法律翻译 | 谷歌因滥用市场支配地位被CCI处以巨额罚款

翻 译 | 傅玄 福州大学本科

审 核 | 一审：Alex 中国政法大学硕士

         二审：郑晨焕 WUSTL LL.M.

编 辑 | 玦珮 范德堡大学 LL.M.

责 编 | Izzy 美国西北大学 LL.M.

1.The Competition Commission of India (Commission) has imposed a penalty of Rs. 1337.76 crore on Google for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets in the Android Mobile device ecosystem, apart from issuing cease and desist order. The Commission also directed Google to modify its conduct within a defined timeline.

1.因谷歌滥用其在Android移动生态系统中多个市场的支配地位，印度竞争委员会（以下简称“委员会”）责令谷歌停止反竞争行为并限期整改，同时对其处以133.78亿卢比的罚款。

2.Smart mobile devices need an operating system (OS) to run applications (apps) and programs. Android is one such mobile operating systems which was acquired by Google in 2005. The Commission in the instant matter has examined various practices of Google w.r.t. licensing of this Android mobile operating system and various proprietary mobile applications of Google (e.g. Play Store, Google Search, Google Chrome, YouTube, etc.).

2.智能移动设备需要安装操作系统来运行应用软件与程序。安卓正是这样一种用于移动设备的操作系统，它于2005年被谷歌收购。本案中，委员会审查了谷歌授权安卓移动操作系统以及谷歌旗下应用程序（例如谷歌娱乐商店、谷歌搜索引擎、谷歌浏览器以及油管等等）的各种行为。

3.For this purpose, the Commission delineated following five relevant markets in the present matter:

a.Market for licensable OS for smart mobile devices in India

b.Market for app store for Android smart mobile OS in India

c.Market for general web search services in India

d.Market for non-OS specific mobile web browsers in India

e.Market for online video hosting platform (OVHP) in India.

3.为此，委员会在本案中划定了如下五大相关市场：

a.印度获许可经营的智能移动设备操作系统市场

b.印度安卓系统应用商店市场

c.印度通用网络搜索服务市场

d.印度非操作系统专用的移动网络浏览器市场

e.印度在线视频托管平台市场

4.During the course of inquiry, Google argued about the competitive constraints being faced from Apple. In relation to understanding the extent of competition between Google’s Android ecosystem and Apple’s iOS ecosystem, the Commission noted the differences in the two business models which affect the underlying incentives of business decisions. Apple’s business is primarily based on a vertically integrated smart device ecosystem which focuses on sale of high-end smart devices with state of the art software components. Whereas Google’s business was found to be driven by the ultimate intent of increasing users on its platforms so that they interact with its revenue earning service i.e., online search which directly affects sale of online advertising services by Google.

4.在调查过程中，谷歌辩称其面临苹果带来的限制竞争压力。委员会在分析谷歌安卓生态系统与苹果iOS生态系统之间的竞争程度时，注意到两大公司商业模式之间的差异，而这些差异影响了两家公司做出商业决策的出发点。苹果以纵向的综合智能设备生态系统为根基，主营由先进软件组建而成的高端智能设备的销售业务。反观谷歌，其构建的商业模式与苹果截然不同。调查发现，由于网络搜索服务的使用量直接影响谷歌网络广告业务的销售额，谷歌业务的重心在于持续增加平台用户数量，进而引导用户使用搜索服务以实现创收。

5.Further, in relation to app stores, the Commission noted that the demand for the same, come from three different sets of consumers i.e., (a) Smart device OEMs who wish to install an app store to make their smart devices commercially viable and marketable; (b) app developers, who want to offer their services to the end users; and (c) end users to wish to access app stores to access content or avail other services. The Commission examined the substitutability between Google’s Play Store for Android OS and Apple’s App Sore for iOS from the perspective of all three demand constituents and found that there is that no substitutability between Google’s Play Store and Apple’s App Store. The Commission further noted that there might be some degree of competition between the two mobile ecosystems i.e., Android and Apple, however, that too is also limited at the time of deciding as to which device to buy. At that stage also, the Commission was of the considered view that the primary and the most significant factor in the mind of an end user is the hardware specification and the device price.

