判例译析 | 最高法院对运营商价格挤压的反垄断审查 ——太平洋贝尔电话公司诉连线通讯公司案评析
译者 | 朱晗 康奈尔大学法学院 LL.M.
一审 | 程子珊 USC LL.M.
二审 | Cindy Wong Leeds LL.B.
编辑 | 邹鹏 吉林大学法硕
李建云 中国政法大学硕士
责编 | 王有蓉 中国政法大学硕士
最高法院对运营商价格挤压的反垄断审查
——太平洋贝尔电话公司诉连线通讯公司案
评析
一、案件背景
掠夺性定价指具有支配力的市场参与者在商品上使用低价，通过阻止新参与者进入市场或阻碍其他市场参与者创新以破坏动态竞争。[1]美国的司法实践采取了一个更明确、也更限缩的定义：掠夺性定价低于成本，并且卖方有望收回损失的收入。[2]需要注意的是，仅仅低于成本销售并不构成掠夺性定价。企业无论是为了处理滞销商品，还是为了提高市场知名度，使用低于成本的定价本身并不违法。[3]通过掠夺性定价，企业希望将竞争对手赶出市场，或迫使他们放弃市场扩张，不论低于成本的售价面向全体买方还是针对特定买方。[4]另一方面，仅仅是日后的价格上涨也不足以构成掠夺性定价，价格本身需要上涨到正常竞争环境下的价格水平之上，额外的收入也需要足以补偿先前低价销售的损失，甚至包括损失的时间价值。[5]尽管这种定价策略短期内对买家有利，但一旦其他市场参与者不再参与竞争，企业就可以大幅提高价格，以收回之前低价销售造成的损失，并有机会攫取可观的垄断利润。[6]
联邦最高法院在Brooke Group案中列出了掠夺性定价的两个要素，不过相关成本的衡量标准尚未明确。[7]各巡回法院在司法实践中制定了各种具体标准，尽管有所差异，但大多基于边际成本或平均可变成本。一些法院建立了推定掠夺性价格标准，如第三巡回法院会推定高于边际成本的定价不具有掠夺性，第六、第八和第九巡回法院则推定高于平均可变成本的定价不具有掠夺性。[8]
当零售层面的价格具有掠夺性，而批发层面的价格又高于合理价格时，其他竞争者就有机会依据《谢尔曼法》第二节提出价格挤压之诉。[9]对于受全面监管的行业，第一巡回法院认为行政监管就可以制止具有反竞争效果的价格挤压行为，因此其他市场参与者不再能提出价格挤压之诉。[10]第九巡回法院则认为，受监管的垄断者仍然可能通过操纵备案文件造成有效的价格挤压，而即使是暂时的价格挤压也会破坏市场竞争。[11]不过，即使是第一巡回法院也没有禁止其他行业提起价格挤压索赔，即使该行业至少一个层面的价格受到行政监管。[12]
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在Trinko案中，联邦最高法院指出通信服务行业受到联邦通信委员会（FCC）的监管，而FCC的监管降低了反竞争行为的发生风险。[13]然而，相比于电力工业行业受到的全面监管，FCC对通信服务行业的监管是否能够阻止所有价格上的反竞争行为并不明确。在通信行业中，对定价行为的审查并不完善；而作为一个快速发展的科技行业，维护市场参与者进入和创新的便利至关重要，这使得法院通过反垄断法审查通信巨头的定价具有经济效益。另一方面，纵向一体化公司的价格挤压也有对消费者有益的一面：不仅仅在于消费者可以少支付一个层面上的商家利润，价格挤压也会消除下游垄断商，即使纵向一体化公司形成垄断，消费者也可以少支付一个层面的垄断利润。[14]
此外，在反垄断法是对企业唯一约束的市场中，法院充当价格监管者尽管效率欠佳，但因其唯一而具有必要性。然而，在具有专门机构监督的市场中，法院作为价格审查机构的必要性将不再令人信服，特别是考虑到监管机构既拥有特定行业的专业知识，也有精通价格监管的内部经济专家。[15]因此，本案中AT&T这样在通信行业的纵向一体化公司，在FCC的监管下是否还需要法院介入价格监管，这种价格监管的标准又如何确立，有待法院在本案中分析解答。
二、案件事实和程序概要
贝尔电话公司（Bell Telephone Company）在1877年于马萨诸塞州正式成立，三年后与美国语音电话公司（American Speaking Telephone Company）合并成为美国贝尔电话公司（American Bell Telephone Company），此后又在纽约注册成立了子公司美国电话电报公司（AT&T）。为规避马萨诸塞州公司法对公司资本的严格限制，美国贝尔电话公司在十九世纪末通过资产转让成为了AT&T的子公司。[16]在接下来的几十年里，AT&T逐渐垄断了美国的电话服务市场。1984年，美国司法部提起的“美国诉AT&T”案以和解告终，AT&T被分立为八家公司，仅长途电话业务保留在AT&T内。分立出的西南贝尔公司（Southwestern Bell Corporation）在1995年改名为SBC通信（SBC Communications），并在2005年收购了分立出的AT&T，随后采用了更知名的AT&T作为品牌名，成为了延续至今的AT&T Inc.。被收购的AT&T最终以AT&T Corp. 的身份作为AT&T Inc. 的子公司继续经营长途电话业务。
