【定稿】法律翻译 | 美国国家大学体育协会诉阿尔斯通案

译者：林雨弦 北京大学本科

审稿：LYJ  新加坡国立大学LL.M.

         汪晨涵 复旦大学

编辑：Gary 詹远 UNSW J.D.

责编：陈远航 美国西北大学LL.M.

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Shawne Alston, et al.

美国国家大学体育协会诉阿尔斯通案：设置学生运动员所获福利的上限是否构成垄断？

From the start, American colleges and universities have had a complicated relationship with sports and money. In 1852, students from Harvard and Yale participated in what many regard as the Nation's first intercollegiate competition - a boat race at Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire. But this was no pickup match. A railroad executive sponsored the event to promote train travel to the picturesque lake. T. Mendenhall, The Harvard-Yale Boat Race 1852-1924, pp. 15-16 (1993). He offered the competitors an all expenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes - along with unlimited alcohol. See A. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals 6-7 (1999) (Zimbalist); Rushin, Inside the Moat, Sports Illustrated,Mar. 3, 1997. The event filled the resort with “life and excitement,” N. Y. Herald, Aug. 10, 1852, p. 2, col. 2, and one student-athlete described the "'junket"' as an experience "'as unique and irreproducible as the Rhodian colossus,"' Mendenhall, Harvard-Yale Boat Race, at 20.

自古以来，美国高校、体育、金钱的关系就剪不断、理还乱。1852年，哈佛大学和耶鲁大学的学生参加了在新罕布什尔州温尼普索基湖举行的划船比赛，这也是很多人眼中的第一场美国高校校际比赛。这场比赛的举办并非临时起意，它由一位铁路高管赞助，目的是向人们推销前往风景如画的温尼普索基湖的火车旅行。这位高管为参赛者提供了完全免费的假期、奢华的奖品以及无限量的酒精饮料。这场比赛使温尼普索基湖充满了“活力与激情”，一名学生运动员将这次“免费的旅行”描述为“像罗德岛太阳神巨像一样独一无二”的经历。

Life might be no "less than a boat race," Holmes, On Receiving the Degree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Commencement, June 30, 1886, in Speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes, p. 27 (1918), but it was football that really caused college sports to take off. "By the late 1880s the traditional rivalry between Princeton and Yale was attracting 40,000 spectators and generating in excess of $25,000 ... in gate revenues." Zimbalist 7. Schools regularly had "graduate students and paid ringers" on their teams. Ibid.

生命如一场划船比赛一样（值得人为之奋斗）， 但真正使高校体育事业腾飞的运动项目是橄榄球。在19世纪80年代末，普林斯顿大学和耶鲁大学之间的传统对抗赛吸引了4万名观众，并创造了超过2.5万美元的门票收入。高校队伍中经常有已经毕业的学生和职业球员混入。

Colleges offered all manner of compensation to talented athletes. Yale reportedly lured a tackle named James Hogan with free meals and tuition, a trip to Cuba, the exclusive right to sell scorecards from his games - and a job as a cigarette agent for the American Tobacco Company. Ibid.; see also Needham, The College Athlete, McClure's Magazine, June 1905, p. 124. The absence of academic residency requirements gave rise to "'tramp athletes"' who "roamed the country making cameo athletic appearances, moving on whenever and wherever the money was better." F. Dealy, Win at Any Cost 71 (1990). One famous example was a law student at West Virginia University-Fielding H. Yost- "who, in 1896, transferred to Lafayette as a freshman just in time to lead his new teammates to victory against its arch-rival, Penn." Ibid. The next week, he "was back at West Virginia's law school." Ibid. College sports became such a big business that Woodrow Wilson, then President of Princeton University, quipped to alumni in 1890 that "'Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: football, baseball, and collegiate instruction."' Zimbalist 7.

高校向有才能的运动员提供了各种形式的报酬（compensation）。据报道，耶鲁大学为了吸引一位名叫詹姆斯·霍根（James Hogan）的阻截队员 ，免除了他的伙食费和学费，并为他提供了免费的古巴之旅、出售其比赛记分卡的独家权利，以及一份在美国烟草公司的香烟代理工作。在校修读学分数限制 的缺失催生了“流浪汉运动员”，他们“在全国各地的高校做客串运动员，无论何时何地，哪里给的钱多就去哪里”。一个著名的例子是西弗吉尼亚大学的一名法学生菲尔丁·H·约斯特（Fielding H. Yost）——“1896年，他作为一名新生转入拉斐特大学，正好赶上了带领他的新队友战胜宿敌宾大的机会”；下一周，他“又回到了西弗吉尼亚大学法学院”。高校体育变成了一项如此壮大的事业，以至于时任普林斯顿大学校长的伍德罗·威尔逊（Woodrow Wilson）在1890年向校友打趣道：“普林斯顿在这个广阔的世界上以三件事闻名：橄榄球、棒球和大学教学。”

By 1905, though, a crisis emerged. While college football was hugely popular, it was extremely violent. Plays like the flying wedge and the players' light protective gear led to 7 football fatalities in 1893, 12 deaths the next year, and 18 in 1905. Id., at 8. President Theodore Roosevelt responded by convening a meeting between Harvard, Princeton, and Yale to review the rules of the game, a gathering that ultimately led to the creation of what we now know as the NCAA. Ibid. Organized primarily as a standard-setting body, the association also expressed a view at its founding about compensating college athletes-admonishing that "[n]o student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate game or contest who is paid or receives, directly or indirectly, any money, or financial concession." Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States Constitution By-Laws, Art. VII, §3 (1906); see also Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, Dec. 28, 1916, p. 34.

然而，1905年，一场危机浮现。高校橄榄球虽然很受欢迎，但也极其暴力。1893年，由于球员的轻型防护装备往往不足以保护其免受飞铲 等比赛动作的伤害，发生了7起橄榄球球员死亡事件；次年发生了12起；1905年发生了18起。西奥多·罗斯福（Theodore Roosevelt）总统召集哈佛大学、普林斯顿大学和耶鲁大学开会审查比赛规则，这次会议最终促成了美国国家大学体育协会（National Collegiate Athletic Association，NCAA）的建立。设立该协会的宗旨是建立一个标准制定机构，协会在成立之初也表达了对高校运动员报酬的看法：“任何学生如果获得了报酬，或是直接或间接地接受了任何金钱或经济优待，就不得代表高校参加任何校际比赛。”

Reality did not always match aspiration. More than two decades later, the Carnegie Foundation produced a report on college athletics that found them still "sodden with the commercial and the material and the vested interests that these forces have created." H. Savage, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, American College Athletics Bull. 23, p. 310 (1929). Schools across the country sought to leverage sports to bring in revenue, attract attention, boost enrollment, and raise money from alumni. The University of California's athletic revenue was over

$480,000, while Harvard's football revenue alone came in at $429,000. Id., at 87. College football was "not a student's game"; it was an "organized commercial enterprise" featuring athletes with "years of training," "professional coaches," and competitions that were "highly profitable." Id., at viii.

但事与愿违。二十多年后，卡内基基金会（the Carnegie Foundation）编写了一份关于高校体育的报告，发现其仍然“被商业、物质以及上述力量所创造的既得利益浸染”。全国各地的高校都力图利用体育带来收入、获得关注、提高入学率，并向校友筹得资金。加利福尼亚大学的体育收入超过了48万美元，而哈佛大学仅在橄榄球一项上获得的收入就达到42.9万美元。高校橄榄球赛事并非“学生之间的游戏”；它是一个由经过“多年训练”的运动员、“专业的教练”以及“高利润”的比赛组成的“井井有条的商业化机构”。

The commercialism extended to the market for student athletes. Seeking the best players, many schools actively participated in a system "under which boys are offered pecuniary and other inducements to enter a particular college." Id., at xiv-xv. One coach estimated that a rival team "spent over $200,000 a year on players." Zimbalist 9. In 1939, freshmen at the University of Pittsburgh went on strike because upperclassmen were reportedly earning more money. Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition, 28 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 181, 190 (2017). In the 1940s, Hugh McElhenny, a halfback at the University of Washington, "became known as the first college player 'ever to take a cut in salary to play pro football."' Zimbalist 22-23. He reportedly said: "'[A] wealthy guy puts big bucks under my pillow every time I score a touchdown. Hell, I can't afford to graduate."' Id., at 211, n. 17. In 1946, a commentator offered this view: "[W]hen it comes to chicanery, double-dealing, and general undercover work behind the scenes, big-time college football is in a class by itself." Woodward, Is College Football on the Level?, Sport, Nov. 1946, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35.

商业性延伸到了学生运动员的市场。为了招徕最优秀的运动员，许多高校积极使用“金钱或其他能够诱使男生们入学的手段”。一位教练估计，其对手球队之一“每年在球员身上的花费超过20万美元”。1939年，匹兹堡大学的新生罢工抗议，因为高年级学生的收入据说比低年级学生更高。20世纪40年代，华盛顿大学的中后卫休·麦克伦尼（Hugh McElhenny），“被称为第一个‘有史以来降薪打职业橄榄球的高校球员’”。据报道，他说：“每次我触地得分，一个有钱人就会在我的枕头下放上大笔钱。毕业让我血亏。”1946年，一位评论员表示：“论及诡计、口是心非和幕后卧底工作，一流院校橄榄球可谓无人能及。”

In 1948, the NCAA sought to do more than admonish. It adopted the "Sanity Code." Colleges Adopt the 'Sanity Code' To Govern Sports, N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1948, p. 1, col. 1. The code reiterated the NCAA's opposition to "promised pay in any form." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1094 (1978). But for the first time the code also authorized colleges and universities to pay athletes' tuition. Ibid. And it created a new enforcement mechanism providing for the "suspension or expulsion" of "proven offenders." Colleges Adopt 'Sanity Code,' N. Y. Times, p. 1, col. 1. To some, these changes sought to substitute a consistent, above-board compensation system for the varying under-the-table schemes that had long proliferated. To others, the code marked "the beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effective cartel," by enabling its member schools to set and enforce "rules that limit the price they have to pay for their inputs (mainly the 'student-athletes')." Zimbalist 10.

1948年，NCAA不再只是对高校进行劝诫。协会正式通过了“健全准则”（Sanity Code），重申NCAA“反对任何形式的报酬承诺”，但也首次授权高校免除运动员的学费。此外，该守则还创设了一个新的执行机制，规定对“被证实的违法者”处以“停赛或开除”。在一些人看来，上述变化试图用标准统一、公开透明的报酬制度来取代横行已久、标准不一的暗箱操作；但在另一些人看来，该守则使其成员高校能够制定和执行“规则，以限制高校必须为其投入（主要是学生运动员）所支付的价格上限”，这标志着“NCAA开始成为一个有效的卡特尔组织”。

The rules regarding student-athlete compensation have evolved ever since. In 1956, the NCAA expanded the scope of allowable payments to include room, board, books, fees, and "cash for incidental expenses such as laundry." In re National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (ND Cal. 2019) (hereinafter D. Ct. Op.). In 1974, the NCAA began permitting paid professionals in one sport to compete on an amateur basis in another. Brief for Historians as Amici Cu riae 10. In 2014, the NCAA "announced it would allow athletic conferences to authorize their member schools to increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance." O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 802 F. 3d 1049, 1054-1055 (CA9 2015). The 80 member schools of the "Power Five" athletic conferences-the conferences with the highest revenue in Division I-promptly voted to raise their scholarship limits to an amount that is generally several thousand dollars higher than previous limits. D. Ct. Op., at 1064.