5.此外，委员会指出，对应用商店的需求来自以下三类不同的消费者：（1）智能设备的原始制造商。他们希望下载应用商店以使其智能设备具备商业可行性且易于销售。（2）为终端用户提供服务的应用开发商。（3）访问应用商店以获取内容和其他服务的终端用户。委员会从上述三大需求来源出发，检验了适用于安卓系统的谷歌应用商店与适用于iOS系统的苹果应用商店相互之间的替代性，但结果表明两大应用商店并不互为替代品。委员会经过深思熟虑后进一步阐释道，两大移动生态系统（即安卓与苹果）之间或许存在一定程度上的竞争。但是在选购设备这一阶段，终端用户最在意的仍然是硬件规格以及设备价格，而不是移动生态系统。

6.Based on its assessment, the Commission found Google to be dominant in all the above- mentioned relevant markets.

6.委员会基于对谷歌的评估发现谷歌在上述所有相关市场中都具有市场支配地位。

7.Google operates/ manages the Android OS as well as licences its other proprietary applications and OEMs use this OS & Google’s apps in their smart mobile devices. Accordingly, they enter into multiple agreements to govern their rights and obligations viz. Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA), Anti-fragmentation Agreement (AFA), Android Compatibility Commitment Agreement (ACC), Revenue Sharing Agreement (RSA), etc.

7.谷歌运营安卓系统，并授权其旗下应用程序、原始设备制造商在其智能移动设备中使用该操作系统以及谷歌应用程序。因此，谷歌与原始设备制造商签订了诸多规定双方权利和义务的协议，例如《移动应用软件分发协议》《反碎片化协议》《安卓兼容性承诺协议》《收益共享协议》等等。

8.MADA assured that the most prominent search entry points i.e., search app, widget and chrome browser are pre-installed on Android devices, which accorded significant competitive edge to Google’s search services over its competitors. Further, Google also secured significant competitive edge over its competitors, in relation to its another revenue earning app i.e. YouTube in the Android devices. The competitors of these services could never avail the same level of market access which Google secured and embedded for itself through MADA. Network effects, coupled with status quo bias, create significant entry barriers for competitors of Google to enter or operate in the concerned markets.

8.《移动应用软件分发协议》保证谷歌搜索、微件、谷歌浏览器等重要搜索入口应用预装在安卓设备中，这使得谷歌搜索业务相较于其竞争对手具有显著的竞争优势。此外，谷歌在安卓设备中还赋予其旗下其他创收应用程序（例如油管）相较于其竞争对手显著的竞争优势。谷歌在上述业务领域的竞争对手绝不可能拥有与《移动应用软件分发协议》相同的市场进入条件。网络效应(network effect)[1]与现状偏差(status quo bias)[2]不仅阻碍了谷歌的竞争对手进入相关市场，同时也明显增加了其在相关市场中运营的难度。

9.AFA/ACC guaranteed that distribution channels for competing search services is altogether eliminated by prohibiting OEMs from offering devices based on Android forks. It ensured that OEMs are not able to develop and/ or offer devices based on forks, which are outside the control of Google. In the absence of these restrictions, the competing search services could have availed of sufficient distribution channels in partnership with OEMs, offering devices based on forks. Similarly, the android fork developers also could not find distribution channels for their fork OSs as almost all the OEMs were tied with Google.

9.《反碎片化协议》《安卓兼容性承诺协议》禁止原始设备制造商供应装有“Android forks”（即安卓操作系统的修改版本）的设备，这一规定阻塞了与谷歌处于竞争关系的搜索服务提供商的分销渠道。原始设备制造商不能开发或供应装有安卓修改版本的设备——因为这些系统不受谷歌的控制。倘若没有这些限制性规定，搜索服务提供商本可以与原始设备制造商合作，利用广阔的分销渠道提供装有forks的设备。同样，因为几乎所有原始设备制造商皆与谷歌紧密捆绑在一起，Android forks的开发商亦不能为他们的fork操作系统找到分销渠道。

10.Simultaneously, RSAs helped Google to secure exclusivity for its search services to the total exclusion of competitors. The combined results of these agreements guaranteed a continuous access to search queries of mobile users which helped not only in protecting the advertisement revenue but also to reap the network effects through continuous improvement of services, to the exclusion of competitors. With these agreements in place, the competitors never stood a chance to compete effectively with Google and ultimately these agreements resulted in foreclosing the market for them as well as eliminating choice for users.