AT&T拥有大量必要的基础设施和设备，以提供数字用户线路（DSL）互联网服务。作为之前合并的条件， FCC曾要求AT&T必须将其基础设施使用权出售给与AT&T在零售市场上竞争的独立DSL提供商。AT&T在批发级别向独立DSL提供商提供基础设施和设备，同时在零售级别向消费者销售DSL，从而在批发和零售两个层面上都参与了竞争。Linkline通信公司和其他四家 DSL零售商购买了 AT&T 系统的接入权，以提供自己的 DSL 服务。[17]
2003年，这些零售商对AT&T提起诉讼，指控 AT&T 利用其在 DSL 服务批发和零售市场中的定价能力，通过价格挤压将L其他DSL零售商挤出市场，以进一步巩固 AT&T 在 DSL 服务市场中的垄断地位。[18]加州中区联邦地区法院作出有利于零售商的判决，随后联邦第九巡回上诉法院维持原判。[19]AT&T请求联邦最高法院调卷审理，认为纵向一体化企业并没有反垄断义务为零售商留出足够的利润空间，联邦最高法院批准了调卷令。[20]
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三、裁判要旨
A price-squeeze claim may not be brought under § 2 when the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiff at wholesale.
如果被告在批发层面没有与原告交易的反垄断义务，（《谢尔曼法》）第二节下的价格挤压之诉就无法成立。
(a) Businesses are generally free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.[21] But in rare circumstances, a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for purely unilateral conduct, such as charging “predatory” prices.[22] There are also limited circumstances in which a firm's unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability.[23] Here, plaintiffs do not allege predatory pricing, and the District Court concluded that there was no antitrust duty to deal. Plaintiffs challenge a different type of unilateral conduct in which a firm “squeezes” its competitors' profit margins. This requires the defendant to operate in both the wholesale (“upstream”) and retail (“downstream”) markets. By raising the wholesale price of inputs while cutting its own retail prices, the defendant can raise competitors' costs while putting downward pressure on their revenues. Price-squeeze plaintiffs assert that defendants must leave them a “fair” or “adequate” margin between wholesale and retail prices.
（一）企业通常可以自由选择交易的对象、价格、条款和条件。[24]但在极少数情况下，具有支配地位的公司可能会因纯粹单方面的行为，比如实施“掠夺性”定价，而承担反垄断责任。[25]有些时候，公司单方面拒绝与其竞争对手交易也可能导致反垄断责任。[26]本案中，原告并未指控掠夺性定价，地方法院也认为被告没有反垄断法上的交易义务。原告质疑了另一种单方行为，即企业“挤压”竞争对手的利润空间。这要求被告同时在批发（“上游”）市场和零售（“下游”）市场中运营。通过在提高产品批发价格的同时降低自身的零售价格，被告可以提高竞争对手的成本，同时施压降低其收入。提出价格挤压诉求的原告声称被告必须在批发和零售价格之间留下“公平”或“充足”的利润空间。
(b) Where there is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, a firm is not required to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals' profit margins.
