法律翻译 | 当事方、第三方与条约解释：欧洲人权法院的乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案

Of Parties, Third Parties, and Treaty Interpretation: Ukraine v. Russia (X) before the European Court of Human Rights

题目：当事方、第三方与条约解释：欧洲人权法院的乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案

Written by Justine Batura and Isabella Risini

作者：贾斯汀·巴图拉（Justine Batura）、伊莎贝拉·里西尼（Isabella Risini）

September 26, 2022

原文发表时间：2022年9月26日

原文链接：https://www.ejiltalk.org/of-parties-third-parties-and-treaty-interpretation-ukraine-v-russia-x-before-the-european-court-of-human-rights/

States are currently (re-)discovering their legal possibilities to express solidarity with Ukraine in its ‘lawfare’ against Russia. Following a joint statement of 41 States and the EU calling ‘upon the international community to explore all options to support Ukraine in its proceedings before the ICJ’, a large number of States have requested to intervene in The Hague.

各国目前正在重新探索在乌克兰对俄罗斯的法律战中声援乌克兰的法律可能性。在41个国家与欧盟发表联合声明，呼吁“国际社会探索一切可能性，在国际法院的诉讼中支持乌克兰”之后，许多国家已要求在海牙作为第三国参加诉讼。

Meanwhile, an even greater wave of intervention requests has reached the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): more than half of all member States have expressed interest in intervening as third-party in Ukraine’s application concerning the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022. It remains interesting to see the final list of intervening States and their geographic relationship with Russia.

与此同时，一大波第三国的参加请求已经到达欧洲人权法院（ECtHR）：超过一半的成员国都表示有兴趣作为第三国参加乌克兰关于2022年2月俄罗斯全面入侵的指控。最终的参加国名单及其与俄罗斯的地理关系十分值得玩味。

In this post, we analyse the value of the unprecedented number of third-State interventions concerning Ukraine v. Russia (X) (11055/22), a value that certainly goes beyond a mere expression of solidarity with Ukraine. Not only are these third-party interventions a timely opportunity for States to express their support for the European regional human rights system and convey legitimacy to the later judgment. The procedural instrument under Art. 36 § 2 ECHR also provides States the prime opportunity to express their views on the interaction of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the wake of Georgia v. Russia (II). In this vein, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has also requested leave to intervene.

在本文中，笔者分析了空前数量的第三国参加乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案 (11055/22)的价值。这一价值当然不仅仅是表达对乌克兰的声援：这些第三国的参加不仅表现了各国适时把握了机遇，表达了其对欧洲区域人权制度的支持，还传递了其对将来的判决的合法性认可。《欧洲人权公约》第36条第2款下的程序文书也为各国提供了在格鲁吉亚诉俄罗斯（Georgia v. Russia）第2号案之后就国际人道法和人权法的相互作用发表意见的最佳机会。在这一方面，日内瓦国际人道法和人权学院也请求参加。

Ukraine and Russia in Strasbourg

乌克兰对俄罗斯在欧洲人权法院的诉讼活动

Following Russia’s expulsion as a member State from the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022, the ECHR has ceased to apply to the Russian Federation. However, in line with the procedural rules on expulsion, Russia remained bound by the ECHR until 16 September 2022. The ECtHR retains jurisdiction to hear cases against the Russian Federation concerning violations that have occurred before said date. The Court has yet to clarify how it intends to go ahead with the thousands of individual applications and several inter-State cases against Russia. The more member States formally engage with the proceedings, the more legitimate it is for the Court to devote its scarce resources to deciding this extremely challenging case.

在俄罗斯于2022年3月16日被驱逐出欧洲委员会成员国后，《欧洲人权公约》不再适用于俄罗斯联邦。然而，根据关于驱逐的程序规则，俄罗斯在2022年9月16日前仍受《欧洲人权公约》的约束。欧洲人权法院保留审理针对俄罗斯联邦在上述日期之前发生的侵权行为的案件的管辖权。法院尚未澄清它打算如何继续处理针对俄罗斯的数千份个人申诉和几个国家间案件。正式参与诉讼的成员国越多，欧洲人权法院就越有理由将其稀缺的资源用于裁决这一极具挑战性的案件。

Since 2014, Ukraine has brought no less than ten inter-State applications against Russia before the ECtHR. With the exception of the Netherlands, no ECHR State party has formally engaged with Ukraine’s first nine applications. Concerning the downing of flight MH-17, the Netherlands initially supported several individual applications as a third-party, and later even filed its own complaint (28535/20), which was then merged by the Court into Ukraine and The Netherlands v. Russia (8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20). However, it remains particularly striking that no other State whose nationals were killed in the MH-17 disaster formally entered the proceedings, as Geir Ulfstein and Isabella Risini noted. Similarly, even though the case Ukraine v. Russia (IX) (10691/21) concerns the use of polonium and novichok on the territory of several European countries, it seems like no State felt compelled to intervene.

