法律翻译 | 布拉格登诉阿伯特案&萨顿诉美国联合航空公司案

译者：朱哿 北京大学国际法学院

         刘燕霖 中国人民大学ppe

         崔程新 湖南大学法本

         何汛 对外经贸大学法本

         应岳 复旦大学法本

         鲁安妮 复旦大学法本

审稿：李梓源 英国布里斯托大学 LL.M.

         孙济民 中国人民大学

编辑：陈逸漩 中国人民大学法本

         Gary 詹远 UNSW J.D.

责编：戚琳颖 大连海事大学本科

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 97-156. Argued March 30, 1998Decided June 25, 1998

美国最高法院 

判决摘要 

BRAGDON 诉 ABBOTT 案 

向美国第一巡回上诉法院提出的诉讼请求 

号97-156

1998年3月30日争讼

1998年6月25日裁决

Respondent is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), but had not manifested its most serious symptoms when the incidents in question occurred. At that time, she went to petitioner's office for a dental examination and disclosed her HIV infection. Petitioner discovered a cavity and informed respondent of his policy against filling cavities of HIV-infected patients in his office. He offered to perform the work at a hospital at no extra charge, though respondent would have to pay for use of the hospital's facilities. She declined and filed suit under, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits discrimination against any individual “on the basis of disability in the enjoyment of the services... of any place of public accommodation by any person who operates [such] a place,” 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a)， but qualifies the prohibition by providing: “Nothing [herein] shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others,” § 12182(b)（3）). The District Court granted respondent summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court that respondent's HIV was a disability under the ADA even though her infection had not yet progressed to the symptomatic stage, and that treating her in petitioner's office would not have posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others. In making the latter ruling, the court relied on the 1993 Dentistry Guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and on the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV.

被告感染了人类免疫缺陷病毒（HIV），但在案涉事实发生时还没有表现出最严重的症状。当时，她到上诉人办公室中进行牙齿检查，并告知其已被艾滋病毒感染的事实。上诉人发现了一个蛀牙，并告知被告其诊所的政策禁止在他的办公室为感染艾滋病毒的病人填补蛀牙。他提出到一家医院进行这次手术，不收取额外费用，但被告必须支付使用医院设施的费用。被告拒绝了，并依据1990年《美国残疾人法案》（ADA）提起诉讼。该法案禁止任何个人“在任何公共场所接受服务时，因残疾而受到经营该场所的任何人的歧视”[42 U. S. C. § 12182(a)]，但对该禁令进行了限定，规定“如果某人对他人的健康或安全构成直接威胁，则不应要求该实体允许该人参与或受益于该实体提供的服务”[§12182(b)(3)]）。地区法院批准了被告提出的简易判决申请。第一巡回法院维持原判，同意下级法院的观点，即根据ADA，被告的艾滋病毒是一种残疾，尽管她的感染尚未发展到有明显症状的阶段，且在上诉人的办公室治疗并不会对其他人的健康和安全构成直接威胁。在作出后一项裁决时，法院依据的是疾病控制和预防中心（CDC）1993年的牙科指南和1991年美国牙科协会关于艾滋病毒的政策。

Held:

1. Even though respondent's HIV infection had not progressed to the so-called symptomatic phase, it was a “disability" under § 12102(2) (A), that is, “a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's] major life activities.” Pp. 3-21.

判决如下：

1. 尽管被告的艾滋病毒感染并未发展到所谓的有明显症状的阶段，但根据12102(2)(A)的规定，它属于残疾的一种，即“严重限制个人的一项或多项主要生活活动的身体损伤”。（第3-21页）

(a) The ADA definition is drawn almost verbatim from definitions applicable to §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and another federal statute. Because the ADA expressly provides that “nothing herein shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than under the Rehabilitation Act. Or the regulations issued pursuant to lit],” § 12201(a), this Court must construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. Pp. 4-5.

