familiar name for the ‘conscious automaton’ theory) is right,
it ought to be quite credible that the constitution and course of nature
would be otherwise just the same as it is if there were not and never had
been any experiencing individuals. Human bodies would still have gone
through the motions of making and using bridges, telephones and telegraphs,
of writing and reading books, of speaking in Parliament, of arguing about
materialism, and so on. There can be no doubt that this is prima facie
incredible to Common Sense (138f.).
What Stout describes in this passage and finds ‘prima facie incredible’ is
a ‘zombie world’: an entire world whose physical processes are closed
under causation (as the epiphenomenalists he was attacking held) and exactly
duplicate those in the actual world, but where there are no conscious
experiences.
Similar ideas were current in discussions of physicalism in the 1970s. As a
counterexample to the psychophysical identity theory there was an ‘
imitation man’, whose ‘brain-states exactly paralleled ours in their
physico-chemical properties’ but who felt no pains and saw no colors (
Campbell 1970). It was claimed that zombies are a counterexample to
physicalism in general, and arguments were devised to back up the intuition
that they are possible (Kirk 1974a, 1974b). Other kinds of systems were
envisaged which behaved like normal human beings, or were even functionally
like human beings, but lacked the ‘qualia’ we have (Block 1980a, 1980b,
1981; Shoemaker 1975, 1981). (Qualia are those properties of experiences or
of whole persons by which we are able to classify experiences according to
‘what they are like’ — what it is like to smell roasting coffee beans,
for example. Even physicalists can consistently use this expression,
although unlike dualists they take qualia to be physical. The phrase ‘
absent qualia’ has come to be used primarily in connection with supposed
counterexamples to functionalism rather than to physicalism in general.) The
most systematic use of the zombie idea against physicalism is by David
Chalmers (1996), some of whose contributions to the debate will be discussed
below.
If zombies are to be counterexamples to physicalism, it is not enough for
them to be behaviorally and functionally like normal human beings: plenty of
physicalists accept that merely behavioral or functional duplicates of
ourselves might lack qualia. Zombies must be like normal human beings in all
physical respects, with the physical properties that physicalists suppose
we have. This requires them to be subject to the causal closure of the
physical, which is why their supposed lack of consciousness is such a
challenge to physicalism. If, instead, their behavior could not be explained
physically, physicalists would point out that in that case we have no
reason to bother with the idea: there is plenty of evidence that our
movements actually are explicable in physical terms, as the original
epiphenomenalists realized (see e.g. Papineau 2002).
The usual assumption is that none of us is actually a zombie, and that
zombies cannot exist in our world. The central question, however, is not
whether zombies can exist in our world, but whether they, or a whole zombie
world (which is sometimes a more appropriate idea to work with), are
possible in some broader sense.
object
it
in
【在 a*****y 的大作中提到】
: Philosophical zombie
: A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
: indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious
: experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object
: , for example, it does not feel any pain. While it behaves exactly as if it
: does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us
: that it is in intense pain), it does not actually have the experience of
: pain as a putative "normal" person does.
: The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a thought experiment used in
: arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind,
Descartes held that non-human animals are automata: their behavior is
explicable wholly in terms of physical mechanisms. He explored the idea of a
machine which looked and behaved like a human being. Knowing only
seventeenth century technology, he thought two things would unmask such a
machine: it could not use language creatively rather than producing
stereotyped responses, and it could not produce appropriate non-verbal
behavior in arbitrarily various situations (Discourse V). For him, therefore
, no machine could behave like a human being. He concluded that explaining
distinctively human behavior required something beyond the physical: an
immaterial mind, interacting with processes in the brain and the rest of the
body. (He had a priori arguments for the same conclusion, one of which
foreshadows the ‘conceivability argument’ discussed below.) If he is right
, there could not be a world physically like the actual world but lacking
such minds: human bodies would not work properly. If we suddenly lost our
minds our bodies might continue to run on for a while: our hearts might
continue to beat, we might breathe while asleep and digest food; we might
even walk or sing in a mindless sort of way (so he implies in his Reply to
Objections IV). But without the contribution made by minds, behavior could
not show characteristically human features. So although Descartes did
everything short of spelling out the idea of zombies, the question of their
possibility did not arise for him. The nearest thing was automata whose
behavior was easily recognizable as not fully human.
