AAPL 这个股票长期FA# Stock
y*r
1 楼
就一句话:
It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
DOW股票，就那回事。
当然，我也不会去short他的。
It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
DOW股票，就那回事。
当然，我也不会去short他的。
t*c
2 楼
不指望大回报，只希望浮出水面
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
S*d
3 楼
过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
y*r
4 楼
大吼一声，苹果你今天在干啥？
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
y*r
5 楼
再加一句aapl的 FA.
steve一死，找第二个aaple要找 twtr 的 CEO.
LOL.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
steve一死，找第二个aaple要找 twtr 的 CEO.
LOL.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
g*g
6 楼
电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
了。
【在 S*****d 的大作中提到】
: 过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
了。
【在 S*****d 的大作中提到】
: 过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
m*e
7 楼
涨势喜人
【在 g*****g 的大作中提到】
: 电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
: 了。
【在 g*****g 的大作中提到】
: 电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
: 了。
y*r
8 楼
就一句话:
It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
DOW股票，就那回事。
当然，我也不会去short他的。
It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
DOW股票，就那回事。
当然，我也不会去short他的。
t*c
9 楼
不指望大回报，只希望浮出水面
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
S*d
10 楼
过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
y*r
11 楼
大吼一声，苹果你今天在干啥？
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
y*r
12 楼
再加一句aapl的 FA.
steve一死，找第二个aaple要找 twtr 的 CEO.
LOL.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
steve一死，找第二个aaple要找 twtr 的 CEO.
LOL.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
g*g
13 楼
电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
了。
【在 S*****d 的大作中提到】
: 过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
了。
【在 S*****d 的大作中提到】
: 过一两年看电动车，手机已经到头了
m*e
14 楼
涨势喜人
【在 g*****g 的大作中提到】
: 电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
: 了。
【在 g*****g 的大作中提到】
: 电动车哪那么容易造。苹果号称要弄个电视，都说了多少年都没动静。汽车难度可大多
: 了。
y*r
15 楼
Tim cook领导aapl
创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
y*r
16 楼
管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
e*r
17 楼
my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
y*r
18 楼
steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
Steve
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
: you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
: Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
Steve
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
: you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
: Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
e*r
19 楼
Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
:
: Steve
oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
:
: Steve
y*r
20 楼
大道至简。
谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
: oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
: oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
B*e
21 楼
Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
e*r
22 楼
same oversimplification... Steve Jobs read your remarks and rolled over once
again in his grave.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
again in his grave.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
a*t
23 楼
收购或兼并tsla，会不会一举两得？
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
: aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
: aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
e*r
24 楼
let me test your knowledge on Jeff Bezos then. Who is Henry Blodget? and why
does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
【在 B******e 的大作中提到】
: Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
【在 B******e 的大作中提到】
: Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
y*r
25 楼
ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
一句话就是： 老大不好当。
今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
下面是转发。
Index Funds
Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
indexes has recently been what one might call a “one way bet”, and there
is good reason for this. Index funds and ETFs have very low fees and have
outperformed the average active manager in recent years. Last year, index
funds were allocated nearly 20% of every dollar invested in the market. That
is up from 10% fifteen years ago. Scroll through the ownership registry of
corporate America and the top three holders are typically Vanguard,
Blackrock, and State Street. As the biggest managers of index funds, they
often cumulatively own 12%, and as much as 20%, of nearly every public
company.
The success of index funds and their use as benchmarks by investors in
actively managed funds lead to even more capital being “closet indexed.”
This is true because the risk of an active manager losing clients is
typically directly correlated with its portfolio’s variance from the
benchmark’s performance. Clients rarely fire a manager for modest
performance below the benchmark for any one year, but client engagements and
mutual fund flows are often lost if the variance is dramatic in any one
year. This encourages managers to invest their portfolios in order to limit
their variance to the S&P, with only slight over- and under-weightings to
sectors or stocks they believe will outperform. By hugging the index, their
performance closely tracks the index, with underperformance attributable to
higher fees and easier to explain away as “We are taking less risk than the
index in the companies we choose to own.”
As more and more capital flows to index funds – and certain index funds
such as those tracking the S&P 500 receive disproportionate amounts of
investor capital – the valuation of the indexed constituent companies
increases. While some investors consider the valuation of the index
components when allocating to specific index funds, many and perhaps most do
not. We would expect that many if not most investors picked an index fund
when they signed up for their 401(k) plans and never looked back.
Index Fund Governance
As index fund ownership grows as a percentage of shares outstanding, the
voting power of index fund managers increases. While on the one hand, one
might believe this is good for America as these “permanent” owners should
think very long term compared with the many investors whose average holding
period is less than one year. On the other hand, there are significant
drawbacks. Index funds managers are not compensated for investment
performance, but rather for growing assets under management. They are
principally judged on the basis of how closely they track index performance
and how low their fees are.
While index fund managers are, of course, fiduciaries for their investors,
the job of overseeing the governance of the tens of thousands of companies
for which they are major shareholders is an incredibly burdensome and almost
impossible job. Imagine having to read 20,000 proxy statements which arrive
in February and March and having to vote them by May when you have not
likely read the annual report, spent little time, if any, with the
management or board members, and haven’t been schooled in the industries
which comprise the index. Consider how difficult this job would be when even
the largest index funds have a hierarchy of only 20 or so people (one per ~
1,000 companies) in their governance departments which determine how proxies
for these companies should be voted.