(a) ADA的定义几乎是逐字逐句地从1973年《康复法案》第504条和另一项联邦法规的定义中择取的。因为ADA明确规定，“这里的任何内容都不应被解释为适用比《康复法案》或根据该法案颁布的条例更低的标准”[§12201(a)]，因此，本法院对ADA的解释应至少使其给予残障人士与实施《康复法案》的条例同等的保护。（第4-5页）

(b) From the moment of infection and throughout every stage of the disease, HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a “physical impairment.” Applicable Rehabilitation Act regulations define “physical or mental impairment” to mean “any physiological disorder Or condition affecting the .. . body[s] hemic and lymphatic [systems].” HIV infection falls well within that definition. The medical literature reveals that the disease follows a predictable and unalterable course from infection to inevitable death. It causes immediate abnormalities in a person's blood, and the infected person's white cell count continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even during the intermediate stage when its attack is concentrated in the lymph nodes. Thus, HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with an immediate, constant, and detrimental effect on the hemic and lymphatic systems.

（b）从感染的那一刻起，艾滋病的每一阶段都符合法律和法规对“身体损伤”的定义。适用《康复法案》的条例将“身体或精神损伤”定义为“任何影响......身体血液和淋巴系统的生理失调或状况”。因此艾滋病感染完全符合这一定义。医学文献显示，这种疾病从感染到不可避免地死亡有一个可预测和不可改变的过程。它在一个人的血液中立即引起异常，而且受感染者的白细胞数在整个疾病过程中持续下降，甚至在其攻击集中于淋巴结的中间阶段也是如此。因此，艾滋病毒感染必须被视为一种对血液和淋巴系统有直接、持续和有害影响的生理紊乱。

(c) The life activity upon which respondent relies, her ability to reproduce and to bear children, constitutes a “major life activity" under the ADA. The plain meaning of the word “major" denotes comparative importance and suggests that the touchstone is an activity's significance. Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself. Petitioner's claim that Congress intended the ADA only to cover those aspects of a person's life that have a public, economic, or daily character founders on the statutory language. Nothing in the definition suggests that activities without such a dimension may somehow be regarded as so unimportant or insignificant as not to be "major.” This interpretation is confirmed by the Rehabilitation Act regulations, which provide an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of major life activities. Inclusion on that list of activities such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, working. and learning belies the suggestion that a task must have a public or economic character. On the contrary, the regulations support the inclusion of reproduction, which could not be regarded as any less important than working and learning. 

（c）被告所依据提起诉讼的生活活动，即她的生殖和生育能力，属于ADA规定的“主要生活活动”。“主要”一词的一般含义指相对的重要性，表明一项活动的重要性是检验其是否属于“主要生活活动”的标准。生育和相关的性活动是生命的核心。上诉人声称，国会旨在让ADA根据其定义将“主要生活活动”限于那些具有公共、经济或日常特征的方面。但是，定义中没有任何内容表明，缺乏此类性质的活动就可以被认为是不重要的，以至于不能被认定为“主要”。这一解释得到了《康复法案》中相关条例的确认，该条例提供了一份说明性的、非详尽的主要生活活动清单。列入该清单的活动包括：自我照顾、从事体力劳动、工作和学习，这与任务必须具有公共或经济性质的说法相矛盾。与之相反，这些条例支持将生育纳入其中，因为生育的重要性并不低于工作和学习。

(d) Respondent’s HIV infection “substantially limits” her major life activity within the ADA’s meaning. Although the Rehabilitation Act regulations provide little guidance in this regard, the Court’s evaluation of the medical evidence demonstrates that an HIV-infected woman’s ability to reproduce is substantially limited in two independent ways: If she tries to conceive a child, (1) she imposes on her male partner a statistically significant risk of becoming infected; and (2) she risks infecting her child during gestation and childbirth, i.e., perinatal transmission. Evidence suggesting that antiretroviral therapy can lower the risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%, even if relevant, does not avail petitioner because it cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one’s child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction. The decision to reproduce carries economic and legal consequences as well. There are added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and long-term health care for the child who must be examined and treated. Some state laws, moreover, forbid HIV-infected persons from having sex with others, regardless of consent. In the context of reviewing summary judgment, the Court must take as true respondent’s unchallenged testimony that her HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child. Pp. 12–15.

