法律翻译 | 《哈佛法律评论》第135卷第8期目录+摘要

译者｜郝羽宽 印第安纳大学JD&MS

审稿｜Cindy Wong University of Leeds LLB 

         汪晨涵 复旦大学

编辑｜杨蒙恩 烟台大学本科

责编｜王冰子 烟台大学本科

The Dangerous Few: Taking Seriously Prison Abolition and Its Skeptics

Essay by Thomas Ward Frampton

危险的少数派：认真对待监狱废除运动支持者及其怀疑者

作者：Thomas Ward Frampton

Prison abolition, in the span of just a few short years, has established a foothold in elite criminal legal discourse. But the basic question of how abolitionists would address “the dangerous few” often receives superficial treatment; the problem constitutes a “spectral force haunting abolitionist thought . . . as soon as abolitionist discourses navigate towards the programmatic and enter the public arena.” 

在短短几年的时间里，废除监狱运动已经在精英刑事法律讨论中站稳了脚跟。但该运动的支持者就如何解决“危险的少数人”这一基本问题往往得到肤浅的对待。这个问题形成了“废除监狱主义的论述一旦成为纲领性文件甚至进入公共领域，就萦绕废除者思想中的幽灵力量。”

This Essay offers two main contributions: it (1) maps the diverse ways in which prison abolitionists most frequently respond to the challenge of “the dangerous few,” highlighting strengths and infirmities of each stance, and (2) proposes alternative, hopefully more productive, responses that interrogate and probe the implicit premises (empirical, ideological, or moral) embedded in and animating questions concerning “the dangerous few.”

本论文有两大贡献：（1）描绘了监狱废奴运动支持者最经常应对“危险少数”挑战的不同方式，突出了每种立场的优势和劣势；（2）希望提出更有成效的替代方案，从而询问和探究支持着“危险少数“问题的经验、意识形态或道德方面的隐含前提。

Puzzles of Progressive Constitutionalism

Book Review by Jonathan S. Gould

进步宪政之谜

书评作者：Jonathan S. Gould

Against Constitutionalism. By Martin Loughlin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2022. Pp. xi, 250. $39.95. 

《反对宪政》，Martin Loughlin著。马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，2022。第十一，250页，39.95 美元。

The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy. By Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2022. Pp. 601. $39.95.

 《反寡头宪法：重建美国民主的经济基础》，Joseph Fishkin和William E. Forbath著，马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，2022。601页，39.95 美元。

This Review examines the relationship between progressivism and constitutionalism. In doing so, it considers three different ways of thinking about a constitution’s role in a political system. First is constitutionalism as a distinct ideology of governance in which an apex court plays a major role in deciding issues of public policy and articulating national values. Second is the way constitutional culture prompts political actors to argue for their preferred policies in constitutional terms, even when calling for legislative rather than judicial action. Third is constitutional design, the rules of the political game that dictate how lawmaking takes place. Each of these three lenses reveals distinctive costs that confront progressives engaged in constitutional politics. Courts that play an outsized role in policymaking can impede progressive agendas. A narrow band of acceptable constitutional arguments can make it hard for progressives to make the best case for their preferred policies. And efforts at institutional reform are made challenging by conflicting progressive commitments and fear of how a less restrained government could be deployed by conservatives. While progressives have no practical choice but to engage in constitutional politics, that reality should not obscure the difficulties that constitutional politics, as currently practiced in the United States, pose for progressive agendas. 

本书评反思了进步主义和宪政主义之间的关系。在此过程中，本文考虑了三种不同的方式来思考宪法在政治体系中的作用。首先是宪政作为一种独特的意识形态，在这种意识形态中，在治理体系顶端的法院在决定公共政策问题和阐明国家价值观方面发挥着重要作用。其次，宪法文化对政治参与者的激励方式，即使在呼吁立法而不是司法行动时，也以宪法条款为他们偏好的政策辩护。最后，是宪法设计，即决定立法方式的政治游戏规则。这三种不同的角度，都用独特的方式揭示了参与宪政政治的进步人士所面临的独特成本。在政策制定中发挥巨大作用的法院可能会阻碍进步议程。一小部分可接受的宪法论据会使进步人士难以为他们喜欢的政策提供最好的辩护。由于进步派的改革目标之间互相有所冲突，且担心保守派掌控一个不受限制的政府，体制改革的努力也面临挑战。虽然进步主义者除了参与宪政政治外别无实际选择，但这一现实不应掩盖目前在美国实行的宪政政治为进步主义议程带来的困难。