法律翻译 | 《哥大商法评论》2021年第2期（上）目录+摘要

1.

Symposium on the Future of Securities Regulation: Part I

Introduction

证券监管的未来研讨会：第一部分

介绍

作者：CBLR Editorial Board

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8628

Well-functioning securities markets are critical to the stability of the U.S. financial system, yet they are changing rapidly. Both securities markets and investors have new complexions, adding to the conventional picture of domestic public trading. For example, an increasing number of transactions today are private. Worldwide, private investment grew more than 250% between 2010 and 2019 before dipping with the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the United States, Regulation D offerings roughly doubled in the decade from 1997 to 2017. Simultaneously, cross-border asset holdings have risen: between 2012 and 2021, American holdings of foreign securities have increased by about 100%, while foreign holdings of American securities have increased by about 125%. New investment strategies have gained popularity, too. Capital increasingly flows through institutions—which, in the United States, in 2019 held assets equal to 291.3% of U.S. GDP, up from 249.3% of GDP in 2012—and into passive investment vehicles. Now, passive investment strategies tracking various indices of market or industry performance and traditional active management strategies each direct about 15 trillion in assets. Both retail and environmental, social, and governance investing, though heretofore less successful in generating investment, have made notable strides of late, as well.

运作良好的证券市场对美国金融体系的稳定至关重要，但它们正在迅速地变化着。证券市场和投资者都有了新的面貌，为美国国内传统的公开交易画面增添了新的图景。例如，今天私人交易的数量正在不断增加。在2010年至2019年期间，世界范围内的私人投资增长了250%以上，此后随着新冠疫情的蔓延而下滑；而在1997年至2017年的20年间，在美国D（豁免）条例（Regulation D）下的公开的发行量 大约增长了一倍。同时，跨境资产的持有量也发生了增长：在2012至2021年间，美国持有的国外证券增长了约100%，而境外所有人持有的美国证券也增长了约125%。新的投资策略也同样得到了普及。资本越来越多地通过机构流向被动投资工具（2019年美国机构持有的资产相当于美国GDP的291.3%，高于2012年所占的比例249.3%）。现在，追踪各种市场或行业表现指数的被动投资策略和传统的主动管理策略各自应用于约15万亿的资产。尽管至今为止零散投资和环境、社会、治理投资在创造投资方面并不成功，但二者最近也取得了明显的进步。

2.

Synthetic Governance

综合治理

作者：Byung Hyun Ahn, Jill E. Fisch, Panos N. Patatoukas, Steven Davidoff Solomon

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8629

Although securities regulation is distinct from corporate governance, the two fields have considerable substantive overlap. By increasing the transparency and efficiency of the capital markets, securities regulation can also enhance the capacity of those markets to discipline governance decisions. The importance of market discipline is heightened by the increasingly vocal debate over what constitutes “good” corporate governance.

尽管证券监管有别于公司治理，但二者之间还是存在相当多的实质性重叠。通过提高资本市场的透明度和效率，证券监管同样能够增强这些市场做出自律治理决定的能力。关于什么是“好的”公司治理的争论日益激烈，市场自律约束的重要性也随之提高。

Securities product innovation offers new tools to address this debate. The rise of index-based investing provides a market-based mechanism for selecting among governance options and evaluating their effects. Through the creation of bespoke governance index funds, asset managers can create indexes that correspond to investors’ governance preferences. We argue that this “synthetic governance” offers a way to gather evidence on the economic impact of corporate governance by providing a market-based tool for evaluating the relationship between corporate governance and stock returns.

证券产品的创新为解决这一争议提供了新的方法。基于指数的投资（Index-based investing）的兴起为我们提供了一个基于市场的机制来选择治理方案并评估其效果。通过创建定制的治理指数基金（Governance index funds），资产管理者可以创建与投资者治理偏好相对应的指数。我们认为，这一“综合治理”（Synthetic governance）通过提供一种用于评估公司治理和股票收益之间关系的、基于市场的方法，从而能收集公司治理对经济影响的证据。

We illustrate the potential of synthetic governance by creating a new governance-based index, the Dual Index, which selects portfolio companies on the basis of a dual class voting structure and comparing its performance to various benchmarks. We further modify the Dual Index by implementing synthetic sunsets to highlight the value creation of dual class companies in their early years and provide evidence on the appropriate length of a time-based sunset provision. Finally, we expand our analysis of synthetic governance with a second index—the Split Index—which tests the effect of separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. We conclude that synthetic governance demonstrates the ability of securities market innovation to discipline corporate governance.

