But when Merkel and Xi spoke on Wednesday, China’s official account of the call did not mention the trade deal or Xinjiang
“We had seven years of negotiations for the deal,” said Joerg Wuttke, head of the European Chamber of Commerce in China. “Now it looks like it will take another seven years.”
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.
The U.S. government does not have such a concise rendering of its One-China policy as Beijing does. When American officials say that “we have a One-China policy,” they usually elaborate by listing several defining elements: adherence to the three U.S.-PRC communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982; implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in April 1979; an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides; opposition to either side unilaterally changing the status quo and non-support for de jure independence of Taiwan; the “six assurances”conveyed to Taiwan in August 1982; and a preference for continuing dialogue and cooperation between Beijing and Taipei, among others
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”
The United States takes no position on how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should resolve their differences on substantive issues. It does, however, consistently state an “abiding interest”in peace and security in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act conveys a political commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense if the PRC were to attack the island militarily. Taiwan’s democratization complicated how the United States should act on its interest in preserving peace and security, and it has, at times, employed an approach of “dual deterrence.”
China has drawn blood along the contested Indian border, threatened Vietnam, expanded its military presence in the South China Sea, increased the tempo of its operations near the Senkaku Islands and trampled Hong Kong's autonomy — to say nothing of the atrocities it is perpetrating against its own citizens in Xinjiang and elsewhere
解放军在台湾全方位演习
to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification
While it is true that some in China have concluded that time is no longer on China's side and Beijing should use force to compel unification, Xi has resisted such pressure. In the latest five-year plan, launched this year, Beijing reaffirmed the policy guideline of pursuing "peaceful development of cross-strait relations,"
Beijing has its own incentives to avoid war. Foremost among them is that any attempt to take Taiwan by force would very likely invite a military conflict with the United States. Such a conflict would be difficult to limit from escalating or spreading beyond the Taiwan Strait三人觉得美国占上风,并不一定是指美国在局部一定会胜,只是当两国交战后,双方就进入一种战争对峙状态,那么任何手段都可以在使用的范围之内
“No other country in the world – not Taiwan, Japan or South Korea – are talking about the likelihood of war on a day-to-day basis. In Australia we seem to be focused on the distant threat of war rather than the very real support that the Taiwanese people need today.”
Money to deter China, Russia: The plan falls short of the 3 to 5 percent boost GOP lawmakers are pressuring the White House to endorse. They argue the range, laid out by Pentagon leaders during the Trump administration, is what’s needed to adequately fund a military transformation to counter threats from China and Russia
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and a force for good in the world. Today we issued guidelines to encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan and strengthen our relationship in accordance with our “one China” policy. https://t.co/01TxaArdKz
Washington can make this change in a manner that is consistent with its one-China policy and that minimizes the risk to U.S.-Chinese relations
为什么呢?因为美国说美国??
的台湾关系法(Taiwan Relations Act)里美国
Maintaining this policy of ambiguity, however, will not keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for the next four decades. China now has the capability to threaten U.S. interests and Taiwan’s future 美国第一
he trend lines continue to move in China’s favor时间不在我们这一边
习近平四处出击,到处冒险,就是武力侵犯
不用担心台湾独立,因为台湾意识到独立就是武统,所以不会贸然,
One thing, however, has not changed over these four decades: an imposed Chinese takeover of Taiwan remains antithetical to U.S. interests. If the United States fails to respond to such a Chinese use of force, regional U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, will conclude that the United States cannot be relied upon and that it is pulling back from the region
美国信誉论
leading to the dissolution of U.S. alliances and the crumbling of the balance of power, or they would seek nuclear weapons
Why ambiguity: Kissinger understood that settling this issue on terms acceptable to all sides was out of reach.
But ambiguity is now unlikely to preserve the status quo.
The White House could articulate this new policy through a presidential statement and accompanying executive order that reiterates U.S. support for its one-China policy but also unequivocally states that the United States would respond should Taiwan come under Chinese armed attack. The statement would make clear that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, thus deterring Taiwan from attempting to capitalize on the new U.S. policy
对中国来说,维护现状就是事实独立,但然这也可以另一种理解,维护现状中国就有机会,等中国发展、壮大
How can you stated "Whether the United States could prevail in a Taiwan conflict is no longer certain, and the trend lines continue to move in China’s favor." w/o asking the question if the US will defend Taiwan regardless cost, as it does in NATO for Europe, is our commitment unwavered in the face of certain defeat
The CCP derives much of its legitimacy from its ability to provide sustained economic growth. Therefore, the United States should make clear that using force against Taiwan would put China’s continued growth at risk. Congress should pass a law that would impose severe sanctions on China should it attack Taiwan. The United States should coordinate with its Asian and European allies so they send similar signals.