自此，关于学生运动员（student athletes）的报酬规则一直在演变。1956年，NCAA将高校可以免除学生运动员的费用范围从学费扩大到了包含食宿、书本、学杂费和其他附带费用（如“为洗衣支付的费用”）。1974年，NCAA开始允许一项运动的职业选手以业余身份参与另一项运动的比赛。2014年，NCAA宣布，它将允许体育协会授权其成员高校将奖学金上限提高至全部就读费用。五大体育联盟——在第一级别中收入最高的联盟——的八十所成员高校迅速投票，将其奖学金限额提高了几千美元。

In recent years, changes have continued. The NCAA has created the "Student Assistance Fund" and the "Academic Enhancement Fund" to "assist student-athletes in meeting financial needs," "improve their welfare or academic support," or "recognize academic achievement." Id., at 1072. These funds have supplied money to student-athletes for "postgraduate scholarships" and "school supplies," as well as "benefits that are not related to education," such as "loss of value insurance premiums," "travel expenses," "clothing," and "magazine subscriptions." Id., at 1072, n. 15. In 2018, the NCAA made more than $84 million available through the Student Activities Fund and more than $48 million available through the Academic Enhancement Fund. Id., at 1072. Assistance may be provided in cash or in kind, and there is no limit to the amount any particular student-athlete may receive. Id., at 1073. Since 2015, disbursements to individual students have sometimes been tens of thousands of dollars above the full cost of attendance. Ibid.

近年来，变化一直在持续。NCAA设立了学生支持基金（Student Assistance Fund）和学术促进基金（Academic Enhancement Fund），以“帮助学生运动员满足经济需要”、“改善学生运动员福利”、“提供学术支持”或“认可学术成就”。上述基金向学生运动员提供了用于“研究生奖学金”和“学习用品”的资金以及“与教育无关的福利”，如缴纳“价值损失保险费”、支付“旅行费用”、购买“衣物”和支付“杂志订阅费”。2018年，NCAA通过学生活动基金（Student Activities Fund）提供了8400多万美元，通过学术促进基金提供了4800多万美元。资助的形式可以是现金，也可以是实物，任一学生运动员可以获得的金额都不存在上限。自2015年以来，有些学生所获得的款项比其就读所需的全部费用高出数万美元。

The NCAA has also allowed payments "'incidental to athletics participation,"' including awards for "participation or achievement in athletics" (like "qualifying for a bowl game") and certain "payments from outside entities" (such as for "performance in the Olympics"). Id., at 1064, 1071, 1074. The NCAA permits its member schools to award up to (but no more than) two annual "Senior Scholar Awards" of $10,000 for students to attend graduate school after their athletic eligibility expires. Id., at 1074. Finally, the NCAA allows schools to fund travel for student-athletes' family members to attend "certain events." Id., at 1069.

NCAA 也允许学生获得“参与体育赛事的附带费用”，包括对“参与体育活动或取得成就”（如“取得参加碗赛 的资格”）的奖励和“来自外部实体的某些款项”（如对“在奥运会上取得成就”的运动员给予的款项）。NCAA允许其成员高校每年颁发最多（但不超过）两个奖金为1万美元的“高级学者奖”（Senior Scholar Awards），供学生在运动员资格到期后就读研究生院。最后，NCAA允许高校为学生运动员的家庭成员陪同参加某些赛事提供旅费。

Over the decades, the NCAA has become a sprawling enterprise. Its membership comprises about 1,100 colleges and universities, organized into three divisions. Id., at 1063. Division I teams are often the most popular and attract the most money and the most talented athletes. Currently, Division I includes roughly 350 schools divided across 32 conferences. See ibid. Within Division I, the most popular sports are basketball and football. The NCAA divides Division I football into the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision, with the FBS generally featuring the best teams. Ibid. The 32 conferences in Division I function similarly to the NCAA itself, but on a smaller scale. They "can and do enact their own rules." Id., at 1090.

几十年来，NCAA已经发展成一个庞大的企业，其成员包括约1100所高校，分为三个级别。第一级别的球队往往是最受欢迎的，也吸引了最多的资金和最有天赋的运动员。目前，第一级别大约包括350所学校，分为32个联盟。在第一级别中，最受欢迎的运动是篮球和橄榄球。NCAA将第一级别橄榄球划分为橄榄球碗赛分区（FBS）和橄榄球锦标赛分区，FBS通常拥有最好的球队。第一级别的32个联盟的功能与NCAA相似，但规模较小。它们可以制定并也确实制定了自己的规则。

At the center of this thicket of associations and rules sits a massive business. The NCAA's current broadcast contract for the March Madness basketball tournament is worth $1.1 billion annually. See id., at 1077, n. 20. Its television deal for the FBS conference's College Football Playoff is worth approximately $470 million per year. See id., at 1063; Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2012. Beyond these sums, the Division I conferences earn substantial revenue from regular-season games. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) "made more than $409 million in revenues from television contracts alone in 2017, with its total conference revenues exceeding $650 million that year." D. Ct. Op., at 1063. All these amounts have "increased consistently over the years." Ibid.

在这些错综的协会和规则之中，核心是一家体量庞大的企业。根据NCAA目前关于“疯狂三月”（March Madness）篮球赛的广播合同，协会每年能获得11亿美元。协会关于FBS高校橄榄球季后赛的电视转播交易每年价值约4.7亿美元。此外，第一级别的联盟能够从常规赛中获得高额收入。例如，2017年，东南联盟（Southeastern Conference, SEC）“仅来自电视转播合同的收入就超过了4.09亿美元，当年其联盟总收入则超过了6.5亿美元”。而上述金额“多年来还一直在持续增长”。

Those who run this enterprise profit in a different way than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee. The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million per year. Brief for Players Association of the National Football League et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Commissioners of the top conferences take home between $2 to $5 million. Ibid. College athletic directors average more than $1 million annually. Ibid. And annual salaries for top Division I college football coaches approach $11 million, with some of their assistants making more than $2.5 million. Id., at 17-18.

经营该企业的人与受其监督的学生运动员具有不同的盈利方式。NCAA的主席每年赚取近400万美元，顶级联盟委员的收入在200-500万美元之间，高校体育竞赛主管的平均年薪超过100万美元；而第一级别高校橄榄球教练的年薪则接近1100万美元，其部分助手的收入超过250万美元。

The plaintiffs are current and former student-athletes in men's Division I FBS football and men's and women's Division I basketball. They filed a class action against the NCAA and 11 Division I conferences (for simplicity's sake, we refer to the defendants collectively as the NCAA). The student-athletes challenged the "current, interconnected set of NCAA rules that limit the compensation they may receive in exchange for their athletic services." D. Ct. Op., at 1062, 1065, n. 5. Specifically, they alleged that the NCAA's rules violate §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "contract[s], combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U. S. C. §1.

原告是男子第一级别FBS橄榄球、男子和女子第一级别篮球的现任和前任学生运动员。他们对NCAA和11个第一级别联盟（为使行文简洁，本院将被告统称为NCAA）提起集体诉讼。上述学生运动员对NCAA“现行的、相互关联的规则”提出质疑，认为“这套规则限制了他们付出体育服务所能取得的报酬”。具体而言，他们主张NCAA的规则违反了《谢尔曼法》（Sherman Act）第1条，该条禁止“限制贸易或商业（restraint of trade or commerce）的合同、联合或共谋”。

After pretrial proceedings stretching years, the district court conducted a 10-day bench trial. It heard experts and lay witnesses from both sides, and received volumes of evidence and briefing, all before issuing an exhaustive decision. In the end, the court found the evidence undisputed on certain points. The NCAA did not "contest evidence showing" that it and its members have agreed to compensation limits on student-athletes; the NCAA and its conferences enforce these limits by punishing violations; and these limits "affect interstate commerce." D. Ct. Op., at 1066.

在历经了跨年的审前程序之后，地方法院进行了为期10天的法庭审判。在发布详细的决定前，法院听取了双方的专家和非专家证人的意见，并收到了成卷的证据和诉状。最后，法院认为，某些方面的证据是无异议的：NCAA没有对“表明”它和它的成员已经同意对学生运动员的报酬进行限制“的证据提出异议”；NCAA及其联盟通过惩罚违规行为来执行上述限制；上述限制“影响了州际商业活动”。

Based on these premises, the district court proceeded to assess the lawfulness of the NCAA's challenged restraints. This Court has "long recognized that in view of the common law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was passed, the phrase 'restraint of trade' is best read to mean 'undue restraint."' Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U. S. __, __ (2018) (slip op., at 8) (brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted). Determining whether a restraint is undue for purposes of the Sherman Act "presumptively" calls for what we have described as a "rule of reason analysis." Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006); Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60-62 (1911). That manner of analysis generally requires a court to "conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure" to assess a challenged restraint's "actual effect on competition." American Express, 585 U. S., at ___-__ (slip op., at 8-9) (internal quotation marks omitted). Always, "[t]he goal is to distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest." Ibid. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

基于上述前提，地方法院进一步对NCAA受到质疑的限制措施的合法性展开评估。法院“早已认识到，鉴于普通法和《谢尔曼法》通过时的国内法，‘贸易限制’（restraint of trade）这一短语最好被理解为‘不适当的限制’（undue restraint）”。依据《谢尔曼法》的目的判断一项限制是否适当，需要依据“合理原则”（rule of reason）进行分析。这种分析方式通常要求法院对“市场力量和市场结构的具体事实进行评估”，以判断被质疑的限制对竞争的“实际影响”。“合理原则的目标”始终“是区分对消费者有害的、具有反竞争效果的限制措施，以及符合消费者最佳利益的、刺激竞争的限制措施。”

In applying the rule of reason, the district court began by observing that the NCAA enjoys "near complete dominance of, and exercise[s] monopsony power in, the relevant market" - which it defined as the market for "athletic services in men's and women's Division I basketball and FBS football, wherein each class member participates in his or her sport-specific market." D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The "most talented athletes are concentrated" in the "markets for Division I basketball and FBS football." Id., at 1067. There are no "viable substitutes," as the "NCAA's Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and basketball." Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its member schools have the "power to restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance." Id., at 1070.

在适用合理原则时，地方法院首先指出，NCAA在相关市场上“几乎享有完全的支配地位，并行使了垄断权力”。法院将“相关市场”（relevant market）定义为“男子和女子第一级别篮球和FBS橄榄球的体育服务市场，其中，原告的每个成员都参与了他或她的特定运动项目所对应的市场”。“最有才能的运动员集中”在“第一级别篮球和FBS橄榄球的市场”。“NCAA第一级别联赛本质上就是精英高校橄榄球和篮球的唯一相关市场”，因此不存在其他“可行的替代品”。简言之，NCAA及其成员高校有能力在任何时候、以任何方式限制学生运动员的报酬，且其市场支配地位不会面临任何显著的风险。

The district court then proceeded to find that the NCAA's compensation limits "produce significant anti-competitive effects in the relevant market." Id., at 1067. Though member schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes, the NCAA uses its monopsony power to "cap artificially the compensation offered to recruits." Id., at 1097. In a market without the challenged restraints, the district court found, "competition among schools would increase in terms of the compensation they would offer to recruits, and student-athlete compensation would be higher as a result." Id., at 1068. "Student-athletes would receive offers that would more closely match the value of their athletic services." Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA "did not meaningfully dispute" any of this evidence. Id., at 1067; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 ("[T]here's no dispute that the-the no-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a relevant antitrust market").

