法律翻译｜《纽大法律评论》第97卷第2期目录+摘要

译者｜常耘硕 北京大学硕士

一审｜岳文豪 上海交通大学法学硕士

二审｜何兰子夜 宾夕法尼亚大学ML

复审｜何兰子夜 宾夕法尼亚大学ML

编辑｜陈婉菁 中国政法大学硕士

         邵娅绮 浙江工商大学本科        

责编｜王有蓉 中国政法大学硕士

Memes on Memes and the New Creativity

模因^[1]和新创意的模因

作者：AMY ADLER, JEANNE C. FROMER

Memes are the paradigm of a new, flourishing creativity. Not only are these captioned images one of the most pervasive and important forms of online creativity, but they also upend many of copyright law’s fundamental assumptions about creativity, commercialization, and distribution. Chief among these assumptions is that copying is harmful. Not only does this mismatch threaten meme culture and expose fundamental problems in copyright law and theory, but the mismatch is even more significant because memes are far from an exceptional case. Indeed, memes are a prototype of a new mode of creativity that is emerging in our contemporary digital era, as can be seen across a range of works. Therefore, the concern with memes signals a much broader problem in copyright law and theory. This is not to say that the traditional creativity that copyright has long sought to protect is dead. Far from it. Both paths of creativity, traditional and new, can be vibrant. Yet we must be sensitive to the misfit between the new creativity and existing copyright law if we want the new creativity to continue to thrive.

“模因”代表着一种新兴、蓬勃的创意潮流。这些文字图片不光是网络创意中最普遍、最重要的模式之一，它们还颠覆了著作权法中关于创意、商业化和传播的许多基本假设。这些假设最主要的观点是，复制是有害的。这种假设一方面威胁了模因文化，暴露了著作权法及其理论中的基本问题，另一方面，由于模因并非是一个特例，这种假设（的威胁）甚至更加突出。诚然，模因是我们当今信息时代创意模式的新雏形，且存在于各个领域中。因此，对于模因的担忧预示着著作权法及其理论中一个更加宽泛的问题。这并不是说著作权法一直以来试图保护的传统创意已经消失，恰恰相反，创意的两种模式——传统的和新兴的——可以共同蓬勃发展。但是，我们必须敏锐地意识到新的创意和现有的著作权法之间的不匹配，以确保新的创意继续繁荣发展。

Financial Inclusion in Politics

政治中的金融参与

作者：ABHAY P. ANEJA, JACOB M. GRUMBACH, ABBY K. WOOD

Our deregulated campaign finance system has a race problem. In this Article, we apply innovations in statistical methods to the universe of campaign contributions for federal elections and analyze the racial distribution of money in American politics between 1980 and 2012. We find that white people are extremely over-represented among donors. This racial gap in campaign contributions is significantly greater than the gap between white and nonwhite voter participation and white and nonwhite officer holders. It is also relatively constant across time and elected offices.

This result is an important missing piece in the conversation about equity in political participation. We argue that the courts and Congress should take steps to address the racial gaps in campaign finance participation. The participation and representation problems that flow from racial inequality in deregulated campaign finance could inform claims under the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and politico-financial inequalities certainly bear on the normative problems that the statute intends to address. But the most politically viable way to address the campaign finance racial gap lies in adoption of public financing for political campaigns, which offer the promise of increasing the racial representation of campaign contributions. When racial representation in contributions is improved, improved equality in the distribution of resources and power in electoral and political systems should follow.