Consider also the potential for conflicts. Index fund managers are highly
incentivized to grow assets, particularly with the high degree of fee
compression that is characteristic of the index and ETF worlds, and the fact
that there is effectively no perceived downside to scale. Their focus on
keeping fees low makes these operations inherently low-cost and laser
focused on continued cost control rather than investing in building best-in-
class governance oversight operations with sufficient scale to oversee
thousands of companies.
Furthermore, corporate pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of
capital invested in index funds. It does not help index fund managers win
business from Corporate America if they have a reputation for being an
activist or if they support activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true.
If their reputation is more for protecting incumbent management than for
supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner assets from
corporate pension plans than index fund managers who are known to vote
against management.
In 2015, the three largest index fund managers, who owned 18% of Dupont’s
stock, voted against Nelson Peltz and his firm’s (Trian’s) candidates for
the board of directors, in what was described at the time as a major defeat
for shareholder activism. The vote was extremely close as most active
managers voted in favor of one or more of Trian’s candidates. After the
failed vote, Dupont’s stock price declined precipitously.
While we have not done a large amount of due diligence on Dupont, based on
our knowledge of the company and the situation, we believe that the issues
raised by Trian were real, and the company would likely have benefited by
the addition of one or more of the Trian nominees. Fortunately, the close
proxy contest was a wake-up call for the board. Within 90 days of the vote,
the company missed earnings and exhibited continued business deterioration.
As a result, the CEO “retired voluntarily” and the company shortly
thereafter announced a merger with Dow Chemical (NYSE:DOW) to address
problems that Trian had identified.
What Happens When Index Funds Control Corporate America?
If the index fund trend continues, and it looks likely to do so, what
happens when index funds control Corporate America? Courts have often deemed
shareholders to be in control of a corporation with as little as 20% of the
ownership of a company. At current rates of asset inflows, it will not be
long before index funds effectively control Corporate America and the
corporations of many foreign countries. The Japanese system of cross
corporate ownership, the keiretsu, has been blamed for decades of Japanese
corporate underperformance and economic malaise. Large passive ownership of
Corporate America by index funds risks a similar outcome without the
counterbalancing force of large active investors and improvements in the
governance oversight implemented by passive index fund managers.
Fortunately, some of the largest index funds have begun to take corporate
governance more seriously. You may remember from our partnership with
Valeant to acquire Allergan that Allergan had devised various incredibly
restrictive and burdensome notice provisions to call a special meeting that
if we, along with other shareholders, had not been able to overturn, would
have become a model for companies whose management teams seek to entrench
themselves. In light of the importance of this issue, during the proxy
contest, the CEO of one of the largest index fund managers personally
attended our presentation when we met with them to seek their support. Later
, I was invited to spend several hours with the board of this mutual fund
complex to discuss governance issues in greater depth. This institution is
taking governance very seriously, and we hope a more serious approach to
governance becomes more pervasive in the index fund industry.
Certain other index fund managers during the Allergan (NYSE:AGN) special
meeting proxy contest did not take this issue seriously, wouldn’t even take
a meeting on the issue, and did not ultimately support the calling of a
special meeting where the future of Allergan could be discussed, despite the
critical importance of this issue as it relates to corporate control of
every company in the country. This was a serious corporate governance
failure in our view.
As more and more capital flows to index funds, the seriousness with which
these funds approach governance issues becomes even more critical for U.S.
and global corporate competitiveness. While fees are clearly one of the most
important factors for choosing among index fund managers, these funds’
approach to governance is a critically important consideration for long-term
investors to evaluate, as active oversight of Corporate America and global
corporations is essential to the country’s long-term business performance.2
Fortunately, there are important long-term economic incentives for index
fund managers to take governance more seriously. The greatest threat to
index fund asset accumulation is deteriorating absolute returns and
underperformance versus actively managed funds. Index funds have had the
proverbial winds at their backs as large and continuous asset flows support
their performance.
The problem of asset flows without regard to valuation is compounded by the
fact that the most popular indexes are market-cap weighted. This means that
the larger the market cap of the company, the larger its representation in
the index. In other words, as the stock price rises, its weighting in the
index increases, and the index fund is required to buy more of the company.
While value investors typically buy more as stock prices decline (assuming
intrinsic value has also not declined), market-cap weighted index funds do
the opposite. They are inherently momentum investors, forced to buy more as
stock prices rise, magnifying the risk of overvaluation of the index
components.
Is There an Index Fund Bubble?
We believe that it is axiomatic that while capital flows will drive market
values in the short term, valuations will drive market values over the long
term. As a result, large and growing inflows to index funds, coupled with
their market-cap driven allocation policies, drive index component
valuations upwards and reduce their potential long-term rates of return. As
the most popular index funds’ constituent companies become overvalued,
these funds long-term rates of returns will likely decline, reducing
investor appeal and increasing capital outflows. When capital flows reverse,
index fund returns will likely decline, reducing investor interest, further
increasing capital outflows, and so on. While we would not yet describe the
current phenomenon as an index fund bubble, it shares similar
characteristics with other market bubbles.3
Consider by analogy the period leading up to the technology stock market
collapse in early 2000.