Blatant interference of "sovereignty"
Similar points, diff conclusion
Those who argue that this new policy extends an additional U.S. commitment at a time when the country is already overextended should not delude themselves: U.S. allies in Asia already assume that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense完全避开回答,好像美国联盟系统必然代表美国利益
The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defense industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.
Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.此处中国强
Eric Chan is a China/Korea strategist for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office,2020.09
China also had a policy of strategic ambiguity: a refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, but emphasizing the economic gains of cooperation. The viability of strategic ambiguity rests on an assumption: that time is on our side
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has taken concrete steps all but formally renouncing strategic ambiguity
2000 to 2008, China-Taiwan trade tripled
The U.S. strategy of promoting stability and long-term democratic influence has instead flipped to an embrace of greater risk to deter China.
For Beijing, the illusion of long-term advantage disappeared following the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower student movement in Taiwan
It has led to the collapse of the pro-engagement Kuomintang (KMT) at the national level. The KMT is now attempting a “redesign,” to include a realignment with the United States.
the KMT collapse has given Tsai political breathing room to continue diversifying Taiwan’s economy away from China, openly align Taiwan’s foreign policy with the U.S.
used to discuss slow “strangulation” methods such as a blockade or the seizure of outlying islands to intimidate Taiwan. However, PLA literature is now fixated on achieving a fait accompli
To achieve this, the PLA has developed aggressive operational concepts that are prone to miscalculation
According to the Domino Theory of American Credibitlity, Taiwan will set to end America's presence in the Pacific, perhaps the world. Why? B/c if you back off in face of war, you lose. But you can't win a war with China on *Taiwan* unless this escalates into a total war, whose outcome is unpredictable. You lose again.
So "strategists" try to outcompete one another with strongest "deternrance". But despite rehtorics from Taiwan, everyone knows its fate is sealed less direct US intervention.
The Biden regime is doing everything to show the world Taiwan is de facto independent. The only diff w the Trump regime is it maintains the facade of the status quote w/o provocation of declaring formal independence.
Of course this comes with a wave of recent claims that China "can invade at any moment". Can't see this is just coincidence.
To be indenpendent w/o the formality of independence obvously runs into the irks Of China. What else can you expect? But that's the point. Taiwan is not a card Vis-à-vis Trump, but "Taiwan is the anchor of the so-called First Island Chain, which U.S. planners have identified as the most promising location from which to oppose Chinese naval moves"
In other words, fotress of Democracy
So how to start a war w China we are so eager to fight but don't want? Well ending the strategic ambigouity or formally recognnize Taiwan will seal the fate on all 3 sides, bluffing (threatening) China into submission is not, after all that's what military deterance is all about. Yes despite "The Economist warned on February 20 that “America is losing its ability to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan", we can achieve all, no formal indenpendence, no invasion, by simply
To avoid a blockade of Taiwan, we must "credibly threaten to sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours"
The Chinese embassy in Iceland on Friday announced sanctions against an Icelandic individual for spreading lies and disinformation on so-called human rights issues in China's Xinjiang without naming the person https://t.co/zPJj2URb4o
We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We share serious concerns regarding the human rights situations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The United States and Japan recognized the importance of candid conversations with China, reiterated their intention to share concerns directly, and acknowledged the need to work with China on areas of common interest.
Biden administration is cementing the position of Japan as an indispensable ally in tackling vexing regional and global challenges and reaffirming the high priority he attaches to the Indo-Pacific.