这一结论填补了关于“公平参与政治”的讨论中一个重要的缺失环节。我们认为，法院和国会应当采取措施来解决竞选资金赞助中的种族差距。在“弱监管”的竞选赞助机制下，种族不平等所产生的参与问题和代表问题可能会影响基于《投票权法案》（VRA）的主张，而政治-经济上的不平等必然会影响该法案意图解决的规范性问题。但是，为竞选提供公共资金是解决竞选赞助中的种族差距的最具政治可行性的方法，因为该方法有望提高竞选赞助中的种族代表性。当竞选赞助中的种族代表性得到改善时，选举和政治体系中的资源和权力分配的平等性问题也将随之改善。

Movement Judges^[2]

运动派法官

作者：BRANDON HASBROUCK

Judges matter. The opinions of a few impact the lives of many. Judges romanticize their own impartiality, but apathy in the face of systems of oppression favors the status quo and clears the way for conservative agendas to take root. The lifetime appointments of federal judges, the deliberate weaponization of the bench by reactionary opponents of the New Deal and progressive social movements, and the sheer inertia of judicial self-restraint have led to the conservative capture of the courts. By contrast, empathy for the oppressed and downtrodden renders substantive justice possible and leaves room for unsuccessful litigants to accept unfavorable outcomes. But some judges—movement judges—bring more to the bench than just empathy, raging against systemic injustice with an understanding of its burdens on real human lives. This Article argues that we need movement judges to realize the abolitionist and democracy-affirming potential of the Constitution. Although the judiciary is often described as the “least democratic” of the three branches of government, it has the potential to be the most democratic. With movement judges, the judiciary can become a force for “We the People.”

（图片源自网络）

法官举足轻重。少数人的意见影响着大众的生活。法官美化了他们的公正性，而他们对压迫机制的冷漠有利于维持现状，并为保守派扫清了道路。联邦法官的终身任命制、故意将法官“武器化”的新政和进步社会运动的反对派，以及司法自我约束的巨大惯性使得法院被保守派控制。对比之下，对受压迫者和弱势群体的同情使实质正义成为可能，并为败诉的当事人留下了接受不利后果的余地。但是有些法官——运动派法官——在法官席上不仅表现出同情，还表现出对系统性不公正的愤怒，并能理解这种系统性的不公正给人们现实生活带来了负担。本文认为，我们需要运动派法官来实现宪法所蕴含的废除主义和坚持民主的潜能。尽管司法系统通常被描述为三权分立政体中“最不民主的”，它仍有可能成为最民主的那一个。有了运动派法官，司法系统可以成为“我们人民”（“We the People”）的力量。

Delegated to the State: Immigration Federalism and Post-Conviction Sentencing Adjustments in Matter of Thomas & Thompson

由州政府行使的权力——移民联邦主义和托马斯&汤普森 (Thomas & Thompson) 事件中的定罪后的量刑调整

作者：DAVID G. BLITZER

In Matter of Thomas & Thompson, former Attorney General William Barr argued that states have no role to play in immigration matters and thus, state adjustments to a criminal sentence post-conviction will not be given effect for adjudicating deportability based on criminal grounds under section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act without an underlying substantive or procedural flaw in the original criminal case. The former Attorney General incorrectly assumed that states cannot be involved in immigration decision making. Not only is it constitutionally permissible for the federal government to delegate certain immigration powers to the states, but the immigration code does so in many places. Careful examination of the text and legislative history of section 101(a)(48)(B) reveals that whatever sentence the state deems operative counts for immigration purposes—even if state law considers the operative sentence a later adjustment—implying that Matter of Thomas & Thompson put forth an erroneous interpretation.

在托马斯&汤普森 (Thomas & Thompson) 事件中，美国前司法部长威廉·巴尔(William Barr) 认为，各州在移民事务中没有发言权，因此，根据《移民和国籍法》第101(a)(48)(B)条，除非原刑事案件中有潜在的实质性或程序性瑕疵，各州在定罪后对刑事判决的调整不构成基于刑事理由被判定移送出境的执行基础。前司法部长错误地假设各州不能参与移民决策。不仅宪法允许联邦政府将某些移民管制权授权给各州，而且移民法在许多地方也赋予各州此类权力。对第101(a)(48)(B)条的文本和立法历史的研究表明，无论各州执行什么判决，即使是执行的判决是适后调整过的，都意在解决、处理移民问题。也就是说， 托马斯&汤普森事件的解释是错误的。

