法律翻译 | Energy Lessons from the Ukraine Crisis 俄乌危机中的能源教训

译者：高翊菲 华东政法大学LL.B.

审稿： peipei Bristol Law

          刘汉青 北京师范大学硕士

编辑：Gary 詹远 UNSW J.D

责编：陈远航 美国西北大学LL.M.

Energy Lessons from the Ukraine Crisis

俄乌危机中的能源教训

Written by Frédéric Gilles Sourgens

作者：弗雷德里克-吉勒-苏根斯（Frédéric Gilles Sourgens）

It is a cliché that wars are fought over energy access. It is just as trite to point out the illegality of military action to secure energy resources for oneself or to deny energy access to adversaries. As sanctions against Russia and against Ukrainian separatist regions come into focus, energy access again comes front and center. Germany’s halt to the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is perhaps emblematic in this respect.  It attempts to strike at Russian interests by means of limiting energy revenue. That being said, as has been pointed out, halting Nord Stream 2 does little to stop gas flows through Nord Stream 1 – Germany thus continues to take gas from Russia even as it hopes to sanction Russia by potentially stranding $11 billion in investments in the Nord Stream 2 project.

利用战争抢夺能源已经是老生常谈的话题。同样陈词滥调的是，为确保自己的能源充足或阻止对手获取能源而采取的军事行动是非法的。随着俄罗斯和乌克兰分离主义地区的制裁成为焦点，获得能源的渠道也再次获得关注。德国停止对北溪2号管道的认证或许是这一方面的标志。它试图通过限制俄罗斯的能源收入的方法来打击其利益。尽管如此，正如已经指出的那样，停止北溪2号管道并不能阻止天然气流经北溪1号管道——因此即使德国希望通过暗中搁置北溪2号项目的110亿美元投资来制裁俄罗斯，它仍然持续从俄罗斯处获得天然气。

Much will be written about what sanctions to use, if sanctions are an appropriate foreign policy tool, and whether they are at all effective at curbing behavior. Suffice it to say that if the vision of sanctions as outlined in some much-praised scholarship had worked, Russia would not have considered it wise to recognize Donetsk’s and Luhansk’s independence. In fact, there is much to be said that the sanctions regime itself may have contributed to further escalation because they did not lay out a path for successful de-escalation.

关于使用什么制裁，制裁是否是一个合适的外交政策工具，以及是否能有效遏制行为，将会有很多值得讨论之处。显而易见，如果一些备受赞誉的学者所描述的制裁前景实现了，俄罗斯就不会认为承认顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克的独立是明智之举。事实上，制裁制度本身可能是促成紧张局势的进一步升级的原因，因为它没有为有效缓解这一局势铺设道路。

The point I wish to clarify is another, and I hope more important one: energy transition policies – particularly when considered in light of legacy energy infrastructure and value chains – materially contribute to conflict. That is to say, part of what is coming home to roost is a failure by environmental and climate lawyers to understand the repercussions of climate and environmental goals when these goals are translated into energy policy. A failure to correct course will not just exacerbate the confrontation between Ukraine and NATO, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other.  A failure to correct course will lead to significant, unanswered military escalation in the South China Sea and beyond. And this escalation is likely to intensify as we seek to implement climate change and environmental policies.

笔者想澄清更重要的一点是：能源转型政策——特别是考虑到遗留的能源基础设施和价值链时——会对冲突产生实质性的影响。也就是说，环境和气候律师在将气候和环境目标转化为能源政策时，未能理解这些目标的影响，这会造成一部分损害。如果该政策没有步入正确的方向，不仅会加剧乌克兰和北约之间的对抗，也会加剧乌克兰与俄罗斯联邦的对抗。未步入正确的方向也将会导致中国南海及其他地区出现重大的、未有回应的军事行动升级。而在我们寻求执行气候变化政策和环境政策时，这种情况可能会加剧。

Ukraine is a case in point for just such a conflict. Gas is a critical resource to support European energy transition goals. While gas is billed as a bridge fuel, it is responsible for 25% or so of total primary energy consumption in 2019 and some 3.118 million TJ in 2020 in Germany alone. 32% of that gas is sourced from Russia. Historically, because gas exports from Russia to Germany relied upon legacy Soviet infrastructure, Russian gas exports transited Ukraine. Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 are attempts to decouple Russian gas exports from that legacy infrastructure. The confrontation between NATO, the EU, and Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on the other therefore is deeply conditioned by energy value chains. Energy transition policies in Germany in particular have elevated these particular value chains to critical importance due to an exit from coal-fired and nuclear power.