During that period, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A)(NYSE:BRK.B) and other
leading value investing practitioners’ portfolios dramatically
underperformed technology stock managers. This caused investors to withdraw
capital from value managers and allocate capital to growth and technology
investors until valuations reached bubble proportions. The tech market
subsequently collapsed, with value investing dramatically outperforming so-
called growth investing in the ensuing years. Last year, a similar
phenomenon occurred as Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 index
by more than 1,300 basis points despite the benefit of the market support
provided from it being one of the index’s largest components.
The fact that most of the investments that we have identified in recent
years have been found outside of the S&P 500 perhaps is suggestive of the
major index components’ relative unattractiveness from a valuation
perspective. It also explains why the shareholder bases of these non-index
companies is comprised mostly of hedge funds and other active managers who,
like Pershing Square, use discount to intrinsic value as a primary
investment consideration.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
一句话就是： 老大不好当。
今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
下面是转发。
Index Funds
Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
indexes has recently been what one might call a “one way bet”, and there
is good reason for this. Index funds and ETFs have very low fees and have
outperformed the average active manager in recent years. Last year, index
funds were allocated nearly 20% of every dollar invested in the market. That
is up from 10% fifteen years ago. Scroll through the ownership registry of
corporate America and the top three holders are typically Vanguard,
Blackrock, and State Street. As the biggest managers of index funds, they
often cumulatively own 12%, and as much as 20%, of nearly every public
company.
The success of index funds and their use as benchmarks by investors in
actively managed funds lead to even more capital being “closet indexed.”
This is true because the risk of an active manager losing clients is
typically directly correlated with its portfolio’s variance from the
benchmark’s performance. Clients rarely fire a manager for modest
performance below the benchmark for any one year, but client engagements and
mutual fund flows are often lost if the variance is dramatic in any one
year. This encourages managers to invest their portfolios in order to limit
their variance to the S&P, with only slight over- and under-weightings to
sectors or stocks they believe will outperform. By hugging the index, their
performance closely tracks the index, with underperformance attributable to
higher fees and easier to explain away as “We are taking less risk than the
index in the companies we choose to own.”
As more and more capital flows to index funds – and certain index funds
such as those tracking the S&P 500 receive disproportionate amounts of
investor capital – the valuation of the indexed constituent companies
increases. While some investors consider the valuation of the index
components when allocating to specific index funds, many and perhaps most do
not. We would expect that many if not most investors picked an index fund
when they signed up for their 401(k) plans and never looked back.
Index Fund Governance
As index fund ownership grows as a percentage of shares outstanding, the
voting power of index fund managers increases. While on the one hand, one
might believe this is good for America as these “permanent” owners should
think very long term compared with the many investors whose average holding
period is less than one year. On the other hand, there are significant
drawbacks. Index funds managers are not compensated for investment
performance, but rather for growing assets under management. They are
principally judged on the basis of how closely they track index performance
and how low their fees are.
While index fund managers are, of course, fiduciaries for their investors,
the job of overseeing the governance of the tens of thousands of companies
for which they are major shareholders is an incredibly burdensome and almost
impossible job. Imagine having to read 20,000 proxy statements which arrive
in February and March and having to vote them by May when you have not
likely read the annual report, spent little time, if any, with the
management or board members, and haven’t been schooled in the industries
which comprise the index. Consider how difficult this job would be when even
the largest index funds have a hierarchy of only 20 or so people (one per ~
1,000 companies) in their governance departments which determine how proxies
for these companies should be voted.
Consider also the potential for conflicts. Index fund managers are highly
incentivized to grow assets, particularly with the high degree of fee
compression that is characteristic of the index and ETF worlds, and the fact
that there is effectively no perceived downside to scale. Their focus on
keeping fees low makes these operations inherently low-cost and laser
focused on continued cost control rather than investing in building best-in-
class governance oversight operations with sufficient scale to oversee
thousands of companies.
Furthermore, corporate pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of
capital invested in index funds. It does not help index fund managers win
business from Corporate America if they have a reputation for being an
activist or if they support activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true.
If their reputation is more for protecting incumbent management than for
supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner assets from
corporate pension plans than index fund managers who are known to vote
against management.
In 2015, the three largest index fund managers, who owned 18% of Dupont’s
stock, voted against Nelson Peltz and his firm’s (Trian’s) candidates for
the board of directors, in what was described at the time as a major defeat
for shareholder activism. The vote was extremely close as most active
managers voted in favor of one or more of Trian’s candidates. After the
failed vote, Dupont’s stock price declined precipitously.
While we have not done a large amount of due diligence on Dupont, based on
our knowledge of the company and the situation, we believe that the issues
raised by Trian were real, and the company would likely have benefited by
the addition of one or more of the Trian nominees. Fortunately, the close
proxy contest was a wake-up call for the board. Within 90 days of the vote,
the company missed earnings and exhibited continued business deterioration.