其次，地方法院认定，NCAA对学生运动员报酬的限制在相关市场上产生了显著的反竞争效果。尽管成员高校在招募学生运动员时竞争激烈，但NCAA利用其买方垄断（monopsony）的垄断权力“任意限制了新人报酬的上限”。地方法院认为，在一个没有上述限制的市场中，高校在新人报酬方面的竞争会更加激烈，而学生运动员的报酬也会因此而提高。“高校愿意向学生运动员支付的报酬将更加接近学生远动员所提供的体育服务的价值”。值得注意的是，法院注意到，对于上述证据，NCAA“没有提出任何有意义的异议”。

The district court next considered the NCAA's procompetitive justifications for its restraints. The NCAA suggested that its restrictions help increase output in college sports and maintain a competitive balance among teams. But the district court rejected those justifications, D. Ct. Op., at

1070, n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here. The NCAA's only remaining defense was that its rules preserve amateurism, which in turn widens consumer choice by providing a unique product-amateur college sports as distinct from professional sports. Admittedly, this asserted benefit accrues to consumers in the NCAA's seller-side consumer market rather than to student-athletes whose compensation the NCAA fixes in its buyer-side labor market. But, the NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess its restraints in the labor market in light of their procompetitive benefits in the consumer market-and the district court agreed to do so. Id., at 1098.

其后，地方法院考虑了NCAA认为其限制措施有利于竞争的抗辩理由。NCAA提出，其限制措施有助于提高高校体育成果的产量，并维持各队之间的竞争平衡。但地方法院没有认可上述理由，NCAA在此也没有继续提出类似主张。NCAA所剩的唯一辩护理由即为，其规则维护了业余性（amateurism），并因此向消费者提供了独特的、不同于职业体育的业余高校体育产品，扩大了消费者的选择。虽然NCAA所主张的利益是对处于以NCAA为卖方的消费品市场中的消费者而言的，而不是对处于以NCAA为买方的劳动力市场中的学生远动员而言的，但NCAA认为，地方法院在评估其限制措施在劳动力市场中的影响时，需要考虑到限制措施在消费品市场中对竞争的刺激作用——地方法院也对此表示同意。

Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA's conception of amateurism has changed steadily over the years. See id., at 1063-1064, 1072-1073; see also supra, at 3-7. The court noted that the NCAA "nowhere define [s] the nature of the amateurism they claim consumers insist upon." D. Ct. Op., at 1070. And, given all this, the court struggled to ascertain for itself "any coherent definition" of the term, id., at 1074, noting the testimony of a former SEC commissioner that he's "'never been clear on ... what is really meant by amateurism."' Id., at 1070-1071.

对此，法院注意到，多年来，NCAA对业余性的理解一直在不断变化。法院指出，NCAA从未在任何地方对其声称消费者所支持的“业余性”给出过定义。基于此，法院难以查明该概念“任何一致的定义”，前SEC委员在证词中也提及他“从未明白……业余性真正的含义”。

Nor did the district court find much evidence to support the NCAA's contention that its compensation restrictions play a role in consumer demand. As the court put it, the evidence failed "to establish that the challenged compensation rules, in and of themselves, have any direct connection to consumer demand." Id., at 1070. The court observed, for example, that the NCAA's "only economics expert on the issue of consumer demand" did not "study any standard measures of consumer demand" but instead simply "interviewed people connected with the NCAA and its schools, who were chosen for him by defense counsel." Id., at 1075. Meanwhile, the student-athletes presented expert testimony and other evidence showing that consumer demand has increased markedly despite the new types of compensation the NCAA has allowed in recent decades. Id., at 1074, 1076. The plaintiffs presented economic and other evidence suggesting as well that further increases in student-athlete compensation would "not negatively affect consumer demand." Id., at 1076. At the same time, however, the district court did find that one particular aspect of the NCAA's compensation limits "may have some effect in preserving consumer demand." Id., at 1082. Specifically, the court found that rules aimed at ensuring "student-athletes do not receive unlimited payments unrelated to education" could play some role in product differentiation with professional sports and thus help sustain consumer demand for college athletics. Id., at 1083.

地方法院也没有找到多少证据能够支持NCAA观点——即其关于报酬的限制在消费者需求中发挥了作用。如法院所述，“证据未能证明被质疑的报酬规则本身与消费者需求有任何直接联系”。法院注意到，例如，NCAA“在消费者需求问题上唯一的经济学专家”并没有“研究任何消费者需求的度量标准”，而只是采访了“由辩护律师为其挑选的、与NCAA及其高校有关的人士”。同时，学生运动员提供的专家证词和其他证据显示，虽然近几十年来NCAA扩展了允许支付的报酬类型，但消费者需求仍在显著增长。原告提供的经济证据和其他证据也表明，进一步增加学生运动员的报酬“不会对消费者需求产生负面影响”。然而，与此同时，地方法院确实发现，NCAA报酬限制的一部分内容“可能对维持消费者需求具有一定影响”。具体而言，法院认为，旨在确保“学生运动员不接受与教育无关的、无限量的报酬”的规则，在一定程度上有利于将NCAA的产品与职业体育区别开来，从而有助于维持消费者对高校体育的需求。

The court next required the student-athletes to show that "substantially less restrictive alternative rules" existed that "would achieve the same procompetitive effect as the challenged set of rules." Id., at 1104. The district court emphasized that the NCAA must have "ample latitude" to run its enterprise and that courts "may not use antitrust laws to make marginal adjustments to broadly reasonable market restraints." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these standards, the court found the student-athletes had met their burden in some respects but not others. The court rejected the student-athletes' challenge to NCAA rules that limit athletic scholarships to the full cost of attendance and that restrict compensation and benefits unrelated to education. These may be price-fixing agreements, but the court found them to be reasonable in light of the possibility that "professional-level cash payments ... could blur the distinction between college sports and professional sports and thereby negatively affect consumer demand." Ibid.

其后，法院要求学生运动员证明，存在“大幅降低限制性的替代规则”，以“实现被质疑的规则下的竞争效果”。地方法院强调，NCAA必须有“充分的自由”（ample latitude）来经营其企业，法院“不能利用反垄断法，对基本合理的市场限制措施进行边际调整”。根据上述标准，法院认为学生运动员在某些方面的举证是充分的，但在其他方面则并非如此。法院驳回了学生运动员对NCAA将体育奖学金上限设定在全部就读费用、并限制与教育无关的报酬和福利的规则的质疑。虽然上述规则可能构成操纵价格的协议，但法院认为，考虑到“职业级别的现金报酬……可能会模糊高校体育和职业体育之间的区别，从而对消费者需求产生负面影响”，上述协议是合理的。

The court reached a different conclusion for caps on education-related benefits-such as rules that limit scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or paid posteligibility internships. Id., at 1088. On no account, the court found, could such education-related benefits be "confused with a professional athlete's salary." Id., at 1083. If anything, they "emphasize that the recipients are students." Ibid. Enjoining the NCAA's restrictions on these forms of compensation alone, the court concluded, would be substantially less restrictive than the NCAA's current rules and yet fully capable of preserving consumer demand for college sports. Id., at 1088.

对于限制教育相关福利的措施——如限制就读研究生院或职业学校的奖学金、学术辅导费或取得资格后的带薪实习机会的规则，法院则得出了不同的结论。法院认为，无论如何，上述与教育相关的福利都不可能“与职业运动员的薪酬混淆”。至少，上述福利“强调了其接受者只能是学生”。法院认为，仅禁止NCAA对上述形式的报酬进行限制，也将大幅放宽NCAA的现行规则，同时也完全能够维持消费者对高校体育的需求。

The court then entered an injunction reflecting its findings and conclusions. Nothing in the order precluded the NCAA from continuing to fix compensation and benefits unrelated to education; limits on athletic scholarships, for example, remained untouched. The court enjoined the NCAA only from limiting education-related compensation or benefits that conferences and schools may provide to student-athletes playing Division I football and basketball. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, p. 167a, ¶1. The court's injunction further specified that the NCAA could continue to limit cash awards for academic achievement-but only so long as those limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for athletic achievement (currently $5,980 annually). Id., at 168a-169a, ¶5; Order Granting Motion for Clarification of Injunction in No. 4:14-md-02541, ECF Doc. 1329, pp. 5-6 (ND Cal., Dec. 30, 2020). The court added that the NCAA and its members were free to propose a definition of compensation or benefits "'related to education."' App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 168a, ¶4. And the court explained that the NCAA was free to regulate how conferences and schools provide education-related compensation and benefits. Ibid. The court further emphasized that its injunction applied only to the NCAA and multi-conference agreements-thus allowing individual conferences (and the schools that constitute them) to impose tighter restrictions if they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6. The district court's injunction issued in March 2019, and took effect in August 2020.

法院随后发布了反映其审查结果和结论的禁止令，该禁止令并没有阻止NCAA继续限制与教育无关的报酬和福利，例如体育奖学金；法院只是禁止NCAA限制联盟和高校可能会向参加第一级别橄榄球和篮球比赛的学生远动员提供的、与教育相关的报酬和福利。法院的禁止令进一步规定，NCAA可以继续限制其对学术成就给予的现金奖励，只要其上限不低于NCAA允许对体育成就给予的现金奖励（目前为每年5,980美元）。法院补充，NCAA及其成员可以自行定义“与教育相关”的报酬和福利。法院指出，NCAA可以自行规定联盟和高校应当如何提供与教育相关的报酬和福利。法院进一步强调，其禁止令只适用于NCAA和多联盟协议——因此，单个联盟（以及组成上述联盟的高校）可以依其意愿施加更严格的限制。地方法院的禁止令于2019年3月发布，并于2020年8月生效。

Both sides appealed. The student-athletes said the district court did not go far enough; it should have enjoined all of the NCAA's challenged compensation limits, including those "untethered to education," like its restrictions on the size of athletic scholarships and cash awards. In re National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F. 3d 1239, 1263 (CA9 2020). The NCAA, meanwhile, argued that the district court went too far by weakening its restraints on education-related compensation and benefits. In the end, the court of appeals affirmed

in full, explaining its view that "the district court struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anti-competitive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports." Ibid.

双方都提起了上诉。学生运动员认为，地方法院的判决还不够彻底；法院应该禁止NCAA所有受质疑的报酬限制，包括“与教育无关”的报酬和福利的限制，如对体育奖学金和现金奖励的限制。而NCAA则认为，地方法院的判决过于激进，削弱了NCAA对与教育相关的报酬和福利的限制。最后，上诉法院维持原判，并表示：“地方法院在制定救济措施时找到了正确的平衡点，既避免了对学生运动员的反竞争伤害，又维护了高校体育的受欢迎程度，以实现促进竞争的目的。”

Unsatisfied with this result, the NCAA asks us to reverse to the extent the lower courts sided with the student-athletes. For their part, the student-athletes do not renew their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA's compensation restrictions. Accordingly, we do not pass on the rules that remain in place or the district court's judgment upholding them. Our review is confined to those restrictions now enjoined.

NCAA对这一结果感到不满，要求本院撤回下级法院对学生运动员有利的判决；而学生运动员则没有重申其对NCAA赔偿限制的全面挑战。因此，本院不会继续考察目前没有受到改变的规则，也就是地方法院所维持的规则。本院的审查范围仅限于现在被禁止的限制措施。

Before us, as through much of the litigation below, some of the issues most frequently debated in antitrust litigation are uncontested. The parties do not challenge the district court's definition of the relevant market. They do not contest that the NCAA enjoys monopoly (or, as it's called on the buyer side, monopsony) control in that labor market-such that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels and restricting the quantity of student-athlete labor. Nor does the NCAA dispute that its member schools compete fiercely for student-athletes but remain subject to NCAA-issued-and-enforced limits on what compensation they can offer. Put simply, this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.