There was greater convergence on the strategic framing of the China challenge. Tokyo surprised many with its joint statement from the 2+2 meeting to directly call out Chinese assertive behavior that destabilizes the international order
joint emphasis on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait did not go unnoticed
to deliver public goods to the region and beyond is an important repositioning. An alliance that embodies a “can-do” attitude can help the United States recover the lost ground from the past four years of defensive and narrow bilateralism
trusted supplier network
There is unease in some Japanese policy circles about being too forward-leaning in countering China and sacrificing the carefully orchestrated rapprochement initiated a few years ago纽时、华尔街日报
To provide a backstop against regional Covid surges we need to pulse vaccine into these areas. Some excess portion of the large additional supply that's coming into the market should be pulsed into U.S. hot zones to quickly ring vaccinate around outbreaks. https://t.co/gH1KjFT87J
As a wife, mother, daughter, physician & CDC Director, I ask you to hold on a little while longer. We are almost there, but not quite yet. Continue using #COVID19 prevention methods & get vaccinated when you can so that you and others will still be here once this pandemic ends.
— Rochelle Walensky, MD, MPH (@CDCDirector) March 29, 2021
2/
How did I pick these 7 states?
- Each had >50 positives (Cq N gene <27) per day in recent Helix tests
- Alternative could be to use a threshold for % of positives in state coming from Helix
~5% of pos in these 7 states come from Helix
Many districts in the country are seeing clusters of cases emerging because of specific events and/or places where crowding happens, or where a large number of people are in close contact coupled with a lack of a COVID-appropriate behaviour.
rime Minister Narendra Modi himself have been addressing rallies and meetings of tens of thousands of people, sitting or standing shoulder-to-shoulder, with only a handful wearing masks
"The worst days are yet to come for India. Our models are showing astronomic projections that we did not see last year. This wave is intrinsically different. People have thrown caution to the wind. The next few weeks are so critical..." ht @BhramarBioStathttps://t.co/IFzf0XAs1y
The truth is that India’s COVID-19 fight has been derailed by an irresponsible, arrogant, and opportunist leadership, supported by a pliant and spineless media.
Modi’s government has also been accused of failures of political leadership from the top, with lax attitudes emulated by state and local leaders from all parties and even health officials across the country, which led many to falsely believe in recent months that India had defeated Covid
与中国截然不同的态度,没法让中国人觉得自己有责任
“Victory was declared prematurely and that ebullient mood was communicated across the country, especially by politicians who wanted to get the economy going and wanted to get back to campaigning. And that gave the virus the chance to rise again.”
Thadhani said this time round the virus was “much more aggressive and much more infectious” and was now predominately affecting young people. “Now it is people in their 20s and 30s who are coming in with very severe symptoms and there is a lot of mortality among young people,” he said.
The devastation has sparked outrage at the lack of preparation among officials who believed that the worst of the pandemic was over. Only two months ago, India was revelling in its success of reining in the spread of the virus.
India’s fatality rate remains relatively low,
the roots of the crisis ran much deeper, exposing years of neglect of public health infrastructure. India’s spending on healthcare has long lagged behind global peers
time for President Biden to follow through on his campaign promise to offer permanent federal help on issues of critical importance to working women, from paid parental leave, to more expansive federal child-care support, and permanent child tax credits
But the stalled drive for the $15 federal minimum wage
Spending has been spurred by a belief that, as long as the federal government can borrow without a rise in low interest rates, no one really needs to pay. In case markets disagree, the rich can be taxed.
Past experience suggests it will be hard to make the rich pay — they will oppose new taxes vigorously and avoid them if implemented.
But in later spending packages, politicians arguably did not want the populist goodies they were targeting at their constituencies to be assessed in the sobering light of the need to pay for them.
the cost to future generations of our eating up their fiscal room could be substantial.
The request is separate from Biden’s $2 trillion-plus infrastructure and jobs plan, and it only covers discretionary spending, which amounts to about a third of the federal budget. A fuller White House budget release, which will include proposals for mandatory spending and tax reform, will be released later this spring and will tie everything together
$2.4 trillion over the next decade,人均税增是1500(美元),但全部由最上20%承担
$330,000 and $790,000 would pay about $9,000 more on average in 2022
Those in the top 1 percent (who will make about $790,000 or more) would pay roughly $265,000 more in taxes on average, or 16 percent of after-tax income. Those in the top 0.1 percent (who will make $3.5 million or more) would pay $1.6 million more than under current law, a steep 22 percent reduction in their after-tax incomes.
As illustrated in Figure 2, only 0.7 percent of taxpayers would be affected by these two provisions and virtually all of the tax increase would fall on the richest 1 percent.
【15】“债务陷阱”是如何出笼的?
