读陆克文

陆克文最近发表了一篇文章，说只要不打仗，什么都行。

 

 

陆克文对美国中国的认识都很深，人缘广，能知道很多人内心的想法和很多国家内部的战略构思，所以他在在外交和国际关系上的见解一般是很有分量。此文给人的感觉是很悲，觉得美中冲突势在必行，不会再有任何表面上的形式，如果不开战，就是万幸。

 

首先得有个认识，陆克文是西方，尤其是美国体制，所谓自由民主国际秩序的信奉者，中国是集权，反民主反人权，自然是西方的敌人，陆克文是站在西方一边的，但中国是消灭不掉的，也分割不开，所以西方只能一边遏制一边控制局面，避免恶化。

 

按照陆的说法美中两国都下意识的觉得2020年代将是美中较量，分出胜负的十年，大家都感觉到这将是一场战略决战，大家都没有退让，最大的因素是习近平自觉势在必得，2035年完成大业，除了公开的生活水平翻一番之外，必然包括统一（台湾），正式挑战美元的地位，所以习近平的时间表是2027年在近海有全面与美军抗衡的能力，在台海击败美军，在2035年退出舞台时国力全面与美国抗衡。

 

这种危险主要来自于各自对自己的信心，当中国意识到自己的实力足以与美国抗衡的时候，美国怎么想是无关紧要的，因为这是中国的行为就取决于中国自己的时间表，至此中国也许已经拥有美国无可奈何的能力，有可能是无算，结果是冲突，不论谁胜谁负都是悲剧。陆克文疏忽的，是这也同样是美国面临的局面。

 

陆克文引用很多国际关系专家的看法，美中冲突的可能性有大于无，他担心的程度是两国必须用美苏那种认真避免战争的态度来对待当前的局面，美中能否在承认两国已经进入战略决战的同时有能力避免战争，陆克文说只能通过双方各自定下红线。必须向对方挑明。

 

美国认为自己的世界霸主，能压住中国，甚至有迫使中国改朝换代的能力，只是个幻觉。过去几年美国的强硬政策和冠疫反而让习近平巩固了自己的地位，习近平已经把中国转变成一种在战争气氛中全国全民为强国这么一个共同点目标牺牲奋斗的体制，这是中国的优越性。

China’s economy is now strong enough to weather such sanctions, and the party can protect officials from any fallout, as well

 

陆克文对中国政局的判断是，一习近平的野心和权力的构造。习近平有与毛泽东媲美的野心，除了中国崛起，与美国抗衡，就是收复台湾，但习近平的愿望并不是中国统治阶层的共识，这就形成了对立和集权，和不满甚至敌意。

二，习近平“集团”的判断：中国已经足以在经济上经得起美国制裁的打击，具体起来，中国不会主动制造与世界常规相违背的事件，美国即使制裁，也将是单方行动，不会赢得全世界的支持，中国更能立足于不败之地。

三：历史决定论，“百年不遇大变局”，美国衰退已经开启。

 

the trouble with this approach is that it prioritizes party control and state-owned enterprises over China’s hard-working, innovative, and entrepreneurial private sector, which has been primarily responsible for the country’s remarkable economic success over the last two decades.

不尽同意，不一定如此，虽然近期对马云和阿里的打击影响不好。

 

With peaceful reunification off the table, Xi’s strategy now is clear: to vastly increase the level of military power that China can exert in the Taiwan Strait, to the extent that the United States would become unwilling to fight a battle that Washington itself judged it would probably lose. Without U.S. backing, Xi believes, Taiwan would either capitulate or fight on its own and lose. This approach, however, radically underestimates three factors

陆克文正确地指出，其实谁都能看出来，中国美国在台湾问题上都别无选择，对双方都是巨大的风险。

 

中国眼里的美国

Underneath all these strategic choices lies Xi’s belief, reflected in official Chinese pronouncements and CCP literature, that the United States is experiencing a steady, irreversible structural decline

陆克文自己都列出了一大堆支持中国看法的事实，但American political class and electorate are so deeply polarized that it will prove difficult for any president to win support for a long-term bipartisan strategy on China，中国如果还这么想，是脑子出问题了。

 

Mindful of this combination of near-term risks and China’s long-term strengths, Xi’s general diplomatic strategy toward the Biden administration will be to de-escalate immediate tensions, stabilize the bilateral relationship as early as possible, and do everything possible to prevent security crises

不失为明智之举

 

He also realizes that Biden has an opportunity to gain international prestige if Beijing cooperates with Washington on climate change, given the weight of Biden’s own climate commitments, and he knows that Biden will want to be able to demonstrate that his engagement with Beijing led to reductions in Chinese carbon emissions

习近平自己要对付气候变化，但意识到如果给拜登一副能说服习近平减碳的之态，那拜登就脸上添光，成为还价。陆克文想多了。

 

For the first time in many decades, the United States will soon require the combined heft of its allies to maintain an overall balance of power against an adversary

 

But even before Trump’s pivot to protectionism, that was not the case. Washington has long burdened even its closest allies with formidable tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, investment, capital, technology, and talent. If the United States wishes to remain the center of what until recently was called “the free world,” then it must create a seamless economy across the national boundaries of its major Asian, European, and North American partners and allies

这里陆克文就想过头了，这是矛盾的，美国做不到，拜登也没打算做。

 

China will seek to achieve global economic dominance and regional military superiority over the United States without provoking direct conflict with Washington and its allies. Once it achieves superiority, China will then incrementally change its behavior toward other states, especially when their policies conflict with China’s ever-changing definition of its core national interests

这种定型结论很费解，这是陆克文从集权国家和中国的领土扩张欲望的角度下的判断，真是如此吗？

 

Indeed, many in the U.S. national security community believe that the CCP has never had any compunction about lying or hiding its true intentions in order to deceive its adversaries. In this view, Chinese diplomacy aims to tie opponents’ hands and buy time for Beijing’s military, security, and intelligence machinery to achieve superiority and establish new facts on the ground

美国这边这么极端，中国有何尝不是觉得美国要扼杀中国？

 

The first step to building such a framework would be to identify a few immediate steps that each side must take in order for a substantive dialogue to proceed and a limited number of hard limits that both sides (and U.S. allies) must respect.

目前美国政府还是拒绝

“Washington must return to strictly adhering to the “one China” policy, especially by ending the Trump administration’s provocative and unnecessary high-level visits to Taipei”

 

They would still compete in foreign investment markets, technology markets, capital markets, and currency markets. And they would likely carry out a global contest for hearts and minds, with Washington stressing the importance of democracy, open economies, and human rights and Beijing highlighting its approach to authoritarian capitalism and what it calls “the China development model.”

言辞看出偏见