法律翻译 | 洛伦佐案聚焦：虚假信息传播者的法律责任何在？

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2024-04-28 09:04

译者 | 刘秋果清华大学

一审 | 汪晨涵复旦大学

二审 | 戚若音 UCB

编辑 | 王妮茜新疆农业大学

仲飞宇西安外国语大学

责编 | 李薇浙江工商大学

Lorenzo v. Securities and

Exchange Commission

洛伦佐诉美国证监会案¹

案情概述

Petitioner Francis Lorenzo, while the director of investment banking at an SEC-registered brokerage firm, sent two e-mails to prospective investors. The content of those e-mails, which Lorenzo’s boss supplied, described a potential investment in a company with “confirmed assets” of $10 million. In fact, Lorenzo knew that the company had recently disclosed that its total assets were worth less than $400,000.

上诉人弗朗西斯·洛伦佐就职于一家注册于美国证券交易委员会的证券公司，在担任公司投资银行部的部门主管期间，其向潜在投资者发送了两封电子邮件。由洛伦佐的上司提供的这些电子邮件，主要描述了在一家拥有“已确认资产”价值1000万美元的公司的潜在投资机会。而事实上，洛伦佐知道该公司最近披露其总资产不到40万美元。

In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted proceedings against Lorenzo (along with his boss and Charles Vista). The Commission charged that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b–5, §10(b) of the Exchange Act, and §17(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Ultimately, the Commission found that Lorenzo had run afoul of these provisions by sending false and misleading statements to investors with intent to defraud. As a sanction, it fined Lorenzo $15,000, ordered him to cease and desist from violating the securities laws, and barred him from working in the securities industry for life.

2013年，美国证券交易委员会对洛伦佐（以及他的老板和查尔斯·维斯塔）启动了诉讼程序，指控洛伦佐违反了第10b-5条、证券交易法第10(b)条和证券法第17(a)(1)条，且最终认定洛伦佐向投资者发送虚假和误导性陈述意图欺诈投资者的行为违反了这些规定。作为处罚，洛伦佐被罚款15,000美元，并被命令停止违反证券法规，终身禁止从事证券行业工作。

（图片来源于网络）

Lorenzo appealed, arguing primarily that in sending the e-mails he lacked the intent required to establish a violation of Rule 10b–5, §10(b), and §17(a)(1), which the court have characterized as “‘a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” Aaronv. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686, and n. 5 (1980). With one judge dissenting, the Court of Appeals panel rejected Lorenzo’s lack-of intent argument. Lorenzo does not challenge the panel’s scienter finding. Reply Brief 17.

洛伦佐提出上诉，主要辩称在发送电子邮件时，他缺乏构成违反第10b-5条、第10(b)条和第17(a)(1)条所需的主观意图，法院将这种主观意图描述为一种“涵盖欺骗、操纵或欺诈意图的精神状态。”（见Aaron v. SEC案）。尽管有一名法官持不同意见，但上诉法院合议庭仍然驳回了洛伦佐认为其缺乏相关意图的主张。洛伦佐并未对合议庭的认定结果提出异议。

Lorenzo also argued that, in light of Janus, he could not be held liable under subsection (b) of Rule 10b–5. The panel agreed. Because his boss “asked Lorenzo to send the emails, supplied the central content, and approved the messages for distribution,”, it was the boss that had “ultimate authority” over the content of the statement “and whether and how to communicate it, Janus, 563 U. S., at 142.

洛伦佐还主张，基于杰纳斯资本集团案的判例，在10b-5规则(b)款的规定范围内他无需承担任何责任。合议庭支持了这一主张。由于是他的老板“要求洛伦佐发送电子邮件，提供了核心内容，并批准了这些消息的发布，因此老板才是有权决定邮件陈述内容及其“是否应该传播”，“应该如何传播”者，（见Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders案）。

On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit held that Lorenzo could not be held liable as a “maker” under subsection (b) of the Rule in light of Janus but sustained the Commission’s finding with respect to subsections (a) and (c) of the Rule, as well as §10(b) and §17(a)(1).