在本院看来，与本案前期的诉讼一样，反垄断诉讼中最常争论的一些问题在此都没有争议。双方对地方法院对相关市场的定义没有异议。他们没有质疑NCAA在该劳动力市场上享有垄断（或者采用买方的说法，买方垄断）控制权——以至于它能够将工资压低到竞争水平以下，并限制学生运动员的劳动力数量。NCAA也没有质疑其成员高校在学生运动员方面存在激烈竞争，但仍受制于由其制定并执行的、关于高校可以向学生运动员提供何种报酬的限制。简言之，本案与在被告享有垄断控制权的市场上公认存在的横向价格垄断有关。

Other significant matters are taken as given here too. No one disputes that the NCAA's restrictions in fact decrease the compensation that student-athletes receive compared to what a competitive market would yield. No one questions either that decreases in compensation also depress participation by student-athletes in the relevant labor market - so that price and quantity are both suppressed. See 12 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2011b, p. 134 (4th ed. 2019) (Areeda & Hovenkamp). Nor does the NCAA suggest that, to prevail, the plaintiff student-athletes must show that its restraints harm competition in the seller-side (or consumer facing) market as well as in its buyer-side (or labor) market. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 235 (1948); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U. S. 312, 321 (2007); 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶352c, pp. 288-289 (2014); 12 id., ¶2011a, at 132-134.

其他重要事项在本案中也被认为是既定的。没有人质疑，相比于竞争性市场，NCAA的限制事实上减少了学生运动员获得的报酬。也没有人质疑，报酬的减少抑制了学生运动员对相关劳动力市场的参与——因此，劳动力的价格和数量都受到了抑制。NCAA也没有提出，为了胜诉，原告学生运动员必须证明NCAA的限制措施既损害了卖方的（也就是面向消费者的）市场的竞争，又损害了买方的（也就是劳动力的）市场的竞争。

Meanwhile, the student-athletes do not question that the NCAA may permissibly seek to justify its restraints in the labor market by pointing to procompetitive effects they produce in the consumer market. Some amici argue that "competition in input markets is incommensurable with competition in output markets," and that a court should not "trade off" sacrificing a legally cognizable interest in competition in one market to better promote competition in a different one; review should instead be limited to the particular market in which antitrust plaintiffs have asserted their injury. Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae 3, 11-12. But the parties before us do not pursue this line.

同时，学生运动员并不质疑NCAA可以通过指出其在消费者市场上产生的促进竞争的效果来为其在劳动力市场上的限制行为进行辩护。有法庭之友认为，“投入端的市场竞争与产出端的市场竞争是不能相提并论的”，法院不应该通过牺牲一个法律所认可的利益来“换取”对另一个市场中竞争的促进；相反，审查应该局限于反垄断原告所主张的伤害所在的市场。但是，双方当事人并未如此主张。

With all these matters taken as given, we express no views on them. Instead, we focus only on the objections the NCAA does raise. Principally, it suggests that the lower courts erred by subjecting its compensation restrictions to a rule of reason analysis. In the NCAA's view, the courts should have given its restrictions at most an "abbreviated deferential review," Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, p. 14, or a "'quick look,"' Brief for Petitioners in No. 20-520, p. 18, before approving them.

鉴于上述事项都是既定的，本院不对其发表任何意见。相反，本院只关注NCAA提出的反对意见。反对意见主要认为，下级法院适用合理原则分析其报酬限制的行为是错误的。在NCAA看来，法院在批准或禁止其限制之前，最多只能对其进行简短的、谦抑的审查，换言之，只能“快速浏览”（quick look）一下。

The NCAA offers a few reasons why. Perhaps dominantly, it argues that it is a joint venture and that collaboration among its members is necessary if they are to offer consumers the benefit of intercollegiate athletic competition. We doubt little of this. There's no question, for example, that many "joint ventures are calculated to enable firms to do something more cheaply or better than they did it before." 13 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶2100c, at 7. And the fact that joint ventures can have such procompetitive benefits surely stands as a caution against condemning their arrangements too reflexively. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1979).

NCAA提出了几个理由。最主要的理由或许是，NCAA认为自己是合资企业（joint venture），如果想要为消费者提供校际体育比赛，NCAA成员之间的合作就是不可避免的。本院不否认这一点。例如，许多“合资企业设立的目的无疑就是为了使企业能够以更低的成本或更优的方式做某事”。这一好处使得合资企业能够促进竞争，也说明合资企业自身的安排不应受到过度谴责。

But even assuming (without deciding) that the NCAA is a joint venture, that does not guarantee the foreshortened review it seeks. Most restraints challenged under the Sherman Act - including most joint venture restrictions-are subject to the rule of reason, which (again) we have described as "a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure" aimed at assessing the challenged restraint's "actual effect on competition" - especially its capacity to reduce output and increase price. American Express, 585 U. S., at __-__ (slip op., at 8-9) (internal quotation marks omitted).

但是，即使假设（而非认定）NCAA是一个合资企业，也不能保证NCAA能够得到其主张的缩短审查。依据《谢尔曼法》，受到质疑的大多数限制——包括大多数合资企业的限制——都受制于合理原则，本院（再次）将合理原则描述为“对市场力量和市场结构的具体事实的评估”，旨在评估受质疑的限制对竞争的实际影响——特别是其减少产量和提高价格的能力。

Admittedly, the amount of work needed to conduct a fair assessment of these questions can vary. As the NCAA observes, this Court has suggested that sometimes we can determine the competitive effects of a challenged restraint in the "'twinkling of an eye."' Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at 110, n. 39 (quoting P. Areeda, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37-38 (Federal Judicial Center, June 1981)); American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 203 (2010). That is true, though, only for restraints at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum. For those sorts of restraints-rather than restraints in the great in-between-a quick look is sufficient for approval or condemnation.

诚然，对上述问题进行公正评估所需的工作量可能有所不同。正如NCAA所注意到的，本院曾在另案中指出，有时我们可以在“一眨眼之间”（twinkling of an eye）确定被质疑的限制措施的竞争效果。不过，这只适用于处于竞争性光谱两极的限制措施。对于上述限制——而非介于两极之间的限制——快速浏览式的审查就足以决定应当批准（approval）还是谴责（condemnation）。

At one end of the spectrum, some restraints may be so obviously incapable of harming competition that they require little scrutiny. In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F. 2d 210 (CADC 1986), for example, Judge Bork explained that the analysis could begin and end with the observation that the joint venture under review "command[ed] between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market." Id., at 217. Usually, joint ventures enjoying such small market share are incapable of impairing competition. Should they reduce their output, "there would be no effect upon market price because firms making up the other 94% of the market would simply take over the abandoned business." Ibid.; see also 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1507a, p. 444 (2017) (If "the exercise of market power is not plausible, the challenged practice is legal"); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F. 2d 185, 191 (CA7 1985) ("Unless the firms have the power to raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, and it makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial").

在光谱的一极，一些限制措施显然不会损害竞争，以至于它们几乎不需要审查。例如，在罗瑟里仓储货运公司诉阿特拉斯货运公司案（Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.）中，博克（Bork）大法官指出，分析的起点和终点都基于被审查的合资企业“控制了相关市场份额的5.1%到6%”这一事实。通常情况下，占有如此小的市场份额的合资企业是不可能损害竞争。即使其减少产量，“也不会对市场价格产生影响，因为占据其他94%市场份额的公司会接管被该企业所放弃的业务”。 

At the other end, some agreements among competitors so obviously threaten to reduce output and raise prices that they might be condemned as unlawful per se or rejected after only a quick look. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3; California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U. S. 756, 770 (1999). Recognizing the inherent limits on a court's ability to master an entire industry-and aware that there are often hard-to-see efficiencies attendant to complex business arrangements - we take special care not to deploy these condemnatory tools until we have amassed "considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue" and "can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances." Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 886-887 (2007); Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 972, 975 (1986) (noting that it can take "economists years, sometimes decades, to understand why certain business practices work [and] determine whether they work because of increased efficiency or exclusion"); see also infra, at 26-27 (further reasons for caution).

在另一极，竞争者之间的某些协议显然威胁到了产量和价格，以至于它们本身就可能被谴责为非法，或者仅仅在快速浏览后就被否决。本院清楚，法院难以精通一整个行业；本院也明白，复杂的商业安排往往有不易察觉的高效之处。因此，在积累了“关于所争议的限制类型的大量经验”，并“可以有把握地预见其在所有或几乎所有情况下都会被宣告无效”之前，本院不会随意使用上述判断方法。

None of this helps the NCAA. The NCAA accepts that its members collectively enjoy monopsony power in the market for student-athlete services, such that its restraints can (and in fact do) harm competition. See D. Ct. Op., at 1067. Unlike customers who would look elsewhere when a small van company raises its prices above market levels, the district court found (and the NCAA does not here contest) that student-athletes have nowhere else to sell their labor. Even if the NCAA is a joint venture, then, it is hardly of the sort that would warrant quick-look approval for all its myriad rules and restrictions.

上述内容并不对NCAA有利。NCAA承认其成员在学生运动员服务市场上共同享有垄断权力，因此其限制措施可以（事实上也确实会）损害竞争。当一家小型货车公司将其价格提高到高于市场水平时，客户会另觅他处；与此不同的是，地方法院发现（NCAA也没有对此提出异议），学生运动员没有其他可以出售其劳动的地方。即使NCAA是一个合资企业，它的特殊性质也无法使其所有的规则和限制都得到快速浏览式的批准。

Nor does the NCAA's status as a particular type of venture categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary rule of reason review. We do not doubt that some degree of coordination between competitors within sports leagues can be procompetitive. Without some agreement among rivals - on things like how many players may be on the field or the time allotted for play - the very competitions that consumers value would not be possible. See Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at 101 (quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278 (1978)). Accordingly, even a sports league with market power might see some agreements among its members win antitrust approval in the "'twinkling of an eye.' American Needle, 560 U. S., at 203.

NCAA作为特殊企业的地位也无法使其限制措施免于正常的合理性审查。本院并不怀疑体育联盟内部竞争者之间某种程度的协调可以促进竞争。如果竞争对手之间没有达成某种协议——如多少球员可以上场、比赛时间应该设置为多久——消费者所重视的比赛就无法实现。因此，即使是具有市场力量的体育联盟，其成员之间的某些协议也会在“一眨眼之间”就获得反垄断批准。

But this insight does not always apply. That some restraints are necessary to create or maintain a league sport does not mean all "aspects of elaborate interleague cooperation are." Id., at 199, n. 7. While a quick look will often be enough to approve the restraints "necessary to produce a game," ibid., a fuller review may be appropriate for others. See, e.g., Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Assn., 95 F. 3d 593, 600 (CA7 1996) ("Just as the ability of McDonald's franchises to coordinate the release of a new hamburger does not imply their ability to agree on wages for counter workers, so the ability of sports teams to agree on a TV contract need not imply an ability to set wages for players").

