法律翻译 | 小冲突，大影响：无人谈论的塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦战争

作者|朱莉娅·埃姆采娃(Julia Emtseva)

译者|李梓涵 中南财经政法大学本科

一审|晏世伟 北京大学本科

二审|汪晨涵 复旦大学法律硕士

编辑|玦   珮 范德堡大学 LL.M.

责编|陈逸漩 中国人民大学本科

Small conflicts with big impact: The Tajik-Kyrgyz war no one talks about

小冲突，大影响：无人谈论的塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦战争

The whole world is shaken by the tragic events happening along Ukrainian frontlines. Other conflicts, however, including those which might be profoundly important for regional, and perhaps even global security remain overlooked. One such conflict is the recent escalation of violence on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border that remained mostly uncovered by international media. The exchange of fire between the two Central Asian states is nothing new, yet, the September 2022 escalation should trigger much more concerns within the international community. There is, on the one hand, Tajikistan which positions itself as a “security guard” keeping Eurasia separated from Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the other, that benefits from various international border security assistance programs as well as economic partnerships with China. The narrative used by those few international actors that talk about the conflict is built around the term “border clashes”. While the use of this term might well be a policy-driven decision in order to avoid the escalation of the situation, there should be more clarity with regard to its international legal qualification. Therefore, this piece aims at discussing whether the Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflict has risen to an international armed conflict and whether parties could invoke the right of self-defence.

发生在乌克兰前线的惨痛事件震撼了全世界。然而，其他冲突（包括那些可能对区域甚至全球范围内的安全具有深远意义的冲突）仍然处于被忽视的状态。其中一个是最近塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦边境的暴力升级，而国际媒体大多没有报道过此事。这两个中亚国家之间的交火并不是新鲜事，然而2022年9月的这起暴力升级事件应当引发国际社会更多的关注。一方面，塔吉克斯坦将自己定位为“安全卫士”，将欧亚大陆与阿富汗和吉尔吉斯斯坦分隔开；另一方面，塔吉克斯坦受益于各种国际边境安全援助计划以及与中国的经济伙伴关系。那些谈论冲突的少数国际行动者的叙述都是围绕着“边境冲突”这个术语展开的。虽然使用这个术语很可能是出于政策驱动，以避免局势继续升级，但对此次事件在国际法上的定性应该更加明确。因此，本文旨在讨论塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦的边境冲突是否已经上升为国际性武装冲突，以及各方是否可以援引自卫权。

On September 14, 2022, Tajik and Kyrgyz forces exchanged gunfire along different points of the border, including civilian-populated villages and towns. Both countries have traded blame for initiating the fighting. Despite the attempts to secure a ceasefire, artillery shelling escalated on September 16 and enlarged from border areas into the undisputed Kyrgyz territory, in particular the city of Batken. The fighting involved hard weaponry including tanks and rocket launchers. As a result, at least 62 people, including civilians, died on the Kyrgyz side and 140,000 had to leave their homes. Hundreds of houses and other civilian infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan were set on fire and destroyed. The Tajik government so far has claimed 35 deaths.

2022年9月14日，塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦的部队在边界的不同地点交火，包括平民居住的村庄和城镇。两国互相指责对方先引发战火。尽管两国试图促成停火协议，但9月16日双方炮击升级，且战火从边境地区延伸到无可争议的吉尔吉斯斯坦领土，尤其是巴特肯（Batken）市。战斗中双方动用了包括坦克和火箭筒在内的重型武器。结果，在吉尔吉斯斯坦一侧，包括平民在内的至少62人死亡，14万人不得不背井离乡。吉尔吉斯斯坦境内成百上千的房屋和其他民用基础设施被放火烧毁。迄今为止，塔吉克斯坦政府发动的袭击已造成35人死亡。

Tensions along the non-demarcated borders in Central Asia are not new. The Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict has a long and complex history. The border between the two states is nearly 1000 km long, yet approximately half of it has not been demarcated since 1991. The Ferghana Valley region is densely populated by three major ethnic groups – Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz, who co-exist on the territory where ethnic and political borders do not coincide. Additionally, the Ferghana Valley map is marked by territorial units – enclaves, which aggravate land and water disputes.

