法律翻译｜外国专家：针对波兰的武力攻击未违反国际法律

作者 | Marko Milanovic

译者 | 司徒沛宏 纽约大学LL.M.

审稿 | Ellen Chen Cornell LL.M.

      李梓源 英国布里斯托大学 LL.M.

排版 | 陈远航 美国西北大学LL.M.

责编 | 王冰子 烟台大学本科

As Far As We Know, There Has Been No Armed Attack Against Poland

据我们所知，没有发生针对波兰的武力攻击

Written by Marko Milanovic

昨日，一枚导弹击中了靠近乌克兰边境的一个波兰村庄，该事件立刻触发了对局势升级以及北约国家直接介入俄乌武装冲突的担忧。在我写这篇博客之际，这枚导弹到底是由俄罗斯还是由乌克兰武装发射的仍不明朗。但美国总统拜登和其他美国官员怀疑导弹实际上是由俄罗斯发射的，而俄罗斯方面则否认攻击波兰领土，并断言导弹来自乌克兰的S-300防空系统。

Again, as things stand the facts are yet to be conclusively established. But from what we know at the moment it seems unlikely that Russia deliberately targeted Polish territory, including because it had nothing to gain and much to lose from such an action. Two hypotheses seem more likely: (1) that the missile was indeed fired by Russia, despite Russia’s protests to the contrary, but at a target in Ukraine and that it somehow got misdirected, through operator error or mechanical failure; (2) that the missile, in fact, came from a Ukranian S-300 system that was fired in response to Russia’s ongoing missile strikes against Ukraine, but that again somehow got misdirected and hit Polish territory.

不过，就目前的情况来看，事实的真相还没有定论。但就当下所知而言，俄罗斯故意以波兰领土为目标的可能性不大，因为这种行动对俄罗斯得不偿失。有两种假设的可能性更大：（1）尽管俄罗斯方面矢口否认，这枚导弹确实是由俄罗斯所发射，只不过其目标是乌克兰，但由于某种操作失误或机械故障致使导弹偏离了方向；或（2）这枚导弹实际上是乌克兰S-300防空系统对俄罗斯持续空袭的回应，但同样因为某种原因失灵导致最后击中波兰领土。

If either of these hypotheses is true, force was used against Poland, by Russia or Ukraine respectively, in a manner contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and in violation of Polish territorial sovereignty. But the force did not rise to the level of an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, because Poland was not targeted intentionally. Rather, the force used against Poland was a ‘frontier incident’ within the meaning given to that term by the International Court of Justice in cases such as Nicaragua and Oil Platforms. Accordingly, the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 does not arise, and Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty is therefore not applicable either.

如果其中一个假设是真的，那么俄罗斯或乌克兰对波兰使用武力的行为违反《联合国宪章》（宪章）第2（4）条，并侵犯波兰的领土主权。但这种武装行为没有达到宪章第51条意义上的武力攻击的程度，因为波兰并非被故意作为目标。相反，对波兰使用的武力属于“边境事件”的范畴。国际法院在“尼加拉瓜案”和“石油平台案”等案件中曾对“边境事件”的含义作出过规定。据此，该事件尚未触发第51条规定的单独或集体自卫权，同样《北大西洋公约》第5条也因此不适用。

There is little doubt that the notion of an armed attack in Article 51 includes not just considerations of gravity and scale of the force used, but also those of intentionality. (For probably the most comprehensive treatment of the subject I would direct readers to Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the Charter, at 158-168.) States have generally not treated accidental uses of force as armed attacks giving rise to self-defence – when its embassy in Belgrade was destroyed by NATO in 1999, for example, which NATO explained as an accident, China did not assert that it was a victim of an armed attack. To be clear here, the intention required by the notion of an armed attack excludes considerations of purpose or motive, but is simply one that the organs of state A have directed a hostile action against state B. On the hypotheses above, neither Russia nor Ukraine had such intent to attack Poland. And even if the notion of armed attack was construed as a purely objective one, contrary to what I have said above without incorporating any element of intentionality, in the case of an accidental spill-over scenario such as this one there would be no necessity for Poland and its allies to respond in self-defence by using force.