在上诉中，哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院认为，参考杰纳斯资本集团案²的相关判决，洛伦佐不能被认定为根据该规则的子条款(b)的“制造者”，但裁定确认了证监会关于该规则的子条款(a)和(c)，以及第10(b)条和第17(a)(1)条的认定。

争议焦点

Whether someone who is not a “maker” of a misstatement under Janus can nevertheless be found to have violated the other subsections of Rule 10b–5 and related provisions of the securities laws.‍

根据杰纳斯资本集团案这一判例，若某人不是虚假陈述的“制造者”，仍有可能被认定违反了《证券交易法》第10b-5条的其他款项和相关规定吗？

判决书原文（节选）

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

布雷耶尔法官发布了法院意见。

Held: Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of Rules 10b–5(a) and (c), as well as the relevant statutory provisions, even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements and consequently falls outside Rule 10b–5(b).

法院裁决：即使传播者并不是实质“作出³”（make）这些陈述的主体从而免于受到规则10b–5(b)款的指控，但散布虚假或误导性陈述，并具有欺诈意图的行为同样可能被认定属于规则10b–5(a)和(c)条款以及其他相关的法规的监管范围。

（图片来源于网络）

(a) It would seem obvious that the words in these provisions are, as ordinarily used, sufficiently broad to include within their scope the dissemination of false or misleading information with the intent to defraud. By sending e-mails he understood to contain material untruths, Lorenzo “employ[ed]” a “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice to defraud” within the meaning of subsection (a) of the Rule, §10(b), and §17(a)(1). By the same conduct, he “engage[d] in a[n] act, practice, or course of business” that “operate[d] . . . as a fraud or deceit” under subsection (c) of the Rule. As Lorenzo does not challenge the appeals court’s scienter finding, it is undisputed that he sent the e-mails with “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” the recipients. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686, and n. 5. Resort to the expansive dictionary definitions of “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice” in Rule 10b–5(a) and §17(a)(1), and of “act” and “practice” in Rule 10b–5(c), only strengthens this conclusion. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how Lorenzo’s actions could escape the reach of these provisions.

（a）通常来看，这些规定的表述足够充分，足以覆盖以欺诈为目的散布虚假或误导性信息的行为。洛伦佐明知内容不实却仍然发送电子邮件，这在规则10b–5(a)和§17(a)(1)的规定下构成了“使用手段、计划和诡计”进行故意欺诈，这一操作，作为“一种欺诈性的行为、实践或商业活动”，同样属于10b–5(c)的监管范畴。由于洛伦佐没有对上诉法院的不实陈述认定提出异议，因此可以肯定的一点是，他发送这些电子邮件是在“意图误导、操纵或欺诈”收件人。对第10b–5(a)条和§17(a)(1)条中“手段”、“计划”和“诡计”和规则10b–5(c)中“行为”和“实施”等词引用字典释义，将进一步印证这一结论。由此来看，洛伦佐的行为其实很难绕开这些规定的约束。

(b) Lorenzo counters that the only way to be liable for false statements is through those provisions of the securities laws—like Rule 10b–5(b)—that refer specifically to false statements. Holding to the contrary, he and the dissent say, would render subsection (b) “superfluous.” The premise of this argument is that each subsection governs different, mutually exclusive, spheres of conduct. But this Court and the Commission have long recognized considerable overlap among the subsections of the Rule and related provisions of the securities laws. And the idea that each subsection governs a separate type of conduct is difficult to reconcile with the Rule’s language, since at least some conduct that amounts to “employ[ing]” a “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” under subsection (a) also amounts to “engag[ing] in a[n] act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud” under subsection (c). This Court’s conviction is strengthened by the fact that the plainly fraudulent behavior confronted here might otherwise fall outside the Rule’s scope. Using false representations to induce the purchase of securities would seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud.