中亚未划定边界沿线地区的紧张局势并不新鲜。塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦之间的冲突有着悠久而复杂的历史。两国的边界线有近1000公里长，但自1991年以来，约有一半没有被划定。费尔干纳（Ferghana）盆地地区人口密集，主要有三个民族——塔吉克人、乌兹别克人和吉尔吉斯人，他们在这片民族边界和政治边界不相重合的领土上共存。此外，费尔干纳盆地地图的一个重要特征是有一些领土单位——飞地，这也导致了土地和水资源的争端加剧。

Since 1991, the two countries have continuously exchanged fire (in 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2015). Some reports show that in the span of two years between 2011 and 2013, 63 violent incidents happened on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, ranging from small fights to hostage-taking.

自1991年以来，两国不断交火（分别于2000、2003、2005、2008、2011、2014、2015年）。一些报告显示，从2011年至2013年的两年时间里，塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯斯坦的边境发生了63起暴力事件，从小规模战斗到劫持人质。

In April 2021, the conflict intensified. Big-scale fighting began in at least a dozen of Kyrgyz villages in districts of Batken and Leilek – territories bordering Tajikistan, including the enclave Vorukh. The reason for the escalation was the installment of surveillance cameras at a water distribution point near Vorukh. As a result, at least 41 people died and hundreds were wounded on both sides.

2021年4月，冲突愈演愈烈。在与塔吉克斯坦接壤的巴特肯和勒勒克（Leilek）地区（包括飞地沃鲁克（Vorukh）），至少有十几个吉尔吉斯斯坦村庄爆发了大规模的战斗。战事升级的原因是在沃鲁克附近的一个配水点安装了监控摄像头。结果，双方至少有41人死亡，数百人受伤。

The escalation of violence in the last two years is a worrisome development. The 2021 events triggered an unprecedented reaction within the Kyrgyz civil society. In June 2021, Kyrgyz academics together with multiple NGOs and CSOs sent a communication to the International Criminal Court asking to initiate an investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Tajik governmental officials. Kyrgyzstan did not ratify the Rome Statute. However, Tajikistan ratified the document back in May 2000, allowing the Court to exercise territorial jurisdiction. This initiative, however, did not receive support from the Kyrgyz president, who stated that all disputes between the two states should be resolved via other channels.

过去两年的暴力升级是一个令人担忧的发展趋势。2021年的事件在吉尔吉斯斯坦的公民社会中引发了前所未有的反应。2021年6月，吉尔吉斯斯坦学术界联合多个非政府组织和民间组织向国际刑事法院发出信函，要求提起对其指控的塔吉克斯坦政府官员所犯战争罪的调查。吉尔吉斯斯坦并没有批准《罗马规约》。然而，塔吉克斯坦早在2000年5月就正式批准了该文件，允许国际刑事法院行使属地管辖权。然而，这一倡议并没有得到吉尔吉斯斯坦总统的支持，他表示，两国之间的所有争端都应通过其他途径解决。

The ICC communication is not available online, which makes it hard to check the rationale that the Kyrgyz side tried to advocate for in the document. Therefore, one of the goals of this piece is to analyze whether the escalation of violence on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could be qualified as an international armed conflict and whether any party could invoke the right to self-defence.

吉尔吉斯斯坦发往国际刑事法院的信函在网上无法查到，这使得我们很难去检验吉尔吉斯斯坦一方在文件中提出主张的理由。因此，本文的目标之一是分析吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦边境暴力冲突的升级是否可以被定性为国际性武装冲突，以及任何一方是否可以援引自卫权。

The very few international media outlets that covered the news about the conflict and certain international and non-governmental organizations still use the term “border clash” to describe the situation. Yet, it is not a legal term of art, which makes the legal analysis of the situation at least not straightforward. It is hard to confirm or refute the evidence provided by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as both sides produce contradictory accounts. Moreover, non of the relevant IOs and international media are present in the region to conduct fact-finding. The situation aggravates by the fact that the Tajik media is heavily controlled by the government and the civil society is relatively weak when compared to Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the following analysis will be based on the available and confirmed data by independent regional journalists.