乌克兰就是体现该冲突的一个例子。天然气是支持欧洲能源转型目标的关键资源。虽然天然气被称为过渡性燃料，但它在2019年占主要能源消耗总量的25%左右，于2020年仅在德国就消耗了大约311.8万吨。其中32%的天然气来源于俄罗斯。历史上，由于从俄罗斯向德国出口天然气依赖于苏联遗留基础设施，俄罗斯的天然气出口要经过乌克兰。北溪和北溪2号是将俄罗斯的天然气出口与这些遗留的设施脱钩的尝试。因而，北约、欧盟和乌克兰与俄罗斯之间的对峙深受能源价值链的制约。特别是德国，由于其不再使用燃煤和核电，其能源转型政策将这些特定的价值链抬高到了至关重要的地位。

What then is the importance of the Donbas region? After all, it is this region that is at the core of the current confrontation (Donetsk and Luhansk are located there). Donbas – and particularly the likely target of Russian advances, Mariupol, in Donetsk oblast – is a metallurgical hub. This hub depends upon coal imported from Russia to produce steel (pp. 182-98). This steel, in turn, is a critical component for the construction of wind turbines. Ukrainian steel produced with Russian coal is rolled in the Friuli in Italy and then becomes a key component of “renewable” energy in Europe (pp. 198-202).  The Donbas thus is also of strategic importance for energy transition – and its importance critically relies upon legacy energy value chains linking Ukraine to Russia and Russian energy exports. 

那么顿巴斯地区的重要性是什么？毕竟，这个地区才是目前对峙的核心（顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克都位于这里）。顿巴斯——尤其是俄罗斯可能进攻的目标，位于顿涅茨克州的马里乌波尔——是一个冶金中心。它依靠从俄罗斯进口的煤炭来生产钢铁（第182-198页），而这种钢材又是建造风力涡轮机的关键部件。用俄罗斯煤炭生产的乌克兰钢铁在意大利的弗留利被轧制，成为欧洲“可再生”能源的一个关键组成部分（第198-202页）。因此，顿巴斯地区对能源转型也具有战略重要性，这一重要性主要来源于连接乌克兰和俄罗斯以及俄罗斯能源出口的传统能源价值链。

The point is not unique to Russia. Most immediately, we are building new energy value chains around pipeline gas and liquified natural gas. Less immediately, there is a rush for the mineral resources needed to build solar arrays, wind turbines, and batteries – a rush that has a scramble for example for cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Given the location and the players involved in these cobalt supplies, it is on the whole not difficult to imagine that the new energy value chains critical for energy transition policies could lead to violent conflict. And as we think about liquified natural gas, the conflict potential is just as apparent. Liquified natural gas is transported by tanker. And tankers must pass through shipping lanes. One of the most important such shipping lanes? The South China Sea.

这一点并不是俄罗斯独有的。最直接的是，我们正在围绕管道天然气和液化天然气方面构建新的能源价值链。不那么直接的是，人们疯狂抢夺建造太阳能电池组、风力涡轮机和电池所需的矿产资源——这种抢夺行为导致了刚果民主共和国争夺钴等行为。鉴于这些在供应钴的过程中涉及的地点和参与者，不难想象，对能源转型政策至关重要的新能源价值链可能将会导致暴力冲突。而当我们考虑液化天然气时，明显也可能存在冲突。液化天然气是通过油轮运输的。而油轮必须通过航道。那么，最重要的航道包括哪条航道呢？中国南海。

Obviously, pointing out that an attempt at fundamental reorganization of global energy systems is bound to lead to strife is just as trite as the observations with which I opened this post. My point is not that this is the case. My point is rather about what should be done about it.

显然，指出对全球能源系统进行根本性重组的尝试必然会导致纷争，就像在这篇文章开篇时所提出的观察一样老套。但笔者的观点并不是这一事实，笔者真正的观点是应该如何解决这一问题。

My first point is straightforward. We cannot continue to think about climate policy and climate law as a purely environmental question. Climate policy is also energy policy and will lead to effects as such. A purely environmental perspective has the potential side effect of inviting the kind of armed conflicts we currently observe simply because we lose legacy infrastructures and energy value chains from view. And the longer we take to make that realization, the worse the problem will become.