我们通过创建一个全新的基于治理的指数（Governance-based index）——双重指数（Dual Index）来阐述综合治理的潜力。该指数根据双层股权结构来选择投资组合公司（Portfolio company），并将其表现与各种基准进行比较。我们进一步通过人为废止契约（Synthetic sunset）的实施改进了双重指数，以此强调双层股权结构公司早期所创造的价值，并为在基于时间的日落条款（Sunset provision）中如何确定时间的合适长度提供了证据。最后，我们通过引入另一个指数——分离指数（Split Index）拓展了我们对综合治理的分析。它检验了将公司总经理和董事长职位分离带来的效果。我们的结论是综合治理展示了证券市场创新规范公司治理的能力。

3.

Modernizing Odd Lot Trading

现代化散股交易

作者：Robert P. Bartlett, III

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8632

Traditional odd lot trades (i.e., trades involving fewer than 100 shares) now comprise over half of all equity trades on U.S. exchanges. Under Regulation National Market System, however, these trades are excluded from a market center’s trade execution statistics. In addition, while brokers are required to consider odd lot quotes as part of their duty of best execution, odd lot quotes are formally excluded from the calculation of the national best bid and offer. This Article, written for a symposium on the Future of Securities Regulation at Columbia Law School, examines whether these regulatory exclusions for odd lot trades and quotes increase trade execution costs for retail trades filled in non-exchange venues. Across more than 3 billion trades during 2020, odd lot trades filled in nonexchange venues received ten percent less price improvement than non-odd lot trades. In addition, using order book data from Nasdaq, examination of a sample of retail, non-exchange trades in two popular retail stocks—Amazon and GameStop—on January 27, 2021 reveals that thirty-one to forty-six percent of odd lot trades would have received better pricing had the venue filled the order at the Nasdaq odd lot quote. These results suggest that the differential treatment of odd lots and round lots in the regulation of U.S. market structure may impair the execution quality of marketable odd lot orders from retail traders.

传统的散股交易（即低于100股的交易）现在占据了美国证券交易所（U.S. exchanges）股票交易量的一半以上。然而，根据《全国市场系统规则》（Regulation National Market System），这些交易被排除在各市场中心交易执行的统计之外。此外，当股票经纪人需要将散股报价纳入他们最佳执行义务的一部分时，散股报价被正式地排除在全国最佳买卖报价的计算之外。本文是为哥伦比亚大学法学院举办的“证券监管的未来”研讨会而写，它检验了这些对散股交易和报价的排除规则是否增加了在非交易场所进行零散交易的执行成本。在2020年超过30亿次的交易中，在非交易场所进行的散股交易获得的价格提升比非散股交易低10%。另外，通过纳斯达克（Nasdaq）的订单数据，本文以2021年1月27日两只广受欢迎的、在非交易场所进行的零散股票Amazon和GameStop为样本进行检验，我们发现31%-46%的散股交易如果以纳斯达克散股交易报价成交，它们能够得到更好的价格。这些结果显示，美国市场结构规则对散股和整股的区别对待可能会损害散户发起的可交易散股订单的执行质量。

4.

FAQS Re: FFPS（Federal Forum Provisions）

对联邦法院条款常见问题的回复

作者：William B. Chandler III, Joseph A. Grundfest, Virginia F. Milstead, Peter B. Morrison

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8633

Federal Forum Provisions (FFPs) direct all Securities Act litigation filed in state court to federal court. Delaware’s Supreme Court has ruled that FFPs are facially valid. To date, each state court that has addressed the merits of the question has enforced the FFP before it as lawful and reasonable.

Questions regarding FFP mechanics nonetheless abound, and this Article addresses the most common FAQs about FFPs. In particular, corporations should consider adopting an FFP now. Waiting has no benefit. Publicly traded corporations can most conveniently adopt an FFP in the form of a bylaw. Privately held entities face potential Securities Act liability in connection with registration violations and section 12(a)(2) liability and can adopt FFPs either as charter or bylaw provisions. We view the charter-bylaw distinction as a matter of close-to-indifference. It is also reasonable for corporations chartered outside of Delaware to adopt FFP provisions, inasmuch as most state courts draw substantial guidance from Delaware precedent.