（二）如在批发环节没有交易义务、零售环节也不存在掠夺性定价，企业无需以保持其竞争对手利润空间的方式确定这两个环节的价格。
(i) Any challenge to AT&T's wholesale prices is foreclosed by a straightforward application of Trinko. The claim in Trinko addressed the quality of Verizon's support services, while the claims in this case challenge AT&T's pricing structure. But for antitrust purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between price and nonprice components of a transaction. The nub of the complaint in both cases is identical—the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (upstream monopolists) abused their power in the wholesale market to prevent rival firms from competing effectively in the retail market. But a firm with no antitrust duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its competitors.[27] Had AT&T simply stopped providing DSL transport service to the plaintiffs, it would not have run afoul of the Sherman Act. Thus, it was not required to offer this service at the wholesale prices the plaintiffs would have preferred.
（1）对AT&T的批发价格的质疑都被Trinko案的直接适用所排除。Trinko案中的主张涉及Verizon的服务质量，而本案中则挑战了AT&T的定价结构。但是就反垄断目的而言，交易的价格和非价格部分并没有实质性区别。在这两种情况下，诉求的核心都是相同的——原告声称被告（上游垄断者）滥用其在批发市场上的权力，以妨碍竞争对手在零售市场上有效地竞争。但是，在批发市场没有反垄断法上交易义务的公司无需按照有利于竞争对手的条款和条件达成交易。即使AT&T停止向原告提供DSL传输服务，它也不会违反《谢尔曼法》。因此，AT&T不需要以原告希望的批发价格提供此项服务。
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(ii) The other component of a price-squeeze claim is the assertion that the defendant's retail prices are “too low.” Here too plaintiffs' claims find no support in existing antitrust doctrine. “Cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.”[29] To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, the Court has carefully limited the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that the defendant's prices are too low.[30] The complaint at issue here has no allegation that AT&T's conduct met either Brooke Group requirement. Recognizing a price-squeeze claim where the defendant's retail price remains above cost would invite the precise harm the Court sought to avoid in Brooke Group: Firms might raise retail prices or refrain from aggressive price competition to avoid potential antitrust liability.[31]
（2）价格挤压之诉的另一个组成部分是主张被告的零售价格“过低”。原告此处的主张在现有的反垄断法中也找不到依据——“为了增加业务而降低价格正是竞争的本质。”[32]为了避免扼杀积极的价格竞争，法院仔细地限制了原告通过声称被告的价格过低来提出《谢尔曼法》主张的情况。[33]本案诉状没有任何指控表明AT&T的行为满足Brooke Group案提出的任何一项要求。如果在被告零售价高于成本时还认可价格挤压主张，这可能正会导致法院试图在Brooke Group 案中避免的伤害：企业可能会提高零售价或避免激进的价格竞争，以规避潜在的反垄断责任。[34]
(c) Institutional concerns also counsel against recognizing such claims. This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust law. Recognizing price-squeeze claims would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed. Courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may result in a squeeze. Moreover, firms seeking to avoid price-squeeze liability will have no safe harbor for their pricing practices. The most commonly articulated standard for price squeezes is that the defendant must leave its rivals a “fair” or “adequate” margin between wholesale and retail prices; this test is nearly impossible for courts to apply without conducting complex proceedings like rate-setting agencies. Some amici argue that a price squeeze should be presumed if the defendant's wholesale price exceeds its retail price. But if both the wholesale price and the retail price are independently lawful, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply because a vertically integrated firm's wholesale price is greater than or equal to its retail price.
