海德格尔《形而上学导论》英译中（导言）

2023-03-17 16:03

《形而上学导论》英译本导言

杨国成

友人自大洋彼岸的加州寄来耶鲁大学出版社2000年版《形而上学导论》英译版，遂发愿藉谋食之闲暇，把斯书译成汉语，一则搞懂海德格尔，二则操练英语。以下连同英语逐段贴出，以求正于方家。

Introduction to Metaphysics

Translators’ Introduction

In 1953, in the preface to the seventh edition of his masterwork, Being and Time, Martin Heidegger suggested that for an elucidation of the question of Being raised by this text, “the reader may refer to my Einfubrung in die Metaphysik, which is appearing simultaneously with this reprinting.” [1]

1953年，马丁·海德格尔在他的名著《本是与时间》（Being and Time）的第7版序中建议，关于该书中提出的本是（Being）问题的释义，“可参见与这一版同时发表的拙著Einfubrung in die Metaphysik［形而上学导论］”。

Heidegger had originally presented this Introduction to Metaphysics as a lecture course at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1935. It attests to the importance he attached to this work that Heidegger chose this course, from among the dozens of manuscripts of lecture courses held over the decades of his teaching career, as the first to present for general publication, and that he saw fit to present this Introduction as a companion -- indeed, as a rightful heir -- to Being and Time, the book that established him as one of the preeminent philosophers of the twentieth century.

《形而上学导论》最初以弗莱堡大学1935年夏季学期课堂演讲的形式面世。海德格尔从十多年教学生涯中积存的大量课堂演讲稿中选出这本著作，首次公开出版，可见他对《形而上学导论》自视甚高——既视之为《本是与时间》的姊妹篇、亦视之为该书的嗣续篇，正是《本是与时间》奠定了海氏作为二十世纪杰出哲学家的声誉。

Although this text consists of a series of classroom lecture, it is composed with great care. Heidegger writes in an intricate, nuanced style. Nearly every paragraph contains a series of plays on words that exploit the sounds and senses of German, and often of Greek, in order to bring us closer to a genuine experience of primordial phenomena – Being, truth, and Dasein (human beings insofar as they relate to Being).

虽然这个文本由一系列课堂演讲组成，却包含着一以贯之的精深思考。海德格尔的写作风格素以晦涩、深奥著称；几乎每一段落都包含了若干文字游戏——在德语（经常地，也包括希腊语）词汇的音和义上大做文章，以引导我们面对面地、真切地体验作为源初现象的——本是（Being）、真理（truth）和此是（Dasein，人之是者与本是之关联）。

In the English-speaking world, the importance of Introduction to Metaphysics was in part established by the fact that in 1959 it became the first book-length work by Heidegger to be translated into English, three years before a translation of Being and Time itself appeared. In effect, the Introduction to Metaphysics introduced Heidegger to the English-speaking world. Ralph Manheim undertook the daunting task of translating Heidegger’s highly idiosyncratic prose, and if we judge the results in view of the fact that he had few models in work with, Manheim’s effort stands as a landmark. He succeeded in presenting Heidegger’s often turgid style in a readable and idiomatic English.

英语世界对《形而上学导论》的重视，在1959年就打下了部分基础，那是海德格尔的大部头著作第一次译成英语，比《本是与时间》英译本问世还要早三年。事实上，是《形而上学导论》把海德格尔引进了英语世界。拉尔夫·曼海姆（Ralph Manheim）担负了这一令人望而生畏的任务，把风格迥异的海氏散文移译成英文。如果我们就曼海姆译介海德格尔的开创性成果作一个评价，那么，其译本无疑是一道里程碑。译者成功地用一种朗朗上口的地道英文转达了海氏一贯铺张的写作风格。

Nevertheless, all important philosophical works are standing invitations to new translation, for translation is one of the means by which such works are continually reappropriated by their interpreters. Furthermore, after forty years, Manheim’s translation is showing its age. To begin with, in these intervening years, a broad consensus has developed for rendering key concepts in Heideggfer’s philosophical lexicon. Although no serious translation should allow such consensus to dictate its labors, a contemporary rendering should take this consensus into account so that, as far as possible, the reader may endeavor to place the arguments of this book in the context of Heidegger’s wider body of work now available in English.