然而有关FFP机制的问题比比皆是，本文将讨论其最常见的一些问题。特别是，公司应当考虑现在就适用FFP，等待不会带来任何益处。上市公司能够通过修改公司细则（Bylaws）的方式适用FFP。面临因违反注册规定和违反《证券法》（Securities Act）第12(a)(2)条责任而存在潜在证券诉讼的私营实体，可以通过章程（Charter）或是公司细则条款的形式适用FFP。我们认为，章程与公司细则几乎不存在差异。在特拉华州之外注册的公司适用FFP条款也是合理的，因为大多数的州法院都从特拉华州的先例中获得了大量指导。

A California trial court recently held that claims against underwriters were not covered by the FFP at issue in that matter. We disagree and welcome California Court of Appeals review of that issue. Other California trial courts have disagreed, as well, finding that substantially identical FFPs do apply to underwriters. However, an essentially costless revision of the form of FFP considered by the California trial courts would eliminate any risk, and we provide two alternative forms of FFP that achieve that result. Corporations with FFPs already in their charters can adopt an additional bylaw to address this risk, or they can amend their charters.

最近，加利福尼亚州的一个初审法院（Trail court）认为对承保人的索赔不在该事项所涉及的FFP的规制范围内。我们不同意这一观点，并且欢迎加利福尼亚州上诉法院（California Court of Appeals）复审这一问题。加利福尼亚州的其他初审法院也有不同意见，认为实质上相同的FFP规则确实能够适用于承保人。然而，加利福尼亚州的初审法院们所考虑的对FFP在形式上的、实质无成本的修订将消除任何风险，我们提供了两种可供选择的FFP形式来实现这一结果。章程中已经包含FFP规则的公司可以通过一个制定额外的公司细则或者修改章程的方式来规避这一风险。

Some FFPs designate a specific federal district court, typically the district in which the corporate headquarters is located, as the venue in which litigation is to proceed. Arguably, federal law governing venue will likely cause the case to proceed in the headquarters district in any event, so companies considering specifying a certain federal district court in the FFP should weigh the risks and rewards of such a provision. For certain foreign issuers, designating a specific federal district court, such as the Southern District of New York, as the venue for all Securities Act claims can be sensible.

一些FFP规则指定了一个特定的联邦地区法院（Federal district court）作为诉讼的地点，这些地点通常位于公司总部所在的地区。依照规则，诉讼管辖地的联邦法律很可能导致在任何情况下案件都会在公司总部所在地区进行。因此，考虑在FFP中特定某个联邦地区法院进行诉讼的公司应该权衡这一规定带来的风险和回报。对于某些境外发行人来说，指定一个特定的联邦地区法院作为所有证券法索赔的诉讼地点是明智的，例如纽约南区法院（the Southern District of New York）。

Large Securities Act liabilities often also arise in the context of registered debt offerings. Companies should therefore consider including FFPs in the indentures in debt offerings as well.

重大的证券法责任往往也发生在注册债务发行的背景下。因此，公司应考虑在债务发行的契约中也加入FFP规则。

Jury trial waivers are common in depositary agreements and indentures. To avoid enforceability challenges based on these waivers, particularly in California, these agreements and indentures should either include a severability provision, or the corporation should be prepared, if necessary, to stipulate not to enforce the jury waiver in federal court when moving to enforce an FFP in California or in other states hostile to such waivers.

选择放弃陪审团审判的权利（Jury trial waivers）在存托协议和契约中十分常见。为了避免这些弃权带来的执行性问题，这些协议和契约应当包括一个可分割条款；或者在有必要的情况下，当案件将移至加利福尼亚州执行FFP条款或是移至其他不支持这种弃权的州进行诉讼时，公司应为明确规定不在联邦法院适用放弃陪审团审判的权利做好准备。

5.

The Future of Disclosure：ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk

信息披露的未来：环境、社会、治理，共有权和系统性风险

作者：John C. Coffee

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8635

The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S. institutional investors now hold twenty percent and vote twenty-five percent of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which has been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are large institutions pressing for increased ESG disclosures?

美国证券市场最近已经经历（或正在经历）三个基本的转变：（1）机构化（结果是机构投资者现在主导了交易和股票所有权）；（2）所有权特别集中（结果是美国三个最大的机构投资者现在持有S&P 500公司20%的股份并拥有25%的投票权）；（3）引入环境、社会、治理（三者简称ESG）等内容的信息披露（在美国由大型机构投资者的压力所推动）。考虑到这些转变，信息披露政策应该如何改变？机构投资者和零散投资者有相同还是不同的信息披露需求？为什么大型机构迫切要求增加ESG信息披露？

This Article will focus on the desire of institutions for greater ESG disclosures and suggest that two reasons underlie this demand for more information: (1) ESG disclosures overlap substantially with systematic risk, which is the primary concern of diversified investors; and (2) high common ownership enables institutions to take collective action to curb externalities caused by portfolio firms, so long as the gains to their portfolio from such action exceed the losses caused to the externality-creating firms. This transition to a portfolio-wide perspective (both in voting and investment decisions) has significant implications but also is likely to provoke political controversy. In its final hours, the Trump Administration adopted new rules that discourage voting based on ESG criteria and thus by extension chill ESG investing. This controversy will continue.

