法律翻译｜金斯伯格大法官和扩大“我们人民”一词中的司法角色

译者|RBG选译小组

审稿|Jessie PKU硕士

编辑|玦珮 范德堡大学 LL.M.

责编|王冰子 烟台大学

Author(s): Samuel R. Bagenstos

This Symposium is dedicated to an assessment of Justice Ginsburg's contributions to Supreme Court jurisprudence—and I will turn to that approved topic in a minute. But I cannot resist starting on a more personal note. I had the honor of clerking for Justice Ginsburg in the Supreme Court's 1997 Term. During my year with her, the Justice taught and inspired me in many ways. Her exacting standards of legal craft have offered an example that I hope to live up to in my own professional life. And her warm heart一the way she makes all of her law clerks feel like members of her extended family—has given me a relationship I truly cherish.

本专题报告致力于评价金斯伯格大法官（Justice Ginsburg）对美国联邦最高法院法律体系所作出的贡献。但在我们正式讨论这个话题之前，我想先谈一个更私人的话题。我曾有幸于1997年在联邦最高法院担任金斯伯格大法官的法官助理。在我与她共事的一年中，她在许多方面教导和启发了我。她对法律技艺的严格标准为我树立了一个榜样，我希望能在自己的职业生涯中为之努力。同时，她为人热心，让法官助理们感到仿佛生活在一个大家庭中，也让我收获了一段宝贵的人际关系。

I could go on. But I fear that the Justice—never one to brook irrelevancies or extraneous matter in her own writing—will have me removed unless I get back on topic. I will focus on an area in which Justice Ginsburg's Supreme Court opinions have contributed to our historic expansion of the reach of those first three words in the Constitution—“We the People.” My particular aim is to show how Justice Ginsburg's opinions have, more than those of any other Justice, reflected the principles of the disability rights movement.2 My focus may be surprising, for the disability rights cause is not one with which Justice Ginsburg is usually associated in the public eye—or even in the legal academy. It may surprise many even in this room to hear that many activists consider her opinion for the Court in Olmstead w. L.C. to be the so-called Broun u. Board of Education of the disability rights movement. I am quite certain that the Justice is too modest to accept the Broun W. Board tag for her Olmstead opinion. But I hope to show in these brief remarks that the Justice's contributions to the legal acceptance of the disability rights movement promise to aid significantly in the achievement of equal citizenship for people with disabilities in this country.

关于我与她的私交，我想说的还有很多，但我担心她看到后会把这些删掉，除非我赶快回归正题——毕竟她从不会写一些无关紧要或繁冗多余的事情。因此，接下来我将重点讨论这个领域——金斯伯格大法官的联邦最高法院意见对历史性地扩大宪法开篇“我们人民”（We the People）一词的解释所作出的贡献。我将特别说明金斯伯格大法官的意见如何比任何其他大法官的意见更充分地反映了残疾人权利运动的原则。这可能是令人惊讶的，因为金斯伯格大法官通常不会在公众面前，甚至包括在法律学术界眼中，与残疾人权利事业联系在一起。甚至在座的许多人都可能会惊讶地听到，许多社会活动家认为她在奥姆斯特德案[Olmstead v. L.C.]中的法庭意见是残疾人权利运动中的“布朗诉教育委员会案”[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka]。（译注：该案推翻了“隔离但平等”原则，任何法律上的种族隔离此后都可能因违反宪法所保障的平等保护原则而被判违宪，美国的民权运动也因为该案的判决迈进了一大步）。我很确定这位谦虚的大法官不愿意被贴上这样的标签，不过我希望在这些简短的评论中表明，她对残疾人权利运动的法律地位所作的贡献，有望极大地帮助残疾人群体在这个国家实现平等的公民权。

My remarks have three parts. I will first briefly discuss the basic goals of the disability rights movement. Then I will illustrate the ways in which Justice Ginsburg's opinions—in Olmstead and elsewhere—are notably responsive to and reflective of those goals. Finally, - will discuss the Olmstead opinion as a model of a particular approach to achieving social change through litigation. Before assuming her current position, Justice Ginsburg urged that courts could not make broad-scale social change alone but must do so in dialogue with more representative, participatory institutions of government. Olmstead, I shall argue, is both a perfect example of this kind of dialogic judicial action and evidence for its effectiveness in achieving the goals of social-change-oriented litigators.

