判例译析｜美国法中行为人因违反证券法而返还的不法财产之性质

（图片来源于网络）

翻译| David 伦敦国王学院LL.M 

一审| 孙济民 中国人民大学

二审| peipei  Bristol Law

编辑| 徐晓彤  UNSW LL.M.

责编| 陈逸漩 中国人民大学

原文链接：

https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.usreports/uss1600529&div=2&start_page=1&collection=usreports&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16-529

CHARLES R. KOKESH, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 5, 2017]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

美国最高法院

CHARLES R. KOKESH（上诉人）诉美国证券交易委员会案

根据提交给美国第十巡回上诉法院的调卷令[1]

SOTOMAYOR法官就本案发表法院判决

A 5-year statute of limitations applies to any “action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise.” 28 U. S. C.§2462. This case presents the question whether §2462 applies to claims for disgorgement imposed as a sanction for violating a federal securities law. The Court holds that it does. Disgorgement in the securities-enforcement context is a "penalty" within the meaning of §2462, and so disgorgement actions must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrues.

根据《美国法典》第28卷第2462条之规定，五年的诉讼时效条款适用于“任何为执行民事罚款、刑罚或没收财产等而提起的诉讼。”本案的争议焦点为，当行为人因违反联邦证券法受到制裁且被提起罚金执行之诉时，第2462条是否适用。法院认为，第2462条适用。因违反联邦证券法而需返还的不法财产是在第2462条中的“刑罚”之范畴中，因此返还不法财产之诉必须在要求行为人返还不法财产之日起五年内提起。

Charles Kokesh owned two investment-adviser firms that provided investment advice to business-development companies. In late 2009, the Commission commenced an enforcement action in Federal District Court alleging that between 1995 and 2009, Kokesh, through his firms, mis-appropriated $34.9 million from four of those development companies. The Commission further alleged that, in order to conceal the misappropriation, Kokesh caused the filing of false and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements. The Commission sought civil monetary penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring Kokesh from violating securities laws in the future.

Charles Kokesh拥有两家为商业发展公司提供投资建议的顾问公司。2009年底，美国证券交易委员会（United States Securities and Exchange Commission，以下简称“SEC”）在联邦地区法院提起执行之诉，指控Kokesh在1995年至2009年期间，通过他的公司，从四家商业发展公司中挪用了3490万美元。SEC还指出，Kokesh为掩盖挪用行为，故意提交虚假的SEC报告和授权委托书。SEC要求Kokesh返还所挪用的资金，对其科以民事罚款，并禁止其今后违反证券法的任何规定。

After a 5-day trial, a jury found that Kokesh's actions violated the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80a-36; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§80b-5, 80b-6; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§78m, 78n. The District Court then turned to the task of imposing penalties sought by the Commission. As to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court determined that §2462's 5-year limitations period precluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to October 27, 2004-that is, five years prior to the date the Commission filed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. The court ordered Kokesh to pay a civil penalty of $2,354,593, which represented "the amount of funds that [Kokesh] himself received during the limitations period." Id., at 31a-32a. Regarding the Commission's request for a $34.9 million disgorgement judgment-$29.9 million of which resulted from violations outside the limitations period-the court agreed with the Commission that because disgorgement is not a "penalty" within the meaning of §2462, no limitations period applied. The court therefore entered a disgorgement judgment in the amount of $34.9 million and ordered Kokesh to pay an additional $18.1 million in prejudgment interest.

经过5天的审判，陪审团认定Kokesh的行为违反了《1940年投资公司法》（《美国法典》第15卷第80a-36条）；《1940年投资顾问法》（《美国法典》第15卷第80b-5、80b-6条）和《1934年证券交易法》（《美国法典》第15卷第78m、78n条）。随后，地区法院着手进行SEC所要求的财产执行工作。地区法院认为，根据《美国法典》第2462条的规定，针对2004年10月27日前发生的挪用资金行为，有关处罚因超过五年诉讼有效期而无法执行。因此，地区法院命令Kokesh为2004年至2009年间挪用的2,354,593美元支付民事罚款。至于SEC所主张的行为人偿还全部所挪用款项（共3490万美元，其中2990万美元为在诉讼有效期外挪用）之请求，地区法院认为，由于返还所挪用资金并不属于第2462条中的“刑罚”之范畴，因此不适用五年诉讼有效期之规定。故地区法院要求Kokesh返还挪用的全部资金，共计3490万美元，并额外支付1810万美元的利息。

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 834 F. 3d 1158 (2016). It agreed with the District Court that disgorgement is not a penalty, and further found that disgorgement is not a forfeiture. Id., at 1164-1167. The court thus concluded that the statute of limitations in§2462 does not apply to SEC disgorgement claims.