As a result, the CEO “retired voluntarily” and the company shortly
thereafter announced a merger with Dow Chemical (NYSE:DOW) to address
problems that Trian had identified.
What Happens When Index Funds Control Corporate America?
If the index fund trend continues, and it looks likely to do so, what
happens when index funds control Corporate America? Courts have often deemed
shareholders to be in control of a corporation with as little as 20% of the
ownership of a company. At current rates of asset inflows, it will not be
long before index funds effectively control Corporate America and the
corporations of many foreign countries. The Japanese system of cross
corporate ownership, the keiretsu, has been blamed for decades of Japanese
corporate underperformance and economic malaise. Large passive ownership of
Corporate America by index funds risks a similar outcome without the
counterbalancing force of large active investors and improvements in the
governance oversight implemented by passive index fund managers.
Fortunately, some of the largest index funds have begun to take corporate
governance more seriously. You may remember from our partnership with
Valeant to acquire Allergan that Allergan had devised various incredibly
restrictive and burdensome notice provisions to call a special meeting that
if we, along with other shareholders, had not been able to overturn, would
have become a model for companies whose management teams seek to entrench
themselves. In light of the importance of this issue, during the proxy
contest, the CEO of one of the largest index fund managers personally
attended our presentation when we met with them to seek their support. Later
, I was invited to spend several hours with the board of this mutual fund
complex to discuss governance issues in greater depth. This institution is
taking governance very seriously, and we hope a more serious approach to
governance becomes more pervasive in the index fund industry.
Certain other index fund managers during the Allergan (NYSE:AGN) special
meeting proxy contest did not take this issue seriously, wouldn’t even take
a meeting on the issue, and did not ultimately support the calling of a
special meeting where the future of Allergan could be discussed, despite the
critical importance of this issue as it relates to corporate control of
every company in the country. This was a serious corporate governance
failure in our view.
As more and more capital flows to index funds, the seriousness with which
these funds approach governance issues becomes even more critical for U.S.
and global corporate competitiveness. While fees are clearly one of the most
important factors for choosing among index fund managers, these funds’
approach to governance is a critically important consideration for long-term
investors to evaluate, as active oversight of Corporate America and global
corporations is essential to the country’s long-term business performance.2
Fortunately, there are important long-term economic incentives for index
fund managers to take governance more seriously. The greatest threat to
index fund asset accumulation is deteriorating absolute returns and
underperformance versus actively managed funds. Index funds have had the
proverbial winds at their backs as large and continuous asset flows support
their performance.
The problem of asset flows without regard to valuation is compounded by the
fact that the most popular indexes are market-cap weighted. This means that
the larger the market cap of the company, the larger its representation in
the index. In other words, as the stock price rises, its weighting in the
index increases, and the index fund is required to buy more of the company.
While value investors typically buy more as stock prices decline (assuming
intrinsic value has also not declined), market-cap weighted index funds do
the opposite. They are inherently momentum investors, forced to buy more as
stock prices rise, magnifying the risk of overvaluation of the index
components.
Is There an Index Fund Bubble?
We believe that it is axiomatic that while capital flows will drive market
values in the short term, valuations will drive market values over the long
term. As a result, large and growing inflows to index funds, coupled with
their market-cap driven allocation policies, drive index component
valuations upwards and reduce their potential long-term rates of return. As
the most popular index funds’ constituent companies become overvalued,
these funds long-term rates of returns will likely decline, reducing
investor appeal and increasing capital outflows. When capital flows reverse,
index fund returns will likely decline, reducing investor interest, further
increasing capital outflows, and so on. While we would not yet describe the
current phenomenon as an index fund bubble, it shares similar
characteristics with other market bubbles.3
Consider by analogy the period leading up to the technology stock market
collapse in early 2000.
During that period, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A)(NYSE:BRK.B) and other
leading value investing practitioners’ portfolios dramatically
underperformed technology stock managers. This caused investors to withdraw
capital from value managers and allocate capital to growth and technology
investors until valuations reached bubble proportions. The tech market
subsequently collapsed, with value investing dramatically outperforming so-
called growth investing in the ensuing years. Last year, a similar
phenomenon occurred as Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 index
by more than 1,300 basis points despite the benefit of the market support
provided from it being one of the index’s largest components.
The fact that most of the investments that we have identified in recent
years have been found outside of the S&P 500 perhaps is suggestive of the
major index components’ relative unattractiveness from a valuation
perspective. It also explains why the shareholder bases of these non-index
companies is comprised mostly of hedge funds and other active managers who,
like Pershing Square, use discount to intrinsic value as a primary
investment consideration.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
g*t
26 楼
这个ackman的信我前两天也仔细看了。
我倾向于认为是被汇率拉下来的。
up.
market
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
: 我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
: 细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
: fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
: 一句话就是： 老大不好当。
: 今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
: 下面是转发。
: Index Funds
: Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
: in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
我倾向于认为是被汇率拉下来的。
up.
market
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
: 我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
: 细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
: fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
: 一句话就是： 老大不好当。
: 今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
: 下面是转发。
: Index Funds
: Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
: in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
y*r
27 楼
Tim cook领导aapl
创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
y*r
28 楼
管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
e*r
29 楼
my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
y*r
30 楼
steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
Steve
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
: you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
: Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
Steve
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: my goodness, yyber! Five lines of text and a single one-year chart... and
: you have all the FA you need for the biggest company on this planet. Steve
: Jobs is rolling over in his grave.
e*r
31 楼
Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
:
: Steve
oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: steve要是跳出他的grave，那么我立刻all in aapl.