中国的一带一路,按英国智库漆咸楼(Chatham House,正式名称为皇家国际事务研究所,The Royal Institute of International Affairs)综合西方的解释, 是中国的一个地缘政治战略,其目的是在欧亚大陆甚至整个世界建立以中国为中心的新秩序,包含了 “深思熟虑的中国大战略”,旨在“重新夺回亚洲的地缘政治主导权,挑战]美国的主导权,建立以中国为中心的秩序”,是一个“地缘政治和外交攻势”,其目的“无异于改写当前的地缘政治格局,建立世界主导权”,这些观点也成为美国政府的看法,将之视为。漆咸楼很权威
As the BRI has developed over the years, projects have been largely scaled back, and the ones we’ve seen in the last few years tend to be more in touch with local conditions.
The PRC has learned these lessons, and is getting better at this kind of work. The BRI isn’t going anywhere (it’s Xi’s signature FP and is in the CCP constitution) and the liberal world would do well not to write it off due to a few early failures
These include confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from revealing the terms of the loans, informal collateral arrangements that benefit Chinese lenders over other creditors and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructurings - dubbed by the authors as “no Paris Club” clauses, the report said. The contracts also give substantial leeway for China to cancel loans or accelerate repayment, it added.
Maria Adele Carrai is an assistant professor in global China studies at New York University Shanghai
肯尼亚铁路,To critics, Kenya’s railway project represents another example of Chinese-owed debt and China’s growing influence in Africa. Indeed, many commentators point out that Kenya has an estimated $9 billion in China-financed debt — and note their concerns that a growing number of projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
My research on two Chinese railway megaprojects in East Africa — the Nairobi-Mombasa line and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti project — suggests the fears that China is upending development guidelines might be misplaced
I analyzed primary sources like Chinese government corporate social responsibility
Chinese government and state-owned enterprises have made CSR a priority, yet these two railway megaprojects show that implementation largely depends on local conditions, suggests insufficient Chinese government enforcement of CSR policies encourages Chinese organizations and enterprises to follow host-government guidelines. At times, this means Chinese companies resort to what I call “adaptive governance” 主要的问题是中企【如果发现东道主国的法律要求低过中国政府的,就】采用东道主国的,这是
Beijing has actively worked to increase CSR within Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks since the early 2000s. The central government, ever cognizant of its international reputation, has vigorously promoted higher standards for state-owned and private Chinese enterprises operating abroad. Hundreds of Chinese regulations and codes require Chinese companies to respect local customs and cultures, honor social responsibilities and protect labor and the environment. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, however, the impact of China’s national directives appears to be limited. Here’s what I found
Brussels responds to Podgorica’s request — and whether it will bail the country out of a project long deemed unviable — will help to shape the bloc’s relationship with the region.
“This is the first time that Montenegro or any other country from the western Balkans has made this type of outreach towards Brussels to combat rising Chinese influence."
Montenegro raised eyebrows in 2014 when it signed a deal with China’s ExIm Bank to finance 85 per cent of the cost of a road with a dollar-denominated loan worth almost $1bn. The first 41km section, a quarter of the total length, cost €20m per km, making it one of the most expensive highways per km in the world, said Spajic.
黑山共和国受惑,中国国企推销,结果背上巨债,现在成了国际事件
Its decision has been scrutinised given that two separate feasibility studies, in 2006 and 2012, concluded that the highway was economically unviable. The government also signed a €54m contract with a Montenegrin-Chinese consortium for a thermal power plant just before it was ejected from office.
signed by the previous Montenegro government led by the Democratic Party of Socialists, which was ousted in August after 30 years in power.
胡说:
Observers said Montenegro’s plea was an opportunity for Brussels. “The EU should step in,” said Tena Prelec, a scholar at the University of Oxford who studies the region. “Montenegro is in the EU’s backyard: it would be, finally, a concrete way to show that the EU is indeed a player, a true geostrategic actor.”
Bruno Maçães, Dec 27, 2020
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
Based on the observation of its implementation, Beijing’s official statements, and my own research, I would argue it is a constantly changing group of policy settings, which encompasses almost all the various clarifications
In practice, the piecemeal realization of BRI projects is determined by local governments and their related political and economic interests via diverse and time-consuming bilateral interaction with Beijing
Yufan Huang is a PhD candidate in the government department of Cornell University
Chinese banks offered African countries significant debt restructuring before the pandemic and have continued to do so
中国主动与债务国协商远超出西方报道
The G-20 effort marks the first time China is participating in multilateral debt relief. As Africa’s largest bilateral creditor, China holds at least 21 percent of African debt — and payments to China account for nearly 30 percent of 2021’s debt service, as shown in the figure below.
