法律翻译 | 五秒表演没有著作权？明星起诉谷歌删除未上映电影画面被法院驳回

作者｜任沐希 中南财经政法大学LL.B.

一审｜赵文磊 波士顿大学 LL.M.

二审｜廖林风 清华大学LL.B.

三审｜赵文磊 波士顿大学 LL.M.

         廖林风 清华大学LL.B.

编辑｜余卓妍 西安交通大学法本

责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学法本

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

加西亚诉谷歌案

Cindy Lee Garcia was cast in a minor role for a film titled “Desert Warrior.” Though Desert Warrior never materialized, Garcia’s scene was used and dubbed in an anti-Islamic film titled “Innocence of Muslims,” which was uploaded to YouTube.com. After the film aired on Egyptian television, protests arose worldwide and Garcia began receiving death threats. She asked Google to remove the video from YouTube by filing five takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

辛迪·李·加西亚在一部名为《沙漠勇士》的电影中扮演一个小角色。虽然《沙漠勇士》从未上映，但加西亚的画面被用在了一部名为《天真穆斯林》的反伊斯兰电影中，并被配音，这部电影被上传到YouTube.com上。这部影片在埃及电视台播出后，世界各地爆发了抗议活动，加西亚开始收到死亡威胁。她根据《数字千年著作权法》(Digital Millennium Copyright Act)提交了五份下架通知，要求谷歌从YouTube上删除该视频。

When Google declined to comply, Garcia filed for a temporary restraining order seeking removal of the film from YouTube, claiming that the posting of the video infringed her copyrights in her performance. The district court in Los Angeles treated the application as a motion for preliminary injunction and denied it.

谷歌拒绝照做后，加西亚申请了临时限制令，要求从YouTube上删除该视频，声称该视频的发布侵犯了她对其表演的著作权。洛杉矶地方法院将该申请视为初步禁令的动议，并予以驳回。

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Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the panel majority reversed and granted Garcia’s preliminary injunction. The panel issued a takedown order instructing Google to remove all copies of the Innocence of Muslims video from YouTube and other platforms within its control. The panel later amended the order to allow YouTube to post any version of the film that did not include Garcia’s performance.

加西亚向第九巡回上诉法院提起上诉，合议庭多数撤销原判并批准了加西亚的初步禁令。合议庭发布了一项下架命令，指示谷歌从YouTube和其控制下的其他平台上删除《天真穆斯林》视频的所有副本。该合议庭后来修改了命令，允许YouTube发布任何不包括加西亚表演的影片版本。

Google requested a rehearing en banc and the Ninth Circuit granted it. The Court of Appeals en banc concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s request for the preliminary injunction, and as a consequence, the mandatory injunction against Google was unjustified and should be dissolved.

谷歌要求复审并由全体出庭法官听审，第九巡回法院批准了这一请求。上诉法院全席审理的结论是，地方法院拒绝加西亚的初步禁令请求并未滥用其自由裁量权。因此，针对谷歌的强制性禁令是不合理的，应该被撤销。

In this case, a heartfelt plea for personal protection is juxtaposed with the limits of copyright law and fundamental principles of free speech. The appeal teaches a simple lesson—a weak copyright claim cannot justify censorship in the guise of authorship.

本案中，对个人保护的衷心请求与著作权法的界限和言论自由的基本原则是并重的。此上诉传达了一个简单的教训——一个微弱的著作权主张不能借作者之名将言论审查合理化。

Asserting that she holds a copyright interest in her fleeting performance, Garcia sought a preliminary injunction requiring Google to remove the film from all of its platforms, including YouTube. The district court denied the injunction, finding that Garcia did not establish likely success on the merits for her copyright claim. Nor did she demonstrate that the injunction would prevent any alleged harm in light of the film’s five-month presence on the Internet. A divided panel of our court reversed, labeled her copyright claim as “fairly debatable,” but then entered a mandatory injunction requiring Google to remove the film. That injunction was later limited to versions of the film featuring Garcia’s performance.

