判例译析 | 苹果公司诉佩珀案：iPhone用户能否就苹果公司的垄断行为提起诉讼？

Apple Inc. v. Pepper

苹果公司诉佩珀案：iPhone用户能否就苹果公司的垄断行为提起诉讼？

原文链接:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-204_bq7d.pdf

目录

I. 案件背景

II. iPhone用户是否是适格原告

    A. iPhone用户是否是直接购买者

    B. 苹果公司的“定价者”理论存在的问题

    C. 伊利诺伊州砖厂案采用直接购买者规则的理由是否在本案中成立

In 2007, Apple began selling iPhones. In July 2008,Apple started the App Store. The App Store now contains about 2 million apps that iPhone owners can download. By contract and through technological limitations, the App Store is the only place where iPhone owners may lawfully buy apps.

2007年，苹果公司开始销售iPhone手机。2008年7月，苹果公司创设了应用商店（App Store）。应用商店中目前有大约两百万个可供iPhone用户下载的应用程序。受合同约定和技术手段的约束，应用商店是iPhone用户可以合法购买应用程序的唯一场所。

For the most part, Apple does not itself create apps. Rather, independent app developers create apps. Those independent app developers then contract with Apple to make the apps available to iPhone owners in the App Store.

在大多数情况下，应用程序不是由苹果公司自己开发，而是由独立的应用程序开发商开发。应用程序被开发出来后，独立的应用程序开发商再与苹果公司签订合同，在应用商店向iPhone用户提供其所开发的应用程序。

Through the App Store, Apple sells the apps directly to iPhone owners. To sell an app in the App Store, app developers must pay Apple a $99 annual membership fee. Apple requires that the retail sales price end in $0.99, but otherwise allows the app developers to set the retail price. Apple keeps 30 percent of the sales price, no matter what the sales price might be. In other words, Apple pockets a 30 percent commission on every app sale.

苹果公司通过应用商店，向iPhone用户直接销售应用程序。为了使自己开发的应用程序能够在应用商店上销售，应用程序开发商必须向苹果公司支付99美元的年度会员费。苹果公司要求应用程序的零售价格以0.99美元结尾，但在该要求之外，应用程序开发商可以自行设定零售价格。无论销售价格是多少，苹果公司都会保留销售价格的30%。换言之，苹果公司能够从每一笔应用程序买卖交易中获得30%的佣金。

In 2011, four iPhone owners sued Apple. They allege that Apple has unlawfully monopolized “the iPhone apps aftermarket.” The plaintiffs allege that, via the App Store, Apple locks iPhone owners “into buying apps only from Apple and paying Apple’s 30% fee, even if” the iPhone owners wish “to buy apps elsewhere or pay less.” According to the complaint, that 30 percent commission is “pure profit” for Apple and, in a competitive environment with other retailers, “Apple would be under considerable pressure to substantially lower its 30% profit margin.” The plaintiffs allege that in a competitive market, they would be able to “choose between Apple’s high-priced App Store and less costly alternatives.” And they allege that they have “paid more for their iPhone apps than they would have paid in a competitive market.” 

2011年，四位iPhone用户起诉了苹果公司。他们声称，苹果公司非法垄断了iPhone应用程序的售后市场。原告称，即使iPhone用户希望在别处购买应用程序或支付更低的费用，苹果公司也会通过应用商店，将iPhone用户购买应用程序的渠道局限在苹果公司内部，并要求用户支付给苹果公司30%的费用。据原告称，对于苹果公司而言，30%的佣金是“纯利润”；而如果苹果公司处于含有其他零售商的竞争性环境中，其就会面临大幅降低其利润率的巨大压力。原告声称，在一个竞争性的市场中，他们将能够在苹果公司高价的应用商店和较为廉价的替代品之间进行选择。他们声称，如果存在一个竞争性市场，他们为自己iPhone上的应用程序所支付的费用将低于现在支付的费用。

Apple moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the iPhone owners were not direct purchasers from Apple and therefore may not sue. In Illinois Brick, this Court held that direct purchasers may sue antitrust violators, but also ruled that indirect purchasers may not sue. The District Court agreed with Apple and dismissed the complaint. According to the District Court, the iPhone owners were not direct purchasers from Apple because the app developers, not Apple, set the consumers’ purchase price.