笔者的第一个想法直截了当。我们不能继续把气候政策和气候法作为一个纯粹的环境问题来考虑。气候政策也是能源政策，并将产生同样的影响。单纯从环境角度出发可能会产生副作用，导致我们目前看到的那种武装冲突，因为我们从视野中失去了传统的基础设施和能源价值链。我们领悟到这点的时间越长，问题就会变得越严重。

Second, if climate policy is energy policy, it is imperative that it not turn into Real-Energiepolitik. Rather, we must commit to energy transition pathways that are driven by the progressive global realization of the social, economic, and cultural rights – and the right to development – of all and of each. In practical terms, this means that affordable energy access and energy security cannot be jeopardized in the name of climate policy.  To do so is to create the conditions for conflict – witness Russia’s incursion into Ukraine at a time of extremely tight gas markets (gas markets which are so tight in significant part because of the energy transition pathways chosen by, for example, leading European economies.).

第二，如果气候政策是能源政策，那么重要的是不要让它变成真正的能源政治。而我们必须做的是通过在全球范围内逐步实现整体和个体的社会、经济和文化权利和发展权利，从而致力于推动能源转型的道路。实践中，这意味着不能以气候政策的名义危害可负担的能源获取和能源安全，这样做就创造了冲突的条件——比如俄罗斯在天然气能源市场极度紧缺的情况下入侵乌克兰（天然气能源如此紧缺的原因在很大程度上是因为如欧洲主要经济体等国家选择的能源转型道路）。

Third, to shore up energy security requires a significant expansion of fossil fuel capabilities around the world (Russia, Qatar, Australia, and the U.S. to name a few).  An increase in gas availability – be it as pipeline gas or liquified natural gas – can meet rising energy demands. Importantly, if this supply is available from multiple sources, it limits the geo-political power wielded by any one supplier and thus provides a bedrock for energy security.  But it also provides market security for producers.

第三，为巩固能源安全，在世界各地（俄罗斯、卡塔尔、澳大利亚和美国等）都应大力扩展化石燃料（的供应）能力。天然气供应的增加——无论是管道天然气还是液化天然气——都可以满足不断增长的能源需求。重要的是，由于可以从多个渠道获得能源供应，那么对任何一个供应商的地缘政治权力都会有所限制，从而为能源安全提供基石，但同时其也为天然气生产商提供了安全的市场。

Finally, to manage energy security requires robust dispute resolution mechanisms.  Trust in energy markets is nearly always backed up by arbitration provisions. We can choose to vilify arbitration. In fact, we frequently do. That choice has consequences far beyond the limited type of dispute resolution targeted by those claiming righteous indignation at, say, investor-state arbitration. The People’s Republic of China feels secure enough to ignore an arbitral award on the South China Sea (one of our flash points).  And Uganda does not feel any particular pressure to comply with a recent judgment by the International Court of Justice in favor of the Democratic Republic of Congo (another future flash point).

最后，维护能源安全需要强有力的争端解决机制。仲裁条款几乎一直是建立能源市场信任的后盾。我们可以选择贬低仲裁，事实上，我们经常这样做。这种选择的后果远远超出某些义愤填膺的人所针对的有限争端解决（比如投资者-国家仲裁）带来的后果。中国有足够的安全感去无视关于中国南海的仲裁裁决（我们的热点之一）。而乌干达也没有感到任何特别的压力来遵守国际法院最近做出的有利于刚果民主共和国的判决（未来的另一个热点）。

If we wish to prevent a proliferation of energy transition wars, international lawyers therefore must act now.  They must do so pragmatically – advocacy and idealism are well and good.  If they intensify flash points for conflict, it is best to tamper both.  They must do so premised in fundamental human rights values – else pragmatism is simply another word for oppression. And they must do so with a firm defense for international law dispute resolution mechanism – else international rule of law will become an unintended casualty of the many fundamental changes to world society energy transition epitomizes.

因此，如果我们希望防止能源转型战争滋长，国际律师必须立即采取行动。宣传和理想主义是好的，但是他们必须务实。如果他们使冲突爆发加剧，那么最好的办法是扰乱宣传和理想主义。他们必须在基本人权价值观的前提下这样做——否则务实主义只是压迫的代名词。他们必须坚定地捍卫国际法争端解决机制——否则国际法治将成为世界社会能源转型所体现的许多根本性变化的意外牺牲品。

原文发表时间：2022年2月24日

原文链接：www.ejiltalk.org/energy-lessons-from-the-ukraine-crisis/