(d)按照《美国残疾人法案》的规定，被告的艾滋病毒感染“极大地限制了”她的主要生活活动。尽管《康复法案》（Rehabilitation Act）的规定并没有在这方面提供多少指导，但法院对医疗证据的评估表明，感染艾滋病毒的妇女的生育能力在两个独立的方面受到很大限制：当她尝试怀孕时，(1)她将使其男性伴侣面临统计学上显著的感染风险；(2)她在妊娠和分娩期间有使胎儿感染的风险，即围产期传播。有证据表明，抗逆转录病毒疗法可以将围产期传播的风险降低到8%左右，但即使这一问题的确与本案相关，这一证据仍然对原告不利，因为不能从法律上说，将一种可怕的致命疾病传播给子女的8%的风险不构成对生育的实质性限制。更何况生育的决定也会带来经济和法律后果。抗逆转录病毒疗法、补充保险和必须接受检查和治疗的儿童的长期保健都需要额外费用。此外，一些州的法律禁止艾滋病毒感染者与其他人发生性行为，而无论性行为的发生是否基于同意。在审查即审判决时，法院必须将被告无可质疑的证词作为事实，即她的艾滋病感染影响了她不生育的决定。（第12-15页）

(e) The uniform body of administrative and judicial precedent interpreting similar language in the Rehabilitation Act confirms the Court’s holding. Every agency and court to consider the issue under the Rehabilitation Act has found statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV. The uniformity of that precedent is significant. When administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, Congress’ intent to incorporate such interpretations as well. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580–581. Pp. 15–19.

(e)行政和司法先例对《康复法案》中类似用语的一致解释证实了法院的看法。根据《康复法案》考虑相关问题的每一个机构和法院都认定无症状艾滋病毒感染者属于该法案的适用范围。此类先例的一致性意义重大。当行政和司法解释已经确定了现有法律条文的含义时，在新法规中重复使用相同的语言通常表明国会也打算采纳这些解释。参见罗瑞拉德诉庞斯案[Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580–581]。（第15-19页）

(f) The Court’s holding is further reinforced by the guidance issued by the Justice Department and other agencies authorized to administer the ADA, which supports the conclusion that persons with asymptomatic HIV fall within the ADA’s definition of disability. The views of agencies charged with implementing a statute are entitled to deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844. Pp. 19–21.

(f)美国司法部和其他被授权执行《美国残疾人法案》的机构发布的指导意见进一步强化了法院的立场，该指导意见支持无症状艾滋病毒感染者符合《美国残疾人法案》对“残疾”的定义这一结论。负责执行法规的机构的意见应当被遵守。参见雪佛龙美国公司诉自然资源保护委员会案[Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844]。（第19-21页）

2. In affirming the summary judgment, the First Circuit did not cite sufficient material in the record to determine, as a matter of law, that respondent’s HIV infection posed no direct threat to the health and safety of others. The ADA’s direct threat provision, §12182(b)(3), stems from School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 287, in which this Court reconciled competing interests in prohibiting discrimination and preventing the spread of disease by construing the Rehabilitation Act not to require the hiring of a person who posed “a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others,” id., at 287, and n. 16. The existence of a significant risk is determined from the standpoint of the health care professional who refuses treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment is based on the medical or other objective, scientific evidence available to him and his profession, not simply on his good-faith belief that a significant risk existed. See id., at 288; id., at 288, n. 18, distinguished. For the most part, the First Circuit followed the proper standard and conducted a thorough review of the evidence. However, it might have mistakenly relied on the 1993 CDC Dentistry Guidelines, which recommend certain universal precautions to combat the risk of HIV transmission in the dental environment, but do not actually assess the level of such risk, and on the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV, which is the work of a professional organization, not a public health authority, and which does not reveal the extent to which it was based on the Association’s assessment of dentists’ ethical and professional duties, rather than scientific assessments. Other evidence in the record might support affirmance of the trial court’s ruling, and there are reasons to doubt whether petitioner advanced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the significance of the risk, but this Court’s evaluation is constrained by the fact that it has not had briefs and arguments directed to the entire record. A remand will permit a full exploration of the issues through the adversary process. Pp. 21–29.

