判例译析 | 从Unocal案看董事会采取反收购措施的权力以及法院审查标准

译者 | 孙书朋 西南政法大学国际法学硕士

一审 | 刘寅 西南政法大学本科

二审 | 岳文豪 上海交通大学硕士

编辑 | 王妮茜 新疆农业大学本科

         邵娅绮 浙江工商大学本科

责编 | 戚琳颖 大连海事大学本科

从Unocal 案看董事会采取反收购措施的权力以及法院审查标准

(注：笔者在翻译判决书时已经删去原文的引用)

一、引言

该案的判决被认为是美国50年来最重要的公司法判决之一，为美国此后30年的公司并购交易奠定了基础。[1]该判例“创造了美国公司法上具有历史意义的新标准——Unocal测试”。[2]这一测试又被称为“双叉测试”（two-prong test），即“合理相信收购构成威胁，以及对抗措施与威胁成比例”。[3]该测试后被用来判断包括“毒丸”在内的收购防御措施是否合法。[4]本文选译了法官关于董事会是否具有采取反收购措施的权力以及法院审查此类措施应该采用何种标准的论述。

二、案件事实[5]

Unocal是美国第12大石油公司，而Mesa则是前者的最大股东。Mesa向Unocal发出双层收购要约（two-tier tender offer），提出以每股54美元的价格现金收购Unocal公司37%的股份，从而取得控制权。对于剩下的股份，Mesa则提出以表面价值54美元的高风险、低顺位的劣后债为对价进行收购。由于《威廉姆斯法》延长了这一双层要约收购的进程，从而给了目标公司董事会反击的机会。于是，Unocal董事会发起了反收购保卫战。之后，董事会（包括8名独立董事和6名内部董事）举行了两次会议。在第一次会议上，董事一致决定拒绝Mesa的收购要约，而在第二次会议上，董事会批准了自我收购方案，即Unocal向除Mesa以外的股东收购Unocal股票。但是，该项收购附带了一项条件——只有当Mesa取得6400万Unocal股票之后，Unocal才会对剩余的股票自我收购。

（图片来源于网络）

三、法官论述

（一）董事会权力基础

We begin with the basic issue of the power of a board of directors of a Delaware corporation to adopt a defensive measure of this type. Absent such authority, all other questions are moot. Neither issues of fairness nor business judgment are pertinent without the basic underpinning of a board's legal power to act.

我们首先讨论特拉华公司的董事会是否有权采取此类反收购措施。如果没有该等权力，那么其他所有问题都变得没有意义。如果没有董事会的法定权力作为基础，那么讨论公平问题以及商业判断问题也就无关紧要了。

The board has a large reservoir of authority upon which to draw. Its duties and responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers conferred by Del.C. § 141(a), respecting management of the corporation's “business and affairs”. Additionally, the powers here being exercised derive from Del.C. § 160(a), conferring broad authority upon a corporation to deal in its own stock. From this it is now well established that in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office.

董事会可以依靠很多权力来采取此类反收购措施。《特拉华公司法》第141条(a)授予董事会的固有权力衍生出了它的义务和责任，即谨慎管理公司“业务和事务”。除此之外，本案中董事会所行使的权力来自《特拉华公司法》第160条(a)，该条授予公司利用自己的股份进行交易这一广泛的权力。因此，该条款可以证明特拉华公司在收购自己的股份时，只要董事会的唯一或者主要目的是巩固自己在董事会的地位，董事会就可以选择性地与股东交易。

Finally, the board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source. Thus, we are satisfied that in the broad context of corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of directors is not a passive instrumentality.

最后，董事会采取反收购措施的权力还衍生自它的基本职能和义务，即保护公司，包括股东免受其合理注意到的来源于任何地方的损害。因此，我们确信在公司治理这一宽泛的情境下，包括发布公司重大变化时，董事会并不是一个消极的工具。

（图片来源于网络）

（二）合理原则

Given the foregoing principles, we turn to the standards by which director action is to be measured. In Pogostin v. Rice, Del.Supr., we held that the business judgment rule, including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable in the context of a takeover. The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” A hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”

考虑到前述原则，我们现在分析该采用何种标准来衡量董事会的行为。在Pogostin v. Rice, Del.Supr.案中，我们认定商业判断规则（BJR, Business Judgment Rule），包括董事行为判断标准可以适用于收购。商业判断规则 即“推定公司董事在做商业决策时，在知情的基础上，善意、诚实地相信其所采取的行动能让公司的利益最大化”。商业判断规则的特征是如果董事会的判断是“基于合理的商业目的”，那么法院不会用自己的判断代替董事会的判断。

When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment. There are, however, certain caveats to a proper exercise of this function. Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.