这篇评论文章包括三个部分。首先，我将简要讨论残疾人权利运动的基本目标；然后，我将说明金斯伯格大法官在奥姆斯特德案和其他案件中的意见是如何重点回应并反映这些目标的；最后，我将以奥姆斯特德案的法庭意见为范例，讨论通过诉讼实现社会变革的特殊进路。在担任现职前，金斯伯格大法官曾提出，法院不能独自进行大规模的社会变革，而必须在与更具代表性、参与性的政府机构的对话中实现社会变革。我将论证，奥姆斯特德案既是这种对话式司法变革的完美范例，也证明了其在实现社会变革型诉讼者的目标时的有效性。

I. DISABILITY RIGHTS AS EXPANDING 

“WE THE PEOPLE” 

I. 残疾人权利：拓展“我们人民”一词的含义

The modern disability rights movement arose in the United States in the early 1970s, as individuals with disabilities increasingly sought to reorient society's responses to disability. Historically, our society had seen individuals with disabilities as objects of pity or charity, or as people who “inspire” those without disabilities by "overcoming” the hardships imposed by fate. On many occasions, these patronizing attitudes were accompanied by virulent animus. But even when well-intentioned, the attitudes of pity, charity, and inspiration treated people with disabilities as fundamentally separate from the “We the People"” who make up our civic community. At best (as when individuals with disabilities were seen as inspirations), these attitudes placed people with disabilities on a pedestal that is in fact a cage. Far more often, these attitudes labeled people with disabilities as straightforwardly lesser persons—-people who must be cared for because they cannot, or cannot be expected to, care for themselves. The result was the exclusion of people with disabilities from the community through such devices as institutionalization, denial of education, and refusal to permit participation in core civic activities.

20世纪70年代初，随着残疾人日益寻求改变社会对残疾的态度，现代残疾人权利运动在美国兴起。以前，社会大众将残疾人视为怜悯或慈善的对象，或视其为一个通过“克服”命运强加的困难而“激励”非残疾人的群体。在许多情况下，这些傲慢的态度伴随着恶毒的敌意。但即使是出于善意，怜悯、慈善和激励的态度也将残疾人与构成公民社会的“我们人民”从根本上分离。即使出发点是好的（如当残疾人被视为激励者时），这些态度仍会将残疾人困于囚笼之中。更多的时候，这些态度给残疾人直接贴上了低人一等的标签——由于他们不能或不能被期望照顾自己，因此只能接受别人的照顾。其结果就是通过安置机构、拒绝给予其教育和拒绝其参与核心公民活动等手段将残疾人排除在普通公众之外。

Inspired in part by the African American civil rights movement of the 1960s as well as the emerging women's movement, and with their ranks augmented by highly politicized veterans returning from Vietnam with disabilities, the disability rights movement sought to change that state of affairs. Through protests, lobbying, and litigation, the disability rights movement sought to entrench a new view of disability and the proper government responses to it. In the view of disability rights activists, disability was neither a personal tragedy nor source of inspiration for the nondisabled; disability was a minority-group status imposed by a society that was not accessible to individuals with physical or mental impairments that deviated too far from the “norm.” It followed that society's proper response to disability was not pity or charity; the proper response was civil rights legislation that would require the full array of public and private institutions to accommodate physical and mental difference and therefore integrate people with disabilities into the mainstream of public, civic, and economic life.

1960年代，受到美国非裔民权运动和新兴妇女运动的启发，再加上从越南回来的高度政治化的残疾老兵使他们的队伍壮大，残疾人权利运动开始试图改变这种状态。通过抗议、游说和诉讼，残疾人权利运动试图重塑并不断巩固对残疾的看法，并要求政府作出适当回应。在残疾人权利活动家看来，残疾既不是个人的悲剧，也不应是非残疾人“精神力量”的来源；残疾是一个社会强加的少数群体地位——这个社会不允许有身体或精神损伤的个人偏离“标准”。因此，社会对残疾的正确反应不是怜悯或慈善；正确的反应是民权立法，要求所有的公共和私人机构充分考虑身体和精神的差异，从而使残疾人融入公共、公民和经济生活的主流。

The disability rights movement's finest legislative achievement has been the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). By extending antidiscrimination protection to employment, access to retail goods and services, and all government activities -- and by defining discrimination as including the failure to provide “reasonable accommodation” -- that statute sought to achieve a significant portion of the disability rights movement's goal of opening up all sectors of society to people with disabilities.