但这种观点并不总是适用。某些限制对于创造或维持一项联赛运动是必要的，但这并不意味着“精心设计的联盟间合作的所有限制都是（必要的）”。虽然快速浏览式的审查往往足以批准“创造一项赛事所必须”的限制措施，但对于其他限制措施，进行更全面的审查或许是更合适的。

The NCAA's rules fixing wages for student-athletes fall on the far side of this line. Nobody questions that Division I basketball and FBS football can proceed (and have proceeded) without the education-related compensation restrictions the district court enjoined; the games go on. Instead, the parties dispute whether and to what extent those restrictions in the NCAA's labor market yield benefits in its consumer market that can be attained using substantially less restrictive means. That dispute presents complex questions requiring more than a blink to answer.

NCAA对学生运动员工资的规定就属于上述“其他限制措施”。没有人质疑，如果不存在地方法院所禁止的与教育有关的报酬限制，第一级别篮球和FBS橄榄球比赛可以继续进行（并且已经继续进行）。相反，双方争论的是，在NCAA劳动力市场上的上述限制是否，以及在多大程度上能够给消费者市场带来好处，而这些好处本可以通过大幅降低限制性的手段实现。这一争议呈现了复杂的问题，不是一眨眼之间就可以解答的。

Even if background antitrust principles counsel in favor of the rule of reason, the NCAA replies that a particular precedent ties our hands. The NCAA directs our attention to Board of Regents, where this Court considered the league's rules restricting the ability of its member schools to televise football games. 468 U. S., at 94. On the NCAA's reading, that decision expressly approved its limits on student-athlete compensation-and this approval forecloses any meaningful review of those limits today.

即使反垄断的基本原则支持适用合理原则，NCAA也认为存在一个能够约束本院的先例。NCAA提出，在俄克拉荷马大学董事会案（Board of Regents）中，本院审查了联盟限制其成员高校用电视转播橄榄球比赛的规则。根据NCAA的理解，该决定明确批准了其对学生运动员报酬的限制，这种批准排除了现在关于报酬限制的任何实质审查。

We see things differently. Board of Regents explained that the league's television rules amounted to "[h]orizontal price fixing and output limitation[s]" of the sort that are "ordinarily condemned" as "'illegal per se."' Id., at 100. The Court declined to declare the NCAA's restraints per se unlawful only because they arose in "an industry" in which some "horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id., at 101-102. Our analysis today is fully consistent with all of this. Indeed, if any daylight exists it is only in the NCAA's favor. While Board of Regents did not condemn the NCAA's broadcasting restraints as per se unlawful, it invoked abbreviated antitrust review as a path to condemnation, not salvation. Id., at 109, n. 39. If a quick look was thought sufficient before rejecting the NCAA's procompetitive rationales in that case, it is hard to see how the NCAA might object to a court providing a more cautious form of review before reaching a similar judgment here.

本院对此持不同看法。俄克拉荷马大学董事会案指出，联盟的电视转播规则相当于“横向定价和产量限制”（horizontal price fixing and output limitations），该限制“通常被谴责”为“本身非法”（illegal per se）。本院没有宣布NCAA的限制本身是非法的，只是因为其出现在“一个特殊的行业”中，在该行业中，“为了产出产品，某些对竞争的横向限制是必须的”。本院现在的分析与此完全一致。事实上，如果本院的分析与此有任何不同，那也只会对NCAA有利。虽然俄克拉荷马大学董事会案没有谴责NCAA的电视转播限制本身是非法的，但其进行了简短的反垄断审查以示谴责，而非认可。在该案中，如果快速浏览式的审查足以驳倒NCAA支持竞争的理由，那么，很难想象NCAA会反对法院在作出类似的判断之前进行更谨慎的审查。

To be sure, the NCAA isn't without a reply. It notes that, in the course of reaching its judgment about television marketing restrictions, the Board of Regents Court commented on student-athlete compensation restrictions. Most particularly, the NCAA highlights this passage:

诚然，NCAA对此并非没有回应。它指出，在作出对电视转播限制的判决的过程中，裁判俄克拉荷马大学董事会案的法庭对学生运动员的报酬限制作出了评论。NCAA特别强调了这段话：

"The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act." Id., at 120.

“NCAA在维护高校体育中令人尊敬的业余传统方面发挥着关键作用。毫无疑问，它需要充分的自由来胜任这一角色，换言之，保有高校运动员为校际体育运动增加了丰富性和多样性，完全符合《谢尔曼法》的目标。”

See also id., at 101, 102 (the NCAA "seeks to market a particular brand of football" in which "athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like"). On the NCAA's telling, these observations foreclose any rule of reason review in this suit.

在NCAA看来，上述内容排除了合理原则审查在本案中的适用。

Once more, we cannot agree. Board of Regents may suggest that courts should take care when assessing the NCAA's restraints on student-athlete compensation, sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these remarks do not suggest that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA's compensation restrictions. Student-athlete compensation rules were not even at issue in Board of Regents. And the Court made clear it was only assuming the reasonableness of the NCAA's restrictions: "It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and are therefore procompetitive... ." Id., at 117 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court simply did not have occasion to declare - nor did it declare - the NCAA's compensation restrictions procompetitive both in 1984 and forevermore.

本院再次表示反对。俄克拉荷马大学董事会案也许表明了法院应当谨慎评估NCAA对学生运动员报酬的限制，对其促进竞争的可能性保持敏感。但上述意见并不意味着法院必须条件反射般地排斥所有对NCAA报酬限制的挑战。学生运动员报酬规则甚至不是俄克拉荷马大学董事会案中的一个争点。而且，本院明确表示，“NCAA的限制是合理的”只是一个假设：“我们可以假设，NCAA的大部分监管措施是促进业余运动队之间竞争的正当手段，因此，在这种假设下，上述措施是有利于竞争的……”。据此，本院根本不可能宣布——事实上也从未宣布——NCAA在1984年及以后的报酬限制都是有利于竞争的。

Our confidence on this score is fortified by still another factor. Whether an antitrust violation exists necessarily depends on a careful analysis of market realities. See, e.g., American Express Co., 585 U. S., at __-__ (slip op., at 10-12); 2B Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶500, p. 107 (2014). If those market realities change, so may the legal analysis.

还有另一个因素支持了本院对此的观点。违反反垄断法的行为是否存在，必然取决于对市场实际的仔细分析。如果市场实际发生了变化，法律分析也可能发生变化。

When it comes to college sports, there can be little doubt that the market realities have changed significantly since 1984. Since then, the NCAA has dramatically increased the amounts and kinds of benefits schools may provide to student-athletes. For example, it has allowed the conferences flexibility to set new and higher limits on athletic scholarships. D. Ct. Op., at 1064. It has increased the size of permissible benefits "incidental to athletics participation." Id., at 1066. And it has developed the Student Assistance Fund and the Academic Enhancement Fund, which in 2018 alone provided over $100 million to student-athletes. Id., at 1072. Nor is that all that has changed. In 1985, Division I football and basketball raised approximately $922 million and $41 million respectively. Brief for Former NCAA Executives as Amici Curiae 7. By 2016, NCAA Division I schools raised more than $13.5 billion. Ibid. From 1982 to 1984, CBS paid $16 million per year to televise the March Madness Division I men's basketball tournament. Ibid. In 2016, those annual television rights brought in closer to $1.1 billion. D. Ct. Op., at 1077, n. 20.

就高校体育而言，毫无疑问，自1984年以来，市场实际已经发生了重大变化。从那时起，NCAA已大幅增加了学校可以提供给学生运动员的福利的数量和种类。例如，它允许联盟灵活设置更高的体育奖学金上限；它批准了更多参与“体育活动的附带福利”；它还建立了学生支持基金和学术促进基金，仅在2018年就向学生运动员提供了超过1亿美元的资金。发生变化的远不止这些。1985年，第一级别橄榄球和篮球联赛分别筹集了约9.22亿美元和4100万美元；到了2016年，NCAA第一级别高校筹集了超过135亿美元的资金；从1982年到1984年，CBS每年为转播“疯狂三月”第一级别男子篮球赛而支付1600万美元；2016年，上述的年度电视转播权带来了将近11亿美元的收入。

Given the sensitivity of antitrust analysis to market realities - and how much has changed in this market - we think it would be particularly unwise to treat an aside in Board of Regents as more than that. This Court may be "infallible only because we are final," Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result), but those sorts of stray comments are neither.

鉴于反垄断分析对市场实际的敏感性——以及相关市场发生了很大的变化——本院认为，过于重视俄克拉荷马大学董事会案中的题外话是非常不明智的。本院也许“不可能出错，只因为我们是终审法院” ，但那些题外话既不是不可能出错，也不是最终的。

The NCAA submits that a rule of reason analysis is inappropriate for still another reason - because the NCAA and its member schools are not "commercial enterprises" and instead oversee intercollegiate athletics "as an integral part of the undergraduate experience." Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 31. The NCAA represents that it seeks to "maintain amateurism in college sports as part of serving [the] societally important non-commercial objective" of "higher education." Id., at 3.

NCAA认为不应当适用合理原则的原因还包括：NCAA及其成员高校不是“商业化的企业”，而是将校际体育活动“视为本科生经历的一个必要组成部分”并进行监督。NCAA表示，其力求“维持高校体育的业余性，以服务于一个具有重要社会意义的非商业目标”：“高等教育”。

Here again, however, there may be less of a dispute than meets the eye. The NCAA does not contest that its restraints affect interstate trade and commerce and are thus subject to the Sherman Act. See D. Ct. Op., at 1066. The NCAA acknowledges that this Court already analyzed (and struck down) some of its restraints as anti-competitive in Board of Regents. And it admits, as it must, that the Court did all this only after observing that the Sherman Act had already been applied to other nonprofit organizations - and that "the economic significance of the NCAA's nonprofit character is questionable at best" given that "the NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenues." 468 U. S., at 100-101, n. 22. Nor, on the other side of the equation, does anyone contest that the status of the NCAA's members as schools and the status of student-athletes as students may be relevant in assessing consumer demand as part of a rule of reason review.

不过，此处的争议或许也比表面上少。NCAA不否认其限制措施影响到了州际贸易和商业，因此受《谢尔曼法》约束。NCAA承认，在俄克拉荷马大学董事会案中，本院已经分析（并认定）了其部分限制的反竞争属性。而且，NCAA必须承认，本院是在注意到《谢尔曼法》已经适用于其他非营利组织后才做出了上述行为；它也必须承认，鉴于“NCAA及其成员机构实际上是为了实现收入最大化”，“NCAA非营利性质的经济意义至少是值得怀疑的”。另一方面，也没有人质疑，NCAA成员作为学校的地位和学生运动员作为学生的地位可能与作为合理原则审查内容之一的消费者需求评估有关。

With this much agreed it is unclear exactly what the NCAA seeks. To the extent it means to propose a sort of judicially ordained immunity from the terms of the Sherman Act for its restraints of trade - that we should overlook its restrictions because they happen to fall at the intersection of higher education, sports, and money - we cannot agree. This Court has regularly refused materially identical requests from litigants seeking special dispensation from the Sherman Act on the ground that their restraints of trade serve uniquely important social objectives beyond enhancing competition.