10.同时，《收益共享协议》帮助谷歌进一步强化了其搜索业务的排他性，甚至产生了完全排除其竞争对手的效果——源源不断的移动用户使用谷歌的搜索查询服务，这不仅有助于维持谷歌的广告收入，不断改进的服务还为其带来更大的网络效应，从而排除了其竞争对手。这些协议的存在使得谷歌的竞争对手从来没有机会与之公平、有效地竞争。它们在妨碍他人进入市场的同时也剥夺了用户的选择权。

11.The Commission opined that the markets should be allowed to compete on merits and the onus is on the dominant players (in the present case, Google) that its conduct does not impinge this competition on merits. By virtue of the agreements discussed above, Google ensured that users continue to use its search services on mobile devices which facilitated un-interrupted growth of advertisement revenue for Google. Further, it also helped Google to further invest and improve its services to the exclusion of others. Thus, the underlying objective of Google in imposing various restrictions via MADA, AFA/ ACC and RSAs was to protect and strengthen its dominant position in general search services and thus, its revenues via search advertisements.

11.委员会认为，市场允许企业按“水平”竞争(competition on the merits)[3]。拥有市场支配地位的企业（在本案中为谷歌）肩负不得限制按“水平”竞争的义务。谷歌凭借上述协议确保用户在移动设备上持续使用其搜索服务，这促进了谷歌广告收入的不断增长，同时推动谷歌进一步投资、改善其服务，进而排除其竞争对手。因此，谷歌经由《移动应用软件分发协议》《反碎片化协议》《安卓兼容性承诺协议》《收益共享协议》施加各项限制性条款，企图巩固和加强其在通用搜索服务市场中的支配地位，进而通过搜索广告获得更多收入。

12.The Commission concluded that,

12.委员会得出如下结论：

12.1.mandatory pre-installation of entire Google Mobile Suite (GMS) under MADA (with no option to un-install the same) and their prominent placement amounts to imposition of unfair condition on the device manufacturers and thereby in contravention of the provisions of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act. These obligations are also found to be in the nature of supplementary obligations imposed by Google on OEMs and thus, in contravention of Section 4(2)(d) of the Act.

12.1.1.在《移动应用软件分发协议》下，设备制造商被强制要求预装全套Google Mobile Suite（并且不能选择取消安装）并将它们置于设备屏幕上的显眼之处，这实则是对设备制造商施加了不公平的条件，违反了印度《竞争法》第4(2)(a)(i)目的规定。[4]与此同时，委员会发现谷歌向原始制造商施加的义务具有补充义务的性质，因此还违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(d)项。[5]

12.2.Google has perpetuated its dominant position in the online search market resulting in denial of market access for competing search apps in contravention of Section 4(2)(c) of the Act.

12.1.2.谷歌巩固了其在在线搜索市场的支配地位，致使与之具有竞争关系的搜索应用无法进入相关市场，这违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(c)项。[6]

12.3.Google has leveraged its dominant position in the app store market for Android OS to protect its position in online general search in contravention of Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.

12.1.3.谷歌借助其在安卓系统应用商店市场的支配地位，维护其对通用在线搜索市场的垄断，这违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(e)项。[7]

12.4.Google has leveraged its dominant position in the app store market for Android OS to enter as well as protect its position in non-OS specific web browser market through Google Chrome App and thereby contravened the provisions of Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.

12.1.4.谷歌利用其在安卓系统应用商店市场的支配地位，借助谷歌浏览器进入非操作系统特定的移动网络浏览器市场，同时维护其在该市场中的地位，这违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(e)项。

12.5.Google has leveraged its dominant position in the app store market for Android OS to enter as well as protect its position in OVHPs market through YouTube and thereby contravened provisions of Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.

