法律翻译 | 《哥大商法评论》2023年第1期目录+摘要

译者 | 薛紫涵 清华大学LL.B.

一审 | 刘汉青 北京师范大学法硕

二审 | 邓雅元 复旦大学法本

编辑 | 王妮茜 新疆农业大学本科

         仲飞宇 西安外国语大学本科

责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学本科

Columbia Business Law Review

Volume 2023, Number 1

《哥大商法评论》2023年第1期

Corporate Liability, 

Collateral Consequences, 

and Capital Structure

公司责任、附带后果与资本结构

Nathan Atkinson

Financial penalties imposed on malfeasant corporations can produce “collateral consequences,” or unintended negative impacts on employees, customers, and society more broadly. I show that the vast majority of government bodies that assess organizational penalties have adopted policies to reduce corporate liability where collateral consequences might otherwise result. Moreover, I demonstrate that officials do reduce penalties in line with these policies, undermining deterrence and compensation of harmed parties. However, evidence from reductions given to publicly-traded firms suggests that officials are often wrong in their assessment of firms’ financial health, thereby awarding reductions to healthy firms where collateral consequences are unlikely to occur. I discuss how officials should approach imposing penalties when they are concerned about prospective collateral consequences.

对违法公司实施的经济惩罚会产生“附带后果”，或者对员工、客户和社会产生意料之外的负面影响。本文研究表明，绝大多数负责评估组织处罚的政府机构都采取了减少公司责任的政策，以减少附带后果的产生。此外，本文还证明了政府官员确实会根据这些政策减轻处罚，从而降低对公司的威慑作用，并减少其需要向受害方支付的补偿。但是，从对上市公司的减免中得到的证据表明，政府官员对公司财务健康状况的估计往往是错误的，从而对不太可能产生附带后果的健康公司减免了惩罚。本文讨论了当政府官员关心潜在的附带后果时，他们应当如何实施处罚。

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Mythical Unicorns and 

How to Find Them: 

The Disclosure Revolution

神秘独角兽及如何发现它们：

信息披露革命

Anat Alon-Beck

John Livingstone

Our federal and state securities laws are centered around two vital requirements for economic growth: capital formation and investor protection. Section 12(g) sits in the middle of these two concepts by attempting to ensure the latter without jeopardizing the former. However, since the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act in 2012, exempt capital formation in the unregulated private market has increased dramatically. At the same time, new ways of investing in these spaces have been opened for retail investors. The result has been the exposure of an increasing amount of the public’s capital to riskier investments in a sphere where information is unavailable in the best of times and deliberately hidden in the worst.

我们的联邦和州证券法将资本形成和投资者保护作为经济发展的两个重要要求。第12（g）条在这两个概念中间取得平衡，试图在保证后者的同时不损害前者。然而，自从2012年《工商初创企业推动法》（JOBS）通过后，在不受监管的私人市场进行的免责资本形成急剧增加。与此同时，该法案也为散户投资者开辟了新的投资途径。这导致越来越多的公众资本暴露在风险较高的投资领域，而最好的情况是投资者无法获得这些领域的信息，最坏的情况则是这些信息被刻意隐藏。

For founders of large private tech companies and their sophisticated investors, this structure remains advantageous. They are capable of raising large sums of capital, something normally only done by public companies, while avoiding the costs associated with our disclosure regime. They care little about the corporate governance responsibilities of running large companies and protect their interests above that of the company as a whole. Minority investors, primarily employees and, in increasing numbers, retail investors, are left in the dark without an ability to diversify and mitigate risk.

对于大型私营科技公司的创始人及其成熟的投资者来说，这样的结构仍然对他们有利。他们有能力筹集通常只有上市公司才能筹集到的大量资金，同时还避免了与我们的信息披露制度相关的成本。他们丝毫不关心经营大型公司的企业管理责任，甚至把个人利益置于公司整体利益之上。少数投资者（主要是雇员）和越来越多的散户投资者被蒙在鼓里，无法分散和减轻风险。

This Article gives recommendations on reforms to Section 12(g) in order to bring more companies into the public reporting sphere without jeopardizing the capital formation process.