残疾人权利运动中最出色的立法成果就是1990年通过的《美国残疾人法案》(Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA)。通过将反歧视保护扩大到就业、获得零售商品和服务以及所有的政府活动中，并将“歧视”定义为包括未能提供“合理便利”，该法规试图实现残疾人权利运动中让残疾人融入所有社会部门这一重要目标。

II. JUSTICE GINSBURG AND DISABILITY RIGHTS

II. 金斯伯格大法官与残疾人权利

In some ways, the signing of the ADA in 1990 was a high point for the disability rights movement. Over a decade's worth of litigation under the statute has not been a pleasant experience for disability rights plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has done its part by issuing a series of decisions that many disability rights activists believe have unduly narrowed the statute—and indeed, the Court has even called into question the constitutionality of applying the statute to government operations. Here I must acknowledge that Justice Ginsburg has joined some (though not all) of the decisions that have drawn fire from disability rights activists. But a reading of Justice Ginsburg's ADA opinions-even in cases in which she has endorsed results that most activists criticize—reveals a person who, in a way unmatched by her colleagues, understands that disability rights laws represent another important historic step in the expansion of "We the People.”

在某些方面，1990年《残疾人法案》的签署可以说是残疾人权利运动的高潮。（但是）该法规颁布十多年来，相关诉讼的结果似乎并不有利于主张残疾人权利的原告。联邦最高法院依法裁定了一系列案件，但是许多残疾人权利活动家认为这些判决结果过分缩小了法规的适用范围，事实上，法院甚至对法规适用于政府运作的合宪性提出了质疑。在此我必须承认，金斯伯格大法官参与了一些裁决（虽然不是全部），它们遭到了残疾人权利活动家的抨击。但是，通过阅读金斯伯格大法官撰写的相关裁判意见——即使是那些遭到大多数活动家批评的同意意见——可以看出，她以一种她的同事无法比拟的方式将残疾人权利法理解为“我们人民”概念扩张的另一个重要历史步骤。

One important set of cases involves the crucial definitional question:

What is a “disability"? This question is central because only those with disabilities have a right to nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation under the ADA. In a series of cases, the Court has adopted a generally narrow view of the scope of the class protected by the statute. Although Justice Ginsburg has joined the majority in all of these cases, her separate opinions show a position that is far more consonant with the basic principles of the disability rights movement than are the positions of the majority opinions—or even the occasional dissents.

一组重要的案件涉及关键的定义问题：

什么是“残疾”？这个问题很重要，因为根据《残疾人法案》，只有残疾人才有权享受不受歧视的、合理的便利。在一系列案件中，法院对法规所保护的范围普遍采取了更为狭隘的观点。尽管金斯伯格法官在所有这些案件中都加入了多数意见，但她的单独意见显示，她的立场远比多数意见——甚至偶尔的反对意见——的立场更符合残疾人权利运动的基本原则。

Justice Ginsburg first showed her embrace of disability rights principles in Bragdon v. Abbott — the only case so far in which the Court has held that a plaintiff did have a disability for purposes of the ADA. The question before the Court was whether asymptomatic HIV infection fit the statutory definition of "disability" —that is, whether that condition either was a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of the plaintiff or was “regarded as” SO limiting. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, concluded that the plaintiff's condition readily satisfied the statutory “disability” definition. But the majority's focus on the inherent physical limitations imposed by HIV infection fit poorly with the disability rights movement's core tenet that disability, far from being inherent in the person with disability, results from the interaction between a person with a particular Condition and a hostile or inaccessible world.

金斯伯格大法官在布拉格顿诉阿伯特案[Bragdon v. Abbott]中首次表明了她对残疾人权利原则的拥护——该案是迄今为止唯一一起法院认为原告确实符合《残疾人法案》所描述的残疾情况的案件。法院面临的问题是，无症状的艾滋病毒感染是否符合“残疾”的法定定义——也就是说，这种情况是否是“实质性地限制了原告的一项或多项主要生活活动的身体或精神损伤”，或者“可以被视作施加了如此严重的限制”。肯尼迪大法官的多数意见认为，原告的情况满足法定的“残疾”定义。但多数意见对艾滋病导致的固有身体限制的关注，与残疾人权利运动的核心宗旨不符，即“残疾”远不是残疾人的一种固有属性，而是由具有特定状况的人与一个对他们充满敌意或令他们难以融入的世界之间的互动造成的。

Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion, by contrast, focused directly on an issue that is of major concern to disability rights activists: the way that society, by its reactions to specific impairments, makes those impairments disabling. She argued that HIV infection “has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself.” And she noted that the disease affected not only “the need for” but also “the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of others to the impairment.” Where the majority urged that individuals with asymptomatic HIV are entitled to protection because of the inherent physical limitations imposed by that condition—a posture reminiscent of the old pity/charity view—Justice Ginsburg argued, in the vein of the disability rights movement, that people with that condition were entitled to protection because society limits their opportunities.