本文将关注机构对披露更多ESG信息的需求，并提出有两个使这类信息需求增多的原因：（1）ESG信息披露与系统性风险有众多的重叠部分，而系统性风险是（投资组合）多元化的投资者的首要关注点；（2）只要这种行动对其投资组合带来的收益超过对公司造成外部性的成本损失，高度的共同所有权使机构能够采取集体行动来遏制（他们投资的）投资组合公司造成的外部性成本。这种向整个投资组合视角的转变（在投票和投资决策方面）具有重大意义，但也可能会引发政治争议。在特朗普政府的执政末期，特朗普政府通过了新的规则，不鼓励基于ESG标准的投票，从而导致了对ESG投资的冷落。这种争议将继续下去。

As more institutions shift to portfolio-wide decisionmaking, there is an optimistic upside: externalities may be curbed by collective shareholder action. For entirely rational reasons, the new “universal” shareholders who now dominate the market will resist even large public companies who might seek to impose externalities on other companies. Owning the market, the “universal” shareholder will protect the market. Still, this process of resistance may produce frictions, and the disclosure needs of individual investors and institutional investors will increasingly diverge. Of course, not all institutional investors are indexed or even diversified, but those that remain undiversified (for example, hedge funds) logically have the perspective of an option-holder and favor greater risk-taking. Across the board, retail investors have different perspectives and preferences than do institutional investors.

当更多的机构以“整个投资组合”的视角为基础进行决策时，会有一个乐观的好处：外部成本可能会被股东的集体行动遏制。出于完全理性的原因，主导市场的新“全民”股东们甚至会在大型上市公司向其他公司施加外部成本时进行抵制。由于拥有了市场，“全民”股东将会保护市场。然而，这一抵制的过程可能产生摩擦，且个体投资者和机构投资者之间的信息披露需求会出现更多的分歧。当然，并非全部机构投资者都是基于（各类）指数甚至是（投资组合）多元化的，但那些没有多元化（投资组合）的投资者（如对冲基金）在逻辑上有一个期权持有者的视角，并赞成承担更多的风险。从整体上看，零散投资者相比于机构投资者有不同的视角和偏好。

Above all, the combination of high common ownership and institutional sensitivity to systematic risk makes disclosure a far more powerful force. If disclosure was once Brandeis’s best disinfectant, it is now becoming a force that can effect significant social and economic change without the need for judicial or agency intervention.

总的来说，高度的共有和机构对系统性风险的敏感度相结合，会使得信息披露成为一种更强大的力量。Brandeis法官曾言“阳光是最好的消毒剂”，如果说信息披露曾经是Brandeis所指代的这种最佳消毒剂，那么现在它正成为一种力量，可以在不需要司法或者机构干预的情况下实现重大的社会和经济变革。

6.

Distributed Ledger Technology and the Securities Markets of the Future: A Stakeholder Survey

分布式账本技术和未来的证券市场的未来：一份利益相关者问卷调查

作者：Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Edward F. Greene, Sue S. Guan

网址：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/8636

This Article evaluates the implications of distributed ledger technology (DLT) for the securities markets of the future and their regulation. DLT is an integral part of the larger revolution in computing, communication and data storage capacity that has transformed securities markets over the last few decades and promises further radical change in the years to come. The potential of DLT, if it can be realized, could improve the functioning of our securities markets while at the same time sharply reducing costs. Based on an interview survey of about 100 persons who play prominent roles in actually making these markets work or in regulating them, this Article reports on the most important topics and themes that have emerged from the wide range of interviewees’ opinions about the extent to which DLT will affect the future of securities markets and their regulation. A significant number saw the potential for DLT to transform securities markets and market structure, from the possibility of stock trading on DLT to the potential impact on intermediaries, the ordinary retail investor, and on preventing wrongdoing in the stock market. However, key questions remain about implementation and the appetite for making DLT-based changes among both market participants and regulators.