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Saudi-Iranian Collaboration: A Forgotten Story
On January 2, 2016, the Sunni government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA
) executed the leading imam of the Shia community in KSA. The Shiite
government of Iran denounced this execution, as did governments throughout
the world, and avowed there would be consequences. Since that time, the
rhetoric has continued to escalate, and the world politicians and media have
talked of a possible direct war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Almost
everyone tends to pose this tension as one that is based on the religious
cleavage between Sunni and Shia that is said to have very long roots into
the past, and defines the present situation based on the religious cleavage
between Sunni and Shia.
While both sides seem to pull back before a direct military confrontation,
there is warfare in Syria and Yemen that is carried out by groups said to be
proxies for the Saudis and the Iranians. Those fighting on the scene in
Syria and Yemen do not seem to be encouraging anyone to act as quasi-neutral
mediators. The groups in both Syria and Yemen are so deeply distrustful of
each other that they seem to regard mediation as unviable. This makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give priority to any strategy
that combats effectively the still widespread strength of the Islamic State,
which the United States (and others) have proclaimed as priority number one.
Our memories tend to be so short-lived that we have forgotten entirely that
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran were once close geopolitical
collaborators. It was not so long ago.
We need not go back to the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932
when Iran gave the new state crucial diplomatic recognition, leading to
Saudi Arabia’s widespread acceptance in the community of sovereign states.
The more interesting period is that of the 1960’s. When the world’s oil
distributors suddenly and unilaterally reduced the prices they were ready to
pay for crude oil, the government of (pre-Chavez) Venezuela suggested to
the government of (pre-Ayatollah) Iran that they meet together, inviting
also Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, to see if there weren’t some steps to
counter this attack on their national income. They were very angry and
blamed both the major banks and oil distributors (the so-called Seven
Sisters) and the U.S. government, which they saw as supporting the banks, if
not actually instigating their decisions.
A meeting did take place in Vienna from September 10-14, 1960. The five
states founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
They invited other states to join OPEC. Over time, others did: Algeria,
Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and
Gabon (which later withdrew).
At first, OPEC was merely a locus for discussion and exchange of information
. When, however, Israel defeated a number of Arab states in the so-called
Yom Kippur War in 1973, with the crucial and overt support of the United
States, OPEC declared a global oil boycott. It was proposed by Saudi Arabia
and Iran. The idea of militant action by OPEC had been proposed previously
by more “radical” OPEC members. But until 1973, it did not have support
either from Saudi Arabia or from Iran. These two states had been considered
the states closest at the time to the United States. Their joint shift in
position marked a major turning-point in the history of OPEC.
But notice the central geopolitical fact. Saudi Arabia and Iran were
collaborating directly. There was no talk of millennial Sunni-Shiite rivalry
. Instead, they were collaborating. And it worked. There followed a major
rise in the world oil price, which benefited both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In 1974, the meeting of the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna was invaded by
supporters of Palestinian movements led by “Carlos the Jackal.” He
threatened to shoot many, especially the Iranian Oil Minister. The story of
how the hostages were finally released and for what price has never been
really clear. There is however one crucial detail. Somebody paid ransom for
the Iranian Oil Minister. Analysts have come to believe that the Saudi
government did it on behalf of their Iranian colleague. Strange behavior if
one believes that the two governments were motivated only by religious
discord.
One final curious moment. In March 2007, there was a meeting of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The KSA
government explicitly invited Iran to send someone to attend. The then
President Ahmadinejad of Iran, considered at the time the Iranian leader
most vocally and unconditionally opposed to any links with the Western world
, accepted the invitation. He was met at the airport by King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia, a great gesture. Abdullah hailed the arrival of “brotherly
nations.” The meeting came to naught, but once again indicated that
geopolitical relations were not governed exclusively by religious criteria.
Why was OPEC able to achieve the boycott and the world oil price rise in
1973 and then again in 1979? What was different then from today in the
Middle East? Two things mainly. The United States was still in 1973 what it
is no longer in 2016, the decisive and geopolitically deciding nation. In
the end everyone had to accommodate to the wishes of the United States, more
or less.
On the other hand, U.S. geopolitical power brought with it pressures. When
it gave its imprimatur to the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War, it needed
immediately to balance this with some gesture in the other direction to
appease at least Saudi Arabia, a crucial ally. There are many who think that
the United States actually gave the go-ahead to Saudi Arabia and Iran to
launch the boycott. Aside from appeasing them, it had the economic advantage
to the United States of strengthening its hand in the trilateral
competition among the United States, western Europe, and Japan.
Where are we then today? Saudi Arabia and Iran have collaborated closely in
the past. It is not at all inconceivable that they may do so again in a
relatively near future. The geopolitical turmoil is very great, and no
analyst should eliminate any possible shift. Geopolitics may again trump
religious differences. This is especially true because of the serious
relative decline of U.S. clout in the region.