:
: Steve
y*r
32 楼
大道至简。
谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
: oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: Oh no... he just rolled over... but he's not pleased with your
: oversimplification of the company he has left behind.
B*e
33 楼
Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
e*r
34 楼
same oversimplification... Steve Jobs read your remarks and rolled over once
again in his grave.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
again in his grave.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 大道至简。
: 谈FA，最重要是谈领导者。
: 21世纪什么最重要？人才！
a*t
35 楼
收购或兼并tsla，会不会一举两得？
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
: aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 管理型CEO就只能得到管理型CEO的回报。
: aapl需要的是革命型CEO。
e*r
36 楼
let me test your knowledge on Jeff Bezos then. Who is Henry Blodget? and why
does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
【在 B******e 的大作中提到】
: Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
【在 B******e 的大作中提到】
: Which is why I am going to hold my AMZN as long as Jeff Bezos is the CEO.
y*r
37 楼
ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
一句话就是： 老大不好当。
今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
下面是转发。
Index Funds
Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
indexes has recently been what one might call a “one way bet”, and there
is good reason for this. Index funds and ETFs have very low fees and have
outperformed the average active manager in recent years. Last year, index
funds were allocated nearly 20% of every dollar invested in the market. That
is up from 10% fifteen years ago. Scroll through the ownership registry of
corporate America and the top three holders are typically Vanguard,
Blackrock, and State Street. As the biggest managers of index funds, they
often cumulatively own 12%, and as much as 20%, of nearly every public
company.
The success of index funds and their use as benchmarks by investors in
actively managed funds lead to even more capital being “closet indexed.”
This is true because the risk of an active manager losing clients is
typically directly correlated with its portfolio’s variance from the
benchmark’s performance. Clients rarely fire a manager for modest
performance below the benchmark for any one year, but client engagements and
mutual fund flows are often lost if the variance is dramatic in any one
year. This encourages managers to invest their portfolios in order to limit
their variance to the S&P, with only slight over- and under-weightings to
sectors or stocks they believe will outperform. By hugging the index, their
performance closely tracks the index, with underperformance attributable to
higher fees and easier to explain away as “We are taking less risk than the
index in the companies we choose to own.”
As more and more capital flows to index funds – and certain index funds
such as those tracking the S&P 500 receive disproportionate amounts of
investor capital – the valuation of the indexed constituent companies
increases. While some investors consider the valuation of the index
components when allocating to specific index funds, many and perhaps most do
not. We would expect that many if not most investors picked an index fund
when they signed up for their 401(k) plans and never looked back.
Index Fund Governance
As index fund ownership grows as a percentage of shares outstanding, the
voting power of index fund managers increases. While on the one hand, one
might believe this is good for America as these “permanent” owners should
think very long term compared with the many investors whose average holding
period is less than one year. On the other hand, there are significant
drawbacks. Index funds managers are not compensated for investment
performance, but rather for growing assets under management. They are
principally judged on the basis of how closely they track index performance
and how low their fees are.
While index fund managers are, of course, fiduciaries for their investors,
the job of overseeing the governance of the tens of thousands of companies
for which they are major shareholders is an incredibly burdensome and almost
impossible job. Imagine having to read 20,000 proxy statements which arrive
in February and March and having to vote them by May when you have not
likely read the annual report, spent little time, if any, with the
management or board members, and haven’t been schooled in the industries
which comprise the index. Consider how difficult this job would be when even
the largest index funds have a hierarchy of only 20 or so people (one per ~
1,000 companies) in their governance departments which determine how proxies
for these companies should be voted.
Consider also the potential for conflicts. Index fund managers are highly
incentivized to grow assets, particularly with the high degree of fee
compression that is characteristic of the index and ETF worlds, and the fact
that there is effectively no perceived downside to scale. Their focus on
keeping fees low makes these operations inherently low-cost and laser
focused on continued cost control rather than investing in building best-in-
class governance oversight operations with sufficient scale to oversee
thousands of companies.
Furthermore, corporate pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of
capital invested in index funds. It does not help index fund managers win
business from Corporate America if they have a reputation for being an
activist or if they support activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true.
If their reputation is more for protecting incumbent management than for
supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner assets from
corporate pension plans than index fund managers who are known to vote
against management.
In 2015, the three largest index fund managers, who owned 18% of Dupont’s
stock, voted against Nelson Peltz and his firm’s (Trian’s) candidates for
the board of directors, in what was described at the time as a major defeat
for shareholder activism. The vote was extremely close as most active
managers voted in favor of one or more of Trian’s candidates. After the
failed vote, Dupont’s stock price declined precipitously.