然而，重译所有重要的哲学著作永远是一种挡不住的诱惑，因为翻译是一种手段，在不断地重译中，译者才能吃透原著的思想。况且， 40年前的曼海姆译本也确实太老了。首先，这些年间，人们已经就海德格尔哲学语汇中的关键概念的英译达成了广泛的共识。虽然此类共识并非就是任何严肃的翻译工作必须奉行的戒律，但人们在当代的翻译工作中却不得不将其考虑在内，因此，读者应尽可能结合现有的海德格尔著作英译文本来看待关于本书的争议。

Secondly, Manheim’s felicitous translation of Heidegger at times obscures, by its very fluidity, important philosophical issues; this is because an idiomatic translation may sacrifice terminological consistency or precision in a turn of phrase for the sake of a more natural-sounding English expression. We have tried to maintain a high degree of consistency in conveying key concepts, retreating from this standard only when sense absolutely dictates otherwise. The point of this procedure is to let readers form their own interpretations of Heidegger’s words. To some readers this fidelity will result in what sounds at times like an unnatural English, but it is important to recognize that Heidegger’s can be just as alien to a native German speaker.

其次，由于曼海姆在一些海德格尔重要哲学术语翻译上的随意性，其措辞考究的译文时而会变得晦涩难解；因为当一个词语反复出现时，过于追求流畅、生动的译文往往会牺牲名词术语的统一性和精确性。因此，我们在移译若干关键概念时尽量保持其译名的统一性，除非它们的意义确实另有所指。采取这一步骤的目的在于，让读者对海德格尔的用语形成自己的见解。有些读者会觉得过于忠实的译文读起来不像地道的英语，要晓得即使一个土生土长的德国人读海德格尔也会有读外国话的感觉。

A common objection against so-called literal translations is that a single word can have many meanings, depending on the context. This is true, and it is especially true of Heidegger. But the best way to suggest the shifting pattern of the meanings of a German word is to use one word to English that is amenable to undergoing a similar series of uses. For example, when we consistently use “fittingness” to translate Fug, we do not mean to imply that the word should always be understood according to some single formula, such as a dictionary definition. The various meanings of “fittingness” in this text must be gathered from its successive contexts, just as one would understand the senses of Fug if one were reading the German text. If we used several different renderings, it would become impossible to see the connections among the various uses of Fug – for there are many such connections, even if no single, formulaic definition of the word is possible. Having said this, we must also acknowledge that is has not always been possible to employ a single English word to render some of Heideggfer’s terms.

常见的反对直译的意见认为，一个单词原本有多种含义，只有结合上下文才可确定。这话没错，对海德格尔著作来说尤其没错。但最好的方法莫过于用一个英语单词来对译一个词义繁复多变的德语单词，以经得起一连串类似用法的推敲。例如，我们统一用“合式”（fittingness）移译Fug，并无意暗示必须像查辞典一样，对号入座地理解这个词。“fittingness”在文本各处的确切含义必须根据其上下文来推断，就像读德文本时必须根据上下文来理解Fug的含义一样。如果我们采用不同的译名，就不可能看出Fug的不同用法之间的联系，因为的确存在着许多这样的联系；因此，即使找不到一对一的译名，固定对Fug的译法仍然是可取的。说到这里，我们必须承认，并非总能找到一个英语单词来移译海德格尔的某些术语。

Because Heidegger places such a great emphasis on the importance of language and the use of language for the question of Being and its history, the attentive reader should learn enough about Heidegger’s philosophical terminology to form a judgment concerning the best way to render Heidegger’s key words in English. Because we have endeavored to maintain a high degree of terminological consistency in our translation, we hope this version of the Introduction to Metaphysics will aid this process of reflection. To assist the reader further, especially the reader who comes to Heidegger for the first time with this book, we offer here a brief discussion of important words in Heideggfer’s philosophical vocabulary, restricting ourselves to the most difficult and characteristic terms used by Heidegger in this work. We also recommend a study of the more comprehensive glossary accompanying this translation. The reader must understand that what follow here are sketches, not definitions, and that only closer study through an engaged process of familiarization can develop the fuller meaning of these words. There are no solutions to genuine problems of translation, only temporarily satisfactory placeholders for what thoughtful readers should themselves take up as a question about language.