为了在不危害资本形成过程的情况下将更多公司纳入公开报告的范围，本文对第12（g）条的改革提出了建议。

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Rethinking Community Reinvestment

对社区再投资的重新思考

Benjamin Della Rocca

Policymakers have struggled for decades to boost lowincome credit access, which is vital for combatting socioeconomic inequality. In 1977, Congress hoped the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) would fix the problem. The CRA compels banks to lend near their branches - in low and high-income neighborhoods alike. Still, millions of creditworthy borrowers can’t find affordable loans. What’s the solution?

几十年来，政策制定者一直在努力促进低收入人群获得贷款，因为这对消除社会经济不平等至关重要。1977年，国会通过了《社区再投资法案》（CRA），希望能够解决这个问题。该法案强迫银行在其分行附近发放贷款，无论该区域属于低收入社区还是高收入社区。c尽管如此，仍有数百万信誉良好的借款人找不到负担得起的贷款。如何解决这一问题？

The CRA, this Article argues, should push large banks to support community banks and other small lenders, including through capital provision, joint ventures, technical assistance, or subsidies. Why? While big banks make nearly all CRA loans, small, community-based lenders reach marginalized groups far more effectively. Economic data indicate this so-called “small-lender effect.” But so far, lawyers haven’t gotten the memo.

本文认为，《社区再投资法案》应当通过包括提供资本、合资企业、技术援助或补贴在内的方式，促使大型银行支持社区银行和其他小型贷款机构。这是因为，虽然大型银行几乎发放了所有的CRA贷款，但以社区为基础的小型贷款机构能更有效地帮助边缘群体。经济数据也表明了这种所谓的“小贷效应”。但截至目前，律师们仍未收到这份备忘录。

Ample legal scholarship has discussed the CRA - often focusing on whether it is “efficient”, in the law-and-economics sense. This Article makes two interventions in these debates, which are each necessary and together sufficient to compel its prescriptions. First, drawing on past economics scholarship and original empirical work, it demonstrates small lenders’ greater ability to underwrite low-income borrowers. Second, it shows that community lenders are stymied, themselves, by separate market failures that keep them from filling the gaps left by big banks. Enlisting large banks to support community lenders would therefore expand credit access and fulfill the CRA’s goals. Even better, it would do so efficiently. This Article’s prescriptions, finally, explain how to refit the CRA for this purpose.

已有大量法律学者从法学和经济学的角度讨论了《社区再投资法案》是否有效。本文针对这些争论做了两项必要的研究工作，足以使本文提出解决问题的对策。首先，本文借鉴了以往的经济学研究成果和原创性实证工作，证明了小型贷款机构更有能力为低收入借款人提供担保。其次，社区贷款机构自身也受到了个别市场失灵的阻挠，无法填补大型银行留下的空白。因此，召集大型银行对社区贷款机构提供支持能够扩大借款人获得贷款的渠道，从而实现《社区再投资法案》的目标。更妙的是，这样做还能提高效率。最后，本文提出的对策还解释了如何修改《社区再投资法案》，使其实现这一目的。

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Money and the Public Debt: 

Treasury Market Liquidity 

as a Legal Phenomenon

货币与公共债务：

作为法律现象的国债市场流动性

Lev Menand

Joshua Younger

The market for U.S. government debt (Treasuries) forms the bedrock of the global financial system. The ability of investors to sell Treasuries quickly, cheaply, and at scale has led to an assumption, in many places enshrined in law, that Treasuries are nearly equivalent to cash. Yet in recent years Treasury market liquidity has evaporated on several occasions and, in 2020, the market’s near collapse led to the most aggressive central bank intervention in history.