加西亚声称，她对自己短暂的表演拥有著作权权益，并寻求初步禁令，要求谷歌从包括YouTube在内的所有平台上删除这部电影。地方法院驳回了这一禁令，认为加西亚并未证实她的著作权主张有取得成功的可能性。她也没有证明在电影已经在互联网上流传了五个月的情况下，禁制令能防止任何据称的损害。本院的一个意见分歧的合议庭推翻了这一观点，将她的著作权主张标记为“相当值得商榷”，但随后判决强制禁令，要求谷歌删除这部电影。这一禁令后来被限制在有加西亚表演的电影版本上。

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As Garcia characterizes it, “the main issue in this case involves the vicious frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film caused among certain radical elements of the Muslim community.” We are sympathetic to her plight. Nonetheless, the claim against Google is grounded in copyright law, not privacy, emotional distress, or tort law, and Garcia seeks to impose speech restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster rather than repress free expression. Garcia’s theory can be likened to “copyright cherry picking,” which would enable any contributor from a costume designer down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and pieces of a unitary motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the Copyright Act. Putting aside the rhetoric of Hollywood hijinks and the dissent’s dramatics, this case must be decided on the law.

正如加西亚所描述的那样，“这个案子的主要问题是，这部电影在穆斯林社区的某些激进分子中引起了对加西亚女士的恶性狂热。”我们对她的困境表示同情。尽管如此，对谷歌的索赔是基于著作权法，而不是隐私、情绪困扰或侵权法，而加西亚试图根据这部旨在促进而不是压制言论自由的著作权法施加言论限制。加西亚的理论可以被比作“对著作权的择优适用”，这使得任何贡献者，从服装设计师到临时演员或伴郎，都可以在不满足著作权法要求的情况下，对一部电影的随机片段声称享有著作权。抛开好莱坞狂欢的花言巧语和异议法官的戏剧技术理论，这个案子必须由法律来裁决。

In light of the Copyright Act’s requirements of an “original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), the mismatch between Garcia’s copyright claim and the relief sought, and the Copyright Office’s rejection of Garcia’s application for a copyright in her brief performance, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s request for the preliminary injunction. As a consequence, the panel’s mandatory injunction against Google was unjustified and is dissolved upon publication of this opinion.

《著作权法》关于“附着于任何有形媒介的原创作品[]”的要求，即《美国法典》第17编第102(a)条，加西亚的著作权主张与所寻求的救济之间的不匹配，以及著作权局拒绝了加西亚就其简短表演的著作权申请，我们得出结论：地方法院在拒绝加西亚的初步禁令请求时没有滥用其自由裁量权。因此，合议庭对谷歌的强制禁令是不合理的，并在该意见公布后被撤销。

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Garcia sued under a slew of legal theories, but she moved for a preliminary injunction on just one of them: the copyright claim. Hence, copyright is the only basis for the appeal. Garcia’s tort allegations—and claimed harm resulting from those torts, such as emotional distress—do not figure into our analysis.

加西亚根据一系列法律理论提起诉讼，但她只针对其中之一申请了初步禁令:著作权索赔。因此，著作权是上诉的唯一依据。加西亚的侵权指控——以及侵权行为所造成的损害，如精神困扰——不在我们的分析范围之内。

The district court’s order denying Garcia’s motion for a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Because our review is deferential, “[w]e will not reverse the district court where it ‘got the law right,’ even if we ‘would have arrived at a different result,’ so long as the district court did not clearly err in its factual determinations.”

地区法院驳回加西亚初步禁令动议的命令因滥用自由裁量权而复审。由于我们的复审是尊让的，“只要地方法院在其事实认定中没有明显错误，我们就不会推翻地方法院‘适用法律正确’的判决，即使我们‘会得出不同的结果’。”

The Supreme Court has emphasized that preliminary injunctions are an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The district court correctly identified that Garcia must satisfy Winter’s four-factor test. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

最高法院在Winter诉NRDC案中强调，初步禁令是一种“从未被当作正当权利的特殊救济”。地区法院正确地认定加西亚必须满足Winter的四要素测试。“寻求初步禁令的原告必须表明：(1)她在实体上有胜诉可能性，(2)在没有初步救济的情况下，她很可能遭受无法弥补的伤害，(3)权益平衡对她有利，(4)禁令符合公共利益。”Farris诉Seabrook案(引用Winter,555美国判例第20段)。

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The first factor under Winter is the most important—likely success on the merits. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“We begin with the first and most important factor: whether petitioners have established a likelihood of success on the merits.”). Because it is a threshold inquiry, when “a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, we ‘need not consider the remaining three [Winter elements].’” Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting DISH Network Corp. v. F.C.C., 653 F.3d 771, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Winter测试中的第一个要素是最重要的——实体胜诉可能性。Aamer诉Obama案（“我们从第一个也是最重要的因素开始：上诉人是否根据案情建立了胜诉可能性。”）。因为这是一个门槛性的调查，当“原告未能证明在实体上的胜诉可能性时，我们不需要考虑其余三个[Winter要素]。”Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec诉Harris案)(引DISH Network Corp诉F.C.C案）。

Garcia’s burden here is doubly demanding: Because Garcia seeks a mandatory injunction, she must establish that the law and facts clearly favor her position, not simply that she is likely to succeed.