In the nineteenth century scientists began to think that physics was capable
of explaining all physical events that were explicable at all. It seemed
that every physical effect has a physical cause: that the physical world is
‘closed under causation’. The developing science of neurophysiology was
set to extend such explanations to human behavior. But if human behavior is
explicable physically, how does consciousness fit into the story? One
response — physicalism — is to insist that it is just a matter of physical
processes. However, the phenomena of consciousness are hard to account for
in those terms, and some thinkers concluded that something nonphysical must
be involved. Given the causal closure of the physical, they also concluded
that consciousness has no effects on the physical world. On this view human
beings are ‘conscious automata’, as T. H. Huxley put it: all physical
events, human behavior included, are explicable in terms of physical
processes; and the phenomena of consciousness are causally inert by-products
(see James 1890, Chapter 5). It eventually became clear that this view
entailed there could be purely physical organisms exactly like us except for
lacking consciousness. G. F. Stout (1931) argued that if epiphenomenalism (
the more familiar name for the ‘conscious automaton’ theory) is right,
it ought to be quite credible that the constitution and course of nature
would be otherwise just the same as it is if there were not and never had
been any experiencing individuals. Human bodies would still have gone
through the motions of making and using bridges, telephones and telegraphs,
of writing and reading books, of speaking in Parliament, of arguing about
materialism, and so on. There can be no doubt that this is prima facie
incredible to Common Sense (138f.).
What Stout describes in this passage and finds ‘prima facie incredible’ is
a ‘zombie world’: an entire world whose physical processes are closed
under causation (as the epiphenomenalists he was attacking held) and exactly
duplicate those in the actual world, but where there are no conscious
experiences.
Similar ideas were current in discussions of physicalism in the 1970s. As a
counterexample to the psychophysical identity theory there was an ‘
imitation man’, whose ‘brain-states exactly paralleled ours in their
physico-chemical properties’ but who felt no pains and saw no colors (
Campbell 1970). It was claimed that zombies are a counterexample to
physicalism in general, and arguments were devised to back up the intuition
that they are possible (Kirk 1974a, 1974b). Other kinds of systems were
envisaged which behaved like normal human beings, or were even functionally
like human beings, but lacked the ‘qualia’ we have (Block 1980a, 1980b,
1981; Shoemaker 1975, 1981). (Qualia are those properties of experiences or
of whole persons by which we are able to classify experiences according to
‘what they are like’ — what it is like to smell roasting coffee beans,
for example. Even physicalists can consistently use this expression,
although unlike dualists they take qualia to be physical. The phrase ‘
absent qualia’ has come to be used primarily in connection with supposed
counterexamples to functionalism rather than to physicalism in general.) The
most systematic use of the zombie idea against physicalism is by David
Chalmers (1996), some of whose contributions to the debate will be discussed
below.
If zombies are to be counterexamples to physicalism, it is not enough for
them to be behaviorally and functionally like normal human beings: plenty of
physicalists accept that merely behavioral or functional duplicates of
ourselves might lack qualia. Zombies must be like normal human beings in all
physical respects, with the physical properties that physicalists suppose
we have. This requires them to be subject to the causal closure of the
physical, which is why their supposed lack of consciousness is such a
challenge to physicalism. If, instead, their behavior could not be explained
physically, physicalists would point out that in that case we have no
reason to bother with the idea: there is plenty of evidence that our
movements actually are explicable in physical terms, as the original
epiphenomenalists realized (see e.g. Papineau 2002).
The usual assumption is that none of us is actually a zombie, and that
zombies cannot exist in our world. The central question, however, is not
whether zombies can exist in our world, but whether they, or a whole zombie
world (which is sometimes a more appropriate idea to work with), are
possible in some broader sense.
object
it
in
【在 a*****y 的大作中提到】
: Philosophical zombie
: A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is
: indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious
: experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object
: , for example, it does not feel any pain. While it behaves exactly as if it
: does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us
: that it is in intense pain), it does not actually have the experience of
: pain as a putative "normal" person does.