苹果公司对此表示反对，认为iPhone用户没有直接向苹果公司购买产品，因此不得起诉。在伊利诺伊州砖厂（Illinois Brick）案中，本院认为产品的直接购买者（direct purchasers）可以起诉违反反垄断规定的主体，但也判定间接购买者不得起诉。地方法院同意了苹果公司的意见，驳回了起诉。地方法院认为，iPhone用户并不是直接购买者，因为设定消费者购买价格的是应用程序开发商，而非苹果公司。

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the iPhone owners were direct purchasers under Illinois Brick because the iPhone owners purchased apps directly from Apple. According to the Ninth Circuit, Illinois Brick means that a consumer may not sue an alleged monopolist who is two or more steps removed from the consumer in a vertical distribution chain. Here, however, the consumers purchased directly from Apple, the alleged monopolist. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the iPhone owners could sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing the sale of iPhone apps and charging higher than-competitive prices. We granted certiorari. 

第九巡回法院推翻了该决定。第九巡回法院判定，根据伊利诺伊州砖厂案的判决，iPhone用户是直接购买者，因为iPhone用户直接向苹果公司购买了应用程序。第九巡回法院认为，伊利诺伊州砖厂案说明，在一个垂直分销链中，如果消费者所谓的垄断者与消费者相隔两个或更多个步骤，消费者就不能对其提起诉讼；但在本案中，消费者直接从其所谓的垄断者，即苹果公司处购买了产品。因此，iPhone用户可以起诉苹果公司涉嫌垄断iPhone应用程序的销售，并收取高于竞争性的价格。本院同意提审。

(图片来源于网络)

B. 苹果公司的“定价者”理论存在的问题

All of that seems simple enough. But Apple argues strenuously against that seemingly simple conclusion, and we address its arguments carefully. For this kind of retailer case, Apple’s theory is that Illinois Brick allows consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining party. Apple says that its theory accords with the economics of the transaction. Here, Apple argues that the app developers, not Apple, set the retail price charged to consumers, which according to Apple means that the consumers may not sue Apple.

上述内容似乎都很简单，但苹果公司极力反对这一看似简单的结论，本院将仔细讨论其论点。对于此类零售商案件，苹果公司的观点是：伊利诺伊州砖厂案确立的规则只允许消费者起诉制定零售价格的一方，无论该方是否直接向投诉方出售了商品或服务。苹果公司认为，其观点符合交易的经济性。在本案中，苹果公司认为，应用程序开发商确定了向消费者收取的零售价格，而非苹果公司，这意味着消费者不能起诉苹果公司。

We see three main problems with Apple’s “who sets the price” theory.

本院认为，苹果公司的“定价者”理论（“who sets the price” theory）存在三个主要问题。

First, Apple’s theory contradicts statutory text and precedent. As we explained above, the text of §4 broadly affords injured parties a right to sue under the antitrust laws. And our precedent in Illinois Brick established a bright-line rule where direct purchasers such as the consumers here may sue antitrust violators from whom they purchased a good or service. Illinois Brick, as we read the opinion, was not based on an economic theory about who set the price. Rather, Illinois Brick sought to ensure an effective and efficient litigation scheme in antitrust cases. To do so, the Court drew a bright line that allowed direct purchasers to sue but barred indirect purchasers from suing. When there is no intermediary between the purchaser and the antitrust violator, the purchaser may sue.The Illinois Brick bright-line rule is grounded on the “belief that simplified administration improves antitrust enforcement.” Apple’s theory would require us to rewrite the rationale of Illinois Brick and to gut the longstanding bright-line rule.