While we have not done a large amount of due diligence on Dupont, based on
our knowledge of the company and the situation, we believe that the issues
raised by Trian were real, and the company would likely have benefited by
the addition of one or more of the Trian nominees. Fortunately, the close
proxy contest was a wake-up call for the board. Within 90 days of the vote,
the company missed earnings and exhibited continued business deterioration.
As a result, the CEO “retired voluntarily” and the company shortly
thereafter announced a merger with Dow Chemical (NYSE:DOW) to address
problems that Trian had identified.
What Happens When Index Funds Control Corporate America?
If the index fund trend continues, and it looks likely to do so, what
happens when index funds control Corporate America? Courts have often deemed
shareholders to be in control of a corporation with as little as 20% of the
ownership of a company. At current rates of asset inflows, it will not be
long before index funds effectively control Corporate America and the
corporations of many foreign countries. The Japanese system of cross
corporate ownership, the keiretsu, has been blamed for decades of Japanese
corporate underperformance and economic malaise. Large passive ownership of
Corporate America by index funds risks a similar outcome without the
counterbalancing force of large active investors and improvements in the
governance oversight implemented by passive index fund managers.
Fortunately, some of the largest index funds have begun to take corporate
governance more seriously. You may remember from our partnership with
Valeant to acquire Allergan that Allergan had devised various incredibly
restrictive and burdensome notice provisions to call a special meeting that
if we, along with other shareholders, had not been able to overturn, would
have become a model for companies whose management teams seek to entrench
themselves. In light of the importance of this issue, during the proxy
contest, the CEO of one of the largest index fund managers personally
attended our presentation when we met with them to seek their support. Later
, I was invited to spend several hours with the board of this mutual fund
complex to discuss governance issues in greater depth. This institution is
taking governance very seriously, and we hope a more serious approach to
governance becomes more pervasive in the index fund industry.
Certain other index fund managers during the Allergan (NYSE:AGN) special
meeting proxy contest did not take this issue seriously, wouldn’t even take
a meeting on the issue, and did not ultimately support the calling of a
special meeting where the future of Allergan could be discussed, despite the
critical importance of this issue as it relates to corporate control of
every company in the country. This was a serious corporate governance
failure in our view.
As more and more capital flows to index funds, the seriousness with which
these funds approach governance issues becomes even more critical for U.S.
and global corporate competitiveness. While fees are clearly one of the most
important factors for choosing among index fund managers, these funds’
approach to governance is a critically important consideration for long-term
investors to evaluate, as active oversight of Corporate America and global
corporations is essential to the country’s long-term business performance.2
Fortunately, there are important long-term economic incentives for index
fund managers to take governance more seriously. The greatest threat to
index fund asset accumulation is deteriorating absolute returns and
underperformance versus actively managed funds. Index funds have had the
proverbial winds at their backs as large and continuous asset flows support
their performance.
The problem of asset flows without regard to valuation is compounded by the
fact that the most popular indexes are market-cap weighted. This means that
the larger the market cap of the company, the larger its representation in
the index. In other words, as the stock price rises, its weighting in the
index increases, and the index fund is required to buy more of the company.
While value investors typically buy more as stock prices decline (assuming
intrinsic value has also not declined), market-cap weighted index funds do
the opposite. They are inherently momentum investors, forced to buy more as
stock prices rise, magnifying the risk of overvaluation of the index
components.
Is There an Index Fund Bubble?
We believe that it is axiomatic that while capital flows will drive market
values in the short term, valuations will drive market values over the long
term. As a result, large and growing inflows to index funds, coupled with
their market-cap driven allocation policies, drive index component
valuations upwards and reduce their potential long-term rates of return. As
the most popular index funds’ constituent companies become overvalued,
these funds long-term rates of returns will likely decline, reducing
investor appeal and increasing capital outflows. When capital flows reverse,
index fund returns will likely decline, reducing investor interest, further
increasing capital outflows, and so on. While we would not yet describe the
current phenomenon as an index fund bubble, it shares similar
characteristics with other market bubbles.3
Consider by analogy the period leading up to the technology stock market
collapse in early 2000.
During that period, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A)(NYSE:BRK.B) and other
leading value investing practitioners’ portfolios dramatically
underperformed technology stock managers. This caused investors to withdraw
capital from value managers and allocate capital to growth and technology
investors until valuations reached bubble proportions. The tech market
subsequently collapsed, with value investing dramatically outperforming so-
called growth investing in the ensuing years. Last year, a similar
phenomenon occurred as Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 index
by more than 1,300 basis points despite the benefit of the market support
provided from it being one of the index’s largest components.
The fact that most of the investments that we have identified in recent
years have been found outside of the S&P 500 perhaps is suggestive of the
major index components’ relative unattractiveness from a valuation
perspective. It also explains why the shareholder bases of these non-index
companies is comprised mostly of hedge funds and other active managers who,
like Pershing Square, use discount to intrinsic value as a primary
investment consideration.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
一句话就是： 老大不好当。
今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
下面是转发。
Index Funds
Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
indexes has recently been what one might call a “one way bet”, and there
is good reason for this. Index funds and ETFs have very low fees and have
outperformed the average active manager in recent years. Last year, index
funds were allocated nearly 20% of every dollar invested in the market. That
is up from 10% fifteen years ago. Scroll through the ownership registry of
corporate America and the top three holders are typically Vanguard,
Blackrock, and State Street. As the biggest managers of index funds, they
often cumulatively own 12%, and as much as 20%, of nearly every public
company.
