法律翻译｜《哈佛法律评论》第135卷第5期目录+摘要

译者｜周文君 布里斯托大学 LL.M.

一审｜Ellen Chen (Cornell LLM)

二审｜晏世伟 PKU LL.B

编辑｜吴文骏 清华大学本科

责编 | Izzy 美国西北大学LL.M.

1. Article：Discriminatory Taint

 歧视性污点

作者：W. Kerrel Murray

The truism that history matters can hide complexities. Consider the idea of problematic policy lineages. When may we call a policy the progeny of an earlier, discriminatory policy, especially if the policies diverge in design and designer? Does such a relationship condemn the later policy for all times and purposes, or can a later decisionmaker escape the past? It is an old problem, but its resolution hardly seems impending. Just recently, Supreme Court cases have confronted this fact pattern across subject matters as diverse as entry restrictions, nonunanimous juries, and redistricting, among others. Majority opinions seem unsure whether or why “discriminatory predecessors” matter, and individual Justices who agree that they do squabble over methodology.

“历史很重要”，这一众所周知的道理会掩盖复杂情况。请思考“有问题的政策体系”(Problematic Policy) 这一概念。我们何时可以将一项政策称为早期的歧视性政策的后果，特别是当这些政策在设计和设计者方面不一致时？这种关系是否会在任何时间、出于任何目的都谴责新政策，或者新政策制定者是否可以逃避过去？这是一个老问题，但是其解决办法似乎尚未出现。就在最近，最高法院的案件已经在不同主题案件中遇到了这类情况，诸如入境限制、非一致同意的陪审团以及重新划分选区等。多数观点似乎并不确定“歧视性先例”是否重要、或者为何重要，而同意“歧视性先例”重要的个别法官则在方法论上争执不休。

One could answer these questions by banishing them. Thus, some would simply treat any nonidentical policy predecessor as minimally relevant, and only relevant insofar as it suggests present-day bad intent. Anything else, they suggest, risks an unmoored original sin jurisprudence, with courts claiming to know guilt when they see it. Simple is not always better, however, especially if it risks eliding information material to a policy’s validity. But again: how do we divine materiality?

人们可以通过消除这些问题来回答这些问题。因此，有些人会简单地认为任何不一致的政策先例仅仅具有最低程度的相关性，并仅在它表明当前不良意图范围内相关。他们认为，如若不然，就可能出现脱离实际的原罪法学，以及法院声称当他们看到罪行时就知道这是犯罪 (know it when they see it)。然而，简单并非总是更好，尤其是如果它可能会省略政策效力相关的信息材料。但是，我们怎样才能识别出重要相关性？

Better approaches are possible. While our law broadly appreciates that continuity matters to legal meaning and responsibility, constitutional law has undertheorized it. Deploying continuity here helps conceptualize, and craft guideposts for, “discriminatory taint”: an objectively ascertainable relationship between an earlier policy and a later, similar policy. Thus defined, taint can impugn some policies that might otherwise have passed constitutional muster. Yet it also facilitates realistic approaches — judicial and nonjudicial — to distinguishing genuine purging of taint from its laundering. And it supplements debates on the nature of wrongful discrimination by underscoring how continuity can help identify persistent constitutional problems even absent subjective bad intent.

更好的方法是可能存在的。尽管我们的法律明显认为连续性对法律含义和责任很重要，但宪法已经在理论上弱化了它。在此运用连续性有助于概念化 “歧视性污点”，并为其制定指导方向，即，一项旧政策和与之相似的新政策之间存在客观可确定的关系。一经定义，污点可以驳斥一些本可以通过合宪性审查的政策。它还便于以现实的司法或非司法方法来区分是真正清除污点还是洗白污点。同时，它还强调了，在没有主观恶意的情况下，连续性是如何帮助识别持续存在的宪法问题的。从而补充了关于不合法歧视性质的辩论观点。

2. Article

Navigating the Identity Thicket: Trademark’s Lost Theory of Personality, the Right of Publicity, and Preemption

在身份丛林中航行：商标的人格迷失理论、形象权和优先权

作者：Jennifer E. Rothman

Both trademark and unfair competition laws and state right of publicity laws protect against unauthorized uses of a person’s identity. Increasingly, however, these rights are working at odds with one another and can point in different directions with regard to who controls a person’s name, likeness, and broader indicia of identity. This creates what I call an “identity thicket” of overlapping and conflicting rights over a person’s identity. Current jurisprudence provides little to no guidance on the most basic questions surrounding this thicket, such as what right to use a person’s identity, if any, flows from the transfer of marks that incorporate indicia of a person’s identity, and whether such transfers can empower a successor company to bar a person from using their own identity, and, if so, when.