Saudi-Iranian Collaboration: A Forgotten Story
On January 2, 2016, the Sunni government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA
) executed the leading imam of the Shia community in KSA. The Shiite
government of Iran denounced this execution, as did governments throughout
the world, and avowed there would be consequences. Since that time, the
rhetoric has continued to escalate, and the world politicians and media have
talked of a possible direct war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Almost
everyone tends to pose this tension as one that is based on the religious
cleavage between Sunni and Shia that is said to have very long roots into
the past, and defines the present situation based on the religious cleavage
between Sunni and Shia.
While both sides seem to pull back before a direct military confrontation,
there is warfare in Syria and Yemen that is carried out by groups said to be
proxies for the Saudis and the Iranians. Those fighting on the scene in
Syria and Yemen do not seem to be encouraging anyone to act as quasi-neutral
mediators. The groups in both Syria and Yemen are so deeply distrustful of
each other that they seem to regard mediation as unviable. This makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give priority to any strategy
that combats effectively the still widespread strength of the Islamic State,
which the United States (and others) have proclaimed as priority number one.
Our memories tend to be so short-lived that we have forgotten entirely that
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran were once close geopolitical
collaborators. It was not so long ago.
We need not go back to the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932
when Iran gave the new state crucial diplomatic recognition, leading to
Saudi Arabia’s widespread acceptance in the community of sovereign states.
The more interesting period is that of the 1960’s. When the world’s oil
distributors suddenly and unilaterally reduced the prices they were ready to
pay for crude oil, the government of (pre-Chavez) Venezuela suggested to
the government of (pre-Ayatollah) Iran that they meet together, inviting
also Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, to see if there weren’t some steps to
counter this attack on their national income. They were very angry and
blamed both the major banks and oil distributors (the so-called Seven
Sisters) and the U.S. government, which they saw as supporting the banks, if
not actually instigating their decisions.
A meeting did take place in Vienna from September 10-14, 1960. The five
states founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
They invited other states to join OPEC. Over time, others did: Algeria,
Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and
Gabon (which later withdrew).
At first, OPEC was merely a locus for discussion and exchange of information
. When, however, Israel defeated a number of Arab states in the so-called
Yom Kippur War in 1973, with the crucial and overt support of the United
States, OPEC declared a global oil boycott. It was proposed by Saudi Arabia
and Iran. The idea of militant action by OPEC had been proposed previously
by more “radical” OPEC members. But until 1973, it did not have support
either from Saudi Arabia or from Iran. These two states had been considered
the states closest at the time to the United States. Their joint shift in
position marked a major turning-point in the history of OPEC.
But notice the central geopolitical fact. Saudi Arabia and Iran were
collaborating directly. There was no talk of millennial Sunni-Shiite rivalry
. Instead, they were collaborating. And it worked. There followed a major
rise in the world oil price, which benefited both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In 1974, the meeting of the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna was invaded by
supporters of Palestinian movements led by “Carlos the Jackal.” He
threatened to shoot many, especially the Iranian Oil Minister. The story of
how the hostages were finally released and for what price has never been
really clear. There is however one crucial detail. Somebody paid ransom for
the Iranian Oil Minister. Analysts have come to believe that the Saudi
government did it on behalf of their Iranian colleague. Strange behavior if
one believes that the two governments were motivated only by religious
discord.
One final curious moment. In March 2007, there was a meeting of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The KSA
government explicitly invited Iran to send someone to attend. The then
President Ahmadinejad of Iran, considered at the time the Iranian leader
most vocally and unconditionally opposed to any links with the Western world
, accepted the invitation. He was met at the airport by King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia, a great gesture. Abdullah hailed the arrival of “brotherly
nations.” The meeting came to naught, but once again indicated that
geopolitical relations were not governed exclusively by religious criteria.
Why was OPEC able to achieve the boycott and the world oil price rise in
1973 and then again in 1979? What was different then from today in the
Middle East? Two things mainly. The United States was still in 1973 what it
is no longer in 2016, the decisive and geopolitically deciding nation. In
the end everyone had to accommodate to the wishes of the United States, more
or less.
On the other hand, U.S. geopolitical power brought with it pressures. When
it gave its imprimatur to the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War, it needed
immediately to balance this with some gesture in the other direction to
appease at least Saudi Arabia, a crucial ally. There are many who think that
the United States actually gave the go-ahead to Saudi Arabia and Iran to
launch the boycott. Aside from appeasing them, it had the economic advantage
to the United States of strengthening its hand in the trilateral
competition among the United States, western Europe, and Japan.
Where are we then today? Saudi Arabia and Iran have collaborated closely in
the past. It is not at all inconceivable that they may do so again in a
relatively near future. The geopolitical turmoil is very great, and no
analyst should eliminate any possible shift. Geopolitics may again trump
religious differences. This is especially true because of the serious
relative decline of U.S. clout in the region.