: The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a thought experiment used in
: arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind,
d*n
19 楼
正常啊，并行运算都要特殊编程的。
【在 s****9 的大作中提到】
: 4个core都在工作，load也较均衡
【在 s****9 的大作中提到】
: 4个core都在工作，load也较均衡
r*f
20 楼
哦,这样阿,有道理啊
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
h*z
21 楼
爱死你了，又给我一个不和孩子说英语的借口
其实吧，我就是英语差，不会说，还是中文对路：）
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
其实吧，我就是英语差，不会说，还是中文对路：）
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
V*8
22 楼
老黑一开口闭着眼睛也知道是老黑
r*f
23 楼
嗯,基本从通电话就能知道的.
【在 V*****8 的大作中提到】
: 老黑一开口闭着眼睛也知道是老黑
【在 V*****8 的大作中提到】
: 老黑一开口闭着眼睛也知道是老黑
e*3
24 楼
我见过有父母英语都不好，老爸口音很重，老妈只会简单英文的，竟然不跟孩子说中
文，说是为了孩子更好融入美国。结果导致家里只有当爹的能跟孩子交流，老妈只能跟
孩子简单对话的，很多时候靠摇头点头来回应的，发神经哦！
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
文，说是为了孩子更好融入美国。结果导致家里只有当爹的能跟孩子交流，老妈只能跟
孩子简单对话的，很多时候靠摇头点头来回应的，发神经哦！
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
l*r
25 楼
你心理作用吧？ 我没觉得呀。
不同地方来的人口音本来就不一样。不过没有中国口音区别那么大。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
不同地方来的人口音本来就不一样。不过没有中国口音区别那么大。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
S*J
26 楼
非得要跟老美一样么，那要修改器官了。
s*y
27 楼
我也没觉得
【在 l****r 的大作中提到】
: 你心理作用吧？ 我没觉得呀。
: 不同地方来的人口音本来就不一样。不过没有中国口音区别那么大。
【在 l****r 的大作中提到】
: 你心理作用吧？ 我没觉得呀。
: 不同地方来的人口音本来就不一样。不过没有中国口音区别那么大。
w*t
28 楼
欧洲人也有很重的口音
F*y
29 楼
555555555555555
我的英文就很烂，:S
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
我的英文就很烂，:S
【在 I*****e 的大作中提到】
: 英文发音不准的老中父母硬要和孩子说英文的恶果
i*m
30 楼
你的sample面积太小
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
s*n
31 楼
我以为这是一个听力show off贴。
【在 i******m 的大作中提到】
: 你的sample面积太小
【在 i******m 的大作中提到】
: 你的sample面积太小
i*m
32 楼
确实，我这么说就等于承认自己不能分辨abc的口音
但是也有很多abc说很纯正的，我实在是想bso我认识这部分abc
【在 s***n 的大作中提到】
: 我以为这是一个听力show off贴。
但是也有很多abc说很纯正的，我实在是想bso我认识这部分abc
【在 s***n 的大作中提到】
: 我以为这是一个听力show off贴。
d*o
33 楼
我怀疑这些孩子中文也说不好。
估计他们在家里说英文，他们的父母也跟他们说英文，天长日久的，他们就染了父母的
Chinglish。
如果父母坚持在家说中文，他们也无从接触不标准的英文，就不会有什么中式英语口音
。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
估计他们在家里说英文，他们的父母也跟他们说英文，天长日久的，他们就染了父母的
Chinglish。
如果父母坚持在家说中文，他们也无从接触不标准的英文，就不会有什么中式英语口音