首先，苹果公司的观点与法律条文和先例相矛盾。如本院在上文所解释的，第4条的文本广泛地赋予了受害方根据反垄断法起诉的权利。本院在伊利诺伊州砖厂案中确立了一个明确的规则，即直接购买者（如本案中的消费者）可以起诉向他们出售商品或服务的反垄断违法者。根据本院的理解，伊利诺伊州砖厂案并非以关于定价者的经济理论为基础。相反，伊利诺伊州砖厂案试图为反垄断案件确立一个有用且高效的诉讼方案。为此，本院划定了一条明确的界线，允许直接购买者提起诉讼，但禁止间接购买者提起诉讼。当购买者和反垄断违法者之间没有中间商时，购买者可以起诉。伊利诺伊州砖厂案中的明确规则以“简化管理可以改善反垄断执法的信仰”为基础。苹果公司的观点实际上是在要求本院改写伊利诺伊州砖厂案所确立的基本原理（rationale），并破坏长久以来的明确规则。

To the extent that Illinois Brick leaves any ambiguity about whether a direct purchaser may sue an antitrust violator, we should resolve that ambiguity in the direction of the statutory text. And under the text, direct purchasers from monopolistic retailers are proper plaintiffs to sue those retailers.

如果认为，在直接购买者是否可以起诉反垄断违法者的问题上，伊利诺伊州砖厂案留下了任何模糊之处，那么就应该按照法律条文的指示来厘清模糊之处。而根据条文，垄断性零售商的直接购买者是起诉上述零售商的适格原告。

Second, in addition to deviating from statutory text and precedent, Apple’s proposed rule is not persuasive economically or legally. Apple’s effort to transform Illinois Brick from a direct-purchaser rule to a “who sets the price” rule would draw an arbitrary and unprincipled line among retailers based on retailers’ financial arrangements with their manufacturers or suppliers.

其次，苹果公司提出的规则不仅偏离了法律条文和先例，而且在经济上和法律上都不具有说服力。苹果公司试图将伊利诺伊州砖厂案的规则从直接购买者规则转变为“定价者”规则，这一尝试根据零售商与其制造商或供应商的财务安排，在零售商之间划出了一条任意的、没有原则的界线。

In the retail context, the price charged by a retailer to a consumer is often a result (at least in part) of the price charged by the manufacturer or supplier to the retailer, or of negotiations between the manufacturer or supplier and the retailer. Those agreements between manufacturer or supplier and retailer may take myriad forms, including for example a markup pricing model or a commission pricing model. In a traditional markup pricing model, a hypothetical monopolistic retailer might pay $6 to the manufacturer and then sell the product for $10, keeping $4 for itself. In a commission pricing model, the retailer might pay nothing to the manufacturer; agree with the manufacturer that the retailer will sell the product for $10 and keep 40 percent of the sales price; and then sell the product for $10, send $6 back to the manufacturer, and keep $4. In those two different pricing scenarios, everything turns out to be economically the same for the manufacturer, retailer, and consumer.

在零售方面，零售商向消费者收取的价格往往是制造商或供应商向零售商收取的价格的结果，或者是制造商或供应商与零售商之间谈判的结果（至少部分地受其影响）。制造商或供应商与零售商之间的此类协议可以采取多种形式，例如加价定价模式或佣金定价模式。在传统的加价定价模式中，垄断性零售商可能会向制造商支付6美元，然后以10美元的价格出售产品，自己保留4美元。在佣金定价模式中，零售商可能会不向制造商支付任何费用，但与制造商达成协议，以10美元的价格出售产品，并由零售商保留销售价格的40%；因此，零售商将以10美元的价格出售产品，将6美元返还给制造商，自己保留4美元。在这两种不同的定价情况下，制造商、零售商和消费者的经济效益是相同的。

Yet Apple’s proposed rule would allow a consumer to sue the monopolistic retailer in the former situation but not the latter. In other words, under Apple’s rule a consumer could sue a monopolistic retailer when the retailer set the retail price by marking up the price it had paid the manufacturer or supplier for the good or service. But a consumer could not sue a monopolistic retailer when the manufacturer or supplier set the retail price and the retailer took a commission on each sale.