加西亚在这里的举证责任更重：因为加西亚寻求强制性禁令，她必须证明法律和事实明显有利于她的立场，而不仅仅是她可能会胜诉。

Why? Garcia’s requested injunction required Google to take affirmative action—to remove (and to keep removing) Innocence of Muslimsfrom YouTube and other sites under its auspices, whenever and by whomever the film was uploaded. This relief is treated as a mandatory injunction, because it “orders a responsible party to ‘take action.’” As we have cautioned, a mandatory injunction “goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.”The “district court should deny such relief ‘unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.’”In plain terms, mandatory injunctions should not issue in “doubtful cases.”

为什么?加西亚请求的禁令要求谷歌采取积极措施——从YouTube和其他由其赞助的网站上删除（并持续删除）《天真穆斯林》，无论何时由谁上传该影片。这种救济被视为强制性禁令，因为它“命令责任方‘采取行动’”。正如我们所警告的那样，强制性禁令“远远超出了简单地在判决未定时维持现有状态[并且]特别不常采用。”除非事实和法律明显有利于申请方，否则“地方法院应拒绝此类救济”。通俗地说，强制性禁令不应在“有疑问的案件”中签发。

As we shall see, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Garcia was not likely to succeed on her copyright claim—much less that the law and facts clearly compel suppression of a controversial and politically significant film.

正如我们看到的，地方法院得出加西亚难以在她的著作权诉讼中胜诉的结论时，并没有滥用其自由裁量权——远远不及法律和事实明显迫使一部有争议和政治意义的电影受到压制。

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A.COPYRIGHT

A.著作权

The central question is whether the law and facts clearly favor Garcia’s claim to a copyright in her five-second acting performance as it appears in Innocence of Muslims. The answer is no. This conclusion does not mean that a plaintiff like Garcia is without options or that she couldn’t have sought an injunction against different parties or on other legal theories, like the right of publicity and defamation.

核心问题是，法律和事实是否明确支持加西亚对她在《天真穆斯林》中五秒钟表演的著作权主张。答案是否定的。这一结论并不意味着像加西亚这样的原告没有选择，也不意味着她不能针对另外的当事人或依靠其他法律理论，如名誉权和诽谤，寻求禁令。

Under the Copyright Act, “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . [including] motion pictures.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). That fixation must be done “by or under the authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Benchmarked against this statutory standard, the law does not clearly favor Garcia’s position.

根据《著作权法》，“[c]著作权保护存在于……固定在任何有形表达媒介上的原创作品……(包括)电影。”《美国法典》第102(a)条。该固定必须“由作者或在作者授权下”完成。《美国法典》第101条。以这一法定标准为基准，该法律并不明显支持加西亚的立场。

The statute purposefully left “works of authorship” undefined to provide for some flexibility. Nevertheless, several other provisions provide useful guidance. An audiovisual work is one that consists of “a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown” by machines or other electronic equipment, plus “accompanying sounds.” In turn, a “motion picture” is an “audiovisual work[] consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.” These two definitions embody the work here: Innocence of Muslims is an audiovisual work that is categorized as a motion picture and is derivative of the script. Garcia is the author of none of this and makes no copyright claim to the film or to the script. Instead, Garcia claims that her five-second performance itself merits copyright protection.