极少数在新闻中报道此次冲突的国际媒体以及某些国际组织和非政府组织仍然使用 “边境冲突”一词来描述塔吉边境局势。然而，这并不是一个法律术语，因此它们对局势所涉及的法律问题的分析至少不是直截了当的。我们很难证实抑或反驳吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦所提供的证据，因为双方的说法是相互矛盾的。此外，没有相关的国际组织和国际媒体在该地区开展实况调查。与吉尔吉斯斯坦相比，塔吉克斯坦的媒体受到政府的严格控制，而塔方民间社会力量也相对薄弱，这使得局势进一步恶化。因此，下文将基于现有的由独立的地方记者提供的已经证实的数据进行分析。

Video footage from both sides suggests that Tajikistan used heavy weaponry and military personnel on September 14, which might prove that this was a planned military operation by the Tajik forces. Moreover, photo and video evidence shows that Tajikistan targeted civilian infrastructure, including in undisputed territories such as the airport in the city of Batken and a strategically important bridge that connected several villages in the Batken region. The Kyrgyz side has also reported indiscriminate shelling on its territory, which was the main reason for evacuating those 140,000 who are now internally displaced. The civil movement Bashtan Bashta, initiated by the youth in Kyrgyzstan, analyzed NASA maps that recorded fires and found out that almost all large-scale destructions occurred on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.

双方的录像显示，塔吉克斯坦在9月14日动用重型武器和派出军事人员，证明这可能是塔军方有计划的军事行动。此外，照片和视频证据显示，塔吉克斯坦以民用基础设施为攻击目标，包括在无争议的领土上，如巴特肯市的机场和一座连接巴特肯地区数个村庄的颇具战略意义的桥梁。吉尔吉斯斯坦方面也报道了塔方对其领土不分青红皂白的炮击，这也是目前吉方疏散国内流离失所的14万人的主要原因。由吉尔吉斯斯坦青年发起的民间运动巴什坦·巴什塔（Bashtan Bashta）分析生成了记录火灾的NASA卫星地图，发现几乎所有的大规模破坏都发生在吉尔吉斯斯坦境内。

While both sides do not take responsibility for the initial attack and no independent investigation has been conducted, one fact is clear – both states have used force against each other. The question here is whether the use of force rose to the level of armed attack as Kyrgyzstan insisted that it used retaliatory measures solely for the purpose of self-defence, invoking Article 51 or the UN Charter. Yet, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan sent an official Article 51 letter to the President of the Security Council justifying their military actions.

虽然双方都不愿意为最初发动攻击承担责任，也没有进行独立调查，但有一个事实是明确的——两国都对对方使用了武力。这里的问题是，双方使用武力是否上升到了武力攻击的程度，因为吉尔吉斯斯坦坚持认为，它采取报复性措施完全是出于自卫目的，并且援引了《联合国宪章》第51条（以下简称“第51条”）。然而，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦都没有根据第51条的内容向安理会主席发出正式信函，为其军事行动辩护。

Article 51 is triggered “if an armed attack occurs” and requires a state sponsor of the armed attack. As known, the threshold for qualifying a hostile action as an armed attack is rather high. The ICJ jurisprudence tends to focus on particular elements of a potential armed attack, namely its gravity, scale and effects. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ suggested (para 195) that a “mere frontier incident” does not rise to the level of an armed attack. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission similarly ruled that “geographically limited clashes … along a remote, unmarked, and disputed border … were not of a magnitude to constitute an armed attack” and “[l]ocalized border encounters between small infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for purposes of the Charter.” Yet, while elaborating on the illustrative examples of what could constitute an armed attack, the ICJ stated (para 195) that deploying regular armed forces, irregular militias or other armed groups across the border will generally satisfy the threshold for an armed attack. Additionally, customary practice suggests that uses of force with sufficient gravity to constitute an armed attack are those resulting in death or destruction. As described above, the escalation of violence in September 2022 resulted in at least 62 deaths on the Kyrgyz side.

第51条只有在“发生武力攻击”的情况下才能够适用，并要求国家对武力攻击提供了支持。众所周知，将敌对行动定性为武力攻击的门槛是相当高的。国际法院的判例倾向于关注潜在的武力攻击的特定构成要件，即其严重性、规模和结果。在“尼加拉瓜案”中，国际法院认为（第195段）“单纯的边境事件”并没有上升到武力攻击的程度。同样地，厄立特里亚-埃塞俄比亚赔偿委员会裁定：“沿着偏僻、没有标志、有争议的边境的那些地理上有限的冲突，其规模不足以构成武力攻击”“即使涉及人员伤亡，小规模步兵部队在边境的偶然相遇也不构成《联合国宪章》所指的武力攻击。”然而，国际法院在阐释可能构成武力攻击的情况的说明性案例时指出(第195段)，跨越边境部署正规武装部队、非正规民兵或其他武装团体，一般能够达到武力攻击的门槛。此外，惯例表明，导致人员死亡或设施毁坏的行为是严重到足以构成武力攻击的使用武装行为。如上文所提到的，2022年9月的暴力升级导致吉尔吉斯斯坦方至少有62人死亡。