当董事会在处理待决收购要约时，其有义务决定该要约是否符合公司和股东的最大化利益。在这一方面，董事会的义务和它所承担的其他义务并无二致，董事会的决定应当和其作出的商业判断受到同等尊重。但是，行使这一职能仍有所限制。由于人们普遍担心董事会可能为了自己的利益行事而非为了公司和股东的利益，因此为了加重董事会的义务，就需要在保护商业判断前进行司法审查。

This Court has long recognized that:

本院早已意识到：

We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult.

我们必须牢记：当有人威胁要控制公司时，公司就用自己的资金购买股份，从而消除对公司政策的威胁，这一做法本身就是危险的。董事必然面临利益冲突，很难做出客观的决定。

In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership. However, they satisfy that burden “by showing good faith and reasonable investigation....”. Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.

董事在面临这种固有的冲突时，必须证明他们有合理的理由相信另一人获得公司的股份会威胁公司政策和效益。但是，董事要想证明这一点，就“需要表明他们是善意的且进行了合理的调查……”再者，正如本案一样，由多数外部独立董事组成的董事会通过了反收购措施，这一事实可以极大地增强证明效力。

（三）比例原则

In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis begins with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation's stockholders. As we have noted, their duty of care extends to protecting the corporation and its owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from third parties or other shareholders. But such powers are not absolute. A corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available.

在讨论董事会行使公司权力拒绝收购要约时，我们首先分析了基本原则，即公司董事会负有信义义务[YWH1] ，以最有利于公司股东的方式行事。正如我们注意到的那样，董事会的注意义务扩展至保护公司及其所有人免受董事会所注意到的损害，无论该损害来自第三方还是其他股东。但是，这一权力并不是绝对的。公司并不享有绝对的自由裁量权，从而使用任何可用的严厉手段去抵抗任何其所注意到的威胁。

The restriction placed upon a selective stock repurchase is that the directors may not have acted solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office. Of course, to this is added the further caveat that inequitable action may not be taken under the guise of law. The standard of proof established in Cheff v. Mathes and discussed supra at page 16, is designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct. However, this does not end the inquiry.

选择性回购股份仍应当被限制，即董事不能仅仅出于或者主要出于稳固自己在董事会的地位而选择性回购股份。当然，还有一条限制就是不得用法律的幌子采取不公平的行为。Cheff v. Mathes案所确立的以及在第16页所讨论的证明标准是为了确保董事是在善意的考虑下为了公司和其股东的利益而采取用来挫败或者阻止收购的防御措施，这些措施在任何情况下都不得存在欺诈或者其他不当行为。但是，这并没有完全回答我们的问题。

（图片来源于网络）

A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on “constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation[YWH2] , and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange. While not a controlling factor, it also seems to us that a board may reasonably consider the basic stockholder interests at stake, including those of short term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the expense of the long term investor.

另一个层面的要素是保持平衡。如果一个防御措施是商业判断的范围内做出的，那么该措施必须相对于威胁来说是合理的。这就需要董事分析收购要约的性质及其对公司的影响。例如，董事可能需要考虑要约价格不充分、要约的性质和时间、非法性，对于股东以外的“选民”的影响（例如债权人、顾客、员工，甚至社会公众）、并购失败的风险、以及证券交易所内交易证券的质量。我们还认为董事会可能还需要合理地考虑利益相关股东的基本利益，包括短期投机者的利益，这些投机者的行为可能会以长期投资者为代价增强要约的胁迫性。

脚注

[1] 张巍：《资本的规则》，中国法制出版社2017年版，第101页。

[2] 同上注，第116页。

[3] 同上注，第118页。

[4] 同上注。

[5] 案件事实整理摘编自张巍：《资本的规则》，中国法制出版社2017年版，第105-110页。

法官论述部分链接：https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullTextfindType=Y&serNum=1985129647&pubNum=0000162&originatingDoc=I1559f7a8eef211e28578f7ccc38dcbee&refType=RP&originationContext=document&transitionType=PLDocumentLink&billingHash=556CDE7EA7AB717C6E230A3491C5CF5F35BD4463E276CA91F49DF08623FD1041&ppcid=7619733fa99a42a2879f8bc1c3049411&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_162_954 （opinion III、IV A和B部分内容）