自2014年以来，乌克兰已经向欧洲人权法院提出了不少于10份针对俄罗斯的国家间指控。除荷兰外，《欧洲人权公约》的任何缔约国都没有正式参与乌克兰的前九项指控。关于MH-17航班被击落一案，荷兰起初作为第三方支持了多个个人申诉，后来甚至提出了自己的指控（28535/20），随后法院将其合并为乌克兰和荷兰诉俄罗斯案（Ukraine and The Netherlands v. Russia）（8019/16、43800/14和28525/20）。然而，仍然特别引人注目的是，正如盖尔·乌尔施泰因（Geir Ulfstein）和伊莎贝拉·里西尼（Isabella Risini）所指出的，在MH-17灾难中丧生的其他国民的所属国均未正式参与诉讼程序。同样，尽管乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第9号案（10691/21）涉及在几个欧洲国家境内使用钋和诺维乔克，但似乎没有一个国家觉得有必要参加诉讼。

Finally, the case Ukraine v. Russia (X) (11055/22) refers to the full-scale invasion of Russian troops of the entire Ukrainian territory. Shortly after the start of this military operation, Ukraine applied for interim measures, which the Court granted. Subsequently, Ukraine submitted a full application in June. Since then, several overlapping individual applications under Art. 34 ECHR have been filed.

最后，乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案(11055/22)提到了俄罗斯军队对乌克兰全境的入侵。在这次军事行动开始后不久，乌克兰申请采取临时措施，法院予以批准。随后，乌克兰在6月提交了一份完整的指控。此后，根据《欧洲人权公约》第34条又提出了若干重叠的个人申诉。

Emerging engagement of other State parties with Ukraine v. Russia X

其他缔约国对乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案的新参与

With respect to the inter-State case Ukraine v. Russia (X), the twelve-week period of Rule 44 § 3 (b) for requesting permission to intervene as third-party has expired on 20 September 2022. Unlike the parallel procedure at the ICJ, the requests for intervention are not public and no official information is available on which State was the first to request permission to intervene. However, in contrast to the usually rather discreet practice of States intervening, there was  a movement in recent weeks to even publicly announce their formal engagement with the proceedings. The Netherlands appears to have been the first State to make public its application in the realm of the Ministerial Ukraine Accountability Conference on 14 July. Latvia announced its request in early August. In the beginning of September, the public announcements finally gained momentum and a number of States such as Ireland, Estonia, Sweden, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Finland published successively their requests. On 23 September, the Court itself announced that it had received a total of 23 applications and that the UK and Iceland were granted an extension of the deadline. If the Chamber president permits their intervention, these (for now) 25 third-States will now submit written observations on the substance of the case.

对于乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案，《程序规则》第44条第3(b)款规定的请求允许作为第三方参加诉讼的12周期限已于2022年9月20日届满。与国际法院的平行程序不同，参加诉讼的请求并不公开，也没有关于哪个国家最先请求参加诉讼的官方信息。然而，与以往各国相当谨慎的参加做法相比，最近几周，各国出现了一种公开宣布正式参与诉讼的动向。荷兰似乎是第一个在7月14日的乌克兰部长级问责会议上公开其参加诉讼申请的国家。拉脱维亚在8月初宣布了其申请。9月初，公开宣布终于形成势头，爱尔兰、爱沙尼亚、瑞典、波兰、罗马尼亚、斯洛文尼亚和芬兰等国相继公布了其请求。9月23日，欧洲人权法院宣布其共收到23份申请，英国和冰岛获准延长期限。如果分庭庭长允许他们参加，目前的25个第三国将就本案的实质内容提交书面意见。