尽管双方达成了众多共识，NCAA的诉求仍不清晰。它意图就贸易限制提起一种《谢尔曼法》下的司法规定的豁免（immunity）——即如果贸易限制恰好处于高等教育、体育和金钱的交汇地带，法院应当忽略这种限制——对此本院不能同意。本院经常驳回诉讼当事人与此类似的请求，即，当事人以其贸易限制是为了服务于促进竞争以外的、独特的、重要的社会目标为由，寻求《谢尔曼法》下的特别豁免。

Take two examples. In National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978), a trade association argued that price competition between engineers competing for building projects had to be restrained to ensure quality work and protect public safety. Id., at 679-680. This Court rejected that appeal as "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." Id., at 695. The "statutory policy" of the Act is one of competition and it "precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad." Ibid. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411 (1990), criminal defense lawyers agreed among themselves to refuse court appointments until the government increased their compensation. Id., at 414. And once more the Court refused to consider whether this restraint of trade served some social good more important than competition: "The social justifications proffered for respondents' restraint of trade ... do not make it any less unlawful." Id., at 424.

举二例为证。在全国职业工程师协会诉美国案中，一个贸易协会认为，为了保证工作质量、保护公共安全，必须限制竞争建筑项目的工程师之间的价格竞争。本院驳回了该上诉，认为这“无异于对《谢尔曼法》基本政策的正面攻击”。该法的“法定政策”（statutory policy）是鼓励竞争的，“无论竞争的实际效果是好是坏”。在美国联邦贸易委员会诉高级法院庭审律师协会案（FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn.）中，刑事辩护律师之间达成一致，在政府增加其报酬前拒绝法庭任命。本院再次拒绝考虑这种贸易限制是否服务于某种比竞争更重要的社会利益：“利用贸易限制的社会意义为被告的限制措施进行辩护……无法削减其非法性”。

To be sure, this Court once dallied with something that looks a bit like an antitrust exemption for professional baseball. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), the Court reasoned that "exhibitions" of "base ball" did not implicate the Sherman Act because they did not involve interstate trade or commerce-even though teams regularly crossed state lines (as they do today) to make money and enhance their commercial success. Id., at 208-209. But this Court has refused to extend Federal Baseball's reasoning to other sports leagues-and has even acknowledged criticisms of the decision as "'unrealistic"' and "'inconsistent"' and "aberration[al]." Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258, 282 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445, 452 (1957)); see also Brief for Advocates for Minor Leaguers as Amicus Curiae 5, n. 3 (gathering criticisms). Indeed, as we have seen, this Court has already recognized that the NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman Act.

诚然，本院曾处理过类似于职业棒球反垄断豁免的问题。在巴尔的摩联邦棒球俱乐部诉全国职业棒球俱乐部联盟案（Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs）中，本院认为，“棒球”的“展览”不适用《谢尔曼法》，因为它们不涉及州际贸易或商业——即使球队经常（现在也是如此）跨州赚钱以提高其商业成就。但本院已经拒绝将联邦棒球俱乐部的推理扩展到其他体育联盟——并且认为对该决定的批评是“不现实的”、“不一致的”、“反常的”。事实上，如我们所见，本院已经认可NCAA受《谢尔曼法》的约束。

The "orderly way" to temper that Act's policy of competition is "by legislation and not by court decision." Flood, 407 U. S., at 279. The NCAA is free to argue that, "because of the special characteristics of [its] particular industry," it should be exempt from the usual operation of the antitrust laws - but that appeal is "properly addressed to Congress." National Soc. of Professional Engineers, 435 U. S., at 689. Nor has Congress been insensitive to such requests. It has modified the antitrust laws for certain industries in the past, and it may do so again in the future. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §§291-292 (agricultural cooperatives); 15 U. S. C. §§1011-1013 (insurance); 15 U. S. C. §§1801-1804 (newspaper joint operating agreements). But until Congress says otherwise, the only law it has asked us to enforce is the Sherman Act, and that law is predicated on one assumption alone-"competition is the best method of allocating resources" in the Nation's economy. National Soc. of Professional Engineers, 435 U. S., at 695.

放松《谢尔曼法》中的竞争政策的“正确方式”是“通过立法，而不是通过法院裁决”。NCAA当然可以主张，“由于所在行业的特殊性，它应该免于反垄断法的一般约束”——但这种主张应该“以正确的方式向国会提出”。国会也并非没有意识到类似的需求，过去也曾为某些行业修改过反垄断法，将来也可能会再这样做。但是，在国会另行规定之前，它要求本院执行的唯一法律就是《谢尔曼法》，而该法仅以一个假设为前提——在国家经济中，“竞争是分配资源的最优方法”。

While the NCAA devotes most of its energy to resisting the rule of reason in its usual form, the league lodges some objections to the district court's application of it as well.

虽然NCAA的主要反对意见是其不认可法院适用合理原则的一般形式进行审查，但其也对地方法院适用合理原则的过程提出了反对。

When describing the rule of reason, this Court has sometimes spoken of "a three-step, burden-shifting framework" as a means for "'distinguish[ing] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest."' American Express Co., 585 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 9). As we have described it, "the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect." Ibid. Should the plaintiff carry that burden, the burden then "shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint." Ibid. If the defendant can make that showing, "the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means." Id., at ___-__ (slip op., at 9-10).

在描述合理原则时，本院有时会提及“责任转移的三步走框架”（a three-step, burden-shifting framework），以“区分对消费者有害的、具有反竞争效果的限制，和符合消费者最佳利益的、促进竞争的限制”。如本院所述，责任转移的三步走框架是指，“原告负有证明被质疑的限制措施具有显著反竞争效果的初步责任”。如果原告承担了这一责任，那么责任就“转移到了被告身上，由被告来证明该限制措施有利于竞争”。如果被告能够证明这一点，“责任就又转移到了原告身上，要求原告证明，减少反竞争手段能够实现促进竞争的效果”。

These three steps do not represent a rote checklist, nor may they be employed as an inflexible substitute for careful analysis. As we have seen, what is required to assess whether a challenged restraint harms competition can vary depending on the circumstances. See supra, at 15-19. The whole point of the rule of reason is to furnish "an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint" to ensure that it unduly harms competition before a court declares it unlawful. California Dental, 526 U. S., at 781; see also, e.g., Leegin Creative, 551 U. S., at 885 ("'[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition"'); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 768 (1984); 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1507a, at 442-444 (slightly different "decisional model" using sequential questions).

这三个步骤并不是一个机械的清单，也不是细致分析的僵化替代品。如我们所见，评估一项被质疑的限制措施是否损害竞争，可能因情况而异。合理原则的全部意义在于提供“案情调查会（an equiry meet for the case），对限制措施的所处环境、细节和逻辑进行审视”，以确保在法院宣布其非法之前，上述措施确实对竞争造成了不当的损害。

In the proceedings below, the district court followed circuit precedent to apply a multistep framework closely akin to American Express's. As its first step, the district court required the student-athletes to show that "the challenged restraints produce significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market." D. Ct. Op., at 1067. This was no slight burden. According to one amicus, courts have disposed of nearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show a substantial anticompetitive effect. Brief for 65 Professors of Law, Business, Economics, and Sports Management as Amici Curiae 21, n. 9 ("Since 1977, courts decided 90% (809 of 897) on this ground"). This suit proved different. As we have seen, based on a voluminous record, the district court held that the student-athletes had shown the NCAA enjoys the power to set wages in the market for student-athletes' labor - and that the NCAA has exercised that power in ways that have produced significant anticompetitive effects. See D. Ct. Op., at 1067. Perhaps even more notably, the NCAA "did not meaningfully dispute" this conclusion. Ibid.

在以下诉讼程序中，地方法院遵循巡回法院的先例，采用了与美国运通公司案（American Express）类似的多步骤框架。作为第一步，地方法院要求学生运动员证明“被质疑的限制措施在相关市场上产生了显著的反竞争效果”。这并不好证明。据一位法庭之友称，在过去的四十五年中，法院几乎以原告未能证明显著反竞争效果为由，处理了所有适用了合理原则的案件。不过，本案有所不同。如我们所见，基于大量记录，地方法院认为，学生运动员已经证明NCAA在学生运动员的劳动力市场上享有设定工资的权力——而且NCAA已经以产生了显著反竞争效果的方式运用了这种权力。也许更值得注意的是，NCAA对这个结论没有提出有意义的异议。

Unlike so many cases, then, the district court proceeded to the second step, asking whether the NCAA could muster a procompetitive rationale for its restraints. Id., at 1070. This is where the NCAA claims error first crept in. On its account, the district court examined the challenged rules at different levels of generality. At the first step of its inquiry, the court asked whether the NCAA's entire package of compensation restrictions has substantial anticompetitive effects collectively. Yet, at the second step, the NCAA says the district court required it to show that each of its distinct rules limiting student-athlete compensation has procompetitive benefits individually. The NCAA says this mismatch had the result of effectively - and erroneously - requiring it to prove that each rule is the least restrictive means of achieving the procompetitive purpose of differentiating college sports and preserving demand for them.

因此，不同于多数案件，地方法院继续进行了第二步审查，即NCAA能否证明其限制措施有利于竞争。NCAA声称，错误在此首次出现：在NCAA看来，地方法院在审查被质疑的规则的不同步骤中采用了不同的标准。在审查的第一步中，法院询问NCAA的整套报酬限制措施是否在总体上看（collectively）具有实质性的反竞争效果。然而，NCAA说，在第二步中，地方法院要求其证明其限制学生运动员报酬的每一条规则在单独上看（individually）都有利于竞争。NCAA认为，这种标准不一致的审查有效地——并且错误地——要求其证明，NCAA的每条规则都是实现高校体育差异化、维持对高校体育的需求这一竞争性目的的、限制性最小的手段。

We agree with the NCAA's premise that antitrust law does not require businesses to use anything like the least restrictive means of achieving legitimate business purposes. To the contrary, courts should not second-guess "degrees of reasonable necessity" so that "the lawfulness of conduct turn[s] upon judgments of degrees of efficiency." Rothery Storage, 792 F. 2d, at 227; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 58, n. 29 (1977). That would be a recipe for disaster, for a "skilled lawyer" will "have little difficulty imagining possible less restrictive alternatives to most joint arrangements." 11 Areeda Hovenkamp ¶1913b, p. 398 (2018). And judicial acceptance of such imaginings would risk interfering "with the legitimate objectives at issue" without "adding that much to competition." 7 id., ¶1505b, at 435-436.

本院赞同NCAA的观点中的前提，即反垄断法并不要求企业采用限制性最小的手段等措施来实现商业目的的合法化。相反，法院不应在事后评价“合理必要性的程度”（degrees of reasonable necessity），否则“行为的合法性就将取决于对效率高低的判断”。这将酿成灾难，因为一个熟练的律师“极易想象出大多数联合安排的可能的、限制性更小的替代方案”，而司法上对这种想象的接受可能干扰“争议中的合理目标”，且可能不会“对竞争起到多少促进作用”。

Even worse, "[r]ules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CAI 1983) (BREYER, J.). After all, even "[u]nder the best of circumstances," applying the antitrust laws "'can be difficult'" - and mistaken condemnations of legitimate business arrangements "'are especially costly, because they chill the very'" procompetitive conduct "'the antitrust laws are designed to protect."' Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 414 (2004). Indeed, static judicial decrees in ever-evolving markets may themselves facilitate collusion or frustrate entry and competition. Ibid. To know that the Sherman Act prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade is thus to know that attempts to "'[m]ete[r]' small deviations is not an appropriate antitrust function." Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N. Y. U. J. L. & Bus. 369, 377 (2016).