由于海德格尔格外强调语言的重要性、以及语言的使用在追问本是及其历史中的重要性，因此，有心的读者应充分熟悉海德格尔的哲学术语，以自行判断究竟以何种方法移译海氏关键词为佳。我们之所以在翻译中坚持名词术语的高度统一性，是希望这一版本的《形而上学导论》有助于激发进一步的思考。为了更好地帮助读者，特别是帮助那些通过本书第一次接触海德格尔的读者，我们拟就海德格尔哲学语汇中的若干重要语词作一番简要的探讨，但仅限于海氏在本书中用过的、最独特、最难解的语词。我们建议读者结合译本阅读这个语词汇释，以便充分理解这些语词。读者应该理解下述汇释只是梗概、绝非定论，只有通过鍥而不舍、精益求精的深入研究，才能呈现这些语词的更为丰富的含义。对于译本中真正的难解之处，语词汇释并非标准答案、而是权宜之计，对于勤于思考的读者来说，必然会以此为出发点，坚持不懈地追问这些语词的内涵。

Das Seiende: beings; what is; that which is. Heidegger’s expression das Seinde is broad enough to refer to any entity, physical or otherwise, with which we may have dealings, whether real, illusory, or imagined. One helpful passage in this text (IM 58) suggests the range of things that may count as beings, including vehicles, mountains, insets, the Japanese, and Bach’s fugues. Das Seiende (or the equivalent Seiendes) also often refers to beings in general and as a whole, as in the opening question of the book, “Why are there beings [Seiendes] at all instead of nothing?” It should noted that the German expression, unlike the English “beings”, is not plural, and is translated most literally as “what is” or “that which is”. Occasionally, Heidegger refers to something as seined, and we have translated this word as “in being”. This is meant to function as a verbal adjective and does not mean located inside a being or thing. Finally, Seiendheit means “beingness”, that which characterizes beings as beings, in general. For Heidegger, much of the history of philosophy has focused on this beingness rather than inquiring into the happening of Being itself.

Das Seiende：是者（beings），所是者（what is），其所是者（that which is）。海德格尔语词Das Seiende的含义甚广，可指称我们与之打交道的任何东西，无论它是物质的、还是其他性质的，无论它是真相、还是假相、甚至是幻相。本书中有一段话（见德文版第58页）列举了一系列被称为“是者”的东西，其中包括车辆、山脉、河道、日本人、巴赫的赋格曲等。Das Seiende (或它的同义词 Seiendes)也总称一切是者和作为整体的是者，如本书开头即发问：“为什么是者［Seiendes］皆是而无却不是？”这表明该德语词不同于英语词的“是者（beings）”，没有复数形式，多数情况可以直译为“所是者（what is）”或“其所是者（that which is）”。海德格尔偶尔也指称某物为seined，我们把这个词译为“是着的（in being）”，可见这是一个具有动词功能的形容词，而不是指“居于某是者或某物中”的意思。末了，Seiendheit的意思为“所是状态（beingness）”，一般专指是者之为是者的状态。海德格尔认为，一部哲学史几乎可称之为探究“所是状态（beingness）”的历史、而非探究“本是（Being）”自身演义（happening）的历史。