Third parties, and parties

第三方和当事方

In public international law and international arbitration, third-party interventions provide the contracting parties with the opportunity to communicate their understanding of the treaty to the respective monitoring body. In the practice of the ECtHR, States seem to mostly use their possibility to intervene when they are concerned that the Court’s ‘judgment would have a horizontal effect on other countries’, as Latvia explicitly stated when intervening in Hirst v. the UK (II) (74025/01, § 55). Via Art. 36 § 2 ECHR, States have expressed their rather restrictive interpretation of the ECHR (e.g. when ten States intervened in Lautsi and others v. Italy, GC, 30814/06) and explicitly invited the Court to revisit previous decisions (e.g. the UK intervening in Scoppola v. Italy (III), 126/05, § 78). Nicole Bürli concluded that ‘the role of member State intervention is the reinforcement of State sovereignty vis-à-vis the Court’ (p. 175).

在国际公法和国际仲裁中，第三方参加为缔约方提供了向条约监督机构传达其对条约的理解的机会。在欧洲人权法院的实践中，当各国担心法院的“判决会对其他国家产生横向影响”时，它们似乎有很大可能会参加诉讼，正如拉脱维亚在参加赫斯特诉英国（Hirst v. the UK）第2号案 (74025/01,§55)时的明确表示。通过《欧洲人权公约》第36条第2款，各国表达了它们对《欧洲人权公约》的限制性解释（例如，当十个国家参加拉齐斯等诉意大利案（Lautsi and others v. Italy, GC, 30814/06）的诉讼时），并明确邀请法院重新审查以前的裁决（例如，英国参加斯科波拉诉意大利（Scoppola v. Italy）第3号案的诉讼，126/05，§78）。妮可·勃利（Nicole Bürli）总结道，“成员国参加的作用是增强国家主权对法院的对抗作用”（第175页）。

When assessing the value of third-party interventions, it should also be borne in mind that all State parties are entitled to bring an inter-State application under Art. 33 ECHR for violations by other member States – also for those committed in the course of the Russian invasion before 16 September 2022 – with the full scale of an applicant’s procedural rights. In this spirit, in 1967, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands took the driver’s seat, instead of being mere passengers, in the ‘Greek case’, and each lodged full applications against the Hellenic Republic, which had fallen prey to a coup d’état and temporarily left the Council of Europe in 1969.

在评估第三国参加的价值时，还应该记住，所有缔约国都有权根据《欧洲人权公约》第33条就其他成员国的侵犯行为（也包括2022年9月16日之前俄罗斯入侵期间的违反）提出国家间控告，并享有申诉方的全部程序权利。本着这种精神，1967年，丹麦、挪威、瑞典和荷兰在“希腊案”从纯粹的第三国变为起诉者，它们各自对希腊共和国提起了全面控告。希腊共和国在1969年遭受政变，暂时退出了欧洲委员会。

In contrast, the intervention of a third-party under Art. 36 § 2 ECHR depends on the Court’s discretion, which grants permission to intervene only if it is ‘in the interest of the proper administration of justice’ (as opposed to the right to intervention, like for cases involving the State’s nationals under Art. 36 § 1 ECHR or to the intervention under Art. 63 ICJ-Statute). Intervening third-States do not become parties to the case, their intervention may be subject to any conditions set by the Chamber President (Rule 44 § 5) and hearing participation is permitted only ‘in exceptional circumstances’ (Rule 44 § 3 (a)).

相反，第三方根据《欧洲人权公约》第36条第2款参加取决于法院的自由裁量权，只有在“有利于司法的适当执行”的情况下才允许参加（与参加权相反，如根据《欧洲人权公约》第36条第1款涉及国家国民的案件或根据《国际法院规约》第63条参加）。参加的第三国不会成为案件的当事人，他们的参加可能受到分庭庭长设定的任何条件的制约（《程序规则》第44条第5款），只有在“特殊情况下”才允许参与听证（《程序规则》第44条第3 (a)款）。

From this comparison, it appears that States have chosen the passenger’s seat instead of the driver’s in their response to the Russian invasion. However, the unprecedented number of intervening States gives hope that the case of Ukraine v. Russia (X) will generate a more energetic response than the lukewarm reactions to Russia’s conduct in the past, which led to human rights ‘grey zones’, as Andrew Forde pointed out. In this context, it should be emphasized that even though the timeframe of the Rule 44 has expired, the Chamber President is entitled to fix another time line (Rule 44 § 3 (b)) and has in fact already extended the deadline upon request – additional member States could still join the coalition of intervening States. Art. 36 ECHR itself does not contain a limitation in time. The additional workload for the Court must certainly be weighed in, but in view of the singularity of Ukraine v. Russia (X) for the Council of Europe and its importance for pending and future cases, the effort seems well worthwhile.