相比之下，金斯伯格大法官的同意意见直接聚焦于一个残疾人权利活动家主要关注的问题上，即社会如何通过对特定身体损伤作出反应而使这些损伤被定义为“残疾”。她认为，艾滋病“被视作一种对生命本身造成限制的疾病”。她指出，这种疾病不仅影响患者“对医疗保健资源的需要”，还会因为其他人对这种损害的反应而影响其“获得医疗保健资源的能力”。当大多数人认为无症状的艾滋病患者因遭受疾病本身导致的身体限制而有权得到保护——这让人想起了古老的同情或慈善观点——金斯伯格大法官却从残疾人权利运动的角度提出，患有这种疾病的人之所以有权得到保护，是因为社会对他们所能获得的机会施加了限制。

A second definition-of-disability case—Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.—presents a more complicated picture. There, the Court held that the disability analysis must take account of any measures, such as medications or prosthetics, the plaintiff takes to mitigate the effects of his or her impairment; if those mitigating measures render insubstantial any limitations otherwise imposed by the impairment, the plaintiff will have no disability under the “substantially limits” prong of the statutory definition. The Court applied that rule to hold that twin sisters with myopia had no ADA disability. Although their uncorrected vision satisfied criteria for legal blindness, they could achieve 20/20 vision simply by putting on glasses. Accordingly, they could not maintain a suit against the airline that refused, because of their eyesight, to hire them as global pilots.

第二个对“残疾”进行定义的案例——萨顿诉联合航空公司案[Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.]——展现了一个更为复杂的情况。在该案中，法院认为对残疾情况的分析必须将原告采取的一切用于减轻其机体损伤带来的影响的措施考虑在内，如药物或假肢；如果这些措施使身体损伤造成的限制变得微不足道，那么根据法规所定义的“实质性限制”，原告就不属于“残疾”。法院应用这一规则，认为患有近视的双胞胎姐妹并不属于《残疾人法案》规定的残疾情况。虽然她们的未矫正视力符合法定的失明标准，但她们只要戴上眼镜就能达到20/20的视力。因此，她们不能因航空公司以视力为由拒绝雇用她们作为环球飞行员而对其提起诉讼。

The Sutton opinion—which Justice Ginsburg joined—has been much criticized by disability rights advocates. Critics allege that the Court sought to limit the statute's protections to an unduly narrow class of individuals. And indeed, the Court's discussion, like that of the majority in Bragdon, does appear to treat disability as a physical limitation that is inherent in a person with a given impairment. But Justice Ginsburg again filed a separate concurrence that was far more in tune with disability rights principles. Focusing, as she had in Bragdon, on the goals she attributed to Congress, the Justice placed the decision to take account of mitigating measures on a solid disability rights footing:

萨顿案的法庭意见（金斯伯格大法官参与）受到了残疾人权利活动人士的大量批评。批评者称，法院试图将法规的保护范围限制在不适当的、狭隘的个人层面。事实上，法院的讨论的确与布拉格登案中的多数意见一样，似乎将残疾视为遭受特定类型损伤的人所固有的身体限制。但金斯伯格大法官又提交了一份单独的同意意见，该份意见中的观点与残疾人权利运动的原则更为契合。正如她在布拉格登案中所关注的那样，她聚焦于国会的立法目标，在尊重残疾人权利的坚实基础上将各种缓解身体损伤的措施考虑在内。（她提到：）

[P]ersons whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for their well-being, can be found in every social and economic class; they do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as historical victims of discrimination. In short, in no sensible way can one rank the large numbers of diverse individuals with corrected disabilities as a “discrete and insular minority.”

未矫正视力较差的人、依靠日常药物治疗的人在每个社会和经济阶层都可以找到，而并非只出现在政治上无权无势的人中，也并非全都是历史性歧视的受害者。简而言之，我们不应以任何方式将大量不同的矫正残疾者理解为“零散的、孤立的少数群体”。

Although rendered in support of a result that disappointed many activists, that passage represents a powerful embrace of the disability rights movement's notion that disability is a minority-group status rather than a physical condition.

虽然这段话支持的是一个令许多活动人士失望的结果，但它代表了对残疾人权利运动所提出主张的有力支持，即残疾是社会少数群体所处的一种状态，而不只是一种身体状况。

Indeed, even Justice Stevens's Sutton dissent—which defended the result most activists urged—invoked the very stereotype of inspirational overcoming that so offends the disability rights movement. Referring to what he called the “courageous determination” of those who have lost limbs but nonetheless “can perform all of their major life activities just as efficiently as an average couch potato,” Justice Stevens argued that those courageous individuals should be entitled to invoke the ADA's protection. Where Justice Stevens sought to activate charitable impulses that the nondisabled have toward people with disabilities—generous impulses, to be sure—it was Justice Ginsburg who again embraced the disability rights movement's notion that civil rights legislation is necessary to protect a class of people labeled “disabled” by society's attitudes and practices.