（b）洛伦佐反驳称，只有证券法中那些明确提及虚假陈述的条款才能够确定行为人是否需要承担虚假陈述责任，比如第10b-5的(b)款。他和其他与法院持不同意见者表示，这样做会让（b）款变得“多余”。然而这一理由的假设前提是，每个条款都分管着截然不同、互相排斥的行为领域。但是，本法院和证监会早已认识到，该条款的各个款项以及证券法的相关规定之间存在相当大的重叠部分。并且，每个条款都管辖一种独立的行为类型这一观点本身即与该规则的语言表述存在矛盾，因为至少在某些情况下，在（a）款下构成“使用”、“欺诈手段、计划或诡计”的行为也会构成（c）款下的“从事. . .作为欺诈的行为”。本法院的判决因此得到了巩固。利用虚假陈述来引诱投资者购买证券这一行为是典型的证券欺诈，若不依此思路，即使这样明显的欺诈行为也可能会被划定在该规则的监管范围之外。

（图片来源于网络）

(c) Lorenzo and the dissent make a few other important arguments. The dissent contends that applying Rules 10b–5(a) and (c) to conduct like Lorenzo’s would render Janus “a dead letter.” Post, at 9. But Janus concerned subsection (b), and it said nothing about the Rule’s application to the dissemination of false or misleading information. Thus, Janus would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false information— provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud. Lorenzo also claims that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would erase or at least weaken the distinction between primary and secondary liability under the statute’s “aiding and abetting” provision. See 15 U. S. C. §78t(e). But the line the Court adopts today is clear: Those who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b–5(a) and (c), §10(b), and §17(a)(1), even if they are secondarily liable under Rule 10b–5(b). As for Lorenzo’s suggestion that those like him ought to be held secondarily liable, this offer will, too often, prove illusory. Where a “maker” of a false statement does not violate subsection (b) of the Rule (perhaps because he lacked the necessary intent), a disseminator of those statements, even one knowingly engaged in an egregious fraud, could not be held to have violated the “aiding and abetting” statute. And if, as Lorenzo claims, the disseminator has not primarily violated other parts of Rule 10b–5, then such a fraud, whatever its intent or consequences, might escape liability altogether. That anomalous result is not what Congress intended.

（c）洛伦佐与异议者还给出了不少其他非常重要的理由。异议者认为，如果洛伦佐的行为纳入10b-5规则(a)款和(c)款监管范围，那么杰纳斯资本集团案这一判例就成了“一纸空文”。但杰纳斯案仅仅涉及10b-5规则的（b）款，并且并未讨论该条款是否应当适用于对虚假或误导信息传播这一问题。因此，只要个人既不制造也不传播虚假信息——当然，前提是该个人没有参与任何其他形式的欺诈行为——那么杰纳斯案仍然是相关的（作为排除个人责任的支撑）。洛伦佐还提出，证监会第10b-5条有“协助和教唆”条款，区分了主要责任和次要责任，若让他承担主要责任，会削弱甚至消除主次责任间的区别。但是，在本法院看来，该判决的立场是十分清晰的：以欺诈意图传播虚假或误导性陈述，即便只承担针对第10b-5(b)条的次要责任，也要承担在10b-5规则(a)款、(c)款和17(a)(1)条款规定下的主要责任。假设如洛伦佐所言，像他这样的虚假信息传播者只应该承担次要责任，那么特定的情况下往往会导致无人担责。比如在虚假陈述的制作者（因缺乏必要意图等）不违反10b-5规则(b)款的情形下，即便传播者故意参与骗局，也无法将其定为“协助和教唆”条款下的次要责任。而且如果虚假信息传播者没有首先违反第10b-5条款的其他部分，那么这样的欺诈行为，无论其意图如何恶劣，带来的后果如何严重，都有可能完全逃脱责任。这种荒谬的结果显然不是国会立法的本意。

Rather, Congress intended to root out all manner of fraud in the securities industry. And it gave to the Commission the tools to accomplish that job.

