法律翻译 |《哥大商法评论》2021年第1期（第6-9篇）目录+摘要

（图片来源于网络）

译者 |伍雪畅 杜伦大学LL.M. 

一审 |戚若音 UCB LL.M.

二审 | 汪晨涵 FDU 法律硕士

编辑 |wrj 中国政法大学硕士

责编 |陈远航 美国西北大学LL.M.

Business as Usual

一切照旧

Hobby Lobby and the Purpose of Corporate

Hobby Lobby与公司的目标

作者：Dalia T. Mitchell

This article explores the interdependence of the discourse of corporate rights and the law of corporate purpose. I argue that the history of corporate rights reflects changing reactions of the U.S. Supreme Court to social, political, and cultural concerns, each reaction offering a different purpose for corporations in our modern society. At the turn of the twentieth century, in response to fears about the advance of socialism, the Court used liberal assumptions to justify protecting the publicly held corporation’s property rights as derived from the rights of individual shareholders. In so doing, the Court helped turn the corporation, with its collective ownership, into the epitome of capitalism. In the 1940s, as fears about the potential impact of European totalitarianism on American democracy mounted, the Court drew on theories of pluralism, which focused on corporate power, to impose constitutional limitations on private entities and organizations. The corporation became the guardian of American democracy. Beginning in the 1970s, amidst concerns about the potential threat that large corporations posed to economic and political markets, the Court relied on the managerialist view that corporate managers were best suited to attend to the affairs of their corporations to rationalize the extension of First Amendment rights to corporations. Even when the Court acknowledged corporate management’s responsibility to the shareholders, it dismissed concerns about management’s usage of shareholder funds to promote corporate goals with which the shareholders might not agree. Questions about corporate rights and corporate purpose became questions of business judgment, and corporate managers became the mediators of American society’s social and cultural goals.

本文探讨了公司权利与有关公司目标的法律之间的依赖关系。笔者认为，公司权利的历史发展体现了美国最高法院对社会、政治和文化问题不断变化的反应，每一种反应都在我们现代社会中为公司提供了不同的引导。在二十世纪之交，为了回应对于社会主义不断发展的担忧，法院利用自由主义理论来证明保护上市公司的产权这一衍生自个人股东权利的财产权的正当性。这样一来，法院将拥有集体所有权的公司塑造成了资本主义的典型。20世纪40年代，由于担心欧洲极权主义对美国民主产生的潜在影响，法院利用重视公司权力的多元主义理论，对私人实体和组织苛以宪法限制。公司成为了美国民主的守护者。从20世纪70年代开始，由于担忧大公司对经济和政治市场构成的潜在威胁，法院借用管理主义的观点，即公司经理是处理公司事务的最佳人选，从而使第一修正案扩展到公司的权利合理化。即使法院承认了公司管理层对股东的责任，它也驳回了有关管理层利用股东资金来促成股东可能不同意的公司目标的观点。关于公司权利和公司目标的问题变成了商业判断的问题，而公司经理则成为美国的社会和文化目标的调解人。

Defending FERC’s Ratemaking Authority in Electric Utility Bankruptcies

捍卫FERC在电力公司破产中的费率制定权

作者：Megan Hirsh

In the recent PG&E and FirstEnergy bankruptcies, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits were faced with a difficult issue that has created confusion and uncertainty for electric utility debtors: does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have jurisdiction concurrent with the bankruptcy courts to decide whether an electric utility debtor can reject power purchase agreements (PPAs) under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code? The answer has billion-dollar implications for renewable generation companies that depend on the stability of long-term PPAs and for electric utilities, which increasingly are filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy due to competition from alternative energy sources and natural disasters.

在最近的PG&E和FirstEnergy公司破产案中，第九与第六巡回法庭面临着一个使电力公司债务人感到困惑与不安的难题：联邦能源管理委员会（FERC）是否与破产法院同样拥有管辖权，以决定电力公司债务人是否可以根据《破产法》第365条拒绝接受电力购买协议（PPAs）。该问题的答案对于那些依赖长期PPAs的稳定性的可再生能源发电公司和电力公司有数以亿计美元的影响，加之替代能源的竞争与自然灾害的破坏，越来越多的电力公司正在根据第11章申请破产。

This Note explores this issue in four parts. First, it provides an overview of the debtor’s rejection power, the applicable energy law, and the factual and procedural contexts in which this issue recently arose. In the next two parts, it resolves doctrinal confusion by analyzing the relevant cases and identifying the heightened standard for rejection of PPAs that the circuit courts have universally endorsed. Finally, it argues that—absent FERC’s approval—rejection should not relieve electric utility debtors of their public rate obligations.