Privatizing the Provision of Water: The Human Right to Water in Investment-Treaty Arbitration

水供应的私有化： 投资条约仲裁中的饮用水人权问题

作者：ASHLEY OTILIA NEMETH

Despite its critical importance, the fulfillment of the human right to water is far from the reality for many today. One in three people do not have access to safe drinking water and more than half of the world’s population does not have access to safe sanitation. Achieving the international community’s commitment of universal access to safe water and sanitation by 2030 would cost states approximately $150 billion per year. Meeting those funding needs inevitably entails private, and often foreign, investment. When investments do not go as planned, foreign investors may turn to international arbitration for relief. While intended to protect investments, this legal regime has allowed investors to challenge regulatory measures that further human rights and to wield undue power over states. This Note analyzes investment-treaty disputes involving drinking water to understand how states have invoked, and tribunals have considered, the human right to water. The cases show an important evolution on the part of tribunals. 

（图片源自网络）

尽管获得水是一项至关重要的人权，但对今天的许多人来说，饮用水人权的实现还遥遥无期。全球三分之一的人口无法获得安全的饮用水，超过一半的人没有安全的卫生设施。要想实现国际社会关于到2030年普及安全饮用水和卫生设施的承诺，每年需要各国投入约1500亿美元。满足这些资金需求不可避免地需要私人投资，且往往是外国投资。当投资出现问题时，外国投资者可能会向国际仲裁寻求救济。尽管这一法律制度的目的是保护投资，但它使投资者有机会挑战有利于人权的监管措施，并对国家施加不当的压力。本文分析了涉及饮用水的投资条约争端，来从中理解各国政府如何援引饮用水人权，以及仲裁庭如何考虑饮用水人权。这些案例显示了仲裁庭在这方面的重要演变。

Nevertheless, almost all of the tribunals fall short of integrating the human right to water in their analysis of substantive treaty claims. Interestingly, the cases also reveal that, despite invoking human rights defenses, states engage in actions that are difficult to justify as furthering the right to water. In turn, this Note argues that the “fair and equitable treatment” standard can and should include relevant human rights law as part of “investors’ legitimate expectations.” Such an integration creates opportunities for accountability on both sides of the ledger: Investors are expected to engage in human rights legal due diligence, and states are taken to task when they invoke human rights in a perfunctory fashion. The fair and equitable treatment standard presents an opportunity to expand fairness and equity in international arbitration not only for the disputing parties, but also for the people who stand to lose from their actions.

然而，几乎所有仲裁庭都没有将饮用水人权纳入其对具体仲裁请求的分析中。有趣的是，这些案例还表明，尽管相关国家援引人权作为抗辩，国家采取的行动难以被证明是为了促进饮用水人权。相反，本文认为，作为“投资者的合法期望”的一部分，“公平和公正待遇”标准可以且应当包括相关的人权法。这种整合为双方均提供了问责机会：投资者应当进行人权法方面的尽职调查，而国家以例行公事的方式援引人权时也会被追究责任。公平和公正待遇标准为扩大国际仲裁的公平性和公正性提供了机会，这不仅是为了争议当事各方，也是为了那些因其行为而遭受损失的人们。

The Limits of Dual Sovereignty

双重主权理论的局限

作者：ELEUTHERA OVERTON SA

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Yet the dual sovereignty doctrine, a longstanding rule of judicial interpretation, reads the Double Jeopardy Clause as applying only to prosecutions by a single sovereign. Successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns, including the United States and foreign nations, do not implicate double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects the individual from government overreach, but the dual sovereignty doctrine flips the script: It protects the interests of the sovereign at the expense of the individual. After many decades of criticism, the Supreme Court reconsidered and then reaffirmed the doctrine in Gamble v. United States. The current blanket rule solves one problem—the fear that sovereign interests will be thwarted by other sovereigns—but creates another: an incentive for two sovereigns to join up to evade constitutional requirements. In the shadow of the dual sovereignty rule, lower courts have articulated an exception where one sovereign manipulates another or uses it as a “sham” or a “cover” for its own aims. Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, however, courts are reluctant to find the exception to apply.