相反，国会旨在根除证券行业中的各种欺诈行为。为此，其将完成这项工作所需要的法律工具被交到了证监会手中。

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

基于这些理由，我们仍然维持上诉法院的判决。

补充：SEC Rule 10b-5⁴

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful:

证券交易委员会10b–5规则规定以下行为非法：

§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices⁵.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

(Sec. 10; 48 Stat. 891; 15 U.S.C. 78j)

§ 240.10b-5 使用操纵和欺骗性手段。

任何人通过利用州际商业方式或手段、信函、或者全国性证券交易所的任何设备，直接或者间接地从事下列行为，均为非法：

(a) 使用任何手段、技巧或计划进行欺诈，

(b) 就某项重大事实作出任何不实陈述、或者忽略陈述某项在作出陈述吋的情况下有必要使作出的陈述不具误导性的重大事实，或者

（第10条；48 Stat. 891；15 U.S.C.78j）

（图片来源于网络）

SEC Rule 10b-5 is one of the most important rules targeting securities fraud promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to its authority granted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule prohibits any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. The issue of insider trading is given further definition in SEC Rule 10b5-1

《美国证券交易委员会第10b-5条规则》是美国证券交易委员会根据1934年《证券交易法》第10(b)条制定的最重要的规则是一，主要针对证券欺诈行为。该规则禁止任何在证券买卖中可能会造成欺诈或欺骗的行为或者重大遗漏。关于内幕交易的问题在美国证券交易委员会第10b5-1条规则中得到进一步的定义。

To establish a claim under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs (including the SEC) must show (i) Manipulation or Deception (through misrepresentation and/or omission); (ii) Materiality; (iii) "In Connection With" the purchase or sale of securities, and (iv) Scienter. Private plaintiffs have the additional burden of establishing (v) Standing - Purchaser/Seller Requirement; (vi) Reliance (presumed if there was an omission); (vii) Loss Causation; and (viii) Damages.

根据10b-5规则，原告（包括美国证券交易委员会）必须证明以下来要件提起诉讼：

该行为操纵或欺诈（通过虚假陈述和/或重大遗漏）；

重大性；

行为与证券的购买或出售有关；

故意性。

私人原告还有额外的举证负担：

资格- 购买者/卖家要求；

依赖性（如果该项信息存在遗漏，则应进行推定）；

行为与损失之间存在因果关系；

对原告造成损害。

These are roughly comparable to the elements of common law fraud, which are i) Deception; ii) Materiality; iii) with Intent to Cause Reliance; that iv) causes Actual Reliance; and v) Harm.

这些要素大致相当于普通法欺诈的要素，即

1.欺骗；

2.重大性；

3.具有导致依赖的意图；

4.导致实际依赖；以及

5.造成损失

Both the SEC and private citizens can enforce the requirements of the rule through lawsuits. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores⁶, the Supreme Court held that only purchasers or sellers of securities may bring a private action for damages under Rule 10b-5; however any member of the public may provide information to the SEC regarding possible violations of the federal securities laws.

美国证监会和私人公民都可以通过诉讼来执行该规则的要求。此外，在Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores案中，最高法院裁定只有证券的购买方或卖方才能根据10b-5规则提起私人损害赔偿诉讼；然而，任何公众成员都可以向美国证监会提供关于可能违反联邦证券法的信息。

参考文献与注释

[1]https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1077_21o3.pdf

[2] Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders , 564 U. S. 135 (2011).

[3] 这里译者为了方便理解做了一定程度上的归化翻译。

[4] "SEC Rule 10b-5." Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 Aug. 2023, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEC_Rule_10b-5. Accessed 1 Mar. 2024.

[5] https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-II/part-240/subpart-A/subject-group-ECFRbda83517ce4377f/section-240.10b-5

[6] Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).

原文链接：

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1077_21o3.pdf.

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