比较得出，各国在应对俄罗斯的入侵时似乎选择了乘客的位置，而不是司机的位置。然而，空前数量的参加国使人们希望乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案将产生更积极的反应，而不是像安德鲁·福德（Andrew Forde）指出的那样，过去对俄罗斯的行为反应冷淡，导致了人权“灰色地带”。在这种情况下，应该强调的是，即使《程序规则》第44条的申请参加期限已届至，分庭庭长有权确定另一个期限（《程序规则》第44条第3(b)款）。事实上，分庭庭长已经应要求延长了期限——更多的成员国仍然可以加入参加国的联盟中。《欧洲人权公约》第36条本身并无时间限制。法院的额外工作量当然必须加以权衡，但考虑到乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10 号案对欧洲委员会的特殊性及其对未决和未来案件的重要性，这一努力似乎是值得的。

Added value of the multitude of third-State interventions

众多第三国参加的附加值

With regards to Ukraine v. Russia (X), we identify three aspects conveying value to third-party interventions by other States.

对于乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10 号案，笔者认为有三个方面为其他国家的第三方参加提供了价值。

First, by intervening, member States are living up to their role as ‘guards’ of the Convention. It is the ECHR’s purpose ‘to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ (ECommHR, Austria v. Italy (admissibility), 788/80, p. 18; Preamble, para. 6). Upon ratification, States have explicitly affirmed their ‘primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms’ defined by the ECHR and vowed to their ‘collective enforcement’ (Preamble, para. 7). Given the jointly expressed sympathy of many countries, third-party interventions in Strasbourg should also be understood as a symbolic expression of solidarity through legal means.

首先，通过参加诉讼，成员国正在履行其作为《公约》“卫士”的职责。欧洲人权法院的宗旨是“建立欧洲自由民主国家的共同公共秩序，以捍卫其政治传统、理想、自由和法治的共同遗产”（欧洲人权法院，奥地利诉意大利（可受理性）（Austria v. Italy (admissibility)），788/80，第18页；序言，第6段）。6). 各国在批准《欧洲人权公约》时，明确申明其“保障权利和自由的主要责任”，并保证将“集体执行”（序言第7段）。鉴于许多国家共同表达的同情，第三方在欧洲人权法院诉讼的参加活动也应被理解为通过法律手段象征性地表达团结。

Second, the submissions of more than half of the member States to the ECHR can provide legitimacy to the later judgment. It goes without saying that third-State interventions cannot replace the opposing submissions of the respondent. In cases where the respondent has indicated that it will not formally participate – such as Russia before the ICJ and presumably also before the ECtHR, the written statements of a range of (third) States bound by this very treaty have a significant value. It is also recalled here that the Russian Federation argued in favor of the supremacy of international humanitarian law in the proceedings of Georgia v. Russia (II), a subset of international law that is characterized by a regrettable lack of judicial enforcement mechanisms. Much needed support also concerns the factual side of the conflict; States are entitled to participate in investigation measures (Rule A1 § 6) and could, by their own means, validate factual conclusions.

其次，半数以上的成员国向欧洲人权法院提交的材料可以为后来的判决提供合法性支持。不言而喻，第三国的参加不能取代被告国的反对意见。在被告国已经表示不会正式参与的情况下（比如俄罗斯在国际法院的表现，在欧洲人权法院俄罗斯也可能采取相同措施），一系列受该条约约束的（第三）国的书面声明具有重要价值。在此，有必要回顾，俄罗斯联邦在格鲁吉亚诉俄罗斯（Georgia v. Russia）第2号案的诉讼中支持国际人道法的至高无上性，而令人遗憾的是，国际人道法以缺乏司法执行机制为特点。非常需要的支持方面还涉及冲突的事实；各国有权参与调查措施（《程序规则》第A1条第6款），并可通过自己的手段验证事实结论。

Third, an intervention is also an opportunity for dialogue between the member States and the Court. By way of intervention in Ukraine v. Russia (X), States could chose to express their disagreement with the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly on the eminent question of how human rights law and humanitarian law should interact.