美国国债市场是全球金融体系的基石。投资者能够快速、廉价、大量出售国债，这使得很多地方的法律都认为国债几乎等同于现金。然而，近年来国债市场的流动性多次消失，在2020年甚至几乎崩溃，导致央行进行了史上最激进的干预。

This Article pieces together what went wrong and offers a new account of the relationship between money issue and debt issue as mechanisms of public finance. It argues that a high degree of convertibility between Treasuries and cash generally requires intermediaries that can augment the money supply, absorbing sales by expanding their balance sheets on both sides. The historical depth of the Treasury market was in large part the result of a concerted effort by policymakers to nurture and support such balance sheet capacity at a collection of nonbank broker-dealers. In 2008, the ability of these intermediaries to augment the money supply became impaired as investors lost confidence in their money-like liabilities (known as repos). Subsequent changes to market structure pushed substantial Treasury dealing further beyond the bank regulatory perimeter, leaving public finance increasingly dependent on high-frequency traders and hedge funds—“shadow dealers.” The near money issued by these intermediaries proved highly unstable in 2020. Policy makers are now focused on reforming Treasury market structure so that Treasuries remain the world’s most liquid asset class. Successful reform likely requires a legal framework that, among other things, supports elastic intermediation capacity through balance sheets that can expand and contract as needed to meet market needs.

本文分析了问题所在，并对作为公共财政机制的货币发行和债务发行之间的关系做出了新的解释。本文认为，国债和现金之间的高可兑换性通常要求中介机构能够增加货币供应，同时通过扩大资产负债表的两边来吸引销售。国债市场历史上的深度在很大程度上是政策制定者共同努力的结果，以培育和支持非银行经纪商的资产负债表能力。2008年，由于投资者对其类似于货币的负债（被称为回购）失去信心，这些中介机构增加货币供应的能力被削弱了。随后市场结构的变化将大量国债交易进一步推到了银行监管范围之外，导致公共财政越来越依赖于高频交易商和对冲基金——“影子交易商”。事实证明，这些中介机构发行的准货币在2020年非常不稳定。政策制定者现在聚焦于改革国债市场结构，使国债继续成为全世界流动性最强的资产类别。成功的改革可能需要一个法律框架，该框架在起到其他效果的同时，应对弹性中介能力具有支持作用，即通过能根据需要扩张和收缩的资产负债表来满足市场需求。

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Taking Innovation Seriously: 

A Dynamic Competition Model 

for Antitrust Law

认真对待创新：

反垄断法的动态竞争模式

William H. Rooney

Colin Lee

Amanda M. Payne

Although innovation is often portrayed as a byproduct of competition, innovation and related dynamic aspects of competition are also, and perhaps more so, drivers of competition. The current antitrust framework, as illustrated by merger law and the agency guidelines that bear on that law, emphasizes static, demand-side conditions in defining markets and assessing likely anticompetitive effects. Only after the market has been defined and competitive effects assessed are innovation and dynamic, supply-side developments considered, and then in the context of rebutting anticompetitive findings already made on the basis of the static assessment. In addition, the burden of demonstrating and quantifying the supply-side developments is placed on the merging parties despite their relatively limited access to competitor capabilities, strategies, and plans. The following article suggests a new framework that places the burden of addressing dynamic considerations primarily on the enforcement agencies that must be met before the agencies can establish a presumption of illegality against a proposed transaction or a prime facie case against a competitive practice. It also suggests a more qualitative assessment of innovation and likely supply responses that is elaborated in the accompanying article by Professor David J. Teece.

尽管创新通常被视为竞争的副产品，创新和竞争的相关动态方面也是、并且也许更多地体现为竞争的驱动因素。如合并法和与合并法相关的机构准则所示，目前的反垄断框架在界定市场和评估可能的反竞争影响时，更加注重静态的需求方条件。只有在界定市场并评估竞争效果之后，或者在反驳根据静态评估做出的反竞争结论时，才会考虑创新和供给端的动态发展。此外，尽管合并的参与各方对竞争对手的能力、战略和计划的了解相对有限，证明和量化供给端发展的责任却落在了他们身上。下文提出了一个新框架，将解决动态考量的责任主要放在执法机构身上，执法机构必须满足这些条件，才能推定拟议中的交易不合法，或对竞争行为提出主要证据确凿的指控。本文还建议对创新和供给端可能作出的反应进行更加定性的评估，David J. Teece教授在随附的文章中对此进行了详细阐述。