Das Sein: Being. For Heidegger, Being is not any thing. It is not a being at all. Introduction to Metaphysics often gives the impression that Being is the same as beingness. However, Heidegger’s ultimate question is how it is that beings in their beingness become available to us in the first place, or how we come to understand what it means to be. The question of Being, in this sense, inquires into the happening, the event, in which all beings become accessible and understandable to us as beings. Being is thus essentially verbal and temporal. Literally translated, das Sein would be “the to be”, but this would be far too clumsy a rendering. Among Heidegger scholars there is considerable controversy on how best to translate das Sein into English. Many prefer the lowercase “being” in order to fend off the impression that Heidegger means some Supreme Being standing above or holding up all other beings, das Sein must not be mistaken for a subject deserving the substantiation that capitalization can imply in English. (In German, all nouns are capitalized, so there is no such implication.) Still, in our judgment, to render das Sein as “being” risks confusion, especially with “beings” as the translation for das Seiende, and so we resort to the capitalized term.

Das Sein：本是（Being）。海德格尔认为，本是并非任何东西，并且根本就不是一个是者。《形而上学导论》给人一种印象，似乎本是如同所是状态（beingness）。然而，海德格尔的穷根究底之问乃：是者的所是状态如何可能被我们获知？或者我们如何可能知晓是者已成其所是状态？在此意义上的本是问题乃探究发生事件的演义，探究演义中的一切是者对同样为是者的我们，如何成为可通达的和可知晓的。因此，本是在本质上乃一个动词性的和历时性的名词，如果直译的话，das Sein应译成“是（the to be）”，但这样的译法显然太乏味了。海学专家们曾经就das Sein的最佳英译名进行过严肃的争论。许多人宁可喜欢首字母小写的“所是（being）”，只为枉绝此类念头——以为海德格尔的das Sein乃一个高居于众是者之上或者支承着众是者的至高无上者，因此必须避免把das Sein误视作某个对象，而英语译名的首字母大写会暗示和鼓励das Sein的实体化。（由于德语中所有名词的首字母都大写，故不存在类似联想。）但我们仍然认为，把das Sein移译为“所是（being）”存在着与das Seiende 的译名“是者（beings）”混淆的危险，故毅然采用了首字母大写的译名“本是（Being）”。

Dasein: A word left untranslated in almost all renderings of Heidegger’s work, Dasein denotes that being for whom Being itself is at issue, for whom Being is in question. For the most part, in Heidegger, this being is us, the human being, although Dasein is nor equivalent to human beings; Heidegger insists that Dasein is not an anthropological, psychological, or biological concept. We can think of Dasein as a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when Being becomes an issue for them; in this sense, Heidegger often speaks in this text of “historical Dasein”, “our Dasein”, “human Dasein”, or “the Dasein of a people”. In everyday German, the word Dasein is used just as we use the word “existence”; readers may always substitute “existence” for “Dasein” in order to get a sense of how Heidegger’s statements would have sounded to his original audience,. But Heideger consistently sees the Latin term existentia as misleading and superficial (see IM 49, 138), so it is preferable to interpret Dasein in terms of its root meaning. This root meaning is usually rendered in as “Being there”, but when Heidegger hyphenates Da-sein, we have employed the equally valid translation “Being-here”. Dasein is the being who inhabits a Here, a sphere of meaning within which beings can reveal themselves as meaningful, as significant.

Dasein：此是。在海德格尔著作的各种译本中几乎都直接引入此词而不加翻译。此是（Dasein）意指这样一种是者，本是（Being）因它而展开自身，因它而被追问。在多数情况下，海德格尔意指的这种是者乃我们自己，乃人性之是者（the human being）；尽管此是并非等于人之是者（human beings），海德格尔也坚持认为此是并非指称一种或人类学的、或心理学的、或生物学的概念。我们可以把此是看成人之是者的亲历之境（a condition into which human beings enter），它既非指个人的、也非指集体的、乃指本是因之绽开的历史发生事件，在此意义上，海德格尔在本书中常有“历史的此是”（historical Dasein）、“我们的此是”（our Dasein）、“人之此是”（human Dasein）或“民族的此是”（the Dasein of a people）之类说法。在日常德语中，说“此是”如同我们说“存在”（existence），读者可以自始至终把“此是”思作“存在”，以便确切把握海德格尔当年面对听众言说时所欲表达的意思。由于海德格尔一向认为拉丁语词existentia［存在］易使人望文生义而误人子弟（参见德文版第49页，138页），因此宜取它的源初含义以释此是。这个源初含义通常被移译为“在那儿是着”（Being there），仅当海德格尔把它写成Da-sein时，我们也相应地译成“此之是”（Being-here）。此是乃栖居在此（Here）、栖居在一片富有意蕴的场域中的人性之是者；而非人性之众是者惟在这片场域中方能展示自身的目的和意义（Dasein is the being who inhabits a Here, a sphere of meaning within which beings can reveal themselves as meaningful, as significant）。