第十巡回上诉法院维持原判。该法院认同地区法院的判决，即同样认为应予返还的不法财产并不等同于刑罚，并进一步提出了返还不法财产亦不同于没收财产。故第十巡回上诉法院认为，第2462条中规定的诉讼时效不适用于SEC的所要求的返还不法财产。

This Court granted certiorari, 580 U. S. __ (2017), to resolve disagreement among the Circuits over whether disgorgement claims in SEC proceedings are subject to the 5-year limitations period of §2462.

本法院决定受理该诉讼请求，以解决各巡回法院之间关于SEC的诉讼请求中的返还不法财产是否适用第2462条有关五年诉讼时效的规定之分歧。

（图片来源于网络）

Statutes of limitations "se[t] a fixed date when exposure to the specified Government enforcement efforts en[d]." Gabelli, 568 U. S., at 448. Such limits are "'vital to the welfare of society"' and rest on the principle that "'even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten."' Id., at 449. The statute of limitations at issue here-28 U. S. C. §2462-finds its roots in a law enacted nearly two centuries ago. 568 U. S., at 445. In its current form, §2462 establishes a 5-year limitations period for "an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture." This limitations period applies here if SEC disgorgement qualifies as either a fine, penalty, or forfeiture. We hold that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty.

诉讼时效条款“规定了一个可请求公权力进行执法的固定时间期限”[2]。该规定对于促进社会福利而言十分重要，它建立在“即使是不法分子，也有权认为他们的罪行可能被遗忘”[3]的原则之上。本案所涉及的有关诉讼时效的第2462条规定源于近两个世纪前颁布的法律[4]。第2462条规定，提起执行民事罚款、刑罚或没收财产的诉讼有效时限为五年。如果行为人返还不法财产属于第2462条中的“民事罚款、刑罚或没收”，则该条款适用于本案情形。本院认为，行为人返还不法财产应当被视为一种刑罚，其符合第2462条规定的情形。

A "penalty" is a "punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws." Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667 (1892). This definition gives rise to two principles. First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns in part on "whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual." Id., at 668. Although statutes creating private causes of action against wrongdoers may appear-or even be labeled penal, in many cases "neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal." Id., at 667. This is because "[p]enal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the State." Ibid. Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty only if it is sought "for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner"-as opposed to compensating a victim for his loss. Id., at 668.

“刑罚”是“国家针对实施犯罪或违法行为的行为人所施加和执行的金钱或人身上的惩罚”[5]。该定义提出了两项法律原则。其一，一项制裁是否被认定为刑罚，“一定程度上应当取决于引起制裁的不法行为是针对社会大多数群体，还是针对个人”[6]。尽管许多用于救济因针对个人的不法行为而产生的侵害的法律规定被贴上刑罚的标签，但在许多案件中，“此种规定对行为人施加的责任并不都是严厉的惩罚”[7]。这是因为，“严格意义上的刑法 ，是指针对国家的犯罪行为进行惩罚的法律”[8]。其二，只有在“为了惩罚和阻止其他人以同样的方式犯罪”[9]，而不是为了补偿受害者损失的情况下，有关财产的处罚才能被视为是一种刑罚手段。

The Court has applied these principles in construing the term "penalty." In Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148 (1899), for example, a playwright sued a defendant in Federal Circuit Court under a statute providing that copyright infringers "'shall be liable for damages ... not less than one hundred dollars for the first [act of infringement], and fifty dollars for every subsequent performance, as to the court shall appear to be just."' Id., at 153. The defendant argued that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction on the ground that a separate statute vested district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over actions "to recover a penalty." Id., at 152. To determine whether the statutory damages represented a penalty, this Court noted first that the statute provided "for a recovery of damages for an act which violates the rights of the plaintiff, and gives the right of action solely to him" rather than the public generally, and second, that "the whole recovery is given to the proprietor, and the statute does not provide for a recovery by any other person." Id., at 154, 156. By providing a compensatory remedy for a private wrong, the Court held, the statute did not impose a "penalty." Id., at 154.