This Note offers a new approach to inter-sovereign successive prosecutions that would reconcile these two doctrinal threads and provide greater protection to defendants at the mercy of multiple sovereigns: application of the strict scrutiny standard. Courts should embrace the complexity of inter-sovereign prosecutions, which can range from situations of obstruction, where successive prosecution may be necessary, to manipulation, where it should be prohibited. Genuine protection of the right against double jeopardy demands strict scrutiny.

本文为不同主权国家间的连续起诉提供了一种新的路径，即严格审查标准，用以调和上述两项理论，并更好地保护受多个主权国家支配的被告。法院应当认识到不同主权国家间起诉的复杂性，其涵盖范围从阻碍情形（此时可能需要进行后续起诉）到操纵情形（此时应禁止连续起诉）。要真正保护免受双重审判的权利，就必须进行严格审查。

A “Charter of Negative Liberties” No Longer: Equal Dignity and the Positive Right to Education

消极自由宪章不复存在——平等的尊严和积极的受教育权^[4]

作者：ARIJEET SENSHARMA

In the Spring of 2020, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gary B. v. Whitmer penned an opinion recognizing a fundamental right to basic minimum education. While this decision was subsequently vacated pending en banc review and then dismissed as moot following a settlement, it stands as a bellwether of the long-overdue march toward recognition of positive rights under the Constitution. A series of Burger Court opinions attempted to calcify the notion that the Constitution is a “charter of negative liberties,” most famously DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services and its progeny. These opinions erected three key doctrinal barriers to recognition of positive rights: 1) that a cognizable due process claim must arise from direct, de jure state deprivation; 2) that separation of powers points towards legislatures, not courts, as the appropriate bodies for curing social and economic ills; and 3) that furnishing equality is not a proper aim of due process.

But substantive due process doctrine has transformed over the past few decades. Most notably in a series of cases protecting the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals—Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, United States v. Windsor in 2013, and Obergfell v. Hodges in 2015—the doctrines of due process and equal protection have fused so intimately as to have revealed a new doctrinal structure, which Laurence Tribe has termed “equal dignity.” The doctrine of equal dignity has profound implications for the recognition of positive rights. Its theoretical tenets undermine the doctrinal elements which have traditionally steered federal courts away from recognizing positive rights. This Note argues that the case of education—considered in light of the post-Obergefell substantive due process doctrine—dismantles each of the traditional pillars of negative-rights constitutionalism, paving the way for recognition of a positive right to a basic minimum education. More broadly, Gary B. demonstrates that courts are now doctrinally equipped to recognize positive rights within the framework of modern substantive due process, a development that has radical implications for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the project of constitutional equality.

但实质性正当程序原则在过去的几十年里发生了变化。最值得注意的是，在一系列保护LGBTQ+[6]个人权利的案件中——如2003年的劳伦斯诉美国得克萨斯州案 (Lawrence v. Texas)、2013年的美国诉温莎案 (United States v. Windsor) 以及2015年的奥伯格菲尔诉霍奇斯案 (Obergfell v. Hodges)——正当程序和平等保护两个原则紧密融合，形成了一个新的理论结构，劳伦斯·特莱布 (Laurence Tribe) 称其为“平等尊严”。平等尊严学说对承认积极权利产生了深远的影响，削弱了导致联邦法院回避承认积极权利的传统理论要素。本文认为，在奥伯格菲尔案之后发展的实质性正当程序原则[7]下进行考虑，教育权案例逐步废除了消极权利立宪主义的一切传统理论基础，为承认获得最低基础教育的积极权利铺平了道路。更广泛地说，加里案表明了法院如今在理论上有能力来承认现代实质性正当程序框架下的积极权利，这一发展对第十四修正案的判例和宪法平等的研究具有根本的影响。

原文链接：

https://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-97-number-2/