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The Dynamic Competition Paradigm: 

Insights and Implications

动态竞争范式：启示和影响

David J. Teece

Dynamic innovation-driven competition is what strong competition policy should favor; yet it is the weaker static efficiency driven competition which animates current competition economics and enforcement action. The shortcomings of the static efficiency approach have resulted in backward looking antitrust actions that underappreciate certain forms of potential competition resulting in errors with respect to the assessment of monopoly power, M&A activity, and complex contracts. This paper exposes the weaknesses of static analysis and calls for a forward-looking capabilitiesbased determination of competitive effects. The proposed framework requires deeper analyses of (supply side) capabilities, both technological and organizational, present and future. It endorses a long-term consumer welfare standard and calls for a multidisciplinary approach that draws on complexity economics, technology management, organizational behavior, and information and computer science. The administrability of the dynamic competition framework will be at hand once the foundation of dynamic competition are more fully embellished and better understood by both economists and lawyers.

强有力的竞争政策应该支持由创新驱动的动态竞争；然而，当前的竞争经济学和执法行动却以较弱的静态效率驱动竞争为动力。静态效率方法的缺陷导致反垄断行动开倒车，低估了某些形式的潜在竞争，并在评估垄断势力、并购活动和复杂合同方面造成失误。本文揭露了静态分析法的弱点，并呼吁对竞争效果进行基于能力的前瞻性判断。本文所提出的框架要求对（供给端的）能力进行更深入的分析，包括技术能力和组织能力、现在能力和未来能力。本文赞同长期消费者福利标准，并呼吁采用借鉴复杂经济学、技术管理、组织行为学以及信息和计算机科学的多学科方法。一旦经济学家和律师对动态竞争的基础有了更全面的阐述和理解，动态竞争框架的可管理性就指日可待了。

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Are We Not Taking Innovation Seriously? A Discussion of the 2022 Howard Taft Lecture

我们是否没有认真对待创新？关于2022 年Howard Taft讲座的讨论

Tasneem Chipty

A growing body of research papers, speeches, and litigation challenges focused on innovation competition suggests that antitrust practitioners are taking innovation seriously. This paper provides an overview of the innovation debate, with a commentary on a proposed policy framework to promote competition in high-technology or big-technology industries described by Professor David Teece in his 2022 Taft Lecture. Experts agree that conduct involving harm to innovation competition and mergers that focus on an overlap of future products that do not currently exist cannot easily be understood, if at all, with traditional analyses of historical prices, output, and margins for existing products. The hard part is figuring out what to do instead. Recent cases that focus on harm to innovation competition highlight the need to understand business capabilities and the frontier of new technology in the pled markets. Recent decisions demonstrate that courts are not necessarily swayed by structural presumptions involving large firms in highly concentrated markets as measured by today’s output; instead, courts understand that large dominant firms can be competitive, because of their desire to maintain their lead position. These cases also provide guidance on how to prove (or disprove) a theory of harm involving potential competition.

越来越多研究文章、演讲和诉讼挑战聚焦于创新竞争，这表明反垄断从业者正在认真对待创新。本文提供了一个对创新相关争论的概览，并对David Teece教授在 2022年Taft讲座中提出的促进高科技或大科技行业竞争的政策框架进行了评论。专家们一致认为，对涉及损害创新竞争的行为和以目前尚不存在的未来产品的重叠为重点的兼并，即使能够通过对现有产品的历史价格、产量和利润率进行传统分析，也不容易理解。困难之处在于如何取而代之。近期一些关注损害创新竞争的案例表明，了解业务能力和前沿新技术是十分必要的。最近的判决表明，法院不一定会被结构性假定所左右，这些假定涉及的是在高度集中市场中以当前产量衡量的大公司；相反，法院认为在市场中占据主导地位的大公司也可能具有竞争性，因为它们希望能保持其领先地位。这些案例还为如何证明（或反驳）潜在竞争损害的相关理论提供了指导。

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Regulating Democratized Finance: 

Cryptocurrency, Retail Broker-Dealers and the SEC’s Regulatory Perimeter

监管民主化金融：加密货币、零售经纪商

和美国证券交易委员会的监管边界

Eric Rolston

The SEC has long been faced with the difficult task of regulating financial market innovations, and the rise of fintech has increased the complexities faced by the agency. As fintech entities grew in popularity among retail investors and moved financial markets closer to what some call “democratized finance,” calls for new regulations grew louder. After years of hesitancy, investigation and regulatory uncertainty, the SEC has been increasingly responsive to these calls.