法院在解释“刑罚”一词时适用了上述原则。例如，在Brady v. Daly（1899）[10]一案中，一位剧作家向联邦巡回法院起诉了一个被告，原告援引的法律规定为：版权侵权者“…自第一次侵权行为发生，应赔偿不少于100美元，往后该剧每进行一次演出，侵权者再赔偿50美元，以此类推”[11]。而被告的观点为，巡回法院对此案无管辖权，理由是一项单独的法规赋予了地区法院对“追缴罚金”的专属管辖权[12]。为了确定原告所主张的法定赔偿金是否为罚金，联邦巡回法院指出，原告所援引的条款规定，“对侵犯原告权利的行为进行赔偿，并将诉讼权完全赋予原告”，而不是将诉讼权赋予给社会大多数群体；其次，“支付法定赔偿金的义务全部被施加在剧场所有权人身上，并不要求剧场的其他人员进行赔偿”。[13]因此法院认为，该条款着眼于救济某一个体所遭受的侵害，并不等同于向行为人施加“刑罚”[14]。

Similarly, in construing the statutory ancestor of §2462, the Court utilized the same principles. In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 421-422 (1915), the Interstate Commerce Commission, a now-defunct federal agency charged with regulating railroads, ordered a railroad company to refund and pay damages to a shipping company for excessive shipping rates. The railroad company argued that the action was barred by Rev. Stat. §1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, §1712 (now 28 U. S. C. §2462), which imposed a 5-year limitations period upon any "'suit or prosecution for a penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States.' 236 U. S., at 423. The Court rejected that argument, reasoning that "the words 'penalty or forfeiture' in [the statute] refer to something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law." Ibid. A penalty, the Court held, does "not include a liability imposed [solely] for the purpose of redressing a private injury." Ibid. Because the liability imposed was compensatory and paid entirely to a private plaintiff, it was not a "penalty" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Ibid.; see also Gabelli, 568 U. S., at 451-452 ("[P]enalties" in the context of §2462 "go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers").

与上述观点类似，在解释第2462条的渊源时，其他法院亦适用了相同的理论。在Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.（1915）[15]一案中，一个已解散的负责监管铁路的联邦机构，州际商业委员会，命令一家铁路公司为过高的运费向一家航运公司退款并支付赔偿。该铁路公司辩称，根据现行第2462条规定，原告之诉因超过了五年的诉讼时效而应当被予以不受理。而法院驳回了这一观点，法院认为，“第2462条中的刑罚或被没收之财产，针对的是因违反公法而施加的惩罚，”[16]该罚金“并不适用于损害某个体合法权益的侵权行为上，”[17]因为该案被告所需承担的赔偿责任是用于补偿原告损失且仅向原告这一个体支付，该赔偿责任并不属于第2462条中的“刑罚”，不适用该诉讼时效规定[18]。类似的理论适用可参考Gabelli v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n（2013）一案。

Application of the foregoing principles readily demonstrates that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of §2462.

根据上述理论，SEC所请求的行为人返还不法财产应当构成第2462条中的刑罚。

First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a consequence for violating what we described in Meeker as public laws. The violation for which the remedy is sought is committed against the United States rather than an aggrieved individual-this is why, for example, a securities enforcement action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not parties to the prosecution. As the Government concedes, "[w]hen the SEC seeks disgorgement, it acts in the public interest, to remedy harm to the public at large, rather than standing in the shoes of particular injured parties." Brief for United States 22. Courts agree. See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F. 2d 1486, 1491 (CA9 1993) ("[D]isgorgement actions further the Commission's public policy mission of protecting investors and safeguarding the integrity of the markets"); SEC v. Teo, 746 F. 3d 90, 102 (CA3 2014) ("[T]he SEC pursues [disgorgement] 'independent of the claims of individual investors"' in order to "'promot[e] economic and social policies"').