事实上，即使是史蒂文斯大法官（Justice Stevens）在萨顿案中撰写的反对意见——它为大多数活动人士所支持的结果辩护——也激起了一种刻板印象，这种印象是对残疾人权利运动的一种严重的冒犯。史蒂文斯大法官提到,那些失去四肢但“仍能像普通人一样正常地进行基本日常生活”的人们有着“勇毅的决心”，并认为这些勇敢的人们应该有权援引《残疾人法案》为自己提供保护。史蒂文斯大法官试图激发健全人对残疾人的仁爱心理——一种出于慷慨的情感，而金斯伯格大法官则再次诉诸残疾人权利运动提出的主张，即为了保护因社会的态度和做法而被称为“残疾人”的群体而进行民权立法是有必要的。

But it is Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Olmstead that most fully embraces the expansionist “We the People” goals of the disability rights movement. Olmstead held that unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities was in many circumstances a form of “discrimination” prohibited by Title II of the ADA. There are at least two reasons why many disability rights activists consider Olmstead to be their Brown v. Board of Education. First, the direct holding of the case squarely attacked a practice that the disability rights movement had long mobilized against: the isolation of individuals with disabilities in congregate institutions separate from the community at large. To disability rights activists, that practice of segregation bore a striking resemblance to the Jim Crow practices attacked by the African American civil rights movement.

但是，金斯伯格大法官在奥姆斯特德案中的意见，才最充分地体现了残疾人权利运动中“我们人民”的扩张主义目标。奥姆斯特德案认为，在许多情况下，对残疾人进行不必要的机构安置是《残疾人法案》第二章所禁止的一种“歧视”形式。至少有两个原因使许多残疾人权利活动家认为奥姆斯特德一案将成为残疾人权利问题上的“布朗诉教育委员会案”。首先，该案的直接裁决直截了当地驳斥了残疾人权利运动长期以来所反对的一种做法：将残疾人隔离在与社区分开的集中机构中。对残疾人权利活动家来说，这种隔离的做法与美国黑人民权运动所攻击的吉姆·克罗黑人隔离法（Jim Crow Laws）有着惊人的相似之处。

Second-and perhaps more important-the Olmstead opinion marked the Court's most expansive endorsement of the disability rights movement's broad conception of discrimination and of its goal of integrating people with disabilities throughout the fabric of community life. The state had argued that its failure to provide community residential placements for people with disabilities could not constitute "discrimination," because the state did not provide such community placements for individuals without disabilities. But Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, was "satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA." The Justice gave two basic reasons for that conclusion, both of which invoke core principles articulated by the disability rights movement: "First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life." And "[s]econd, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment." Given the Court's expansive definition of discrimination, and Justice Ginsburg's extensive articulation of the disability rights principles behind that definition, the Olmstead opinion will likely have an effect far beyond the deinstitutionalization context. Whether or not Justice Ginsburg herself is too modest to acknowledge it, disability rights activists have ample reason to call Olmstead their Brown v. Board of Education-atag that perfectly suits an opinion written by the Justice often called "the Thurgood Marshall of the women's rights movement."

其次，或许也是更为重要的一点，奥姆斯特德案的判决标志着法院对残疾人权利运动提出的广义“歧视”概念的采纳，及其对使残疾人融入社区生活这一目标的支持。该州辩称它没有为残疾人提供社区住宅并不构成“歧视”，因为州政府没有为非残疾个人提供这种社区安置。但金斯伯格大法官在为法院撰写判决书时，“对国会关于《美国残疾人法案》中提出的歧视概念有一个更全面的看法感到满意”。她为这一结论给出了两个基本理由，这两个理由都援引了残疾人权利运动所阐述的核心原则。“首先，将能够应对并受益于社区环境的人安置在（特定的）机构中，会永久化他们没有能力或配不上参与社区生活的无端假设……其次，机构的限制严重干扰了个人的日常生活，包括家庭关系、社会交往、工作选择、经济独立、教育进步和文化生活的多样”。鉴于法院对“歧视”的宽泛定义，以及金斯伯格大法官对该定义背后体现的残疾人权利原则作出的广义阐述，奥姆斯特德案的影响可能会远远超出“去机构化”的范畴。无论金斯伯格大法官本人是否过于谦虚而不承认这一点，残疾人权利活动家们有充分的理由将奥姆斯特德案称为他们的“布朗诉教育委员会案”——这一称号完全适合这位经常被称为“妇女权利运动的瑟古德·马歇尔（Thurgood Marshall）”的大法官所撰写的意见。