毫无疑问，第51条中的武力攻击概念不仅包括对所使用武力的严重性和规模的考虑，还包括对蓄意性的考虑。（关于这个问题最全面的讨论，请读者参阅Tom Ruys《“武力攻击”与联合国宪章第51条》第158-168页）。各国通常不把意外使用武力视作可以引起自卫的武力攻击——例如，1999年，北约解释炸毁中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆的事件属于意外，中国方面没有声称自己是武力攻击的受害者。这里要明确的是，武力攻击概念所要求的意图不包括对目的或动机的考虑，而只需要A国的机关对B国采取敌对行动。根据上述假设，俄罗斯和乌克兰都没有意图攻击波兰。而且即使把武力攻击解释为一个纯粹的客观概念，而不考虑蓄意性的要件，在本案的情形下，波兰属于被意外波及，波兰及其盟国也没有必要用武力自卫来回应。

That Poland was likely not the victim of an armed attack does not mean that it has not been wronged. Prohibited force, in the sense of Article 2(4) of the Charter, and the duty to respect sovereignty, do not require a similar element of intentionality. Depending on who fired the missile, either Russia or Ukraine would have the duty to provide adequate reparation to Poland, including measures of satisfaction and compensation, especially because two lives were lost.

尽管波兰可能不是武力攻击的受害者，但这并不意味着它没有受到伤害。宪章第2（4）条意义上的不得使用武力，以及尊重国家主权的义务，不要求有类似蓄意性的要件。因此，俄罗斯或乌克兰中发射导弹的一方有义务向波兰提供充分的赔偿，包括满足措施和补偿措施，尤其是因为在这次攻击中有两人丧生。

That said, a particular issue arises with respect to Ukraine (but not Russia): on the hypothesis that Ukraine was responding to a Russian attack and launched S-300 missiles in the exercise of its own right to self-defence, which in error spilled over onto Polish territory, would Ukraine be able to rely on self-defence against Russia as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness vis-a-vis Poland, thus obviating any duty to provide reparation? This would essentially be a ‘mistake of fact’ scenario in Ukraine’s own use of force in self-defence, which I have extensively previously examined on the blog here, here and here. To put a long story short, on one view Ukraine would be responsible for any errors its organs and agents have made, however innocent, and Poland in particular could not be expected to bear the cost of a use of force against it. On another view, an honest and reasonable mistake of fact could operate as an excuse or justification – if the relevant Ukrainian agents did all that could reasonably be expected of them to prevent the S-300 system from hitting Polish territory while defending Ukraine against Russian attacks, Ukraine’s own reliance on self-defence would preclude the wrongfulness of the injury done to Poland. (My own view is that the former option is at least generally the right one in the ad bellum context; this is of course also an issue that arises in other contexts, especially in responses to cyber attacks). It will be very interesting to observe what legal positions the affected states eventually take on this matter, in the case the hypothesis of a misdirected Ukranian S-300 strike ultimately proves correct.

也就是说，乌克兰（而非俄罗斯）方面要面临一个特殊的问题：假设乌克兰是为了回应俄罗斯的攻击而在行使自卫权时发射了S-300导弹，这些导弹错误地波及到了波兰领土，那么乌克兰是否能够援引对俄罗斯的自卫权来排除对波兰的不法性，从而免除一切赔偿责任？乌克兰这种在自卫中使用武力的行为基本上会被认为属于“事实错误”的情况，关于这个问题我在之前的博客中进行过广泛的讨论。简而言之，有一种观点认为，即使没有恶意，乌克兰应该对其机关和代理人所犯的任何错误负责，且尤其不能指望由波兰来承担自己遭受武力使用的损失。另一种观点则认为，诚实且合理的事实错误可以作为理由或者正当性依据——如果在对俄罗斯的攻击进行自卫时，相关的乌克兰代理人已经采取了所有可以合理预期的措施来防止S-300系统击中波兰领土，那么乌克兰可以依赖自卫权来排除对波兰造成的损害的不法性。（我的个人观点是，至少在战时状态下，前一种观点总体而言是正确的；当然，前者在其他的情形下也会出现问题，特别是对于网络攻击的回应）。如果乌克兰S-300错误击中波兰的假设成立的话，观察在这个问题上受到影响国家最终会采取什么样的法律立场将会是件非常有趣的事情。

December 22, 2022

原文发表时间：2022年11月16日

原文链接：https://www.ejiltalk.org/as-far-as-we-know-there-has-been-no-armed-attack-against-poland/