2.在维持即审判决时，第一巡回法院没有在记录中引用足够的材料，以从法律上确定被告的艾滋病毒感染不会对他人的健康和安全构成直接威胁。《美国残疾人法案》的第§12182(b)(3)条直接威胁条款（direct threat provision）源于拿骚市学校董事会诉阿赖恩案[School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline., 480 U. S. 273, 287]，在该案中，本院通过解释《康复法案》不要求雇用“具有向他人传播传染病的重大风险（a significant risk）”的人，调和了在禁止歧视和防止疾病传播方面的利益冲突（见该案判决287页）。其中“重大风险”的存在是由拒绝提供治疗或住院收治的专业医疗卫生人员确定的，而且对风险的评估必须基于他本人及其同僚所能获得的医学或其他客观的科学证据，而不仅仅基于他认为存在重大风险这样的主观想法（见该案判决288页）。在大多数情况下，第一巡回法院遵循了适当的标准，对证据进行了彻底的审查。然而，它可能错误地依据了1993年疾病控制与预防中心（CDC）发布的牙科指南和1991年美国牙科协会关于艾滋病毒的政策，前者建议采取某些普遍预防措施，以应对牙科的医疗环境中存在的艾滋病毒传播风险，但他们实际上没有评估这种风险的水平，而后者只是一个专业组织而非公共卫生当局的工作，也并没有指出其在多大程度上只是基于协会对牙医职业道德和专业责任的评估，而不是基于一种科学性评估。记录中的其他证据可能支持初审法院的裁决，而且有理由怀疑原告提出的证据是否足以就“重大风险”提出一个可审判的事实问题，但本院的评估程序受到限制，因为我们没有获得关于整个记录的摘要和论述内容。发回重审将允许通过对抗程序对问题进行更充分的探讨。（第21页）

107 F. 3d 934, vacated and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which O’Connor, J., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

本案[107 F. 3d 934]发回重审。

肯尼迪法官发表了法庭意见，另有史蒂文斯法官、苏特法官、金斯伯格法官和布雷耶法官加入。史蒂文斯法官单独提交了一份同意意见，布雷耶法官加入。金斯伯格法官单独提交了同意意见。伦奎斯特法官单独提交了一份意见，对判决表示部分同意、部分异议，奥康纳法官加入了其中的第二部分，并单独提交了一份表示部分同意和部分异议的意见。

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring

金斯伯格法官发表协同意见。

HIV infection, as the description set out in the Court’s opinion documents, ante, at 8–10, has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself. See Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 20. The disease inevitably pervades life’s choices: education, employment, family and financial undertakings. It affects the need for and, as this case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of others to the impairment. No rational legislator, it seems to me apparent, would require nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the disease, though present, is not yet visible. I am therefore satisfied that the statutory and regulatory definitions are well met. HIV infection is “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits . . . major life activities,” or is so perceived, 42 U. S. C. §§12102(2)(A),(C), including the afflicted individual’s family relations, employment potential, and ability to care for herself, see 45 CFR §84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR §41.31(b)(2) (1997).

正如法院意见书中所列出的描述，参见判决书前文，第8—10页，艾滋病毒感染已被视为一种限制生命本身的疾病。参见Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae[1] 20. 这种疾病不可避免地渗透到生活的选择中：教育、就业、家庭和财务事业。正如本案例所示，由于其他人对病毒损害的反应，它影响了对医疗保健的需要，并影响了获得医疗保健的能力。在我看来，显然没有哪个理性的立法者会在疾病症状明显时要求不歧视，而在疾病虽然存在，但还不明显时允许歧视。因此，我很乐于见到法定和监管的定义得到了充分满足。艾滋病毒感染是“实质性限制主要生活活动的身体损伤”，或者被认为是这样，42 U. S. C. §§12102(2)(A),(C), 包括被感染者的家庭关系、就业潜力和自我照顾能力，参见45 CFR §84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR §41.31(b)(2) (1997).