III. OLMSTEAD AS A MODEL OF SOCIAL CHANGE LITIGATION

III. 作为社会变革型诉讼案件的奥姆斯特德案

It should hardly be surprising that Justice Ginsburg is the Justice to have most fully embraced the principles of the disability rights movement. Not only is she one of only two sitting Justices who spent a significant portion of their pre-judicial work as civil rights lawyers. But more important, the critique of paternalism that lies at the core of disability rights thinking has much in common with-and was surely influenced by-the women's movement's own attack on paternalistic practices that limited women's opportunities, an attack exemplified by then-Professor Ginsburg's litigation agenda throughout the 1970s.

金斯伯格大法官是最支持残疾人权利运动原则的大法官，这一点并不令人惊讶。一方面，她是时任大法官中仅有的两位拥有民权律师经验的大法官之一；更重要的是，作为残疾人权利思想核心的对家长制的批判，与妇女运动对限制妇女机会的家长制做法的攻击有很多共同点，并且在一定程度上受到了妇女运动的影响——而时任大学教授的金斯伯格在整个1970年代的诉讼案件正是这一社会影响的重要例证。

But Justice Ginsburg's disability rights jurisprudence-and particularly her opinion in Olmstead-seems to draw yet a broader lesson from the Justice's experience as a women's rights litigator. Olmstead is an exemplar of a particular approach to achieving social change through litigation-an approach the Justice followed in the cases she litigated, and one she has urged since becoming a judge. In her Madison lecture, delivered before her elevation to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg argued that the courts have an important role to play in producing social change, but that they should do so by "[m]easured motions." Courts must recognize, the Justice contended, that "they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as well." In her view, courts operate best when, instead of "remov[ing] the ball from the legislators' court," they "open[] a dialogue with the political branches of government." When they do, "without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain," courts "can reinforce or signal a green light for a social change."

但是，金斯伯格大法官参与的残疾人权利案件——特别是她在奥姆斯特德案中的意见，似乎表明她从自己担任妇女权利律师的经验中汲取了更广泛的教训。奥姆斯特德案是通过诉讼实现社会变革这一特殊方法的典范——这是金斯伯格在她的律师生涯中遵循的方法，也是她成为大法官后一直倡导的方法。金斯伯格在成为联邦最高法院大法官之前发表的麦迪逊演讲（Madison lecture）中认为，法院在产生社会变革方面可以发挥重要作用，但它们应该通过“有条件的动议”来实现。她认为，法院必须认识到，“他们参与了与其他政府机构以及人民的对话”。她认为，当法院不是“将决策权从立法者的议事堂上拿走”，而是“与政府的政治部门展开对话”时，法院的运作效果是最好的。当他们“没有冒着无法遏制的强烈反弹的风险采取较大的行动时”，法院“可以强化或发出允许社会变革的信号”。

To illustrate the point, the Justice contrasted the Supreme Court's gradual recognition of constitutional rights against gender discrimination with the Court's sudden, maximalist recognition of a constitutional right to choose abortion in Roe v. Wade. In the gender discrimination cases, the Court issued a series of decisions that repeatedly instructed Congress and state legislatures to "rethink ancient positions on these questions." Although the Court "wrote modestly" and "put forward no grand philosophy," it nonetheless cemented a major change in gender relations and the social status of women. In Justice Ginsburg's words, "by requiring legislative reexamination of once customary sex-based classifications, the Court helped to ensure that laws and regulations would ' catch up with a changed world.'" In Roe, by contrast, the Court seemed to jump ahead of a political process that was already liberalizing abortion law and to have done so in a way that mobilized a fervent backlash.