该法规有意不定义“作者作品”，以提供一定的灵活性。然而，其他几个条款提供了有用的指导。视听作品是指由机器或其他电子设备“一系列内在意图显示的相关图像”以及“伴随的声音”组成的作品。反过来，“电影”是“由一系列相关图像组成的视听作品[]，这些图像在连续放映时，与伴随的声音（如果有的话）一起给人一种运动的印象。”这两个定义体现了这里的作品:《天真穆斯林》是一部视听作品，被归类为电影，是剧本的衍生品。加西亚不是这一切的作者，也没有对电影或剧本提出著作权要求。相反，加西亚声称她的五秒钟表演本身就应该受到著作权保护。

In the face of this statutory scheme, it comes as no surprise that during this litigation, the Copyright Office found that Garcia’s performance was not a copyrightable work when it rejected her copyright application. The Copyright Office explained that its “longstanding practices do not allow a copyright claim by an individual actor or actress in his or her performance contained within a motion picture.” Thus, “[f]or copyright registration purposes, a motion picture is a single integrated work. . . . Assuming Ms. Garcia’s contribution was limited to her acting performance, we cannot register her performance apart from the motion picture.”

在这一法定机制下，毫不奇怪，在这场诉讼中，著作权局在拒绝加西亚的著作权申请时认为她的表演不属于受著作权保护的作品。著作权局解释说，其“长期以来的做法不允许单个演员在电影中的表演中提出著作权主张。”因此，“[f]出于著作权注册的目的，一部电影是一个单一的完整作品. . . .假设加西亚女士的贡献仅限于她的表演，我们不能将她的表演与电影分开来登记。”

We credit this expert opinion of the Copyright Office—the office charged with administration and enforcement of the copyright laws and registration.

我们相信著作权局的这一专家意见，著作权局负责著作权法的管理和执行以及著作权登记。

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The Copyright Act provides that when a work is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,” the work becomes a “joint work” with two or more authors. Garcia unequivocally disclaims joint authorship of the film.

《著作权法》规定，当一部作品“由两个或两个以上的作者准备，意图将他们的贡献合并为一个统一整体中不可分割或相互依存的部分”时，该作品就成为两个或两个以上作者的“共同作品”。加西亚明确否认对影片的共同作者身份。

In Aalmuhammed, we concluded that defining a “work” based upon “some minimal level of creativity or originality . . . would be too broad and indeterminate to be useful.”

在Aalmuhammed案中，我们得出结论，基于“某种最低限度的创造力或原创性……”定义“作品”将太过宽泛和不确定而不起作用。

So many people might qualify as an “author” if the question were limited to whether they made a substantial creative contribution that that test would not distinguish one from another.

如果这个问题仅限于他们是否做出了实质性的创造性贡献，那么很多人可能都有资格成为“作者”，以至于这个测试无法将他们区分开来。

Treating every acting performance as an independent work would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it would turn cast of thousands into a new mantra: copyright of thousands.

把每场表演都当成独立的作品来处理，不仅是后勤和财务上的噩梦，还会把成千上万的演员阵容变成一个新的口号：成千上万的著作权。

The reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire doctrine govern much of the big-budget Hollywood performance and production world.Absent these formalities, courts have looked to implied licenses.Indeed, the district court found that Garcia granted Youssef just such an implied license to incorporate her performance into the film.But these legal niceties do not necessarily dictate whether something is protected by copyright, and licensing has its limitations.

现实情况是，合同和职务作品条款在很大程度上支配着大预算的好莱坞演出和制片领域。在没有这些手续的情况下，法院会考虑默示许可。事实上，地区法院发现，加西亚授予了Youssef将她的表演纳入电影的默示许可。但这些法律上的细微之处并不一定能决定某物是否受著作权保护，许可也有其局限性。

Garcia’s copyright claim faces yet another statutory barrier: She never fixed her acting performance in a tangible medium, as required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”)According to the Supreme Court, “the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”Garcia did nothing of the sort.

加西亚的著作权主张还面临着另一个法定障碍:她从未按照《美国法典》第17章第101条的要求，将她的表演固定在有形的表达媒介中（“当作品在副本或唱片中的体现，由作者或在作者的授权下，足够永久或稳定，允许其在一段时间内被感知、复制或以其他方式传播时，作品就被‘固定’在有形的表达媒介中。”）根据最高法院的说法，“作者是实际创作作品的一方，也即是将一个想法转化为固定的、有形的表达方式的人。这样的人有权获得著作权保护。”加西亚并没有这样做。

For better or for worse, Youssef and his crew “fixed” Garcia’s performance in the tangible medium, whether in physical film or in digital form. However one might characterize Garcia’s performance, she played no role in fixation. On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the film or her cameo in it was fixed “by or under [her] authority.”