西方: they are not relaxing repayment requirements. Likewise, bondholders, who are responsible for 19 percent of 2021’s debt service, have held back from providing any debt relief.
Our research at the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) suggests that China has played a significant role in helping African countries to manage their debt. We documented 16 cases of debt restructuring worth $7.5 billion in 10 African countries between 2000 and 2019
Our research found that Chinese lenders have not pursued lawsuits in cases of debt default. We also found no asset seizures.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests
China has not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific, although a continuation of business as usual would risk future debt problems in several countries.
There is scope for a new Australian infrastructure financing facility to provide loans to the Pacific without causing debt problems, particularly as it has adopted key sustainable lending rules.
Pacific nations have an opportunity to obtain more favourable financing from official development partners but care must be taken to avoid overly geopolitical aid.
This whole narrative misunderstands China and ignores the interests and agency of recipient countries
Sinologists have documented the reality of what they term fragmented authoritarianism, recounting fierce inter-agency rivalries and factionalism, which top leaders struggle to manage, even under Xi,
In reality, the idea of aggregating China’s long-standing infrastructure connectivity projects beneath a broad banner originated with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
as party-state agencies jostled for resources.
Disbursements start with requests from abroad, not Chinese planners. The whole edifice—especially today, with growth slowing, profitability collapsing, and surplus capacity endemic—is skewed towards helping Chinese businesses expand overseas
Quantity has not meant quality. The narratives Beijing is pushing are a web of contradictions. One line seeks to justify government actions by citing terrorism in the region. Another spouts a clumsy moral equivalence with the west’s human rights record. At the same time, diplomats and state media push the “nothing to see here” narrative, churning out images of the sweeping landscapes of “#AmazingXinjiang” as if to say: “How could something so beautiful be bad?”
当殖民殖到无地可殖之后,炮舰政策就不知道怎么使了,但此时世界已经买入现代化,观念成为主宰世界的机制,虽然民主与自由不总是兼容,推崇民主以保护自由成了新的使命,不过虽然威尔逊说这已经过百年了(Make the world safe for democracies)【1】,推行民主真正是在二战后才开始的,那是美国确实是有实力了,而且二战过程中美国精英届达成一个共识,那就是美国必须以其强大的军力控制全球,限制一切邪恶势力的更生,如纳粹主义,军国主义,后来加上共产主义,来推行自己的体制,因为自己的体制代表自由和和平,从此,美帝国世界秩序(Pax Americana)就成了自由,平等,和平,繁荣的同义词,加上联合国在美国指导下通过的人权宣言,美国精神传遍世界,只是后来苏联太邪恶,玷污的纯洁的美国人,使得美国不得不使用政变、暗杀、酷刑、镇压、干预内政,战争这种人类最野蛮、残酷的手段,慢慢也堕落了。
To come to America to become a "Chinese American" is meant to break with the past (China), embrace the present (America) & hope for (a better) future. To have come from a civilization is antithesis to being a free & cosmopolitan individual, or being American, where history means little, choice everything. The fantasy of entertainment and consumption is the new realism you settle on.
"This loss of history and crisis of civilization is not small", to cling to history is the rejection of the present, and as recognition the choice has been wrong
【Multiculturalism is just a word, "America" a dream. Such is the contradiction】
the government told auto makers they would only qualify for subsidies if they used batteries from a list of approved suppliers, which included dozens of Chinese firms but excluded foreign ones
“The price is high, and the service is slow”
In June, Beijing announced plans to scrap its controversial restrictions on foreign EV batteries and reopen its market to the big Korean and Japanese players
US President Joe Biden's administration has doubled down on the claim that China is mounting a genocide against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. But it has offered no proof, and unless it can, the State Department should withdraw the charge and support a UN-based investigation of the situation in Xinjiang.
NEW YORK/LONDON – The US government needlessly escalated its rhetoric against China by claiming that a genocide is being mounted against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. Such a grave charge matters, as genocide is rightly considered “the crime of crimes.” Many pundits are now calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, dubbing them the “Genocide Olympics.”