12.1.5.谷歌利用其在安卓系统应用商店市场的支配地位，借助油管进入在线视频托管平台市场，同时维护其在该市场中的地位，这违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(e)项。

12.6.Google, by making pre-installation of Google’s proprietary apps (particularly Google Play Store) conditional upon signing of AFA/ ACC for all android devices manufactured/ distributed/ marketed by device manufacturers, has reduced the ability and incentive of device manufacturers to develop and sell devices operating on alternative versions of Android i.e., Android forks and thereby limited technical or scientific development to the prejudice of the consumers, in violation of the provisions of Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.

12.1.6.谷歌以在所有由设备制造商制造、分销、销售的安卓设备中预装其旗下应用程序（尤其是谷歌应用商店）为签署《反碎片化协议》《安卓兼容性承诺协议》的条件。这一举措减弱了设备制造商开发以及销售装有其他安卓版本设备的能力和积极性，从而限制了科学技术的发展，损害了消费者的利益，违反了《竞争法》第4(2)(b)(ii)目的规定。[8]

13.Accordingly, in terms of the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the Commission has imposed monetary penalty as well as issued cease and desist order against Google from indulging in anti-competitive practices that have been found to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Some of the measures that were indicated by the Commission are as follows:

13.因此，根据《竞争法》第27条的规定，[9]委员会决定对谷歌处以罚款，同时责令谷歌停止违反《竞争法》第4条规定的反竞争行为。如下是委员会下达的部分整改措施：

i.OEMs shall not be restrained from (a) choosing from amongst Google’s proprietary applications to be pre-installed and should not be forced to pre-install a bouquet of applications, and (b) deciding the placement of pre-installed apps, on their smart devices.

13.1. (a) 原始设备制造商应当享有更广阔的预装应用程序选择权，而不以谷歌旗下产品为限。同时他们不应被强迫预装一系列应用程序。(b) 原始设备制造商有自主决定预装应用在智能设备上放置位置的自由。

ii.Licensing of Play Store (including Google Play Services) to OEMs shall not be linked with the requirement of pre-installing Google search services, Chrome browser, YouTube, Google Maps, Gmail or any other application of Google.

13.2. 当谷歌授权原始设备制造商使用谷歌应用商店时，不应附加预装谷歌搜索引擎、谷歌浏览器、油管、谷歌地图、谷歌邮箱以及其他谷歌旗下应用程序的不合理条件。

iii.Google shall not deny access to its Play Services APIs to disadvantage OEMs, app developers and its existing or potential competitors. This would ensure interoperability of apps between Android OS which complies with compatibility requirements of Google and Android Forks. By virtue of this remedy, the app developers would be able to port their apps easily onto Android forks.

13.3. 谷歌不得为了使原始设备制造商、应用程序开发商以及其现存或潜在的竞争对手处于不利地位而关闭其应用商店的应用编程接口(Application Programming Interface)。这在保障安卓系统之间应用程序的互操作性的同时也符合了谷歌和Android Forks的兼容性要求，应用程序开发商得以轻松地移植他们的应用程序到Android fork中。

iv.Google shall not offer any monetary/ other incentives to, or enter into any arrangement with, OEMs for ensuring exclusivity for its search services.

13.4. 谷歌不得为了保证其搜索业务的排他地位而对原始设备供应商采取金钱激励（或其他激励手段）或与之达成任何协议。

v.Google shall not impose anti-fragmentation obligations on OEMs, as presently being done under AFA/ ACC. For devices that do not have Google’s proprietary applications pre-installed, OEMs should be permitted to manufacture/ develop Android forks based smart devices for themselves.

13.5. 谷歌不得像在《反碎片化协议》《安卓兼容性承诺协议》规定的那样，向制造商施加反分裂化义务。原始制造商应被准许在没有预装谷歌旗下产品的智能设备上为个人制造、开发Android forks。

vi.Google shall not incentivise or otherwise obligate OEMs for not selling smart devices based on Android forks.