While defining whether the right to self-defence could be triggered is subject to debate, a more straightforward issue here is whether international humanitarian law applies in the given situation. The threshold for acknowledging that the situation between two (or more) states has reached the level of an international armed conflict is low. The Geneva Conventions do not provide for the definition of an armed conflict. However, the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2.” It further adds, “[i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces[…].” Therefore, there is little doubt that at least April 2021 and September 2022 events on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border could be qualified as an international armed conflict. Yet, given that both parties sought ceasefire, concluded peace agreements (both in 2021 and already in 2022) and it seems that combat-related manoeuvres have ended, the international armed conflict between them might have already ended.

虽然界定是否能够触发自卫权仍有待讨论，但这里更直接的问题是国际人道法是否适用于当下的特定情况。承认两个（或多个）国家之间的局势已经达到国际性武装冲突程度的门槛很低。《日内瓦公约》没有对武装冲突的定义作出规定。然而，《日内瓦公约》的评注解释说，“两个国家之间产生的导致武装部队成员干预的任何分歧，都是第2条意义上的‘武装冲突’。”评注进一步补充说，“冲突持续多长时间、发生多少屠杀、参与部队有多少人，都不影响其被定义为‘武装冲突’”。因此，至少2021年4月和2022年9月在塔吉克斯坦与吉尔吉斯边境发生的事件可以被定性为国际性武装冲突，这一点是无可争议的。然而，鉴于双方都希望促成停火并缔结和平协议（在2021年和2022年都是），而且与战斗有关的演习似乎都已结束，他们之间的国际性武装冲突可能已经收尾。

Nevertheless, labelling the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict merely as “border clashes” or “border skirmish” might pose some risks as the incorrect qualification creates an illusion that the situation does not require a serious reaction from the international community, which might transform sporadic and rapid escalations of violence into “unstoppable cycle of force and counterforce.” Folding the conflict and its 2021 and 2022 escalations into a narrative of “clashes” implies that the tensions between the two states will inevitably continue as no international organization or other states try to condemn the violence. The term “clashes” also suggests that it is normal to use heavy weapons and an official army to destroy civilian infrastructure to resolve local disputes. Most importantly, the wrong classification fails to hold those who authorized the use of force accountable – a very dangerous practice (as seen in the situation with Russia). Lastly, the existence of an armed conflict has an important impact on the operation of international law, namely the application of international humanitarian law. This could, for instance, give those fleeing the conflict region the right to asylum.

然而，仅仅将塔吉冲突打上“边境冲突”或“小规模边境冲突”的标签可能会带来一些风险，因为这种错误的定性造成了一种错觉，即这种局势不需要国际社会做出严肃反应，这可能会将原本零星分散和急速升级的暴力转变为“势不可挡的武力与反对武力的循环”。将此次冲突及其2021年和2022年的暴力升级统称为“冲突”的叙述，意味着在没有国际组织或其他国家试图谴责暴力的情况下，两个国家之间的紧张局势将不可避免地持续下去。“冲突”一词还暗示，使用重型武器和官方军队摧毁民用基础设施来解决地方争端的方式是正常的。最重要的是，这种错误的分类方法未能让那些授权使用武力的人承担责任——这是一种非常危险的做法（从俄罗斯的局势来看）。最后，武装冲突的存在对国际法的运作，即国际人道主义法的适用具有重要的影响。例如，这可以使那些逃离冲突地区的人获得庇护的权利。

Language is a powerful tool in times of conflict. Language frames conflicts. The deliberate use of certain terms instead of others has the potential to neglect the scale of events as well as the political context and its historical repercussions. Many people have already died in the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict and hundreds of houses and businesses were destroyed. The international community should get more involved in the discussions about the conflict. Preventing further escalations is key for the region and it appears to be difficult without the acknowledgment of the armed conflict and the urgent need to stop it.

在冲突时期，语言是一个强有力的工具。语言建构了冲突的框架。故意使用某些特定的术语而不是其他更准确的术语，有可能导致忽视事件的规模、政治背景及其历史影响。许多人已经在塔吉冲突中丧生，数百所房屋和企业被毁。国际社会应该更多地参与到有关冲突的讨论中来。防止冲突的进一步升级对该地区至关重要，但如果国际社会不承认其是武装冲突，不强调停止冲突的紧迫性，这一点似乎很难做到。