然而，苹果公司提出的规则允许消费者在前一种情况下起诉垄断性零售商，但不允许消费者在后一种情况下起诉垄断性零售商。换言之，根据苹果公司的规则，当零售商通过标高其向制造商或供应商支付的商品或服务的价格来确定零售价格时，消费者可以起诉垄断性零售商。但是，当制造商或供应商确定零售价格，而零售商从每笔销售中抽取佣金时，消费者就不能起诉垄断性零售商。

Apple’s line-drawing does not make a lot of sense, other than as a way to gerrymander Apple out of this and similar lawsuits. In particular, we fail to see why the form of the upstream arrangement between the manufacturer or supplier and the retailer should determine whether a monopolistic retailer can be sued by a downstream consumer who has purchased a good or service directly from the retailer and has paid a higher-than-competitive price because of the retailer’s unlawful monopolistic conduct. As the Court of Appeals aptly stated, “the distinction between a markup and a commission is immaterial.” A leading antitrust treatise likewise states: “Denying standing because ‘title’ never passes to a broker is an overly lawyered approach that ignores the reality that a distribution system that relies on brokerage is economically indistinguishable from one that relies on purchaser-resellers.” If a retailer has engaged in unlawful monopolistic conduct that has caused consumers to pay higher-than-competitive prices, it does not matter how the retailer structured its relationship with an upstream manufacturer or supplier—whether, for example, the retailer employed a markup or kept a commission.

苹果公司的划界行为并不具有合理性，只是一种使苹果公司免于遭受这起诉讼和类似诉讼的不正当划界手段而已。本院尤其不能理解，当消费者直接从零售商处购买了商品或服务，并由于零售商的非法垄断行为而支付了高于竞争性水平的价格时，为什么垄断性零售商能否被下游的消费者起诉，应该被制造商或供应商与零售商之间的上游安排的形式所决定。正如上诉法院切中要害的表述：“加价和佣金之间并没有实质区别。”与之类似，一篇反垄断领域的前沿论文同样指出：“因为‘所有权’（title）从未转移到代理商手中而拒绝赋予诉讼资格，是一种过度法律化的做法（an overly lawyered approach），这种做法忽视了这样一个现实：依靠代理商佣金（brokerage）的分销系统与依靠购买者-经销商（purchaser-resellers）的分销系统在经济学意义上是没有区别的。”如果零售商从事非法的垄断行为并导致消费者支付了高于竞争性水平的价格，那么，零售商如何构建与上游制造商或供应商的关系——例如，零售商是采用加价的模式还是采用划扣佣金的模式——并不重要。

To be sure, if the monopolistic retailer’s conduct has not caused the consumer to pay a higher-than-competitive price, then the plaintiff ’s damages will be zero. Here, for example, if the competitive commission rate were 10 percent rather than 30 percent but Apple could prove that app developers in a 10 percent commission system would always set a higher price such that consumers would pay the same retail price regardless of whether Apple’s commission was 10 percent or 30 percent, then the consumers’ damages would presumably be zero. But we cannot assume in all cases—as Apple would necessarily have us do—that a monopolistic retailer who keeps a commission does not ever cause the consumer to pay a higher-than-competitive price. We find no persuasive legal or economic basis for such a blanket assertion.

可以肯定的是，如果垄断性零售商的行为没有导致消费者支付高于竞争性水平的价格，那么原告的损失将是零。例如，在本案中，如果竞争性佣金的比例是10%而不是30%，但苹果公司可以证明：在10%佣金的制度下，应用程序开发商总是会制定一个更高的价格，使得无论苹果公司的佣金是10%还是30%，消费者都会支付同样的零售价格；那么，消费者的损失可以推定为零。但是，本院不能像苹果公司一定会希望的那样，在所有情况下都假设划扣佣金的垄断性零售商不会导致消费者支付高于竞争性水平的价格。本院没有发现任何支持这一笼统论断（a blanket assertion）的、有说服力的法律或经济依据。

In short, we do not understand the relevance of the upstream market structure in deciding whether a downstream consumer may sue a monopolistic retailer. Apple’s rule would elevate form (what is the precise arrangement between manufacturers or suppliers and retailers?) over substance (is the consumer paying a higher price because of the monopolistic retailer’s actions?). If the retailer’s unlawful monopolistic conduct caused a consumer to pay the retailer a higher-than-competitive price, the consumer is entitled to sue the retailer under the antitrust laws.