The genocide charge was made on the final day of Donald Trump’s administration by then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, who made no secret of hisbelief in lyingas a tool of US foreign policy. Now President Joe Biden’s administration has doubled down on Pompeo’s flimsy claim, even though the State Department’sown top lawyersreportedly share our skepticism regarding the charge.
This year’s State DepartmentCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices(HRP) follows Pompeo in accusing China of genocide in Xinjiang. Because the HRP never uses the term other than once in the report’s preface and again in the executive summary of the China chapter, readers are left to guess about the evidence. Much of the report deals with issues like freedom of expression, refugee protection, and free elections, which have scant bearing on the genocide charge.
There are credible charges of human rights abuses against Uighurs, but those do not per se constitute genocide. And we must understand the context of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang, which had essentially the same motivation as America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.
As the Hong Kong-based businessman and writer Weijian Shan hasrecounted, China experienced repeated terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the same years that America’s flawed response to 9/11 led to repeated US violations of international law and massive bloodshed. Indeed, until late 2020, the US classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan, and held many as prisoners. In July 2020, the United Nationsnotedthe presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria.
The charge of genocide should never be made lightly. Inappropriate use of the term may escalate geopolitical and military tensions and devalue the historical memory of genocides such as the Holocaust, thereby hindering the ability to prevent future genocides. It behooves the US government to make any charge of genocide responsibly, which it has failed to do here.
Genocide is defined under international law by theUN Genocide Convention(1948). Subsequent judicial decisions have clarified its meaning. Most countries, including the United States, have incorporated the Convention’s definition into their domestic legislation without any significant alteration. In the past few decades, the leading UN courts have confirmed that the definition requires proof to a very high standard of the intentional physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
The definition specifies that one of five acts must be perpetrated. Obviously, killing tops the list. The State Department’s report on China says there were “numerous reports” of killings, but that “few or no details were available,” and cites only one case – that of a Uighur man detained since 2017 who died of natural causes, according to the authorities. The report doesn’t even explain why the official explanation should be questioned.
Technically, genocide can be proven even without evidence that people were killed. But because courts require proof ofintentto destroy the group physically, it is hard to make the case in the absence of proof of large-scale killings. This is especially true when there is no direct evidence of genocidal intent, for example in the form of policy statements, but merely circumstantial evidence, what international courts refer to as a “pattern of conduct.”
International courts have repeatedly said that where genocide charges are based only upon inferences drawn from a pattern of conduct, alternative explanations must be ruled out definitively. That’s why the International Court of Justicerejected in 2015the genocide charge against Serbia and the counter-charge against Croatia, despite evidence of brutal ethnic cleansing in Croatia.
So, what else might constitute evidence of genocide in China? The State Department report refers to mass internment of perhaps one million Uighurs. If proven, that would constitute a gross violation of human rights; but, again, it is not evidence, per se, of intent to exterminate.
Another of the five recognized acts of genocide is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The State Department report refers to China’s notoriously aggressive birth-control policies. Until recently, China strictly enforced its one-child policy on the majority of its population but was more liberal toward ethnic minorities, including the Uighur.
Today, the one-child policy is no longer applied to the majority Han Chinese, but stricter measures have been imposed on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, whose families are traditionally larger than China’s average. Still, Xinjiang records a positive overall population growth rate, with the Uighur population growing faster than the non-Uighur population in Xinjiang during 2010-18.
The genocide charge is being fueled by “studies” like the Newlines Institutereportthat recently made global headlines. Newlines is described as a “non-partisan” Washington, DC-based think tank. On closer inspection, it appears to be a project of atiny Virginia-based universitywith 153 students, eight full-time faculty, and an apparently conservative policy agenda. Other leading human rights organizations have refrained from using the term.
UN expertsare rightly calling for the UN to investigate the situation in Xinjiang. China’s government, for its part, hasrecently statedthat it would welcome a UN mission to Xinjiang based on “exchanges and cooperation,” not on “guilty before proven.”
Unless the State Department can substantiate the genocide accusation, it should withdraw the charge. It should also support a UN-led investigation of the situation in Xinjiang. The work of the UN, and notably of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, is essential to promote the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
NEW YORK/LONDON – The US government needlessly escalated its rhetoric against China by claiming that a genocide is being mounted against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. Such a grave charge matters, as genocide is rightly considered “the crime of crimes.” Many pundits are now calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, dubbing them the “Genocide Olympics.”