I further agree, in view of the “importance [of the issue] to health care workers,” ante, at 28, that it is wise to remand, erring, if at all, on the side of caution. By taking this course, the Court ensures a fully informed determination whether respondent Abbott’s disease posed “a significant risk to the health or safety of [petitioner Bragdon] that [could not] be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §12182(b)(3).

我进一步同意，鉴于“这一问题对医护人员的重要性”，判决书前文，第28页，发回重审是明智的，如果有必要的话，宁可过于谨慎。通过采取这种做法，法院确保在充分知情的情况下确定被告阿伯特的疾病是否对“[原告布拉登]的健康或安全构成重大风险，而这种风险[无法]通过修改政策、惯例或程序来消除。”42 U. S. C. §12182(b)(3).

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SUTTON ET AL. v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 97–1943. Argued April 28, 1999, Decided June 22, 1999

判决摘要 

SUTTON ET AL.诉UNITED AIR LINES, INC.案 

向美国第十巡回上诉法院提出的诉讼请求 

号97-1943

1999年4月28日争讼

1999年6月22日裁决

Petitioners, severely myopic twin sisters, have uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse, but with corrective measures, both function identically to individuals without similar impairments. They applied to respondent, a major commercial airline carrier, for employment as commercial airline pilots but were rejected because they did not meet respondent’s minimum requirement of uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. Consequently, they filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits covered employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. Among other things, the ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities,” 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A), or as “being regarded as having such an impairment,” §12102(2)(C). The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that petitioners were not actually disabled under subsection (A) of the disability definition because they could fully correct their visual impairments. The court also determined that petitioners were not “regarded” by respondent as disabled under subsection (C) of this definition. Petitioners had alleged only that respondent regarded them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular job, global airline pilot. These allegations were insufficient to state a claim that petitioners were regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Employing similar logic, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

上诉人是一对严重近视的双胞胎姐妹，她们的未矫正视力为20/200或更差，但采取矫正措施后，两人的视力与没有类似损伤的人相同。她们向被告（一家较大的商业航空公司）申请成为商业航空公司的飞行员，但被拒绝了，因为她们不符合被告所提出的未矫正视力0.2或以上的最低要求。因此，他们根据1990年的《美国残疾人法案》（ADA）提起诉讼，该法案禁止所涉及的雇主以残疾为由对个人进行歧视。除其他事项外，ADA将“残疾”定义为“严重限制一项或多项……主要生理活动的身体或精神损伤”，42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A)，或“被视为有这种损伤”，§12102(2)(C)。地区法院驳回了上诉人的申诉，因为他们没有提出可以获得救济的申诉。法院认为，根据残疾定义的(A)款，上诉人实际上没有残疾，因为他们可以完全矫正他们的视力障碍。法院还裁定，根据该定义的(C)小节，上诉人没有被被告“视为”残疾。上诉人只是声称被告认为他们无法满足全球航空公司飞行员这一特定工作的要求。这些指控不足以说明上诉人被视为在工作这一主要生活活动方面受到严重限制。采用类似的逻辑，第十巡回法院维持原判。

Held: Petitioners have not alleged that they are "disabled" within the ADA's meaning. Pp. 4-21.

(a) No agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term "disability" as it is used in the ADA. The EEOC has, nevertheless, issued regulations that, among other things, define "physical impairment" to mean "[a]ny physiological disorder ... affecting... special sense organs," "substantially limits" to mean "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform," and "[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities [to] mea[n] functions such as ... working." Because both parties accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, the Court has no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any. The EEOC and the Justice Department have also issued interpretive guidelines providing that the determination whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as assistive or prosthetic devices. Although the parties dispute the guidelines' persuasive force, the Court has no need in this case to decide what deference is due. Pp. 4-7.

