会议预告丨人大国发院“理论与政策”研讨会（第131期-132期）

第131期   

Migrate to elude: The impact of soybean import shock in China

主  讲：林发勤（中国农业大学经济管理学院）

主  持：刘畅（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年9月20日14:00-15:30

地  点：立德（教学办公）楼11层1133会议室

As the largest soybean importing country, this study analyzes the migration effect of soybean import shock in China. Exploiting the main soybean producing areas, the three northeastern provinces in China as our sample and using population Census data, we constructed prefecture-level soybean import shock and individual level migration variables. We found a large out of migration effect caused by soybean import shock: 13% of the rural migration of northeastern regions over 2001-2010 can be explained by the soybean import shock. The shock reduces (increases) soybean planting (land renting) activities, leading rural residents to seek opportunities in other more developed regions mainly by becoming migrant workers. Such migration-to-elude effect is largely driven by low educated and mature farmers.

林发勤，江苏南通海安人，经济学双博士，中国农业大学经济管理学院教授、博士生导师、农产品国际贸易研究中心主任，China Economic Review副主编。社科重大项目首席专家和自然科学基金国际合作重点项目首席专家。已在Journal of International Economics, Journal of Development Economics， European Economic Review，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Comparative Economics, World Development,  Economic Inquairy, 《经济研究》，《管理世界》国内外期刊等发表了近百篇学术论文, 其中SSCI收录近60篇。作为主要成员参编教育部主持的首批中国经济学教材中国开放型经济学教材的编写工作,出版畅销书《你应该知道的国际贸易》（销量2万本）和教材型专著《贸易中的引力模型：理论基础和实证应用》，参编《农产品国际贸易》、Handbook of International Trade and Transportation等教材和学术专著多本。

第132期   

Decentralization and Environmental Regulation under Overlapping Hierarchies: Evidence from China's SOE Reform

主  讲：黄清扬（北京大学国家发展研究院）

主  持：刘畅（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年9月20日15:30-17:00

地  点：立德（教学办公）楼11层1133会议室

Chinese central and provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were exempt from local environmental regulations because of an institutional barrier. This exemption pushed local regulators to impose more stringent regulations on private firms. We use rich firm-level panel data and exploit the decentralization of Chinese central and provincial SOEs to explore the direct and spillover effects of removing this regulatory constraint. We report that a polluting SOE invests more in unproductive pollution abatement inputs and therefore pollutes less and has lower productivity when decentralized to the prefectural level; moreover, private firms in the same prefecture pollute more while increasing output and TFP. The spillover effects are stronger among private firms with more binding financial constraints. At the aggregate level, decentralization of polluting SOEs in a prefecture decreases total emissions without a significant negative effect on total industrial output or aggregate productivity. When hypothetically reallocating 10% of emissions from central and provincial SOEs to private firms, we calculate total industrial output gains of 0.74–3.31%.

黄清扬，加州大学伯克利分校农业与资源经济学博士，现于北京大学国家发展研究院和南南合作与发展学院担任助理教授。他的研究方向是发展经济学、环境经济学和政治经济学。他的论文发表在Journal of Comparative Economics, European Journal of Political Economy等国际专业杂志上。