（三）制度上的考虑也不利于承认此类主张。本法院一再强调反垄断法中规则明确的重要性。承认价格挤压主张将需要法院同时监管批发和零售价格，以确保竞争对手不被挤压。由于可能导致价格挤压的是这两种价格之间的相互作用，因此法院需要瞄着变化的目标。此外，寻求避免价格挤压责任的公司将缺乏定价上的安全港。最常见的价格挤压标准是，被告必须在批发和零售价格之间留给其竞争对手一个“公平”或“足够”的利润空间；但是，如果没有经过费率设定机构那样复杂的程序，法院几乎无法应用这个标准。一些法庭之友认为，如果被告人的批发价超过其零售价，则应推定存在价格挤压。但是，如果批发价和零售价单独来看都是合法的，就没有理由仅仅因为纵向一体化的企业其批发价大于等于其零售价而追究其反垄断责任。
四、判决意见选段
Until recently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required incumbent phone companies such as AT&T to sell transmission service to independent DSL providers, under the theory that this would spur competition.[35] In 2005, the FCC largely abandoned this forced-sharing requirement in light of the emergence of a competitive market beyond DSL for high-speed Internet service; DSL now faces robust competition from cable companies and wireless and satellite services.[36] As a condition for a recent merger, however, AT&T remains bound by the mandatory interconnection requirements, and is obligated to provide wholesale “DSL transport” service to independent firms at a price no greater than the retail price of AT&T's DSL service.[37]
近来，基于刺激竞争的理论依据，联邦通信委员会（FCC）要求AT&T等现有电话公司向独立的DSL提供商出售传输服务。[38]然而在2005年，鉴于高速互联网服务出现DSL以外的竞争市场，FCC在很大程度上放弃了这种强制共享要求；DSL现在面临着来自有线电视公司以及无线和卫星服务的激烈竞争。[39]然而，作为最近一次合并的条件，AT&T仍受到强制接入要求的约束，并有义务以不超过AT&T自己零售价格的价格向独立公司批发“DSL传输”服务。[40]
[…]
As a general rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.[41] But there are rare instances in which a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for purely unilateral conduct. For example, we have ruled that firms may not charge “predatory” prices—below-cost prices that drive rivals out of the market and allow the monopolist to raise its prices later and recoup its losses.[42] Here, however, the complaint at issue does not contain allegations meeting those requirements.[43]
企业通常可以自由选择交易的对象、价格、条款和条件。[44]但在极少数情况下，具有支配地位的公司可能会因纯粹单方面的行为而承担反垄断责任。例如，我们已经裁定公司不能收取“掠夺性”价格——用低于成本的价格将竞争对手赶出市场，使垄断者日后得以提高其价格并弥补损失。[45]然而，本案诉状并未包含满足这些要求的指控。[46]
[…]
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not regard Trinko as controlling because that case did not directly address price-squeeze claims.[47] This is technically true, but the reasoning of Trinko applies with equal force to price-squeeze claims. AT&T could have squeezed its competitors' profits just as effectively by providing poor-quality interconnection service to the plaintiffs, as Verizon allegedly did in Trinko. But a firm with no duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its competitors. If AT&T had simply stopped providing DSL transport service to the plaintiffs, it would not have run afoul of the Sherman Act. Under these circumstances, AT&T was not required to offer this service at the wholesale prices the plaintiffs would have preferred.
地方法院和上诉法院都认为Trinko案对本案不具有约束力，因为该案并未直接提出价格挤压主张。[48]严格来说，确实如此，但Trinko案的推理同样适用于价格挤压主张。AT&T可以通过向原告提供劣质的互联服务从而挤压竞争对手的利润，就像Verizon在Trinko案中所做的那样。但是，在批发市场没有交易义务的公司无需按照有利于竞争对手的条款和条件交易。纵使AT&T停止向原告提供DSL传输服务，它也不会违反《谢尔曼法》。在这种情况下，AT&T无需依照原告希望的批发价格提供此项服务。
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The other component of a price-squeeze claim is the assertion that the defendant's retail prices are “too low.” Here too plaintiffs' claims find no support in our existing antitrust doctrine.