判决如下：上诉人没有声称他们是《美国残疾人法案》意义上的“残疾人”。（第4-21页）

（a）没有任何机构被授权解释《残疾人法案》中使用的“残疾”一词。然而，美国平等就业机会委员会(EEOC)已经发布条例，除其他事项外，将“身体损伤”定义为“影响......特殊感觉器官的任何生理紊乱”，“实质性限制”是指“无法从事一般人可以从事的主要生活活动”，以及“主要活动是指诸如......工作等”。因为双方都接受这些规定是有效的，而且确定它们的有效性并不是决定本案的必要条件，所以法院没有理由考虑这些规定应该得到什么尊重（如果有的话）。美国平等就业机会委员会和司法部还发布了解释性指南，规定必须根据个案来确定一个人的主要生活活动是否受到严重限制，而不考虑辅助或假肢等等缓解措施。虽然双方对指南的说服力有争议，但法院在本案中没有必要决定应给予何种尊重。（第4-7页）

(b) Petitioners have not stated a §12102(2)(A) claim that they have an actual physical impairment that substantially limits them in one or more major life activities. Three separate ADA provisions, read in concert, lead to the conclusion that the determination whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures, such as eyeglasses and contact lenses, that mitigate the individual’s impairment, and that the approach adopted by the agency guidelines is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA. First, because the phrase “substantially limits” appears in subsection (A) in the present indicative verb form, the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently— not potentially or hypothetically— substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A “disability” exists only where an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, not where it “might,” “could,” or “would” be substantially limiting if corrective measures were not taken. Second, because subsection (A) requires that disabilities be evaluated “with respect to an individual” and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the individual’s “major life activities,” the question whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 641–642. The guidelines’ directive that persons be judged in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to this mandated individualized inquiry. The former would create a system in which persons would often be treated as members of a group having similar impairments, rather than as individuals. It could also lead to the anomalous result that courts and employers could not consider any negative side effects suffered by the individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures, even when those side effects are very severe.

（b） 上诉人没有陈述§12102（2）（a）中的主张，即他们有实际的身体损伤，这在很大程度上限制了他们从事一项或多项主要生活活动。将三个独立的《美国残疾人法案》条款结合起来看，可以得出结论，确定一个人是否残疾，应参考减轻个人损害的措施，如眼镜和隐形眼镜，机构指南采用的方法是对《美国残疾人法案》的错误解释。首先，因为“实质性限制”这一短语在(A)款中以现在的指示性动词形式出现，该语言被正确地理解为要求一个人现在（而不是潜在或假设）受到实质性限制，以证明残疾。“残疾”仅在损伤“实质上限制”了主要生活活动的情况下存在，而不是在未采取纠正措施的情况下“可能”、“也许”或“将”实质上限制了主要生活行为的情况下。其次，因为(A)款要求“针对个人”评估残疾，并根据损伤是否严重限制个人的“主要生活活动”来确定残疾，根据《美国残疾人法案》，一个人是否有残疾的问题是一个个体化的问题。见Bragdon诉Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 641-642。指南要求在未矫正或未缓解状态下对人进行判断，这与这一强制性的个性化调查直接背道而驰。前者将创建一个系统，在这个系统中，人们往往被视为具有类似损伤的群体成员，而不是作为个人对待。这也可能导致异常结果，即法院和雇主无法考虑个人因使用缓解措施而遭受的任何负面的副作用，即使这些副作用非常严重。

Finally, and critically, the Congressional finding that 43 million Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, see §12101(a)(1), requires the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring under the ADA’s protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities. That group would include more than 160 million people. Because petitioners allege that with corrective measures their vision is 20/20 or better, they are not actually disabled under subsection (A).

Pp. 7–15.

最后，至关重要的是，国会有关4300万美国人罹有一种或多种身体或精神残疾的调查结果（见第12101条第A款第1项），要求我们得出这一结论——国会并不打算将所有那些未被矫正时身心状况接近于残疾的人纳入《美国残疾人法案》（ADA）的保护范围。这一群体将包括超过1.6亿人。因为上诉人声称其视力在使用矫正措施时可达到20/20乃至更好的水平，所以他们实际上并非A款意义上的残疾人。（第7-15页）