简而言之，本院不理解上游市场结构为何会成为在决定下游消费者是否可以起诉垄断性零售商时的一个影响因素。苹果公司的规则将形式层面的问题（制造商或供应商与零售商之间的确切安排是什么？）拔高到了实质的层面（消费者是否因为垄断性零售商的行为而支付了更高的价格？）。如果零售商的非法垄断行为导致消费者支付高于竞争性水平的价格，消费者就有权根据反垄断法起诉零售商。

Third, if accepted, Apple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims by consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.

最后，如果苹果公司的理论被本院接受，该理论将指引垄断性零售商与制造商或供应商构造交易，以逃避消费者的反垄断索赔，从而使反垄断执法变得无效。

Consider a traditional supplier-retailer relationship, in which the retailer purchases a product from the supplier and sells the product with a markup to consumers. Under Apple’s proposed rule, a retailer, instead of buying the product from the supplier, could arrange to sell the product for the supplier without purchasing it from the supplier. In other words, rather than paying the supplier a certain price for the product and then marking up the price to sell the product to consumers, the retailer could collect the price of the product from consumers and remit only a fraction of that price to the supplier.

考虑传统的供应商-零售商关系，在这种关系中，零售商从供应商处购买产品，然后将产品加价卖给消费者。根据苹果公司提议的规则，零售商不是从供应商处购买产品，而是为供应商销售产品，但不从供应商处购买产品。换言之，零售商不需要向供应商支付一定的产品价格，然后加价将产品卖给消费者；而是向消费者收取产品的价格，并只将该价格的一部分汇给供应商。

That restructuring would allow a monopolistic retailer to insulate itself from antitrust suits by consumers, even in situations where a monopolistic retailer is using its monopoly to charge higher-than-competitive prices to consumers. We decline to green-light monopolistic retailers to exploit their market position in that way. We refuse to rubber-stamp such a blatant evasion of statutory text and judicial precedent.

即使当垄断性零售商利用其垄断地位向消费者收取高于竞争性水平的价格时，交易结构的重构也将使垄断性零售商免受消费者的反垄断诉讼。本院拒绝为垄断性零售商以这种方式利用其市场地位的行为开绿灯。本院拒绝为这种公然规避法律条文和司法先例的行为加盖公章。

In sum, Apple’s theory would disregard statutory text and precedent, create an unprincipled and economically senseless distinction among monopolistic retailers, and furnish monopolistic retailers with a how-to guide for evasion of the antitrust laws.

总而言之，苹果公司的理论是对法律条文和先例的无视，将在垄断性零售商之间制造出没有原则的、经济上毫无意义的区别，并将为垄断性零售商提供逃避反垄断法的指南。

(图片来源于网络)

C. 伊利诺伊州砖厂案采用直接购买者规则的理由是否在本案中成立

In arguing that the Court should transform the direct-purchaser rule into a “who sets the price” rule, Apple insists that the three reasons that the Court identified in Illinois Brick for adopting the direct-purchaser rule apply to this case—even though the consumers here (unlike in Illinois Brick) were direct purchasers from the alleged monopolist. The Illinois Brick Court listed three reasons for barring indirect-purchaser suits: (1) facilitating more effective enforcement of antitrust laws; (2) avoiding complicated damages calculations; and (3) eliminating duplicative damages against antitrust defendants.

在辩称本院应将直接购买者规则转变为“定价者”规则时，苹果公司坚持认为，即使本案的消费者（与伊利诺伊州砖厂案中的不同）是被指控垄断者的直接购买者，也应当继续考察本院在伊利诺伊州砖厂案中所发现的、采用直接购买者规则的三个理由，是否在本案中仍然成立。审理伊利诺伊州砖厂案的法庭列出了禁止间接购买者诉讼的三个理由：（1）促进反垄断法更有效地执行；（2）避免复杂的损害计算；以及（3）消除对反垄断被告的重复损害赔偿。

As we said in UtiliCorp, however, the bright-line rule of Illinois Brick means that there is no reason to ask whether the rationales of Illinois Brick “apply with equal force” in every individual case. We should not engage in “an unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to litigate a series of exceptions.” 