Das Nichts: Nothing. As the first sentence of introduction to metaphysics indicates, the question of “nothing” will be a recurrent theme of this work. For Heidegger, there is a deep connection between das Nichts and das Sein, and once again, the reader must beware of taking the capitalized Nothing as a substantive thing. Neither Being nor Nothing is a being for Heidegger. We have resorted to capitalization again to avoid confusion between Heidegger’s use of das Nichts, which as Nothing is the counterpart to das Sein, Being, and his use of Nichts or nichts, without the article, which generally means “nothing” as employed in more ordinary language.

Das Nichts：本无（Nothing）。《形而上学导论》的第一句话就引出了本书中一再提到的关于“无”（nothing）之追问。对海德格尔来说，本无与本是之间存在着深刻的关联，故读者应谨防把首字母大写的本无（Nothing）误当作实体性的东西。在海德格尔那里，无论本是抑或本无均非是者。我们之所以再次采用首字母大写的译名，旨在区别海德格尔关于das Nichts和Nichts 或 nichts的不同用法——前者为本无（Nothing），与译为本是（Being）的das Sein对举；无冠词的后者多见于日常用语，其意思为“无”（nothing）。

Gewalt: violence. Gewalt belongs to a family of words used in this work that present considerable difficulties for translation. In ordinary German, Gewalt can mean violence in the sense of arbitrary and willful force, but it can also mean the legitimate force employed by the institutions of the state. We have decided to translate this word uniformly as “violence”, in part for the sake of consistency, but also because Heidegger seems to want to underline the radically transformative work of the Gewalt -tat and the Gewalt-tätiger – the act of violence and the doer of violence – without minimizing the danger and even the terror of such work. Still, the reader should keep in mind the ambiguous meaning of Gewalt in German.

Gewalt：强力（violence）。Gewalt乃本书中相当难译的词簇成员之一。在日常德语中，Gewalt既可以指一种专横武断、狂野无羁意义上的暴力，也可以指政府机构雇用的合法暴力。我们决定将此词一律译为“强力”（violence），一方面为了译名统一起见，另一方面因为海德格尔似乎刻意强调了Gewalt-tat（the act of violence，强力行动）和 Gewalt-tätiger（the doer of violence，强力发动者）在剧烈变革中的事功——海氏并未顾忌此类事功危险乃至可怕的一面。读者宜留心体味Gewalt一词在德语中的多义性。

Walten; das Walten: hold sway; the sway. Related to Gewalt are the words walten (a verb) and das Walten (a verbal noun). In ordinary German, walten means to prevail, to reign, to govern, to dominate. Heidegger interprets the Greek word phusis, which is usually translated as “nature”, as a Greek name for Being itself – that is, the “emergent-abiding Walten” of beings as such. We believe the expression “the sway” suggests this powerful upsurge of the presence of beings. That Heidegger seeks to interpret phusis as this “sway” is an undertaking to which the reader must lend special attention.