Petitioners have also failed to allege properly that they are “regarded as,” see §12101(2)(C), having an impairment that “substantially limits” a major life activity, see §12102(2)(A). Generally, these claims arise when an employer mistakenly believes that an individual has a substantially limiting impairment. To support their claims, petitioners allege that respondent has an impermissible vision requirement that is based on myth and stereotype and that respondent mistakenly believes that, due to their poor vision, petitioners are unable to work as “global airline pilots” and are thus substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Creating physical criteria for a job, without more, does not violate the ADA. The ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others, so long as those attributes do not rise to the level of substantially limiting impairments. An employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that are not impairments are preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job. In addition, petitioners have not sufficiently alleged that they are regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the ADA requires, at least, that one’s ability to work be significantly reduced. The EEOC regulations similarly define “substantially limits” to mean significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The Court assumes without deciding that work is a major life activity and that this regulation is reasonable. It observes, however, that defining “major life activities” to include work has the potential to make the ADA circular. Assuming work is a major life activity, the Court finds that petitioners’ allegations are insufficient because the position of global airline pilot is a single job. Indeed, a number of other positions utilizing petitioners’ skills, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor, are available to them. The Court also rejects petitioners’ argument that they would be substantially limited in their ability to work if it is assumed that a substantial number of airlines have vision requirements similar to respondent’s. This argument is flawed because it is not enough to say that if the otherwise permissible physical criteria or preferences of a single employer were imputed to all similar employers one would be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working only as a result of this imputation. Rather, an employer’s physical criteria are permissible so long as they do not cause the employer to make an employment decision based on an impairment, real or imagined, that it regards as substantially limiting a major life activity. Petitioners have not alleged, and cannot demonstrate, that respondent’s vision requirement reflects a belief that their vision substantially limits them. Pp. 15–21.

130 F. 3d 893, affirmed.

上诉人也没有充分论证他们正被“视作”（见第12101条第2款第C项）[2]罹有某种“实质性地限制”了其主要生活活动的功能障碍（见第12102条第2款第A项）。一般而言，当雇主错误地认为一个人罹有实质上的限制性功能障碍时，索赔请求权就会发生。为了支持他们的诉请，上诉人声称，被上诉人设置了一个不合法的、基于普遍但却错误的观念和刻板印象的视力要求，且被上诉人错误地认为，由于视力不佳，上诉人无法从事“全球航线飞行员”的工作，因此其在工作这一主要生活活动方面受到实质上的限制。仅仅为一项工作制定身体标准，并不违反《美国残疾人法案》。《美国残疾人法案》允许雇主偏好某些身体特质，只要这些特质并未上升到实质上的限制性功能障碍。雇主可以自由决定某些不属于功能障碍的身体特征或健康状况更受青睐，就像其可以自由决定一些限制性的功能障碍（但并非实质上限制性的）将使得某些人不太适合从事某项工作。此外，上诉人没有充分论证他们被视作在工作这一主要生活活动方面受到实质上的限制。《美国残疾人法案》要求，（某些限制）至少需要使得一个人获得工作的能力显著降低，才能被视为在工作这一主要生活活动方面（受到实质上的限制）。平等就业机会委员会（Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC）的规定同样将“实质上的限制”定义为，与在受训程度、技能水平和能力水平等方面具有可比性的普通人相比，其在从事某一类或各类工作的能力上受到明显限制。法院未加选择地假设工作是一项主要生活活动，并假设上述规定是合理的。然而，法院认为，将“主要生活活动”定义为包括工作，有可能使《美国残疾人法案》陷入循环论证。假设工作是一项主要生活活动，法院认为上诉人的指控并不充分，因为全球航线飞行员的职位只是一项工作。事实上，允许上诉人运用其掌握的技能的其他一些职位，如地区飞行员和飞行员教练，对他们都是开放的。法院还反驳了上诉人的这一论点，即如果大量航空公司的视力要求与被上诉人的要求相似，那么上诉人获得工作的能力将受到很大的限制。这个论点是有缺陷的，因为仅仅将一个人被认为在工作这一主要生活活动中受到了实质上的限制，归咎于某一个对单一雇主而言是合法的身体标准或偏好被所有类似的雇主采用，这只是对这种身体标准的归责结果而已。相反，只要一个雇主设置的身体标准并没有使得雇主基于其所认为的会实质上限制主要日常活动的功能障碍（无论是真实的还是想象的）作出雇佣决定，那么这种身体标准就是可被允许的。上诉人没有指控，也未能证明，被上诉人的视力要求反映了被上诉人的这一主张，即上诉人的视力对其自身构成了实质性限制。（第15-21页）