最后，参加也是成员国与法院之间进行对话的机会。通过对乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案的参加，尤其是在人权法和人道法应如何互动这一突出问题上，各国可以选择表达它们对法院判例的不同意见。

In the much-criticized judgment Georgia v. Russia (II) (38263/08), the Court had to rule on the consequences of one of the gravest military confrontations the continent had so far experienced since Russia joined the Strasbourg club. The Court, visibly not at ease, found itself “not in a position to develop its case-law beyond the understanding of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ as established to date” (§ 141) and left the five-day exchange of hostilities mostly to the realm of humanitarian law. Nevertheless, it saw itself in a position to decide at least on certain human rights issues concerning the armed conflict: Unanimously, the Court found that Russia had violated Art. 2 ECHR in its procedural aspect for the lack of an effective investigation into the deaths of the numerous victims during and after the hostilities as well as Art. 3 ECHR regarding the treatment of some 30 Georgian servicemen during and after the hostilities. Notably, the Court opined that in the context of an international armed conflict outside the territory of a respondent State “it must be for the Contracting Parties to provide the necessary legal basis for … assessing acts of war and active hostilities” (§ 142).

在备受批评的格鲁吉亚诉俄罗斯（Georgia v. Russia）第2号案（38263/08）的判决中，法院不得不对俄罗斯加入斯特拉斯堡联盟以来，欧洲大陆迄今经历的最严重的军事对抗之一的后果作出裁决。法院显然并不轻松，它发现自己“无法在迄今为止确立的‘管辖权’概念的理解之外发展其判例法”（第141段），并将为期五天的敌对行动主要留给了人道法领域。然而，法院认为自己至少可以就有关武装冲突的某些人权问题作出决定。法院一致认为，由于俄罗斯没有对敌对行动期间和之后的众多受害者的死亡进行有效调查，其在程序方面违反了《欧洲人权公约》第2条；同时，由于俄罗斯没有对敌对行动期间和之后约30名格鲁吉亚军人的待遇进行有效调查，其违反了《欧洲人权公约》第3条。值得注意的是，法院认为，在被告国领土之外的国际武装冲突中，“必须由缔约国为评估战争行为和现行敌对行动提供必要的法律依据”（第142段）。

With this controversial stance of the Court in mind, it is worth recalling that since 2008, the Court has issued broad interim measures regarding the right to life under Art. 2 and Art. 3 ECHR in the context of acute conflict upon the request of individuals and States, namely Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These requests by affected States asking the Court to intervene in the armed conflict with interim measures are to be seen as State practice, indicating that States indeed consider the Convention applicable in situations of conflict. It is this disagreement with current jurisprudence that States could communicate to the Court, when intervening in Ukraine v. Russia (X).

考虑到法院的这一有争议的立场，值得回顾的是，自2008年以来，法院应个人和国家（即格鲁吉亚、乌克兰、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆）的要求，在严重冲突的情况下，就《欧洲人权公约》第2条和第3条规定的生命权发布了广泛的临时措施。受影响国家要求法院以临时措施干预武装冲突的这些请求应被视为国家实践，表明各国确实认为《公约》在冲突局势中适用。在参加乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案时，各国可以向法院传达的正是这种对现行判例的不同意见。

In fact, the Court should not be left alone with the important question of how to apply the ECHR in the war in Ukraine, as this is more than a question of mere interpretation of Art. 1 or Art. 2 ECHR. The Court can expect to be aided on the question on how to square the circle and systemically integrate international humanitarian law.

事实上，法院不应单独处理如何在乌克兰战争中适用《欧洲人权公约》这一重要问题，因为这不仅仅是一个单纯的解释第1条或第2条的问题，更是能让法院期待在如何系统地整合国际人道法这一问题上得到化腐朽为神奇的帮助。

The value of third-party interventions

第三方参加的价值

The array of third-party interventions in Ukraine v. Russia (X) is an opportunity for the primary subjects of international law to express their legal views and to provide clarity on the crucial questions raised, notably on the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law. The unprecedented engagement of more than half of the ECHR member States is also an important validation of the Court’s supervisory system and its parent organization, the Council of Europe.

乌克兰诉俄罗斯（Ukraine v. Russia）第10号案的一系列第三方参加为国际法的主要主体提供了一次机会，借以表达其法律观点并澄清其提出的关键问题，特别是国际人道法和人权法之间的关系。超过半数欧洲人权法院成员国的空前参与，也是对法院的监督系统及其上级组织欧洲委员会的有力见证。