更糟糕的是，“力图将经济的复杂性和限定条件具体化的规则，很可能因为变化无常的监管而产生反作用，削弱其所期望达到的经济效果。”毕竟，即使“在最好的环境下”，适用反垄断法“也可能是困难的”——而对合理商业安排的错误谴责“具有极其高昂的代价，因为这种谴责扼杀了”促进竞争的行为（反垄断法旨在保护的对象）。事实上，在不断变化的市场中，静态的司法判决本身就可能会促进合谋，或者阻碍市场进入和竞争。《谢尔曼法》只禁止不合理的贸易限制，这恰恰说明，“矫正微小的偏差并非反垄断的正确用途”。

While we agree with the NCAA's legal premise, we cannot say the same for its factual one. Yes, at the first step of its inquiry, the district court held that the student-athletes had met their burden of showing the NCAA's restraints collectively bear an anticompetitive effect. And, given that, yes, at step two the NCAA had to show only that those same rules collectively yield a procompetitive benefit. The trouble for the NCAA, though, is not the level of generality. It is the fact that the district court found unpersuasive much of its proffered evidence. See D. Ct. Op., at 1070-1076, 1080-1083. Recall that the court found the NCAA failed "to establish that the challenged compensation rules ... have any direct connection to consumer demand." Id., at 1070.

虽然本院赞同NCAA提出的法律前提，但本院并不赞同其提出的事实前提。诚然，在审查的第一步中，地方法院认为，学生运动员已经完成了其举证责任，即证明NCAA的限制措施总体上产生了反竞争效果；鉴于此，在第二步，NCAA只须证明上述规则总体上促进了竞争。但是对NCAA来说，问题不在于地方法院的审查标准不一致（not the level of generality） ；问题在于，地方法院认为其提供的证据不具有说服力——法院认为NCAA未能“证明被质疑的赔偿规则……与消费者需求有任何直接联系”。

To be sure, there is a wrinkle here. While finding the NCAA had failed to establish that its rules collectively sustain consumer demand, the court did find that "some" of those rules "may" have procompetitive effects "to the extent" they prohibit compensation "unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports leagues." Id., at 1082-1083. The court then proceeded to what corresponds to the third step of the American Express framework, where it required the student-athletes "to show that there are substantially less restrictive alternative rules that would achieve the same procompetitive effect as the challenged set of rules." D. Ct. Op., at 1104. And there, of course, the district court held that the student-athletes partially succeeded - they were able to show that the NCAA could achieve the procompetitive benefits it had established with substantially less restrictive restraints on education-related benefits.

诚然，这里有一个小问题。法院认为，虽然在总体上来看，NCAA未能证明其规则能够维持消费者需求，但法院确实发现这些规则中的“部分”规则“可能”具有促进竞争的效果，“因为”其禁止了“与教育无关的”、“类似于职业体育联盟中的薪酬的”报酬。法院随后进行了相当于美国运通公司案（American Express）框架下的第三步审查，要求学生运动员“证明存在大幅降低限制性的替代规则，可以达到被质疑规则对竞争的促进效果”。对此，地方法院认为学生运动员取得了部分的成功——他们证明了NCAA可以通过大大放宽对教育相关福利的限制，来达到其现在已经实现了的竞争效果。

Even acknowledging this wrinkle, we see nothing about the district court's analysis that offends the legal principles the NCAA invokes. The court's judgment ultimately turned on the key question at the third step: whether the student-athletes could prove that "substantially less restrictive alternative rules" existed to achieve the same procompetitive benefits the NCAA had proven at the second step. Ibid. Of course, deficiencies in the NCAA's proof of procompetitive benefits at the second step influenced the analysis at the third. But that is only because, however framed and at whichever step, anticompetitive restraints of trade may wind up flunking the rule of reason to the extent the evidence shows that substantially less restrictive means exist to achieve any proven procompetitive benefits. See, e.g., 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1505, p. 428 ("To be sure, these two questions can be collapsed into one," since a "legitimate objective that is not promoted by the challenged restraint can be equally served by simply abandoning the restraint, which is surely a less restrictive alternative").

即使承认这一问题，本院也没有发现地方法院的分析有任何违反NCAA所引法律原则之处。法院的判决最终取决于第三步中的关键问题：学生运动员能否证明存在“大幅降低限制性的替代规则”（substantially less restrictive alternative rules）以实现NCAA在第二步中所证明的竞争效果。NCAA在第二步中对竞争效果的证明缺陷确实影响了第三步的分析，但这只是因为，无论采用哪个框架、处于哪个步骤，在证据表明存在大幅降低限制性的手段来实现任何已证实的竞争效果的情况下，反竞争性的贸易限制都可能无法通过合理原则的审查。

Simply put, the district court nowhere - expressly or effectively - required the NCAA to show that its rules constituted the least restrictive means of preserving consumer demand. Rather, it was only after finding the NCAA's restraints "'patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary"' to achieve the procompetitive benefits the league had demonstrated that the district court proceeded to declare a violation of the Sherman Act. D. Ct. Op., at 1104. That demanding standard hardly presages a future filled with judicial micromanagement of legitimate business decisions.

简言之，地方法院没有明示或暗示地要求NCAA证明其规则是维持消费者需求的限制性最小的手段。相反，只有在发现NCAA限制措施的“严格程度明显且无端地超出了”实现其所展现的竞争效果的“必要”时，地方法院才宣布其违反了《谢尔曼法》。地方法院严谨的裁量标准显然不构成对合理商业决策的微观司法管理。

In a related critique, the NCAA contends the district court "impermissibly redefined" its "product" by rejecting its views about what amateurism requires and replacing them with its preferred conception. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 35-36.

在一段相关的批评中，NCAA认为地方法院“毋庸置疑地重新定义”了协会的“产品”（product），因为法院没有接受协会关于业余性的需求的观点，并用法院所偏好的概念取而代之。

This argument, however, misapprehends the way a defendant's procompetitive business justification relates to the antitrust laws. Firms deserve substantial latitude to fashion agreements that serve legitimate business interests - agreements that may include efforts aimed at introducing a new product into the marketplace. Supra, at 15-19. But none of that means a party can relabel a restraint as a product feature and declare it "immune from §1 scrutiny." American Needle, 560 U. S., at 199, n. 7. In this suit, as in any, the district court had to determine whether the defendants' agreements harmed competition and whether any procompetitive benefits associated with their restraints could be achieved by "substantially less restrictive alternative" means. D. Ct. Op., at 1104.

然而，这一观点误解了被告有利于竞争的商业理由与反垄断法的关系。就达成服务于合理商业利益的协议——上述协议可能包括旨在将新产品引入市场的协议——而言，企业享有很大的自由度。但这并不意味着一方可以主张其限制措施是其产品的特征之一，并主张其“免于《谢尔曼法》第1条的审查”。在本案中，与在其他案件中一样，地方法院必须判断被告之间的协议是否损害了竞争，以及其限制措施带来的竞争效果能否通过大幅降低限制性的替代手段实现。

The NCAA's argument not only misapprehends the inquiry, it would require us to overturn the district court's factual findings. While the NCAA asks us to defer to its conception of amateurism, the district court found that the NCAA had not adopted any consistent definition. Id., at 1070. Instead, the court found, the NCAA's rules and restrictions on compensation have shifted markedly over time. Id., at 1071-1074. The court found, too, that the NCAA adopted these restrictions without any reference to "considerations of consumer demand," id., at 1100, and that some were "not necessary to preserve consumer demand," id., at 1075, 1080, 1104. None of this is product redesign; it is a straightforward application of the rule of reason.

NCAA的观点不仅误解了地方法院的审查，而且还要求本院推翻地方法院对事实的认定。虽然NCAA要求本院采用其对业余性的理解，但地方法院指出，NCAA并没有采用任何一致的定义。相反，法院发现，随着时间的推移，NCAA的规则和对报酬的限制发生了明显的变化。法院还发现，NCAA在采用上述限制时并没有“顾及消费者需求”；此外，“为了维持消费者需求，并不必须”采用部分限制。地方法院的上述论述都不是对产品的重新定义，而是对合理原则的明确适用。

Finally, the NCAA attacks as "indefensible" the lower courts' holding that substantially less restrictive alternatives exist capable of delivering the same procompetitive benefits as its current rules. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 46. The NCAA claims, too, that the district court's injunction threatens to "micromanage" its business. Id., at 50.

最后，NCAA认为，下级法院的结论“存在大幅降低限制性的替代规则，能够提供与现行规则相同的竞争效果”是“站不住脚的”。NCAA还声称，地方法院的禁止令可能构成对其业务的“微观管理”（micromanage）。

Once more, we broadly agree with the legal principles the NCAA invokes. As we have discussed, antitrust courts must give wide berth to business judgments before finding liability. See supra, at 15-19. Similar considerations apply when it comes to the remedy. Judges must be sensitive to the possibility that the "continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree" could wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Costs associated with ensuring compliance with judicial decrees may exceed efficiencies gained; the decrees themselves may unintentionally suppress procompetitive innovation and even facilitate collusion. See supra, at 26-27. Judges must be wary, too, of the temptation to specify "the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing"-cognizant that they are neither economic nor industry experts. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 408. Judges must be open to reconsideration and modification of decrees in light of changing market realities, for "what we see may vary over time." California Dental, 526 U. S., at 781. And throughout courts must have a healthy respect for the practical limits of judicial administration: "An antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer" of a detailed decree, able to keep pace with changing market dynamics alongside a busy docket. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Nor should any court "'impose a duty ... that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise."' Ibid. In short, judges make for poor "central planners" and should never aspire to the role. Id., at 408.

本院再次对NCAA援引的法律原则表示大致同意。如前所述，反垄断法院在认定责任之前必须避免作出商业判断。在救济问题上，法院也应当采取类似的做法。法官必须敏感地意识到，“对极其详细的判决的持续监督”最终可能会削弱而非加强竞争。为了执行司法判决而付出的成本可能会超过所增加的效率；判决本身可能会无意中抑制能够促进竞争的创新，甚至助长合谋。法官也必须注意抵制详细说明“适当的价格、数量和其他交易条件”的诱惑，因为他们既不是经济学专家，也不是业界专家。法官必须乐于根据不断变化的市场实际重新考虑和修改其决定，因为“我们所见的一切都可能随着时间的推移而变化”。而且，自始至终，法院都必须对司法监管的实操局限保持合理的尊重：“一个反垄断法院不可能高效地、日复一日地执行”一份详细的判决，在繁忙的诉讼程序中与不断变化的市场动态保持同步。任何法院“都不应当判处一项其无法解释，或无法充分、合理地落实的责任”。简言之，法官是糟糕的“中央规划者”（central planners），也永远不应试图扮演这一角色。

Once again, though, we think the district court honored these principles. The court enjoined only restraints on education-related benefits-such as those limiting scholarships for graduate school, payments for tutoring, and the like. The court did so, moreover, only after finding that relaxing these restrictions would not blur the distinction between college and professional sports and thus impair demand - and only after finding that this course represented a significantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of achieving the same procompetitive benefits as the NCAA's current rules. D. Ct. Op., at 1104-1105.

不过，本院认为，地方法院依然尊重了上述原则。法院只是禁止了对教育相关福利的限制——例如限制研究生院的奖学金、辅导费等。此外，法院是在发现放宽上述限制不会模糊高校体育和职业体育之间的区别、从而损害消费者需求之后，才这样做的——而且法院也是在发现上述做法代表了一种能够实现NCAA现行规则下竞争效果，且大幅（而不是略微）降低限制性的手段。

Even with respect to education-related benefits, the district court extended the NCAA considerable leeway. As we have seen, the court provided that the NCAA could develop its own definition of benefits that relate to education and seek modification of the court's injunction to reflect that definition. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 168a, ¶4. The court explained that the NCAA and its members could agree on rules regulating how conferences and schools go about providing these education-related benefits. Ibid. The court said that the NCAA and its members could continue fixing education-related cash awards, too-so long as those "limits are never lower than the limit" on awards for athletic performance. D. Ct. Op., at 1104; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 168a-169a, ¶5. And the court emphasized that its injunction applies only to the NCAA and multiconference agreements; individual conferences remain free to reimpose every single enjoined restraint tomorrow-or more restrictive ones still. Id., at 169a-170a, ¶¶6-7.