商标和不正当竞争法以及各州形象权法都不允许未经授权使用个人身份。然而，这些权利之间越来越不一致，关于谁控制着个人的姓名、肖像和更广义的身份标志方面，这些权利甚至会指向不同的方向。这就形成了我所称的“身份丛林”，即个人身份上重叠和冲突的权利。目前的法学理论几乎没有为该丛林相关的最基本问题提供任何指导，比如，转让包含个人身份标志的商标会产生什么使用权（如果存在这种权利），以及该转让是否可以授权继任公司禁止个人使用其自己的身份，如果可以授权，那么何时可以。

Part of the challenge for mediating these disputes is that both right of publicity and trademark laws are commonly thought of as concerned solely with market-based interests. But this is not the case. As I have documented elsewhere, the right of publicity has long been directed at protecting both the economic and the noneconomic interests of identity-holders. And, as I demonstrate here, it turns out that the same is true for trademark and unfair competition laws, which have long protected a person’s autonomy and dignity interests as well as their market-based ones.

调解这些争议的部分挑战在于，人们通常认为形象权和商标法只关注基于市场的利益。然而事实并非如此。正如我已在其他地方证明记载的那样，长期以来，形象权旨在保护身份持有者的经济和非经济利益。又如我在此处所阐述，商标和不正当竞争法亦是如此，长期以来保护着个人自主权和尊严利益，以及他们的市场相关利益。

After documenting and developing this overlooked aspect of trademark law, I suggest a number of broader insights of this more robust account of trademark law both for addressing the identity thicket and for trademark law more generally. First, I suggest that recognizing a personality-based facet of trademark law suggests a basis to limit the alienation of personal marks in some contexts. Second, this understanding shores up trademark’s negative spaces, especially when truthful information is at issue. Third, recognizing trademark’s personality-based interests provides a partial explanation (and limiting principle) for some of its expansionist impulses.

在记录和发展了商标法这一被忽视的方面后，我提出了一些更广泛的视角以审视这一更有力的商标法解释，其适用于解决身份丛林问题，也适用于更广义的商标法。第一，我认为承认商标法基于人格的方面，为在某些情况下限制个人标志分离提供了基础。第二，尤其是当真实性信息出现问题时，这一理解支撑着商标的负面空间。第三，承认商标基于人格的利益为其某些扩张主义的动力提供了部分解释（和限制性原则）。

Finally, I contend that recognizing this broader vision of trademark law provides significant guidance as to how to navigate the identity thicket. I employ trademark preemption analysis to mediate disputes between trademark and right of publicity laws. Trademark preemption provides an avenue out of the thicket, but only if trademark law’s robust theory of personality is recognized. A failure to do so risks leaving us with one of two bad options: a right of publicity that acts as a “mutant” trademark law, swallowing up and obstructing legitimate rights to use trademarks, or, alternatively, with a shallow husk of trademark law (rooted solely in commercial interests) that swallows up publicity claims at the expense of personal autonomy and dignity. Trademark law already provides us with the tools to avoid both of these unsavory paths — if only we reclaim its lost personality.

最后，我认为，认识商标法这一更广义的角度，为在身份丛林中航行提供了重要的指引。我运用商标优先权分析来调解商标和形象权法之间的争议。商标优先权在身份丛林之外提供了一条路径，但前提是商标法强有力的人格理论得到认可。如果不这样做，可能会出现两个不佳选项之一：一种是作为“变异”商标法的形象权，吞噬和阻碍合法的商标使用权；另一种是该形象权只拥有一个浅薄的商标法外壳（只存在于商业利益中），该外壳以个人自主权和尊严为代价吞噬形象权。商标法已经为我们提供了避免上述困境的方法——只要我们找回其遗失的人格相关属性。