13.6. 谷歌不得激励或以其他方式迫使原始设备制造商放弃销售装有Android forks的智能设备。

vii.Google shall not restrict un-installing of its pre-installed apps by the users.

13.7. 谷歌不得限制用户卸载其预装的应用程序。

viii.Google shall allow the users, during the initial device setup, to choose their default search engine for all search entry points. Users should have the flexibility to easily set as well as easily change the default settings in their devices, in minimum steps possible.

13.8.谷歌应当允许用户在设备初始设置时自主选择默认搜索引擎。用户能够在各自的设备上，尽可能地以最少的步骤，灵活而便捷地设置、改变其默认搜索引擎。

ix.Google shall allow the developers of app stores to distribute their app stores through Play Store.

13.9.谷歌应当允许应用商店开发者通过谷歌应用商店分销其应用商店。

x.Google shall not restrict the ability of app developers, in any manner, to distribute their apps through side-loading.

13.10.谷歌不得以任何方式限制应用开发商通过“侧载”(side-loading)[10]分销应用程序的能力。

14.In relation to computation of penalty, the Commission noted that there were glaring inconsistencies and wide disclaimers in presenting various revenue data points by Google. However, in the interest of justice and with an intent of ensuring necessary market correction at the earliest, the Commission quantified the provisional monetary penalties on the basis of the data presented by Google. Accordingly, the Commission imposed a penalty of Rs. 1337.76 crore upon Google on provisional basis, for violating Section 4 of the Act. Google has been given a time of 30 days to provide the requisite financial details and supporting documents.

14.委员会在计算罚金时，注意到谷歌提交的收入数据中存在明显的矛盾之处与诸多免责条款。然而委员会出于司法公正和及时纠正市场的利益考量，基于谷歌提供的数据尽其所能地量化了罚款的数额。综上，由于谷歌的行为违反了《竞争法》第4条，委员会决定临时对谷歌处以133.78亿卢比的罚款。谷歌有权在30日内提供必要财务信息和相关证明文件。

15.The public version of the order shall be uploaded on the website of the Commission tomorrow.

15.命令的公开版本将会于明日上传至委员会官网。

相关注释：

[1]网络效应(network effect)，又称网络外部性(network externality)或需求方规模经济(demand-side economies of scale)，指在经济学或商业中，消费者选用某项商品或服务，其所获得的效用与“使用该商品或服务的其他用户人数”具有相关性时，此商品或服务即被称为具有网络外部性。最常见的例子是电话或社交网络服务：采用某一种社交媒体的用户人数越多，每一位用户获得越高的使用价值。

[2]现状偏差(status quo bias)，又叫安于现状偏差，指的是人类倾向于维持现有的状况。即便当现状客观上劣于其它选项或者在信息不完整时，人们还是会做出维持现状的决定，并且倾向将任何改变都视为一种损失。

[3]按“水平”竞争(competition on the merits)，一般来说，该词意味着一个占支配地位的企业可以合法从事属于该词所界定范围内的行为，即使这种行为的后果是竞争对手被迫退出市场或限制竞争对手的进入或扩张。

[4]Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act provides that: There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section, if an enterprise or a group directly or indirectly, imposes unfair or discriminatory condition in purchase or sale of goods or service.

[5]Section 4(2)(d) of the Act provides that: There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section, if an enterprise or a group makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

[6]Section 4(2)(c) of the Act provides that: There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section, if an enterprise or a group indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access in any manner.

[7]Section 4(2)(e) of the Act provides that: There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section, if an enterprise or a group makes uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other relevant market.  

[8]Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that: There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section, if an enterprise or a group limits or restricts technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of consumers.

[9]详见

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2010/1/a2003-12.pdf

[10]在提到Android移动应用程序时，侧载通常意味着将APK格式的应用包安装到安卓设备上。这种软件包通常是从谷歌官方应用商店以外的网站下载的。只有在安全选项中允许安装“来源不明”应用，Android用户才能够侧载应用程序。

原文链接：

https://cci.gov.in/antitrust/press-release/details/265/0

或https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1869748

相关法条链接：

2002印度《竞争法》(The Competition Act,2002)

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2010/1/a2003-12.pdf