The success of index funds and their use as benchmarks by investors in
actively managed funds lead to even more capital being “closet indexed.”
This is true because the risk of an active manager losing clients is
typically directly correlated with its portfolio’s variance from the
benchmark’s performance. Clients rarely fire a manager for modest
performance below the benchmark for any one year, but client engagements and
mutual fund flows are often lost if the variance is dramatic in any one
year. This encourages managers to invest their portfolios in order to limit
their variance to the S&P, with only slight over- and under-weightings to
sectors or stocks they believe will outperform. By hugging the index, their
performance closely tracks the index, with underperformance attributable to
higher fees and easier to explain away as “We are taking less risk than the
index in the companies we choose to own.”
As more and more capital flows to index funds – and certain index funds
such as those tracking the S&P 500 receive disproportionate amounts of
investor capital – the valuation of the indexed constituent companies
increases. While some investors consider the valuation of the index
components when allocating to specific index funds, many and perhaps most do
not. We would expect that many if not most investors picked an index fund
when they signed up for their 401(k) plans and never looked back.
Index Fund Governance
As index fund ownership grows as a percentage of shares outstanding, the
voting power of index fund managers increases. While on the one hand, one
might believe this is good for America as these “permanent” owners should
think very long term compared with the many investors whose average holding
period is less than one year. On the other hand, there are significant
drawbacks. Index funds managers are not compensated for investment
performance, but rather for growing assets under management. They are
principally judged on the basis of how closely they track index performance
and how low their fees are.
While index fund managers are, of course, fiduciaries for their investors,
the job of overseeing the governance of the tens of thousands of companies
for which they are major shareholders is an incredibly burdensome and almost
impossible job. Imagine having to read 20,000 proxy statements which arrive
in February and March and having to vote them by May when you have not
likely read the annual report, spent little time, if any, with the
management or board members, and haven’t been schooled in the industries
which comprise the index. Consider how difficult this job would be when even
the largest index funds have a hierarchy of only 20 or so people (one per ~
1,000 companies) in their governance departments which determine how proxies
for these companies should be voted.
Consider also the potential for conflicts. Index fund managers are highly
incentivized to grow assets, particularly with the high degree of fee
compression that is characteristic of the index and ETF worlds, and the fact
that there is effectively no perceived downside to scale. Their focus on
keeping fees low makes these operations inherently low-cost and laser
focused on continued cost control rather than investing in building best-in-
class governance oversight operations with sufficient scale to oversee
thousands of companies.
Furthermore, corporate pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of
capital invested in index funds. It does not help index fund managers win
business from Corporate America if they have a reputation for being an
activist or if they support activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true.
If their reputation is more for protecting incumbent management than for
supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner assets from
corporate pension plans than index fund managers who are known to vote
against management.
In 2015, the three largest index fund managers, who owned 18% of Dupont’s
stock, voted against Nelson Peltz and his firm’s (Trian’s) candidates for
the board of directors, in what was described at the time as a major defeat
for shareholder activism. The vote was extremely close as most active
managers voted in favor of one or more of Trian’s candidates. After the
failed vote, Dupont’s stock price declined precipitously.
While we have not done a large amount of due diligence on Dupont, based on
our knowledge of the company and the situation, we believe that the issues
raised by Trian were real, and the company would likely have benefited by
the addition of one or more of the Trian nominees. Fortunately, the close
proxy contest was a wake-up call for the board. Within 90 days of the vote,
the company missed earnings and exhibited continued business deterioration.
As a result, the CEO “retired voluntarily” and the company shortly
thereafter announced a merger with Dow Chemical (NYSE:DOW) to address
problems that Trian had identified.
What Happens When Index Funds Control Corporate America?
If the index fund trend continues, and it looks likely to do so, what
happens when index funds control Corporate America? Courts have often deemed
shareholders to be in control of a corporation with as little as 20% of the
ownership of a company. At current rates of asset inflows, it will not be
long before index funds effectively control Corporate America and the
corporations of many foreign countries. The Japanese system of cross
corporate ownership, the keiretsu, has been blamed for decades of Japanese
corporate underperformance and economic malaise. Large passive ownership of
Corporate America by index funds risks a similar outcome without the
counterbalancing force of large active investors and improvements in the
governance oversight implemented by passive index fund managers.
Fortunately, some of the largest index funds have begun to take corporate
governance more seriously. You may remember from our partnership with
Valeant to acquire Allergan that Allergan had devised various incredibly
restrictive and burdensome notice provisions to call a special meeting that
if we, along with other shareholders, had not been able to overturn, would
have become a model for companies whose management teams seek to entrench
themselves. In light of the importance of this issue, during the proxy
contest, the CEO of one of the largest index fund managers personally
attended our presentation when we met with them to seek their support. Later
, I was invited to spend several hours with the board of this mutual fund
complex to discuss governance issues in greater depth. This institution is
taking governance very seriously, and we hope a more serious approach to
governance becomes more pervasive in the index fund industry.