Walten；das Walten：威御（hold sway）；威临（the sway）。动词walten和动词性名词das Walten乃与Gewalt相关联的族簇。在日常德语中，walten意谓战胜（to prevail）、君临（to reign）、统治（to govern）、支配（to dominate）。希腊语词phusis的通常译名为“自然”，惟海德格尔把phusis释为本是（Being）的希腊命名，phusis乃令是者如此这般“发生－卓立之Walten”。我们相信译名“威临”（the sway）能够转达是者出场时的这种强力态势。海德格尔毕生以诠释视作“威临”的phusis为志业，读者对此应予同情地关注。

Grund: ground; reason; foundation. Like its English cognate, “ground”, the German Grund can mean both the earth beneath our feet and the reason upon which we establish a position. As such, ein Grund can be a foundation, and it is opposed to ein Abgrund, an abyss. For Heidegger, every serious “Why?” – strives to reach such a Grund, although a genuine question may well run up against an Abgrund. We translate Grund and related words in a variety of ways, as indicated here, because no single English word can adequately capture its range of meaning.

Grund：大地（ground）；根据（reason）；根基（foundation）。德语Grund与它的同源英语词“ground”相似，既有我们据以立足的大地之义，又有我们据以立论的根据之义。如此，ein Grund意谓根基（foundation）的话，那么，与之对举的ein Abgrund则意谓深渊（abyss）。对海德格尔而言，凡严肃的“为什么”之问都是通达此类Grund之斗争，尽管一种真正的追问的很可能与Abgrund不期而遇。需要说明的是，我们之所以用不同的译名移译Grund及与之相关的语词，乃因为没有一个英语单词能够充分涵盖其一系列含义。

Der Mensch: humanity; human beings; humans; the human being; the human. In German, Mensch means human being, irrespective of gender, and so, with a very few exceptions, we have sought to preserve this gender neutrality, especially because Heidegger discusses all human beings as Dasein.

Der Mensch：人类（humanity）；人之是者（human beings）；人们（humans）；人之所是者（the human being），人（the human）。德语的Mensch意指人之所是者，与性别无关，因此，除了个别例外，我们保持了译名的中性，何况海德格尔乃论述全体人之是者的此是（Dasein）。

Volk: a people; the people. The German word Volk has a troubled history. In official Nazi ideology, the Volk is the race, the bearer of a specific historical destiny, both biological and spiritual. But in ordinary German, Volk has no necessary connection with race. It can mean a people or nation, or “the people” as the basis for sovereignty (as in the American “We the people”), although Volk usually does not mean “people” in the informal sense of “folks around here”. Heidegger uses the word Volk in Being and Time, and there it is best translated as “community”. But in the 1930s, especially during his involvement with the Nazi regime, Heidegger discusses the Volk in a manner that clearly endeavors to come to grips, for better or worse, with the polities of his time.

Volk：民族（a people），人民（the people）。德语Volk一词有过一段不寻常的历史。在纳粹政权的意识形态中，Volk意指种族，意指特定历史使命的担荷者，既有生物学上的含义、亦有精神教化上的含义。在日常德语中，Volk 与种族并无必然联系，可意指民族（people）或国家（nation），也可意指作为主权国家之本的“人民”（the people，一如美国人常说的“我们人民”），虽然Volk通常不指称“定居者”（ folks around here）意义上的非正式用语“族群”（people）。海德格尔在《本是与时间》中使用的Volk一词宜译作“共同体”。但在1930年代，尤其是被卷入纳粹政权期间，海德格尔讨论Volk一词的风格，姑且勿论其是非善恶，明显地紧扣了他那个时代的政治。

Beyond the question of terminology, as our discussion of das Volk suggests, it is crucial to take into account the historical context of Introduction to Metaphysics. Manheim’s translation at times blunts the edge of the political references and implications of Heidegger’s work. When Heidegger delivered the original lecture course in 1935, Adolf Hitler had been in power for two years. Heidegger had himself joined the National Socialist party in May 1933 and served the regime as the rector of the University of Freiburg from April 1933 until his resignation in April 1934, when he determined that he had lost an internal power struggle concerning the direction of educational policy. Readers must judge for themselves how Heidegger had come to

view the historical meaning of the regime by 1935, but to render Führer as “chancellor”, as Manheim does (IM 27), to take one example, makes this reckoning more difficult, because the reader is not fully confronted with the political connections of this book. The implications of Heidegger’s references, as when he makes approving use of Knut Hamsun for an example of talk about Nothing (IM 20) or when he criticizes Theodor Haecker’s What Is Humanity? (IM 109), may well escape the contemporary reader: Hamsun, a Nobel Prize—winning writer, was a Nazi sympathizer; Haecker’s book advanced a clearly anti-Nazi argument.