为了说明这一点，金斯伯格大法官将联邦最高法院逐步承认反对性别歧视的宪法权利与在罗伊诉韦德案[Roe v. Wade]中突然地承认宪法对最广义堕胎权的允许进行了对比。在性别歧视案件中，法院发布了一系列决定，反复要求国会和州立法机构“重新思考这些问题上的古老立场”。尽管法院意见“写得很温和”，也“没有提出宏大的哲学性观点”，但它还是巩固了性别关系和妇女社会地位的重大变化。用金斯伯格大法官的话说，“通过要求立法机构重新审查已经习惯的性别划分，法院帮助确保法律和法规将‘跟上一个变化的世界’。”相比之下，在罗伊案中，法院似乎采取了一种激起强烈反对的做法而走到了一个正在放开堕胎法的政治进程的前面。

Justice Ginsburg’s argument in her Madison lecture aroused more than its share of controversy. But what I want to focus on is not the merits of the contrast between Roe and the gender discrimination cases but the way in which Olmstead is a remarkable example of the Justice following her own advice. If there was ever an area of social change litigation in which a gradual, dialogic approach might seem appealing, it would be deinstitutionalization litigation. Efforts in the 1970s to move individuals with mental illness out of state hospitals through such litigation resulted in a dramatic decrease in the size of such institutions. But the number of people with mental illness who were homeless or incarcerated rose substantially. Whether this result occurred because of the lack of political commitment to fund adequate community mental health services (as deinstitutionalization advocates would contend) or because many people in fact need to be institutionalized (as deinstitutionalization opponents would contend), the ultimate consequences of the 1970s wave of deinstitutionalization litigation were widely regarded as problematic.

金斯伯格大法官在麦迪逊演讲中的论点所引发的争议超过了该演讲本身所提及的问题。但我想关注的不是罗伊案在与其他性别歧视案件的对比中所展示出的价值，而是奥姆斯特德案中大法官遵循其本意做出裁判的典型做法。如果说在社会变革型诉讼中的某一领域中，渐进的、对话的方式似乎很有吸引力，那这一领域就是去机构化诉讼（deinstitutionalization litigation）。20世纪70年代，由于（许多人致力于）通过此类诉讼将精神病患者迁出州立医院，此类机构的规模大幅减少。但是，无家可归或被监禁的精神病患者的人数大幅上升。无论造成这种结果的原因是缺乏为合乎需要的社区心理健康服务提供资金的政治承诺（正如去机构化倡导者所主张的），还是许多人事实上需要被机构收容（正如去机构化反对者所主张的），人们普遍认为七十年代去机构化诉讼浪潮的最终结果问题重重。

As a New Yorker, longtime resident of the city in which the homelessness problem made the critique of deinstitutionalization particularly acute, Justice Ginsburg was surely mindful that a too-sudden move in Olmstead could backfire. And the facts of Olmstead itself-in which the state had previously tried to deinstitutionalize one of the plaintiffs by placing her in a homeless shelter-made the point ever so much more salient. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion responded to these concerns by placing a series of qualifications on the core holding that unnecessary institutionalization is a form of prohibited discrimination. First, the right to deinstitutionalization extends only to those who can “handle or benefit” from it, and “the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals” in answering that question. And even in cases where a state’s treating professionals believe deinstitutionalization to be the proper course, the state may still assert a “fundamental-alteration defense” in the interest of "maintain[ingl a range of facilities” and “administer[ingl services with an even hand.” Justice Ginsburg elaborated, in a portion of her opinion that spoke for only a plurality: “If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, ” the state would satisfy its obligations.

在纽约，无家可归者问题极为严重，这也导致了人们对去机构化的尖锐批评。作为一个纽约人，金斯伯格大法官肯定注意到，在奥姆斯特德案中，过于突然的举动可能会适得其反。奥姆斯特德案的相关事实（州政府之前曾试图通过将一名原告安置在无家可归者收容所而使其离开机构）使得这一点更加突出。金斯伯格大法官通过对“非必要的机构收容是一种被禁止的歧视”（unnecessary institutionalization is a form of prohibited discrimination）这一核心观点作出一系列的限定以对相关的顾虑作出回应。首先，去机构化的权利只适用于那些能够“应对或受益于”它的人，而在回答这一问题时，“州可以依靠州内专业人士的合理评估”。即使在州治疗专家认为去机构化是正确的做法时，该州仍然可以为了“维持一系列设施”和“以公平的方式管理服务业”而主张“实质变更抗辩（fundamental-alteration defense）”。金斯伯格大法官在其意见中的一部分阐述了这一点（其意见支持多数意见），“例如，若州能展示一个全面、有效的计划，将精神障碍者安置于一个限制较少的环境中，并且有一个人数以合理速度变化、且在州未有意施加控制的情况下能够保持人员数量的等候名单”，那么州就可以被视为履行了义务。

One might regard these qualifications as improperly diluting the right to integration that was at stake in Olmstead. But it is possible to see them, instead, as a recognition of the limited capacity of courts to shoulder the burden of significant social change on their own. Where efforts at swift, judicially imposed deinstitutionalization in the 1970s created a political, professional, and ultimately judicial backlash, Justice Ginsburg’s measured approach offers two reasons for hope that such a negative reaction can be avoided. First, by crediting the decisions of states’ treating professionals, the Justice’s opinion enlisted a group of people who, by disciplinary training and inclination, are often supportive of less institutionalized settings but who would object to having courts dictate professional decisions to them. Second, by emphasizing the liability-avoiding power of “a comprehensive, effectively working plan” for deinstitutionalization, Justice Ginsburg-just like the Court in the gender discrimination cases-urged state legislatures to “rethink ancient positions on these questions” without removing the ball from their court.

