法律翻译 | 《哈佛法律评论》第134卷第4期目录+摘要

译者 | 张彤，西北政法大学LL.B.

审稿 | 张庆，复旦大学法律硕士

          董辰，中国政法大学硕士

编辑 | 陈远航，美国西北大学LL.M.

责编 | 陈逸漩，中国人民大学法本

Rethinking Protections For Indigenous Sacred Sites

对于土著圣地保护的重新思考

Meaningful access to sacred sites is among the most important principles to the religious exercise of Indigenous peoples, yet tribes have been repeatedly thwarted by the federal government in their efforts to vindicate this practice of their religion. The colonial, state, and federal governments of this Nation have been desecrating and destroying Native American sacred sites since before the Republic was formed. Unfortunately, the callous destruction of Indigenous sacred sites is not just a troubling relic of the past. Rather, the threat to sacred sites and cultural resources continues today in the form of spoliation from development, as well as in the significant barriers to meaningful access Indigenous peoples face.

朝拜圣地是这些土著民族的宗教活动中最重要的原则之一。然而各部落在努力维护该宗教惯例之时，频频受到联邦政府的阻挠。早在美利坚合众国成立之前，这个国家的殖民地政府、州政府和联邦政府一直在亵渎和破坏美国本土的圣地。不幸的是，对土著圣地的无情破坏不仅仅是曾经令人不安的遗迹。更确切地说，对圣地和文化资源的危险如今仍在继续，包括对其发展的破坏和对土著民族在朝拜圣地方面造成的重大障碍。

Scholars concerned about government failure to protect Indigenous sacred sites on government property have generally agreed that the problem stems from the unique nature of Indigenous spiritual traditions as being too distinct from non-Indigenous religious traditions familiar to courts and legislators, and therefore eluding protection afforded to other traditions. By contrast, this Article approaches the problem from an entirely different angle: we focus instead on the similarities between government coercion with respect to Indigenous religious exercise and other non-Indigenous religious practices. We illustrate how the debate about sacred sites unwittingly partakes in longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of coercion itself — a phenomenon that has previously gone unnoticed by scholars. This Article argues that whether or not one formally labels the government’s actions as “coercive,” the important question is whether the government is bringing to bear its sovereign power in a way that inhibits the important ideal of religious voluntarism — the ability of individuals to voluntarily practice their religious exercise consistent with their own free self-development. Indeed, this is precisely the sort of question courts ask when evaluating government burdens on non-Indigenous religious exercise. The failure to ask this same question about voluntarism for Indigenous religious practices has created a double standard, wherein the law recognizes a much more expansive notion of coercion for contexts impacting non-Indigenous religious practices, and a much narrower conception of coercion when it comes to Indigenous sacred sites.

关于政府未能保护在政府财产上的土著圣地，学者普遍同意其问题源于土著民族精神传统的独特性质与法院和立法者熟悉的非土著宗教传统大相径庭，因此法院和立法者逃避了本该提供的给予其他传统的同样保护。相比之下，这篇文章从一个完全不同的角度来探讨这个问题：相反，我们关注政府对土著民族宗教活动的强压以及对其他非土著宗教活动的强压之间的相似性。我们将说明关于圣地的争论是如何无意中参与到长期以来对强压本身性质展开的哲学辩论——这一印象在此之前未曾被学者注意到。这篇文章认为，无论人们是否正式地将政府的行为定性为“强制性的”，重要的问题在于，政府是否正在以抑制宗教自愿主义——个人自愿地参与与自身自由发展保持一致的宗教活动的能力——的重大理想的方式来行使其主权权力。事实上，这正是法院在评估政府在非土著宗教活动方面的负担所提出的问题。而法院未能对参与土著宗教活动的自愿性提出同样的问题导致了双重标准的产生，这其中法律承认在“强压”的概念在适用于非土著宗教活动时比适用于土著宗教圣地时宽泛得多。

This egregious double standard in the law ought to be revisited. Doing so would have two important implications. First, when government interference with religious voluntarism is viewed clearly, tribal members and Indigenous practitioners should be able to prove a prima facie case under statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act much more easily. Second, this Article makes the novel claim that clearer understanding of the coercive control government exercises over sacred sites should animate a strong obligation under the government’s trust responsibility and plenary power doctrine to provide more — rather than less — robust protection of Indigenous sacred sites.