130 F. 3d 893，维持原判。

O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

奥康纳大法官发表了法庭意见，伦奎斯特首席大法官和斯卡利亚大法官、肯尼迪大法官、苏特大法官、 托马斯大法官和金斯伯格大法官附议。金斯伯格大法官发表了协同意见。斯蒂文大法官发表了异议意见，布雷耶大法官附议。布雷耶大法官发表了异议意见。

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.

金斯伯格大法官发表协同意见

I agree that 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A) does not reach the legions of people with correctable disabilities. The strongest clues to Congress’ perception of the domain of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as I see it, are legislative findings that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities,” §12101(a)(1), and that “individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority,” persons “subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,” §12101(a)(7). These declarations are inconsistent with the enormously embracing definition of disability petitioners urge. As the Court demonstrates, see ante, at 11–14, the inclusion of correctable disabilities within the ADA’s domain would extend the Act’s coverage to far more than 43 million people. And persons whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for their well-being, can be found in every social and economic class; they do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as historical victims of discrimination. In short, in no sensible way can one rank the large numbers of diverse individuals with corrected disabilities as a “discrete and insular minority.” I do not mean to suggest that any of the constitutional presumptions or doctrines that may apply to “discrete and insular” minorities in other contexts are relevant here; there is no constitutional dimension to this case. Congress’ use of the phrase, however, is a telling indication of its intent to restrict the ADA’s coverage to a confined, and historically disadvantaged, class.

我同意《美国法典》（U.S.C.）第42卷第12102(2)(A)条不适用于可用药物或其他器材加以矫正的残疾群体。在我看来，解读国会对《美国残疾人法案》（ADA）适用范围之见解的最有力线索是，立法机构发现“约4300万美国人患有一种或多种身体或精神残疾”[§12101(a)(1)]，以及“残疾人是分离而孤立之少数群体”，“在社会中长期遭受有目的的不平等待遇，并被置于无政治权利的地位” [§12101(a)(7)]。这些表述与起诉人所竭力主张的广义的“残疾”定义并不一致。正如法院在前文第11-14页所表明的，若将可矫正的残疾纳入《美国残疾人法案》的范畴，该法的适用范围将远远超过4300万人。未经矫正时视力低下的人，或依赖日常药物治疗维持健康的人，遍布在每个社会和经济阶层；他们并不集中于政治弱势群体，也不像历史上被歧视的受害者那样聚集在一起。简而言之，我们无法以任何合理方式将大量患有可矫正的残疾的不同个体划分为“分离而孤立之少数群体”。我并不是说在其他情况下可能适用于“分离而孤立”之少数群体的任何宪法假说或教义都与本案有关；本案并不涉及宪法问题。然而，国会对这一短语的使用，有力地表明了其意图，即把《美国残疾人法案》的适用范围限制在一个有限的、历史上处于弱势地位的阶层。

- 注释 -

[1] 译者注：“法庭之友”（amici）是指“对案件中的疑难法律问题陈述意见并善意提醒法院注意某些法律问题的临时法律顾问；协助法庭解决问题的人”。James E. Clapp，Random House Webster's Pocket Legal Dictionary，Random House，2007，p. 13.

[2] 译者注：经查证，1998年最高法院引用的《美国残疾人法案》的条文应当源自于AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990(PL 101–336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat 327)，该法案在2008年被ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008(PL 110–325, September 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553)修正；而在1998年最高法院引用的《美国残疾人法案》中，所谓“视作”（“regarded as”）的表述出现在第12102条第2款第C项，第12101条则并无第2款（也并无“regarded as”表述），此处原文文件似乎出现了笔误。