。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
l*a
34 楼
抱着同哭！！！
想着当初我晚上给小朋友读英文，不是害了她 555555555555
【在 F**********y 的大作中提到】
: 555555555555555
: 我的英文就很烂，:S
想着当初我晚上给小朋友读英文，不是害了她 555555555555
【在 F**********y 的大作中提到】
: 555555555555555
: 我的英文就很烂，:S
w*9
35 楼
美国大部分黑人和很多拉丁裔都有口音。美国白人也有不同文化背景（比如意大利裔）
和地域（比如南方）的痕迹。美国只有个半官方的英语发音：中西部大平原的发音（
whatever that is）。
中国各地的说话习惯和口气，应该也会对小孩有些影响。大部分中国人的家乡应该在长
江附近或以南。其中不少来自地方话不是普通话方言的地区。和普通话比，发音口型比
较拘谨（肌肉更不放松），就像是英国发音口型和美国发音口型之间的区别。喉部发音
更靠上，发气更短。南方人和一些有点南方味道的普通话方言地区（比如南京）的人，
学说美语比（语言意义上的）北方人要克服的困难更大，也许学英国英语比北方人更有
优势。还有鼻音和其它某些音（ch，sh和dg等）会有更多问题。
不少ABC稍微有点口音特点是很正常的。
和地域（比如南方）的痕迹。美国只有个半官方的英语发音：中西部大平原的发音（
whatever that is）。
中国各地的说话习惯和口气，应该也会对小孩有些影响。大部分中国人的家乡应该在长
江附近或以南。其中不少来自地方话不是普通话方言的地区。和普通话比，发音口型比
较拘谨（肌肉更不放松），就像是英国发音口型和美国发音口型之间的区别。喉部发音
更靠上，发气更短。南方人和一些有点南方味道的普通话方言地区（比如南京）的人，
学说美语比（语言意义上的）北方人要克服的困难更大，也许学英国英语比北方人更有
优势。还有鼻音和其它某些音（ch，sh和dg等）会有更多问题。
不少ABC稍微有点口音特点是很正常的。
w*e
36 楼
好专业呀， 你一定是搞相关学科的吧
【在 w********9 的大作中提到】
: 美国大部分黑人和很多拉丁裔都有口音。美国白人也有不同文化背景（比如意大利裔）
: 和地域（比如南方）的痕迹。美国只有个半官方的英语发音：中西部大平原的发音（
: whatever that is）。
: 中国各地的说话习惯和口气，应该也会对小孩有些影响。大部分中国人的家乡应该在长
: 江附近或以南。其中不少来自地方话不是普通话方言的地区。和普通话比，发音口型比
: 较拘谨（肌肉更不放松），就像是英国发音口型和美国发音口型之间的区别。喉部发音
: 更靠上，发气更短。南方人和一些有点南方味道的普通话方言地区（比如南京）的人，
: 学说美语比（语言意义上的）北方人要克服的困难更大，也许学英国英语比北方人更有
: 优势。还有鼻音和其它某些音（ch，sh和dg等）会有更多问题。
: 不少ABC稍微有点口音特点是很正常的。
【在 w********9 的大作中提到】
: 美国大部分黑人和很多拉丁裔都有口音。美国白人也有不同文化背景（比如意大利裔）
: 和地域（比如南方）的痕迹。美国只有个半官方的英语发音：中西部大平原的发音（
: whatever that is）。
: 中国各地的说话习惯和口气，应该也会对小孩有些影响。大部分中国人的家乡应该在长
: 江附近或以南。其中不少来自地方话不是普通话方言的地区。和普通话比，发音口型比
: 较拘谨（肌肉更不放松），就像是英国发音口型和美国发音口型之间的区别。喉部发音
: 更靠上，发气更短。南方人和一些有点南方味道的普通话方言地区（比如南京）的人，
: 学说美语比（语言意义上的）北方人要克服的困难更大，也许学英国英语比北方人更有
: 优势。还有鼻音和其它某些音（ch，sh和dg等）会有更多问题。
: 不少ABC稍微有点口音特点是很正常的。
W*s
37 楼
听出来是ABC又怎样
F*y
38 楼
关键是要听出来不是第一代移民！！！
兰州是想说这个的吧？
【在 W********s 的大作中提到】
: 听出来是ABC又怎样
兰州是想说这个的吧？
【在 W********s 的大作中提到】
: 听出来是ABC又怎样
g*9
39 楼
口腔构造吧，还有就是中文吐字发音对英文的影响。
有点口音怎么了，语言就是一工具罢了。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
有点口音怎么了，语言就是一工具罢了。
【在 r*****1 的大作中提到】
: 好多ABC一开口就让人觉得他们口音和白人不一样，虽然发音标准也流利。大家有这个
: 感觉吗？不知道是
: 不是因为父母教他们中文的结果？
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