我们关于 das Volk 一词的讨论虽然越出了名词术语问题的范围，但它对于《形而上学导论》这个历史文本的解读并非无关紧要的。曼海姆译本不时地削弱了海德格尔著作中或明或暗的政治锋芒。1935年，海德格尔以课堂演讲形式首次发表这一著作时，阿道夫·希特勒已经上台两年了。海氏1933年5月加入国家主义社会党，1933年4月起以弗莱保大学校长身份为当局服务，1934年4月当他确定自己在一场事关教育政策走向的内部权力斗争中已经落败时，便辞去了校长职务。读者本可自行评判1935年的海德格尔会如何看待当局的历史意义，但如曼海姆译本中的例子，把Führer［元首］移译为“总理”（chancellor，参见德文版第27页），使读者无法充分体会原著与政治的亲缘关系，只会徒增读者解读的难度。当海德格尔不无赞赏地援引柯特·哈姆逊（Knut Hamsun）作为谈论本无（Nothing）的例证时（参见德文版第20页），当他抨击舍特·赫克尔（Theodor Haecker）的《人是什么》时（参见德文版第109页），当代读者根本不会留意海氏话中的玄机——身为诺贝尔奖获奖作家的哈姆逊恰恰是纳粹的同路人，而赫克尔则在书中提出了一种直白的反纳粹观点。

The trouble with this explanation is that Heidegger did not add the parenthetical remark in 1935 or soon thereafter, whether as a silent criticism or anything else. In his prefatory note to Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that material in parentheses was added at the time of the lectures and that material in brackets was added during later reworking of the text; in this 1966 interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger explicitly asserted that the parenthetical remark “was present in my manuscript from the beginning” but that he did not read it aloud for fear of party informers. Nevertheless, subsequent scholarship has shown that many of the passages in parentheses should have been in brackets, and the insertion about “the encounter between global technology and modern humanity” is one of these. The reader must judge the meaning of this passage in consideration of the fact that Heidegger did not, at least in 1935 when the lectures were originally delivered, explain the significance of National Socialism in terms of the parenthetical remark.

上述解读的困扰在于，海德格尔并未在1935年或稍后几年内添加过任何夹注，无论是代表一种无声的批判或代表别的什么意思。在《形而上学导论》前言中，海德格尔声称，圆括号内的文字是在演讲时添加的，方括号内的文字是在日后修改文本时添加的。1966年，海德格尔在明镜杂志（Der Spiegel）的访谈中明确肯定， “在我原初的手稿中就有”这个夹注，只因当时害怕有人告密而未在课堂上读出来。但日后的研究表明，圆括号内的多数段落应该放在方括号内，诸如“反抗全球技术化和人类新潮化的遭遇战”这样的插入语即属于这一类情况。在了解了海德格尔在夹注中对国家社会主义理义的疏解不同于他先前的见解、至少不同于他在1935年首次发表演讲时的见解之后，读者当能就这段话的含义作出自己的判断。

In our translation, we have indicated wherever parentheses in the 1953 edition have now been revised to brackets to show that the material was added not in 1935　but thereafter. We have not taken lightly this decision to impose on Heidegge’s text, but we believe that for the sake of a full understanding of the context of the book, such interventions are necessary. We have also provided bibliographical references for literary and philosophical works that Heidegger mentions, and we have occasionally commented on the contents of these works when we believe that such commentary would enhance the understanding of his lectures. Furthermore, in addition to scholarly and contextual references, where Heidegger’s language becomes especially difficult or where the sense depends in part on the German itself, we have provided either interpolations of the German words or, where the language is ambiguous or especially complex, a footnote for entire phrases or sentences. We have also provided the pagination from the Niemeyer edition in the margins of this translation so that readers may easily find the German whenever they have questions about the translation.