价格挤压之诉的另一个组成部分是主张被告的零售价格“过低”。本案中原告的主张在现有的反垄断理论中也找不到依据。
“[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.”[49] In cases seeking to impose antitrust liability for prices that are too low, mistaken inferences are “especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”[50] To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that prices are too low. Specifically, to prevail on a predatory pricing claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs”; and (2) there is a “dangerous probability” that the defendant will be able to recoup its “investment” in below-cost prices.[51] “Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”[52]
“为了增加业务而削减价格正是竞争的本质。”[53]在寻求对过低价格施加反垄断责任的案件中，错误的论断“代价尤其高昂，因为它们会阻碍反垄断法旨在保护的行为”。[54]为了避免扼杀积极的价格竞争，我们仔细地限制了原告通过声称被告的价格过低来提出《谢尔曼法》索赔的情况。具体来说，要成功建立掠夺性定价的主张，原告必须证明：（1）“被起诉的价格低于对其竞争对手成本的适当估量”；且（2）被告有“危险可能性”能够收回其在低于成本价格销售中的“投资”。[55]“无论价格如何设定，低价总会使消费者受益，只要它们高于掠夺性水平，就不会威胁到竞争。”[56]
In the complaint at issue in this interlocutory appeal, there is no allegation that AT&T's conduct met either of the Brooke Group requirements.[57] Recognizing a price-squeeze claim where the defendant's retail price remains above cost would invite the precise harm we sought to avoid in Brooke Group : Firms might raise their retail prices or refrain from aggressive price competition to avoid potential antitrust liability.[58]
在本次中间上诉诉状的相关部分中，对AT&T行为的指控不满足Brooke Group案任何一项要求。[59]如果在被告零售价仍高于成本时就认可价格挤压主张，我们便会面临在Brooke Group案中试图避免的损害：企业可能会提高的零售价格或避免激烈的价格竞争，以规避潜在的反垄断责任。（通常，高于成本的价格产生的排他性影响，要么反映了被指控的掠夺者更低的成本结构，也就意味着实质的竞争；要么在不创设妨碍合法降价这一无法容忍的风险时，超出了法庭的实际控制能力。）[60]
[…]
Trinko holds that a defendant with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals has no duty to deal under the terms and conditions preferred by those rivals.[61] Brooke Group holds that low prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act when the prices are below cost and there is a dangerous probability that the predator will be able to recoup the profits it loses from the low prices.[62] In this case, plaintiffs have not stated a duty-to-deal claim under Trinko and have not stated a predatory pricing claim under Brooke Group. They have nonetheless tried to join a wholesale claim that cannot succeed with a retail claim that cannot succeed, and alchemize them into a new form of antitrust liability never before recognized by this Court. We decline the invitation to recognize such claims. Two wrong claims do not make one that is right.
Trinko案认为，被告没有反垄断义务与竞争对手交易，也没有义务按照竞争对手偏好的条款交易。[63]Brooke Group案认为，只有当价格低于成本，并且掠夺者具有危险可能性能收回因低价而损失的利润时，低价才会在《谢尔曼法》下可诉。[64]本案中，原告并未根据Trinko案提出交易义务之诉，也未根据Brooke Group案提出掠夺性定价之诉。然而，原告试图将无法胜诉的批发价格之诉与无法胜诉的零售价格之诉结合起来，从而转化为本法院从未认可的新型反垄断责任形式。我们拒绝承认此类主张。两个错误的主张不能构成一个正确的主张。
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
上诉法院的判决被推翻，本案被发回以根据本意见进一步审理。
（图片来源于网络）
五、结语
联邦最高法院最终认可了AT&T并不夸张的价格挤压行为，有趣的是，法院作出如此判决的原因之一正是由于新技术的出现，让FCC不再要求AT&T负有DSL服务的交易义务。[65]时至今日，DSL已不再是主流的高速互联网接入方式，同轴电缆、光纤入户（FTTH），乃至全屋光纤（FTTR）等技术为消费者提供了更稳定、更快速的互联网服务。“反垄断政策处于自身的战争之中”，如果没有反垄断法的保护，诞生新技术的创新将困难重重。[66]本案AT&T受益于反垄断法保护，而这种保护恰恰使得AT&T免于反垄断责任。这一看似矛盾的结构体现出反垄断法的核心在于保护竞争，而非效率欠佳的竞争者，以实现反垄断的最终目标——“高效生产、有效创新，为消费者提供低价”。[67]
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