首先，本案中，SEC所请求的对不法财产的追索系因违反Meerker案中所称公法而实施的救济。在SEC进行执法活动时，即使受害者并不支持执法活动，或不是起诉方，SEC同样可以对行为人采取执法活动，由此说明，Kokesh所损害的法益是国家的法益，而并非特定受害人的利益。正如政府所声明的，“当SEC寻求赔偿时，其代表的是公众利益，是为了救济公众合法权益所受到的侵害，而不是站在特定受害方的立场上。”[19]

Second, SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes. In Texas Gulf-one of the first cases requiring disgorgement in SEC proceedings-the court emphasized the need "to deprive the defendants of their profits in order to . . . protect the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations." 312 F. Supp., at 92. In the years since, it has become clear that deterrence is not simply an incidental effect of disgorgement. Rather, courts have consistently held that "[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains." SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F. 3d 170, 175 (CA2 1997); see also SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F. 3d 1450, 1474 (CA2 1996) ("The primary purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for violation of the securities laws is to deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby effectuating the deterrence objectives of those laws"); Rind, 991 F. 2d, at 1491 ("'The deterrent effect of [an SEC] enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit profits"'). Sanctions imposed for the purpose of deterring infractions of public laws are inherently punitive because "deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e]." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539, n. 20 (1979); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 329 (1998) ("Deterrence ... has traditionally been viewed as a goal of punishment").

其次，SEC所请之返还不法财产的目的是惩罚性的。作为最早在SEC诉讼中要求赔偿的案件之一，在德克萨斯海湾案中，法院强调需要“剥夺被告获取的利润，以便......提供对违法行为的有效威慑来保护广大投资者”[20]。随后，公众亦意识到，威慑不仅仅是责令被告人返还不当财产的附带效果。相反，法院认为，“责令被告人返还不法财产的主要目的系防止违反证券法的行为的发生”[21]。为阻止违反公共法律的行为而实施的制裁本质上就是惩罚性的，因为“威慑不是合法的非惩罚性政府目标”[22]。

Finally, in many cases, SEC disgorgement is not compensatory. As courts and the Government have employed the remedy, disgorged profits are paid to the district court, and it is "within the court's discretion to determine how and to whom the money will be distributed." Fischbach Corp., 133 F. 3d, at 175. Courts have required disgorgement "regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be paid to such investors as restitution." Id., at 176; see id., at 175 ("Although disgorged funds may often go to compensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such compensation is a distinctly secondary goal"). Some disgorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are dispersed to the United States Treasury. See, e.g., id., at 171 (affirming distribution of disgorged funds to Treasury where "no party before the court was entitled to the funds and ... the persons who might have equitable claims were too dispersed for feasible identification and payment"); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1404-1405 (CD Cal. 1983) (ordering disgorgement and directing trustee to disperse funds to victims if "feasible" and to disperse any remaining money to the Treasury). Even though district courts may distribute the funds to the victims, they have not identified any statutory command that they do so. When an individual is made to pay a non-compensatory sanction to the Government as a consequence of a legal violation, the payment operates as a penalty. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 402 (1946) (distinguishing between restitution paid to an aggrieved party and penalties paid to the Government).

最后，在许多案件中，SEC对不法财产的追索并不是补偿性的。当法院和政府采取救济措施时，行为人需支付被追索之不法财产至地区法院，再“由地区法院决定该不法财产的分配”[23]。无论该不法财产是否被用于赔偿受损害的投资者，地区法院都会要求行为人向其偿还相应财产[24]。虽然行为人上缴的不法财产往往被用于赔偿受害者的损失，但此种赔偿系该执法手段的次要目标。且当法律认为“没有任何一方有权获得这些财产，或有权获得该财产的主体过于宽泛，法院难以准确识别并支付”时，该财产会被转移至美国财政部[25]。与此同时，并没有任何成文法强制要求地区法院必须将收缴的不法财产分配至受害者。因此，当个体因其违反行为向政府偿还非补偿性的不法财产时，此种制裁便应当被视为一种刑罚[26]。

（图片来源于网络）

SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate. The 5-year statute of limitations in §2462 therefore applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement.

因此，SEC所请求行为人支付的不法财产具有刑罚的所有特征。它是作为违反公法的后果而施加的，其目的是威慑而不是补偿。因此，第2462条规定的五年诉讼时效应当适用本案情形。

（略）

Disgorgement, as it is applied in SEC enforcement proceedings, operates as a penalty under §2462. Accordingly, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued.

根据第2462条的规定，在SEC的执行程序中，要求行为人返还不法财产是一种刑罚。因此，在SEC的此类案件中，任何有关返还不法财产的诉讼都必须在主张索赔之日起五年内提起。

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed.

推翻第十巡回上诉法院的判决。