The genocide charge was made on the final day of Donald Trump’s administration by then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, who made no secret of his belief in lying as a tool of US foreign policy. Now President Joe Biden’s administration has doubled down on Pompeo’s flimsy claim, even though the State Department’s own top lawyers reportedly share our skepticism regarding the charge.
This year’s State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (HRP) follows Pompeo in accusing China of genocide in Xinjiang. Because the HRP never uses the term other than once in the report’s preface and again in the executive summary of the China chapter, readers are left to guess about the evidence. Much of the report deals with issues like freedom of expression, refugee protection, and free elections, which have scant bearing on the genocide charge.
There are credible charges of human rights abuses against Uighurs, but those do not per se constitute genocide. And we must understand the context of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang, which had essentially the same motivation as America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.
As the Hong Kong-based businessman and writer Weijian Shan has recounted, China experienced repeated terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the same years that America’s flawed response to 9/11 led to repeated US violations of international law and massive bloodshed. Indeed, until late 2020, the US classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan, and held many as prisoners. In July 2020, the United Nations noted the presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria.
The charge of genocide should never be made lightly. Inappropriate use of the term may escalate geopolitical and military tensions and devalue the historical memory of genocides such as the Holocaust, thereby hindering the ability to prevent future genocides. It behooves the US government to make any charge of genocide responsibly, which it has failed to do here.
Genocide is defined under international law by the UN Genocide Convention (1948). Subsequent judicial decisions have clarified its meaning. Most countries, including the United States, have incorporated the Convention’s definition into their domestic legislation without any significant alteration. In the past few decades, the leading UN courts have confirmed that the definition requires proof to a very high standard of the intentional physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
The definition specifies that one of five acts must be perpetrated. Obviously, killing tops the list. The State Department’s report on China says there were “numerous reports” of killings, but that “few or no details were available,” and cites only one case – that of a Uighur man detained since 2017 who died of natural causes, according to the authorities. The report doesn’t even explain why the official explanation should be questioned.
Technically, genocide can be proven even without evidence that people were killed. But because courts require proof of intent to destroy the group physically, it is hard to make the case in the absence of proof of large-scale killings. This is especially true when there is no direct evidence of genocidal intent, for example in the form of policy statements, but merely circumstantial evidence, what international courts refer to as a “pattern of conduct.”
International courts have repeatedly said that where genocide charges are based only upon inferences drawn from a pattern of conduct, alternative explanations must be ruled out definitively. That’s why the International Court of Justice rejected in 2015 the genocide charge against Serbia and the counter-charge against Croatia, despite evidence of brutal ethnic cleansing in Croatia.
So, what else might constitute evidence of genocide in China? The State Department report refers to mass internment of perhaps one million Uighurs. If proven, that would constitute a gross violation of human rights; but, again, it is not evidence, per se, of intent to exterminate.
Another of the five recognized acts of genocide is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The State Department report refers to China’s notoriously aggressive birth-control policies. Until recently, China strictly enforced its one-child policy on the majority of its population but was more liberal toward ethnic minorities, including the Uighur.
Today, the one-child policy is no longer applied to the majority Han Chinese, but stricter measures have been imposed on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, whose families are traditionally larger than China’s average. Still, Xinjiang records a positive overall population growth rate, with the Uighur population growing faster than the non-Uighur population in Xinjiang during 2010-18.
The genocide charge is being fueled by “studies” like the Newlines Institute report that recently made global headlines. Newlines is described as a “non-partisan” Washington, DC-based think tank. On closer inspection, it appears to be a project of a tiny Virginia-based university with 153 students, eight full-time faculty, and an apparently conservative policy agenda. Other leading human rights organizations have refrained from using the term.
UN experts are rightly calling for the UN to investigate the situation in Xinjiang. China’s government, for its part, has recently stated that it would welcome a UN mission to Xinjiang based on “exchanges and cooperation,” not on “guilty before proven.”
Unless the State Department can substantiate the genocide accusation, it should withdraw the charge. It should also support a UN-led investigation of the situation in Xinjiang. The work of the UN, and notably of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, is essential to promote the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.