不管是好是坏，Youssef和他的工作人员用有形的媒介“固定”了加西亚的表演，无论是用实体电影还是数字形式。无论人们如何描述加西亚的表现，她都没有在固定中扮演任何角色。最重要的是，加西亚声称她从未同意电影的最终版本，也没有同意她在《天真穆斯林》中的形象，所以她很难说这部电影或她在其中的客串是“由(她)授权或在(她)授权下”确定的。

In sum, the district court committed no error in its copyright analysis. Issuance of the mandatory preliminary injunction requires more than a possible or fairly debatable claim; it requires a showing that the law “clearly favor[s]” Garcia.Because neither the Copyright Act nor the Copyright Office’s interpretation supports Garcia’s claim, this is a hurdle she cannot clear.

总之，地方法院在著作权分析上没有错误。发布强制性初步禁令需要的不仅仅是一个可能的或相当有争议的主张；它需要证明法律“明显支持”加西亚。因为《著作权法》和著作权局的解释都不支持加西亚的主张，这是她无法逾越的障碍。

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B.IRREPARABLE HARM

B.不可弥补的伤害

The difficulty with Garcia’s claim is that there is a mismatch between her substantive copyright claim and the dangers she hopes to remedy through an injunction. Garcia seeks a preliminary injunction under copyright law, not privacy, fraud, false light or any other tort-based cause of action. Hence, Garcia’s harm must stem from copyright—namely, harm to her legal interests as an author.

加西亚主张的困难在于，她的实质性著作权主张与她希望通过禁令来补救的危险之间存在不匹配。加西亚根据著作权法寻求初步禁令，而不是隐私、欺诈、歪曲报道或任何其他侵权行为。因此，加西亚受到的伤害一定源于著作权——也就是说，她作为作者的合法权益受到了损害。

This relief is not easily achieved under copyright law. Although we do not take lightly threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her harms are untethered from—and incompatible with—copyright and copyright’s function as the engine of expression.

这种救济在著作权法下是不容易实现的。虽然我们不能轻视加西亚所承受的生命威胁或情绪困扰，但她的伤害与著作权和著作权作为表达工具的功能无关，也不相容。

In broad terms, “the protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law. . . . To the contrary, the copyright law offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative work of the author.” Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bond and “pointedly” noting copyright cases are analyzed “only under copyright principles, not privacy law”).

从广义上讲，“保护隐私不是著作权法的功能. . . .相反，著作权法提供了有限的垄断，以鼓励公众最终可以使用作者的创造性作品。”见Bond诉Blum案；另见Monge诉Maya Magazines,Inc案（引用Bond并“明确地”指出著作权案件“仅根据版著作权原则，而非隐私法”进行分析）。

Likewise, authors cannot seek emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act, because such damages are unrelated to the value and marketability of their works.

同样，根据著作权法，作者也不能要求精神损害赔偿，因为这种损害赔偿与作品的价值和可销售性无关。

Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to Garcia’s personal and reputational harms. On that point, we offer no substantive view. Ultimately, Garcia would like to have her connection to the film forgotten and stripped from YouTube. Unfortunately for Garcia, such a “right to be forgotten,” although recently affirmed by the Court of Justice for the European Union, is not recognized in the UnitedStates.

隐私法，而不是著作权法，可能会为加西亚的个人和名誉损害提供量身定制的补救措施。在这一点上，我们不提供实质性的意见。最终，加西亚希望她与这部电影的联系被遗忘，并从YouTube上删除。对加西亚来说不幸的是，尽管最近欧盟法院确认了这种“被遗忘的权利”，但在美国却不被承认。

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Garcia failed to muster a clear showing of irreparable harm.

在裁定加西亚未能提出无法弥补的损害的明确证据这一点上，地区法院没有滥用其自由裁量权。

In the face of a doubtful copyright claim and the absence of irreparable harm to Garcia’s interests as an author, we need not consider the final two Winter factors, the balance of equities and public interest.

面对令人怀疑的著作权主张和加西亚作为作者的利益不存在不可弥补的损害，我们不需要考虑最后两个Winter因素，即利益平衡和公共利益。

（图片源于网络）

In February 2014, the panel majority issued the following injunction: “Google, Inc. shall take down all copies of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ from YouTube.com and from any other platforms under Google’s control, and take all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ to those platforms.” Soon after, the panel amended the order to state that the prohibition did “not preclude the posting or display of any version of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ that does not include Cindy Lee Garcia’s performance.”