然而，如本院在公用事业公司案（UtiliCorp）中所述，伊利诺伊州砖厂案所确立的明线规则意味着，没有理由询问伊利诺伊州砖厂案的基本原理是否在每一个个案中都“平等地适用”。本院不应该审理“没有正当理由的、适得其反的、就一系列例外情况提起的诉讼”。

But even if we engage with this argument, we conclude that the three Illinois Brick rationales—whether considered individually or together—cut strongly in the plaintiffs’ favor here, not Apple’s.

但是，即使本院审理这一主张，本院的结论也是：伊利诺伊州砖厂案所确立的三个基本原理——无论是单独考虑还是整体考虑——在本案中，都对原告，而非苹果公司，非常有利。

First, Apple argues that barring the iPhone owners from suing Apple will better promote effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. Apple posits that allowing only the upstream app developers—and not the downstream consumers—to sue Apple would mean more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. We do not agree. Leaving consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply because upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes little sense and would directly contradict the longstanding goal of effective private enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases.

首先，苹果公司主张，禁止iPhone用户起诉苹果公司将更好地促进反垄断法的有效执行。苹果公司认为，只允许上游的应用程序开发商——而不是下游的消费者——起诉苹果公司将意味着反垄断法的执行变得更加有效。本院并不同意。仅仅因为上游供应商也可以起诉零售商，就让消费者任由垄断性零售商摆布，这是不合理的，也直接违背了在反垄断案件中追求有效的私人执法和消费者保护的长期目标。

Second, Apple warns that calculating the damages in successful consumer antitrust suits against monopolistic retailers might be complicated. It is true that it may be hard to determine what the retailer would have charged in a competitive market. Expert testimony will often be necessary. But that is hardly unusual in antitrust cases. Illinois Brick is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to play any time that a damages calculation might be complicated. Illinois Brick surely did not wipe out consumer antitrust suits against monopolistic retailers from whom the consumers purchased goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices. Moreover, the damages calculation may be just as complicated in a retailer markup case as it is in a retailer commission case. Yet Apple apparently accepts consumers suing monopolistic retailers in a retailer markup case. If Apple accepts that kind of suit, then Apple should also accept consumers suing monopolistic retailers in a retailer commission case.

其次，苹果公司警告称，在针对垄断性零售商的、成功的消费者反垄断诉讼中，损害赔偿的计算可能很复杂。的确，零售商在竞争市场上会收取多少费用可能是难以确定的。专家证言经常是必要的。但这在反垄断案件中并不罕见。伊利诺伊州砖厂案并不是垄断性零售商在损害赔偿的计算可能复杂的情况下可以打出的一张免于起诉的牌。伊利诺伊州砖厂案显然没有抹杀消费者对使其购买高于竞争性水平价格的产品或服务的垄断性零售商提起的反垄断诉讼。此外，在零售商加价的情形中，损害赔偿的计算可能与零售商收取佣金的情形一样复杂。但苹果公司显然接受消费者在零售商加价的情形中起诉垄断性零售商。如果苹果公司接受这种诉讼，那么苹果公司也应该接受消费者在零售商收取佣金的情形中起诉垄断性零售商。

Third, Apple claims that allowing consumers to sue will result in “conflicting claims to a common fund—the amount of the alleged overcharge.” Apple is incorrect. This is not a case where multiple parties at different levels of a distribution chain are trying to all recover the same passed-through overcharge initially levied by the manufacturer at the top of the chain. If the iPhone owners prevail, they will be entitled to the full amount of the unlawful overcharge that they paid to Apple. The overcharge has not been passed on by anyone to anyone. Unlike in Illinois Brick, there will be no need to “trace the effect of the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain.” 

最后，苹果公司声称，允许消费者起诉将导致“对共同基金（common fund）的冲突性索赔——所谓的多收取的费用的金额”。苹果公司是不正确的。这并不是一个处于分销链不同层次的多方都试图追讨最初由分销链顶端的制造商征收的、相同的、多收取的转嫁费用（the same passed-through overcharge）的案件。如果iPhone用户胜诉，他们将有权获得他们支付给苹果公司的、全部的、非法多收取的费用。多收取的费用并没有被任何人转嫁给任何人。与伊利诺伊州砖厂案不同的是，本案不需要“通过分销链中的每一步来追踪多收取的费用的影响”。