Certain other index fund managers during the Allergan (NYSE:AGN) special
meeting proxy contest did not take this issue seriously, wouldn’t even take
a meeting on the issue, and did not ultimately support the calling of a
special meeting where the future of Allergan could be discussed, despite the
critical importance of this issue as it relates to corporate control of
every company in the country. This was a serious corporate governance
failure in our view.
As more and more capital flows to index funds, the seriousness with which
these funds approach governance issues becomes even more critical for U.S.
and global corporate competitiveness. While fees are clearly one of the most
important factors for choosing among index fund managers, these funds’
approach to governance is a critically important consideration for long-term
investors to evaluate, as active oversight of Corporate America and global
corporations is essential to the country’s long-term business performance.2
Fortunately, there are important long-term economic incentives for index
fund managers to take governance more seriously. The greatest threat to
index fund asset accumulation is deteriorating absolute returns and
underperformance versus actively managed funds. Index funds have had the
proverbial winds at their backs as large and continuous asset flows support
their performance.
The problem of asset flows without regard to valuation is compounded by the
fact that the most popular indexes are market-cap weighted. This means that
the larger the market cap of the company, the larger its representation in
the index. In other words, as the stock price rises, its weighting in the
index increases, and the index fund is required to buy more of the company.
While value investors typically buy more as stock prices decline (assuming
intrinsic value has also not declined), market-cap weighted index funds do
the opposite. They are inherently momentum investors, forced to buy more as
stock prices rise, magnifying the risk of overvaluation of the index
components.
Is There an Index Fund Bubble?
We believe that it is axiomatic that while capital flows will drive market
values in the short term, valuations will drive market values over the long
term. As a result, large and growing inflows to index funds, coupled with
their market-cap driven allocation policies, drive index component
valuations upwards and reduce their potential long-term rates of return. As
the most popular index funds’ constituent companies become overvalued,
these funds long-term rates of returns will likely decline, reducing
investor appeal and increasing capital outflows. When capital flows reverse,
index fund returns will likely decline, reducing investor interest, further
increasing capital outflows, and so on. While we would not yet describe the
current phenomenon as an index fund bubble, it shares similar
characteristics with other market bubbles.3
Consider by analogy the period leading up to the technology stock market
collapse in early 2000.
During that period, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A)(NYSE:BRK.B) and other
leading value investing practitioners’ portfolios dramatically
underperformed technology stock managers. This caused investors to withdraw
capital from value managers and allocate capital to growth and technology
investors until valuations reached bubble proportions. The tech market
subsequently collapsed, with value investing dramatically outperforming so-
called growth investing in the ensuing years. Last year, a similar
phenomenon occurred as Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 index
by more than 1,300 basis points despite the benefit of the market support
provided from it being one of the index’s largest components.
The fact that most of the investments that we have identified in recent
years have been found outside of the S&P 500 perhaps is suggestive of the
major index components’ relative unattractiveness from a valuation
perspective. It also explains why the shareholder bases of these non-index
companies is comprised mostly of hedge funds and other active managers who,
like Pershing Square, use discount to intrinsic value as a primary
investment consideration.
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: 就一句话:
: It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.
: 除非公司分拆，否则别指望大回报。
: DOW股票，就那回事。
: 当然，我也不会去short他的。
g*t
38 楼
这个ackman的信我前两天也仔细看了。
我倾向于认为是被汇率拉下来的。
up.
market
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
: 我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
: 细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
: fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
: 一句话就是： 老大不好当。
: 今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
: 下面是转发。
: Index Funds
: Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
: in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
我倾向于认为是被汇率拉下来的。
up.
market
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: ACKMAN 的话，可以解释去年苹果股价的各种不如意。。。。
: 我早给你们概括了：“ It is dragged down by its own weigh, period.”
: 细节很复杂，包括什么growth to value呀，index fund buy when price up,index
: fund sell when price down. The trend continue until value investors come up.
: 一句话就是： 老大不好当。
: 今年应该不一样了，把老大的位置让给GOOGLE就好了。。。
: 下面是转发。
: Index Funds
: Index funds and other passive managers have gained increasing market share
: in recent years. Investing capital in funds and ETFs that track major market
y*r
39 楼
我们急切需要大牛来给鼓鼓劲。这个位置很关键。
why
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: let me test your knowledge on Jeff Bezos then. Who is Henry Blodget? and why
: does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
: By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
: area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
: like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
why
【在 e*********r 的大作中提到】
: let me test your knowledge on Jeff Bezos then. Who is Henry Blodget? and why
: does this name have anything to do with Amazon and Jeff Bezos?
: By the way, you better watch AWS's growth.... once growth is gone in that
: area, Jeff's reality distortion field will lose most of its power. Flops
: like the fire phone ain't going to prop it up.
M*o
40 楼
Tim cook领导aapl会不会像steve ballmer领导 microsoft，miss了everything。股价
十年不振
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
十年不振
【在 y***r 的大作中提到】
: Tim cook领导aapl
: 创造了一个大iphone，一个大ipad，一个小ipad，一个gay proud!
s*r
41 楼
This is a value stock, is priced as such. No worry.
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