先说好俺不是game theory大牛,不许拍砖。 比如有参加auction的有两个人,一个按照1st price auction来bid,另一个按照2nd price auction来bid,我的感觉是最后的结果(who is the winner and how much is the payment)应该等同于两个人都按照1st price或2nd price auciton来bid的情形。 也就是说谁的true valuation高谁赢,payment都是等于2nd highest bidder's true valuation。如果参加auction的有多人,而且有多个item,结果是否仍然是一样的呢? 这个问题可能没什么现实意义,我在网上大概找了一下居然没有什么文献,这种 auction有没有什么特定的名字?哪里能找到一些结论性的东西? thx!
d*u
5 楼
恭喜恭喜!
s*g
6 楼
The free one does not give you any meat, you need $395 to gain access to real materials.
【在 r*****g 的大作中提到】 : 先说好俺不是game theory大牛,不许拍砖。 : 比如有参加auction的有两个人,一个按照1st price auction来bid,另一个按照2nd : price auction来bid,我的感觉是最后的结果(who is the winner and how much is : the payment)应该等同于两个人都按照1st price或2nd price auciton来bid的情形。 : 也就是说谁的true valuation高谁赢,payment都是等于2nd highest bidder's true : valuation。如果参加auction的有多人,而且有多个item,结果是否仍然是一样的呢? : 这个问题可能没什么现实意义,我在网上大概找了一下居然没有什么文献,这种 : auction有没有什么特定的名字?哪里能找到一些结论性的东西? : thx!
z*r
8 楼
这个就是玩儿下,真想要那些资料,开完大会了,到处都有了
【在 s*****g 的大作中提到】 : The free one does not give you any meat, you need $395 to gain access to : real materials.
r*g
9 楼
自己顶
r*g
10 楼
就是说按照1st price auction来bid的那个人expect赢了的话付自己bid的钱,按照2nd price auction来bid的人expect赢了的话付比自己低的那个人的bid。 Scenario 1, one 1st price bidder (with lower true value), one 2nd price bidder(with higher true value), 1 item. The 2nd price bidder bids his/her true value and the 1st price bidder bids as much as he/she can afford trying to win the item. The 2nd price bidder wins, and pays the second highest bid , which is the 1st price bidder's true value. Scenario 2, one 1st price bidder (with higher true value
Good to do some thought experiments, but I got a different answer. Do not forget: Under the first-price scheme, buyers have an incentive to hide their true values. Let me give you an example. We both are interested in bidding a vase. Its true value to me is 100 and its true value to you is 110. We both are utility maximizer. 1)Under the first price auction: I bid $90. In case I win the auction, I pay $90 and get $10 surplus. You bid $100, expecting to get $10 surplus as well. So you win and pay
r*g
12 楼
恩,mm解释的很好,多谢。
【在 g****h 的大作中提到】 : Good to do some thought experiments, but I got a different answer. : Do not forget: Under the first-price scheme, buyers have an incentive to : hide their true values. : Let me give you an example. We both are interested in bidding a vase. Its : true value to me is 100 and its true value to you is 110. : We both are utility maximizer. : 1)Under the first price auction: : I bid $90. In case I win the auction, I pay $90 and get $10 surplus. : You bid $100, expecting to get $10 surplus as well. : So you win and pay