会议预告丨人大国发院“理论与政策”研讨会（第129-130期）

第129期   

A Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion Model of Discharge and Moral Hazards in Healthcare

主  讲：易君健（北京大学国家发展研究院）

主  持：刘瑞明（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年9月14日14:00-15:30

地  点：立德（教学办公）楼11层1133会议室

Medical decisions involve physicians and patients, entail information asymmetry, and frequently occur in dynamic contexts.We develop a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model of discharge decisions that incorporates these features.This model enables us to identify three sources of moral hazard: patients' financial incentive and physicians' altruistic and financial incentives.We leverage the unique reimbursement structure of a public health insurance in China to structurally estimate the model and quantify the impacts of the three sources on treatment and welfare outcomes.We find significant effects of all three sources of moral hazard, and the effect of each source depends nonlinearly on the other two.In particular, we are the first to quantify the impact of moral hazard driven by physicians' altruism, and find that the impact is amplified by preference inconsistency between physicians and patients in patients' expense-health tradeoff.

易君健，北京大学博雅特聘教授，北大国发院经济学教授，同时担任《经济学》（季刊）执行主编，Journal of Comparative Economics副主编。其研究成果发表（或已接收待发表）在Journal of Political Economy、 Review of Economic Studies、 Management Science、 Demography、 Lancet与Proceedings of National Academy of Science等学术期刊。主要研究方向为劳动与人口经济学、医疗与健康经济学及发展经济学。

第130期   

Who are the Civil Servants and Why are They Attitudinally Different?

主  讲：张琼（中国人民大学公共管理学院）

主  持：刘瑞明（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年9月14日15:30-17:00

地  点：立德（教学办公）楼11层1133会议室

How to adequately select like-minded individuals and at the same time make merit-based appointments is the core of the modern civil servant selection system, which is also regarded as the key to balancing political stability and socioeconomic development. Based on a large-scale survey spanning the entire process of a civil servant selection in China, this paper attempts to provide a new perspective for re-examining this selection system. It finds that: first, those who passed have higher motivation for public service than those who failed, recognize the government's functional roles and actions more, and are less willing to take risks, challenge authority, and speak out against social injustice. Second, these differences in attitudes are attributable to the self-selection effect, i.e., individuals with the corresponding traits are more likely to be selected. Part of the difference, moreover, comes from the sting of failure, i.e., the motivation of the "losers" under competitive selection to work for the public good will be dampened and they may question the functions and behavior of the government. The paper argues that the selection may well identify qualified applicants while produce and reinforce the cognitive rift between the government and the public.

张琼，中国人民大学公共管理学院副教授。研究主要关注发展经济学与行为公共管理相关话题，研究成果发表在《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》、American Economic Review、Population Studies、Journal of Development Studies等学术期刊；曾获2016年度（第17届）孙冶方经济科学奖论文奖等奖项。

文稿来源：人大国发院

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