It is true that Apple’s alleged anticompetitive conduct may leave Apple subject to multiple suits by different plaintiffs. But Illinois Brick did not purport to bar multiple liability that is unrelated to passing an overcharge down a chain of distribution. Basic antitrust law tells us that the “mere fact that an antitrust violation produces two different classes of victims hardly entails that their injuries are duplicative of one another.” Multiple suits are not atypical when the intermediary in a distribution chain is a bottleneck monopolist or monopsonist (or both) between the manufacturer on the one end and the consumer on the other end. A retailer who is both a monopolist and a monopsonist may be liable to different classes of plaintiffs—both to downstream consumers and to upstream suppliers—when the retailer’s unlawful conduct affects both the downstream and upstream markets.

诚然，苹果公司被指控的反竞争行为可能使其受到不同原告的多重起诉。但是，伊利诺伊州砖厂案并不旨在禁止与将多收取的费用顺着分销链传递无关的多重责任。基本的反垄断法说明，“仅凭因为违反反垄断法而产生了两类不同的受害者这一事实，并不意味着这两类受害者的损害是相互重复的”。当分销链的中间商是一端的制造商和另一端的消费者之间的瓶颈卖方垄断者（bottleneck monopolist）或（和）买方垄断者（monopsonist）时，多重诉讼并非不合规则。当零售商的非法行为影响到下游和上游市场时，既是卖方垄断者又是买方垄断者的零售商可能对不同类别的原告——下游消费者和上游供应商——都要负责。

Here, some downstream iPhone consumers have sued Apple on a monopoly theory. And it could be that some upstream app developers will also sue Apple on a monopsony theory. In this instance, the two suits would rely on fundamentally different theories of harm and would not assert dueling claims to a “common fund,” as that term was used in Illinois Brick. The consumers seek damages based on the difference between the price they paid and the competitive price. The app developers would seek lost profits that they could have earned in a competitive retail market. Illinois Brick does not bar either category of suit.

在本案中，部分下游的iPhone消费者依据卖方垄断理论起诉了苹果公司。而部分上游的应用程序开发商则可能会依据买方垄断理论起诉苹果公司。在这种情况下，这两起诉讼依据的损害理论是完全不同的，也并不会对“共同基金”（该术语在伊利诺伊州砖厂案中被使用）提出竞争性的索赔。消费者根据他们支付的价格和竞争性水平价格之间的差额寻求损害赔偿。应用程序开发商则将寻求他们在竞争性零售市场上本可以获得的利润的损失。伊利诺伊州砖厂案并没有禁止这两类诉讼中的任何一类。

In short, the three Illinois Brick rationales do not persuade us to remake Illinois Brick and to bar direct-purchaser suits against monopolistic retailers who employ commissions rather than markups. The plaintiffs seek to hold retailers to account if the retailers engage in unlawful anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers who purchase from those retailers. That is why we have antitrust law.

简而言之，伊利诺伊州砖厂案所确立的三个基本原理并不能说服本院修改伊利诺伊州砖厂案，禁止直接购买者对划扣佣金而非加价的垄断性零售商提起诉讼。如果零售商所从事的非法反竞争行为损害了在零售商处消费的消费者，原告就会要求零售商承担责任。这就是反垄断法存在的意义。

Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and President Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890, “protecting consumers from monopoly prices” has been “the central concern of antitrust.” The consumers here purchased apps directly from Apple, and they allege that Apple used its monopoly power over the retail apps market to charge higher-than-competitive prices. Our decision in Illinois Brick does not bar the consumers from suing Apple for Apple’s allegedly monopolistic conduct. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

1890年，《谢尔曼法》在国会以压倒性优势通过，并由本杰明·哈里森总统（President Benjamin Harrison）签署，自那时起，“保护消费者免受垄断价格的影响”一直是“反垄断法所关注的核心问题”。本案中，消费者直接从苹果公司处购买了应用程序，且他们指控苹果公司利用其对应用程序零售市场的垄断力量，收取了高于竞争性水平的价格。本院在伊利诺伊州砖厂案中的判决并不妨碍消费者就苹果公司被指控的垄断行为起诉苹果公司。本院维持美国第九巡回上诉法院的判决。

It is so ordered.

判决如上。