在这个译本中，我们把1953年版中的所有圆括号都改为方括号，表示括号内的文字为后来所添，并非1935年原有的。我们并非随心所欲地擅改海氏文本，而是相信这样做的结果，必然有助于读者充分理解本书的内容。我们还在脚注中提供了海氏在书中提及的文学和哲学著作的版本信息，有时也给出相关评论，以增强读者对文本的理解。除了学术性的和引文的注释之外，对于海德格尔遣词造句过于难解之处或只有德国人才能理解之处，我们给出了词语原文；语言暧昧难解或过于繁复的地方，脚注中给出了整个短语或句子。我们同时为这个译本在页边提供了尼迈耶尔（Niemeyer）版页码，读者若对译文有疑问的话很容易找到原文以资对照。

Our practice has been to transliterate individual Greek words, such as phusis, logos, on, einai, polemos, and techne, so that readers unfamiliar with the language may track the use of these terms. We have used the Greek alphabet in longer citations, on the assumption that any readers who study the details of these longer passages will know Greek and will not need a transliteration. In footnotes, we have also frequently provided conventional translations of Greek passages, because Heidegger’s own interpretative translations often depart from what scholars would generally recognize as a conventional rendering, and the reader should have the opportunity to judge the extent of Heidegger’s departure.

我们通常对单个的希腊语词采用音译的方法，诸如phusis， logos， on， einai， polemos,和 techne等，以便不熟悉希腊语的读者对这些语词的用法有迹可寻。我们还给出了较长的希腊语引文，设想任何对这些引文有详细研究的读者自然熟谙希腊语和毋须翻译。在脚注中，我们也不时地给出这些引文的传统英译，因为海德格尔独特的解释性译文常常疏离了学者们公认的传统译法，以便读者有机会判断海德格尔的疏离程度。

Aside from all issues of vocabulary, political context, and textual history, Introduction to Metaphysics remains, first and foremost, a powerful and provocative work of philosophy. Heidegger’s impassioned lectures resonate with each other and with us, leaving us with a wealth of questions. What is the meaning of Being? Does it have a particular meaning for Westerners, and if so, how did it come to have that meaning? Does our ordinary desregard for such issues blind us to our history and condemn us to a superficial relation to the world? Do our ordinary science and logic separate us from the truth? What is truth in the first place? What is language? What is thinking? What is it to be human at all?

除了以上谈到的语汇简释、政治背景和版本历史之外，《形而上学导论》首先作为一本宏大的和极具挑战性的哲学著作而传世。海德格尔充满激情的演讲震憾了听众也震憾了我们，并给我们留下了大量的问题。什么是本是（Being）的意义？它对西方人有特殊意义吗？如果有的话，如何可能通达其意义？我们通常对这些问题的无动于衷造成了我们对历史的熟视无睹和判定了我们与世界的疏远吗？我们通常的科学和逻辑使我们远离了真理吗？首先，什么是真理呢？什么是语言呢？什么是思想呢？质而言之，什么是人之为人呢？

We prefer not to try to answer such questions here, or to venture farther into the difficulties of interpreting Introduction to Metaphysics as a whole. Instead, we hope that our translation will make it possible for thoughtful readers to enter the book on their own and form their own judgments. Our outline, glossary, and index may provide some assistance. Readers who are interested in further explorations of the many dimensions of this text may also consult the anthology A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, which is being published by Yale University Press as a sequel to this volume.

我们既不打算在这里回答上述问题，也不算冒险进一步深入对《形而上学导论》的整体释疑。相反，我们希望我们的译本尽可能让善思的读者自己深入文本和形成自己的看法。我们的提要、语词汇释和索引可能提供某些帮助。愿意进一步对这个文本进行多维度深察的读者可参考论文集《与海德格尔之〈形而上学导论〉同行》（A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics），作为这个译本的后续成果将由耶鲁大学出版社出版。

微信扫码关注该文公众号作者

戳这里提交新闻线索和高质量文章给我们。

来源: qq

点击查看作者最近其他文章