此种法律上过分异常的双重标准应当被重新审视。这种双重标准的做法将会导致两方面的重大影响。首先，当政府对于宗教自愿主义的干预能够被明确看见的时候，部落成员和土著信仰者能够更容易地根据像《宗教自由恢复法案》这样的法令证成一个表面上证据确凿的案件。再者，这篇文章提出了一个新的主张，即对政府强行控制圣地有一个更清晰的理解能够激发政府在信任责任和全权原则下的强烈义务，为土著圣地提供更多——而不是更少——强有力的保护。

（原文链接：

https://harvardlawreview.org/2021/02/rethinking-protections-for-indigenous-sacred-sites/）

Long Live The Federal Power Act’s Bright Line

经久有效的联邦电力法案明线

This Article interprets a trio of recent Supreme Court cases that addressed jurisdictional disputes in energy markets to identify which policies respect the Federal Power Act’s (FPA) allocation of jurisdiction and which do not. While judges and scholars have considered how these cases implicate various jurisdictional disputes, they have so far failed to articulate a coherent framework for understanding when state or federal policies violate the FPA’s jurisdictional silos.

本文解读了最高法院近期处理的三个案件，它们通过辨别政策是否遵守《联邦电力法案》对管辖权的分配以解决能源市场管辖争议。尽管法官和学者已经考虑过这些案件如何牵涉到各种管辖权争议，但到目前为止，在州或联邦政策违反了《联邦电力法案》的司法管辖规定时,他们还没有形成一个连贯的理解框架。

This Article provides that framework. It argues that the Supreme Court’s energy law trio lays the foundation for a doctrinally coherent and normatively compelling interpretation of the FPA. Specifically, these three cases do not, as scholars have maintained, reflect a doctrinal shift away from the venerable “bright line” jurisdictional division that has characterized the FPA since 1935. Those cases instead apply this bright line to the twenty-first-century electricity sector, which has been transformed by technological innovations and by regulatory attempts to introduce competitive forces. The FPA continues to prohibit state and federal energy regulators from interfering with matters reserved to the other’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Court has simply clarified how the FPA applies in light of technological and economic developments that have created situations that implicate the responsibilities of state and federal regulators simultaneously. Rather than create regulatory gaps that would prevent energy regulators from supervising transactions over which the FPA expressly grants those regulators jurisdiction, the Court has prohibited only those unusual policies that (a) expressly decide an issue that the FPA leaves to the other regulator to resolve (for example, setting a rate in a market that is outside of the regulator’s sphere of jurisdiction), (b) “aim at” or “target” matters that the FPA reserves to the other regulator, or (c) render it impossible for FERC to control matters within its regulatory domain. Recognizing that the bright line is alive and well resolves the doctrinal confusion that has plagued courts and clarifies which energy policies are permissible and which are not.

而本文提供了这种框架。最高法院关于能源法的三个案件奠定了对《联邦环保法》进行理论上连贯和规范上令人信服的解释的基础。具体地说，正如学者们所坚持的那样，这三个案例并没有反映出珍贵的自1935年以来就作为《联邦电力法案》一大特色的“明线”管辖权划分的理论转变。相反，这些案例将这条明线应用于21世纪的电力部门，该部门已经为技术革新和试图引入竞争力的监管机构所改变。《联邦电力法案》仍旧禁止州和联邦的能源监管机构干涉保留于对方专属管辖范围内的事项。鉴于技术和经济的发展创造了同时牵涉到州和联邦监管者责任的情形，最高法院仅阐明了《联邦电力法案》如何适用于此类发展。与其造成监管空白从而阻止能源监管机构对《联邦电力法案》明确授予这些监管机构管辖权的交易进行监督，法院不如只禁止这些不寻常的政策，（a）对《联邦电力法案》留给其他监管机构解决的问题作出明确决定的（例如，在监管机构的管辖权之外设定市场利率），（b）针对那些《联邦电力法案》保留给其他监管机构予以调整的事项的，或者是（c）使联邦能源管理委员会无法控制在其监管范围内事项的。因此应当承认明线仍然在起作用，并且很好地解决了困扰法院的理论混淆以及阐明了哪些能源政策是被允许的，而哪些是不被允许的。

（原文链接：

https://harvardlawreview.org/2021/02/long-live-the-federal-power-acts-bright-line/）