人们可能会认为这些限定条件不适当地稀释了奥姆斯特德案中所涉及的“融入权”（the right to integration）。但是，我们也可以把这些限定条件视为对法院在独立承担重大社会变革重任方面能力有限的承认。20世纪70年代通过司法手段迅速实现去机构化的努力导致了在政治上、从业者上，以及最终司法上的反弹，而金斯伯格大法官的谨慎做法为人们期待这一做法能够避免上述负面影响提供了两个理由。首先，金斯伯格大法官的意见通过对专业人士的意见给予充分的信任而争取到了一群基于其学科训练和主观倾向通常支持较低机构化程度、但反对法院对其下达有关其专业的指令的支持者；第二，通过强调制定“全面、有效的计划”能使当局在去机构化问题上免责，（正如法院在性别歧视案件中的立场，）金斯伯格大法官敦促各州立法机构“重新思考在这些问题上的古老立场”，而不是推卸责任。

In Olmstead the Court opened up a dialogue with state legislatures about whether and how to achieve the disability rights movement's goal of moving people with disabilities out of institutions and into the community. Although progress has not been as swift as many would like-and the recent set of state budget crises has further slowed implementation—the political branches have responded to the Oustead decision in precisely the way Justice Ginsburg's Madison lecture suggests they would. Moved by the plurality opinion's emphasis on ‘a comprehensive, effectively working plan,” forty-two states have created state-level task forces, committees, or working groups to assess their current institutionalization regimes and, typically, to draft such plans. The federal government has responded with guidance about the proper content of an effective statewide deinstitutionalization plan, as well as money and technical assistance to help states implement such plans. Although the responses of many states leave much to be desired, most states have made steady, if slow, progress towards deinstitutionalization in response to Olmstead's mandate.

在奥姆斯特德案中，联邦最高法院开启了与各州立法机构的对话，讨论是否以及如何实现残疾人权利运动的目标——让残疾人走出机构，走入社区。尽管实现这一目标的进展并不像许多人所希望的那般迅速，最近的一系列州预算危机更是进一步减缓了落实的速度，但政府部门对奥姆斯特德案判决的反应与金斯伯格大法官在麦迪逊演讲中所作的推测完全一致。在多数意见所强调的“全面、有效的计划”的推动下，42个州建立了州级工作组或委员会，以评估其目前的机构化体系，通常还一并起草上述“计划”。联邦政府已作出回应，就有效的全州去机构化计划（deinstitutionalization plan）的适当内容提供指导，并提供资金和技术援助以帮助各州实施此类计划。尽管许多州的响应还有待改进，但大多数州在响应奥姆斯特德案所要求的去机构化的任务中已经取得了稳固的进展（尽管可能是缓慢的）。

In short, Justice Ginsburg's Olmstead opinion is important for more than just its contribution to the disability rights movement. It is important because it stands as a major and apparently positive example of the very approach to social change litigation that the Justice herself urged in her Madison lecture.

简而言之，金斯伯格大法官在奥姆斯特德案中所发表的意见之所以重要，不仅仅在于其对残疾人权利运动所作的贡献，还因为这是大法官本人在麦迪逊演讲中所力推的以诉讼推进社会变革的一个主要且明显是正面的案例。

Justice Ginsburg's disability rights jurisprudence offers a concrete example of the Justice's deep commitment to expanding the constitutional notion of “We the People.” Justice Ginsburg's opinions in this area demonstrate how such a commitment can be realized with the highest standards of legal craft and a modest conception of the judicial role. They provide a promising model for social change litigation in the twenty-first Century.

金斯伯格大法官对残疾人权利案件作出的裁判具体体现了她对扩张“我们人民”这一宪法概念的坚定承诺。她在这一领域的意见表明了如何能够通过高超的法律技艺和对司法角色的谦抑理解来实现这一承诺。这些意见为21世纪的社会变革型诉讼提供了光明的前景。

【译者】