2014年2月，合议庭多数发布了以下禁令：“谷歌公司应从YouTube.com和谷歌控制下的任何其他平台上删除所有《天真穆斯林》的副本，并采取一切合理措施防止《天真穆斯林》进一步上传到这些平台。”不久之后，合议庭修改了该命令，声明该禁令“不阻止发布或展示任何不包括辛迪李加西亚表演的版本的《天真穆斯林》”。

Although the first order was more sweeping, the second cast the court in the uneasy role of film editor. The amendment only mattered if Google assumed authority to change the content of someone else’s copyrighted film. To no one’s surprise, the end result was the same: the entire film remained removed from YouTube.

虽然第一个命令的范围更广，但第二个命令让法院扮演了电影剪辑师这个令人不安的角色。这项修正案只有在谷歌有权改变别人的著作权电影内容的情况下才有意义。不出所料，最终的结果是一样的：整部电影仍然从YouTube上被移除。

The takedown order was unwarranted and incorrect as a matter of law, as we have explained above. It also gave short shrift to the First Amendment values at stake. The mandatory injunction censored and suppressed a politically significant film—based upon a dubious and unprecedented theory of copyright. In so doing, the panel deprived the public of the ability to view firsthand, and judge for themselves, a film at the center of an international uproar.

正如我们上面所解释的那样，从法律上讲，下架命令是毫无根据和不正确的。它也忽视了第一修正案的价值。这项强制性禁令审查和压制了一部具有政治意义的电影，这部电影基于一种可疑的、前所未有的著作权理论。在这样做的过程中，合议庭剥夺了公众观看第一手资料并自行判断一部处于国际骚动中心的电影的能力。

Although the intersection between copyright and the First Amendment is much-debated, the Supreme Court teaches that copyright is not “categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”The panel’s takedown order of a film of substantial interest to the public is a classic prior restraint of speech.Prior restraints pose the “most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,”, and Garcia cannot overcome the historical and heavy presumption against such restraints with a thin copyright claim in a five-second performance.

尽管著作权与第一修正案之间的交集备受争议，但最高法院认为，著作权并非“绝对不受第一修正案的挑战”。该合议庭对一部对公众有重大利益的电影下达下架令，是一个典型的事先限制言论的案例。事前的限制构成“对第一修正案权利的最严重和最不可容忍的侵犯”。加西亚无法用五秒的表演，以单薄的著作权主张，克服对此类约束的有历史依据的、强有力的推定。

The amended injunction issued February 28, 2014 is dissolved immediately and has no force or effect.

2014年2月28日发布的修正禁令立即解除，不再具有任何效力。

（图片源于网络）

该案讨论了加西亚在电影“Innocence of Muslims”中的五秒表演是否应该受到著作权保护的问题。法官的论证思路围绕初步禁令的满足标准展开，在论述中首先指出初步禁令是一种特殊的救济措施，不是作为权利的自然结果而授予的。法院引用了Winter诉NRDC案件中最高法院的观点，强调了这一点。法院接着提到，原告必须满足Winter案中的四个因素测试，才能获得初步禁令。这四个因素是：实体胜诉可能性；原告在缺乏初步救济的情况下可能遭受无法弥补的损害；权衡利益倾向于原告；禁令符合公共利益。在本案中，原告Garcia需要满足更高的要求，因为她寻求的是强制性禁令。法院解释说，强制性禁令要求被告采取积极行动，而不仅仅是维持现状。因此，原告必须明确证明法律和事实明确支持她的立场，而不仅仅是有可能获得成功。法院还提到，强制性禁令在法律上是不被青睐的，应当在“有疑问的情况下”不予颁发。

判决书中提到了著作权法的相关法律和规定，包括著作权法第102(a)条规定的原创作品受著作权保护、作品必须通过作者或在作者授权下进行固定等。根据判决书，法院认为该演员的表演不符合著作权法的要求，即“在任何有形媒介上固定的原创作品”。此外，著作权局也拒绝了该演员申请对她的表演进行著作权注册。综上，法院认为地方法院没有滥用其裁量权，拒绝了该演员的初步禁令请求。法院还指出，该演员试图通过著作权法来限制言论自由，而著作权法的目的是促进而不是压制言论自由，因此，法院认为该演员的著作权主张与所寻求的救济不相符，对谷歌的强制禁令是不合理的。所以法院解除了之前的禁令，认为它是一种事先限制，侵犯了言论自由的价值观。

（图片源于网络）

注释