长期以来，美国证券交易委员会一直面临着监管金融市场创新的难题，金融科技的兴起也提高了委员会所应对问题的复杂程度。随着金融科技实体在散户投资者中越来越流行，金融市场更加接近于一些人所说的“民主化金融”，要求出台新法规的呼声也越来越大。经过数年的犹豫、调查和监管的不确定性之后，美国证券交易委员对这些呼声的反应越来越积极。

This Note reviews and conceptualizes the SEC’s approach to regulating new developments in financial market access since the agency’s founding in the 1930s. This Note begins with a review of prior SEC approaches to regulation through either enforcement or the promulgation of new regulations, and then reviews how the agency has used these approaches when regulating two prominent fintech segments: online retail-broker dealers and cryptocurrency entities. Lastly, the Note proposes two frameworks to conceptualize historical and contemporary regulatory approaches by the agency. Ultimately, by reviewing prior instances of regulation, contemporary issues and frameworks, this Note aims to give greater clarity to how the SEC has and will continue to regulate financial market innovations, in particular as it relates to “democratized” financial markets.

本文整理了美国证券交易委员会自20世纪30年代成立以来监管金融市场准入新发展的方法，并将其概念化。本文首先回顾了美国证券交易委员会之前通过执法或颁布新法规进行监管的方法，然后阐述了委员会在监管在线零售经纪商和加密货币实体这两个著名金融科技领域时是如何运用这些方法的。本文紧接着提出了两个框架，以便将委员会过去和当前的监管方法概念化。最后，通过回顾以往的监管实例、目前存在的问题和框架，本文进一步阐明美国证券交易委员会已经并将如何继续监管金融市场创新，特别是与“民主化”金融市场相关的创新。

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An Empirical Analysis of SEC Rule 

6C-11’s Impact on the Usage of 

Heartbeat Trades 

by Exchange-Traded Funds

针对美国证券交易委员会6C-11规则

对交易型开放式指数基金使用

“心跳交易”的影响的实证分析

Maddie White

In September 2019, the SEC promulgated Rule 6c-11 to standardize the operation of all exchange-traded funds. Importantly, this rule provided all ETFs with the ability to issue “custom baskets,” which are baskets of stocks that are not composed of a pro rata representation of a fund’s holdings. Such baskets are important because they give ETFs additional flexibility to lower their tax liability by using custom baskets to remove stocks that would incur the highest capital gains from their portfolios. This Note analyzes how expanded custom basket access impacts ETFs use of a certain type of tax-evading trade known as a “heartbeat” trade. It finds that there has been a substantial increase in such trades since the Rule went into effect and that the increase was much larger among funds who were only able to use custom baskets after Rule 6c-11.

为了规范交易型开放式指数基金的运作，美国证券交易委员会于2019年9月颁布了6c-11规则。重要的是，该规则给所有交易型开放式指数基金提供了发行“定制篮子”的能力（定制篮子是指不按比例代表基金持股的一篮子股票）。这样的篮子非常重要，因为它们给交易型开放式指数基金提供了额外的灵活性，使其能够利用定制篮子把资本收益最高的股票从其投资组合中移除，从而降低税负。本文分析了扩大定制篮子准入如何影响交易型开放式指数基金对一种名为“心跳交易”的避税交易的使用。本文发现，自从6c-11规则生效之后，心跳交易的数量明显上升，而且在那些仅在6c-11规则生效之后才能使用定制篮子的基金中更为显著。

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原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/issue/view/970