即使是对与教育相关的福利，地方法院也给予了NCAA很大的回旋余地。如我们所见，法院规定，NCAA可以自行定义与教育相关的福利，并要求法院修改禁令以反映该定义。法院进一步说明，NCAA及其成员可以商定规则，规定联盟和高校如何提供与教育相关的福利；NCAA及其成员也可以继续设定与教育相关的现金奖励的上限——只要“该上限不低于对比赛成绩的奖励上限”。此外，法院强调，其禁止令只适用于NCAA与多联盟协议；单个联盟仍然能够在其内部重新实施被禁止的限制，或在以后施加更多新的限制。

In the end, it turns out that the NCAA's complaints really boil down to three principal objections.

归根结底，NCAA的申诉可以总结为三个主要的反对意见。

First, the NCAA worries about the district court's inclusion of paid posteligibility internships among the education-related benefits it approved. The NCAA fears that schools will use internships as a way of circumventing limits on payments that student-athletes may receive for athletic performance. The NCAA even imagines that boosters might promise posteligibility internships "at a sneaker company or auto dealership" with extravagant salaries as a "thinly disguised vehicle" for paying professional-level salaries. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 37-38.

第一，NCAA对地方法院将取得资格后的带薪实习机会纳入其准许的与教育相关的福利之中感到担忧。NCAA担心高校会利用带薪实习来突破学生运动员因比赛成绩而获得的报酬的限制。NCAA甚至认为，高校代表队的赞助商可能会用提供“在运动鞋公司或汽车经销商处”的取得资格后的高薪实习机会的说辞，作为其支付职业级别薪水的行为的“简陋伪装”。

This argument rests on an overly broad reading of the injunction. The district court enjoined only restrictions on education-related compensation or benefits "that may be made available from conferences or schools." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 167a, ¶1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as the student-athletes concede, the injunction "does not stop the NCAA from continuing to prohibit compensation from" sneaker companies, auto dealerships, boosters, "or anyone else." Brief for Respondents 47-48; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33. The NCAA itself seems to understand this much. Following the district court's injunction, the organization adopted new regulations specifying that only "a conference or institution" may fund post-eligibility internships. See Decl. of M. Boyer in No. 4:14-md-02541, ECF Doc. 1302-2, p. 6 (ND Cal., Sept. 22, 2020) (NCAA Bylaw 16.3.4(d)).

这一观点对禁止令进行了过于宽泛的解读。地方法院只禁止限制“联盟或高校处提供的”与教育相关的报酬或福利。据此，如学生运动员所承认的，禁止令“并没有阻止NCAA继续禁止”来自运动鞋公司、汽车经销商、高校代表队的赞助商“或其他任何人的报酬”。NCAA似乎也明白这一点——在地方法院的禁止令发布后，协会通过了新的条例，规定只有“联盟或（成员）机构”可以资助取得资格后的实习。

Even when it comes to internships offered by conferences and schools, the district court left the NCAA considerable flexibility. The court refused to enjoin NCAA rules prohibiting its members from providing compensation or benefits unrelated to legitimate educational activities-thus leaving the league room to police phony internships. As we've observed, the district court also allowed the NCAA to propose (and enforce) rules defining what benefits do and do not relate to education. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 168a, ¶4. Accordingly, the NCAA may seek whatever limits on paid internships it thinks appropriate. And, again, the court stressed that individual conferences may restrict internships however they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6. All these features underscore the modesty of the current decree.

即使是对于联盟和高校提供的实习机会，地方法院也赋予了NCAA相当大的灵活性。法院拒绝执行NCAA禁止其成员提供与合理的教育活动无关的报酬或福利的规则，因而给协会能够审查实习的真实性留下空间。如我们所见，地方法院还允许NCAA制定（并采用）与教育相关的福利、与教育无关的福利的定义。据此，NCAA可以对带薪实习施加任何其认为合适的限制。而且，法院再次强调，单个联盟可以依其意愿对实习进行限制。所有上述特征都凸显了现有判决的谦抑性。

Second, the NCAA attacks the district court's ruling that it may fix the aggregate limit on awards schools may give for "academic or graduation" achievement no lower than its aggregate limit on parallel athletic awards (currently $5,980 per year). Id., at 168a-169a, ¶5; D. Ct. Op., at 1104. This, the NCAA asserts, "is the very definition of a professional salary." Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 48. The NCAA also represents that "[m]ost" of its currently permissible athletic awards are "for genuine individual or team achievement" and that "[m]ost ... are received by only a few student-athletes each year." Ibid. Meanwhile, the NCAA says, the district court's decree would allow a school to pay players thousands of dollars each year for minimal achievements like maintaining a passing GPA. Ibid.

第二，NCAA批评了地方法院的以下裁决：NCAA可以设定高校对“学术成就或毕业成就”的奖励总额上限，只要该上限不低于其在体育成就方面的同等上限（目前为每年5,980美元）。NCAA宣称，这“正是职业薪酬的定义”。NCAA还表示，其目前所允许的体育奖励“大部分”是真正的个人或团队成就、“大部分……每年只有少数学生运动员获得”。同时，NCAA认为，地方法院的判决将允许高校为最低级的成就（如成绩及格）而向运动员每年支付数千美元。

The basis for this critique is unclear. The NCAA does not believe that the athletic awards it presently allows are tantamount to a professional salary. And this portion of the injunction sprang directly from the district court's finding that the cap on athletic participation awards "is an amount that has been shown not to decrease consumer demand." D. Ct. Op., at 1088. Indeed, there was no evidence before the district court suggesting that corresponding academic awards would impair consumer interest in any way. Again, too, the district court's injunction affords the NCAA leeway. It leaves the NCAA free to reduce its athletic awards. And it does not ordain what criteria schools must use for their academic and graduation awards. So, once more, if the NCAA believes certain criteria are needed to ensure that academic awards are legitimately related to education, it is presently free to propose such rules-and individual conferences may adopt even stricter ones.

上述批评的依据并不明确。NCAA并不认为其目前所允许的体育奖励等同于职业薪酬。而且，这一部分的禁止令直接来源于地方法院的结论，即“体育奖励的上限已被证明不会减少消费者需求”。事实上，地方法院没有发现有证据表明相应的学术奖励会以任何方式损害消费者利益。此外，地方法院的禁止令仍给NCAA留有余地。NCAA可以自行减少其体育奖励。而且，禁止令没有规定高校必须采用什么标准来颁发学术奖励和毕业奖励。因此，如果NCAA认为需要适用某些标准，以确保学术奖励与教育具有合理的相关性，它目前仍然可以自行制定此类规则——而单个联盟也仍然可以采用更严格的规则。

Third, the NCAA contends that allowing schools to provide in-kind educational benefits will pose a problem. This relief focuses on allowing schools to offer scholarships for "graduate degrees" or "vocational school" and to pay for things like "computers" and "tutoring." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-512, at 167a-168a, ¶2. But the NCAA fears schools might exploit this authority to give student-athletes "'luxury cars' "to get to class" and "other unnecessary or inordinately valuable items" only "nominally" related to education. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20-512, at 48-49.

第三，NCAA认为，允许学校提供实物教育福利将引发一个问题。这项救济的目的在于允许高校为“研究生学位”或“职业学校”提供奖学金，并为“计算机”和“辅导”等事项付费。但NCAA担心高校可能会利用这一权力，为学生运动员提供“上课”时乘坐的“豪华汽车”，以及其他不必要或过于昂贵、仅在“表面上”与教育相关的物品。

Again, however, this over-reads the injunction in ways we have seen and need not belabor. Under the current decree, the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a student's actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing a "no Lamborghini" rule. And, again, the district court invited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules delineating which benefits it considers legitimately related to education. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful ambiguity really exists about the scope of its authority - regarding internships, academic awards, in-kind benefits, or anything else - it has been free to seek clarification from the district court since the court issued its injunction three years ago. The NCAA remains free to do so today. To date, the NCAA has sought clarification only once-about the precise amount at which it can cap academic awards-and the question was quickly resolved. Before conjuring hypothetical concerns in this Court, we believe it best for the NCAA to present any practically important question it has in district court first.

然而，这同样是对禁止令的过度解读，我们已经在之前见过了这种过度解读的方式，无需在此赘述。根据目前的判决，NCAA可以自行禁止与学生的实际教育无关的实物利益；它可以畅通无阻地执行“无兰博基尼”（no Lamborghini）的规则。而且，地方法院同样请NCAA明确规定并在之后执行判断何种福利与教育合理相关的规则。如果NCAA认为其权力范围——关于实习、学术奖励、实物福利或其他任何事项——确有重要的模糊之处，自三年前法院发布禁止令以来，它都一直可以请求地方法院澄清，今天也依然可以。但迄今为止，NCAA只要求过一次澄清——关于它可以设定的学术奖励上限的确切数额——而且，这个问题很快就解决了。在向本院提出假想的问题之前，本院认为NCAA最好先对地方法院提出任何具有重要实际意义的问题。

When it comes to fashioning an antitrust remedy, we acknowledge that caution is key. Judges must resist the temptation to require that enterprises employ the least restrictive means of achieving their legitimate business objectives. Judges must be mindful, too, of their limitations - as generalists, as lawyers, and as outsiders trying to understand intricate business relationships. Judges must remain aware that markets are often more effective than the heavy hand of judicial power when it comes to enhancing consumer welfare. And judges must be open to clarifying and reconsidering their decrees in light of changing market realities. Courts reviewing complex business arrangements should, in other words, be wary about invitations to "set sail on a sea of doubt." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (CA6 1898) (Taft, J.). But we do not believe the district court fell prey to that temptation. Its judgment does not float on a sea of doubt but stands on firm ground-an exhaustive factual record, a thoughtful legal analysis consistent with established antitrust principles, and a healthy dose of judicial humility.

就采取反垄断救济措施而言，本院承认，谨慎是关键。法官必须抵制要求企业采用限制性最小的手段来实现其合理商业目标的诱惑。法官也必须警惕其自身——作为通才，作为律师，作为试图了解复杂商业关系的门外汉——的局限性。法官必须意识到，就提高消费者福利而言，市场往往比司法权力的高压措施更为有效。而且，法官必须乐于澄清和重新考虑其判决，以适应不断变化的市场实际。换言之，在审查复杂的商业安排时，法院应当对“在怀疑之海上启航”（set sail on a sea of doubt） 的诱惑保持警惕。但本院认为，地方法院并没有屈服于这种诱惑。它的判决没有漂浮在怀疑之海上，而是站在坚实的基础上——详尽的事实记录、符合既有反垄断原则的严密法律分析，以及适度的司法谦抑。

原文链接：https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.usreports/uss2000512&div=2&start_page=1&collection=usreports&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults

注：出于阅读效果的考虑，译文没有对判决原文中的引注信息进行翻译。判决原文对引注信息的标注方式是直接在文中标明，位于每一引用句的下一句。