本文分四部分探讨了这个问题。首先，本文概述了债务人的拒绝权，可适用的能源法，以及最近出现的该问题的事实与程序背景。在接下来的两部分中，本文通过分析相关案例和确定巡回法院普遍认可的拒绝接受PPAs所需的更高标准来厘清理论上的混乱。最后，笔者认为，如果没有FERC的批准，拒绝接受协议不应成为豁免电力公司债务人的公共费率义务的理由。

Why Courts Should Implement a “Modified Creator Standard”

为何法院应当适用“修正的创作者标准”

作者：Jordan Lieberman

In March 2019, the Supreme Court ruled in Lorenzo v. SEC that the disseminator of a false statement over email could be held primarily liable for engaging in a scheme to defraud investors under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c). The decision has the potential to upend the Court’s prior precedents limiting the scope of primary liability under 10b-5, as the Court had previously ruled that primary liability under 10b-5(b) should be limited to the attributed author of a misstatement. This Note argues for an expansive reading of Lorenzo, adopting a “modified creator standard” that would expand primary liability under 10b-5(a) and (c) to include a subset of participants in the creation and dissemination of a misstatement beyond its attributed author. The goal of this approach is to ensure that culpable actors cannot escape liability while also preserving the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the distinction between primary and secondary liability under Rule 10b-5.

2019年3月，最高法院在Lorenzo诉SEC一案中裁定，根据10b-5(a)与(c)两项条款，通过电子邮件传播虚假陈述的人可能须因涉嫌欺诈投资者而承担主要责任。该判决有可能颠覆法院先前限制第10b-5条主要责任范围的先例，因为法院此前根据第10b-5(b)条裁定，主要责任应限于虚假陈述的作者。本文主张拓展对Lorenzo的解读，采用“修正的创作者标准”，将第10b-5(a)和(c)项下的主要责任扩大到编纂与传播虚假陈述过程中除作者外的一部分参与者。该标准的目的是确保应受惩罚的行为人不能逍遥法外，同时也保留了最高法院对10b-5条规则下主要责任和次要责任之区别的要点。

Co-opted Cooperators

共同协作者

Corporate Internal Investigations and Brady v. Maryland

公司内部调查与Brady v. Maryland案

作者：Sarah Patterson

In 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York criticized the Department of Justice for “outsourc[ing] its investigation” of alleged LIBOR manipulation practices within Deutsche Bank to the bank and its lawyers. The decision to “outsource” had, in the court’s view, rendered the bank and its outside counsel agents of the government, and provided a basis for the defendant, a former Deutsche Bank employee, to claim that his statements to the bank’s lawyers had been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

2019年，司法部将针对德意志银行内部的LIBOR操纵行为的调查“外包”给该银行及其律师，此举遭到美国纽约南区地方法院的批评。法院认为，“外包”的行为使银行及其外聘律师成为政府的代理人，并为被告（一名德意志银行的前雇员）提供了依据，声称他对银行律师的陈述是被迫的，这违反了第五修正案。

This Note considers the effect of such outsourcing on a prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused under Brady v. Maryland. To do so, it imagines a scenario where a corporation facing criminal indictment undertakes a comprehensive internal investigation. The investigation, which is itself part of the company’s campaign to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement and avoid criminal charges, dredges up evidence of conduct that provides the basis for later charges against individual employees, as well as evidence that tends to exculpate them. This scenario sets up the central question: should the fruits of the outsourced investigation be considered part of the government’s file for the purposes of a Brady claim?

检察官有根据Brady v. Maryland案披露对被告有利之证据的责任，本文考虑了这种外包行为对该种责任的影响。为此，本文设想了这样一个场景：一家面临刑事起诉的公司进行了全面的内部调查。该调查本身是该公司签订延期起诉协议和避免刑事指控的活动的一部分，调查挖出的行为证据为后来对个别雇员的指控提供了依据，同时也挖出了利于开脱公司罪行的证据。该设想引出了一个核心问题：就Brady诉求而言，外包调查的结果是否应被视为政府档案的一部分？

This Note argues that, where outsourced investigations make “the prosecution” indistinguishable from its corporate target, courts should consider answering this question in the affirmative. Using three doctrinal lenses to explore the relationship between the government and corporate cooperators, as well as case law touching on the issue, it offers a framework for enforcing the component of due process explicated in Brady where one could reasonably argue that the government constructively possesses all the information collected during a company-sponsored investigation.

本文认为，如果外包调查使“检方”与其公司目标无法区分，法院应对这个问题作出肯定的回答。本文从三个理论角度探讨了政府与公司合作者之间的关系，以及涉及该问题的判例法。该探讨提供了一个框架，以帮助人们理解政府在公司支持的调查中主动掌握收集的所有信息的情况下，执行Brady中所阐述的正当程序的组成部分。