法律翻译｜《纽约大学法律评论》第97卷第5期

译者 | 孙沛 南开大学法学硕士

一审 | 俞悠悠 国际关系学院本科

二审 | 孙济民 中国人民大学法学院

编辑 | NYZ 武汉大学本科

         于杰 上海对外经贸大学本科

责编 | 王有蓉 西安外国语大学本科

ATICLES

01 Reasonable Moral Doubt

02 Regulating for Energy Justice

NOTES

Implementing the Hague Judgments Convention

01

Reasonable Moral Doubt

合理的道德怀疑

作者：EMAD H. ATIQ

Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of "irreparable corruption" is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the "aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors" determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our sentencing case law,” as the Supreme Court recently put it in Kansas v. Carr. According to these courts, “it would mean nothing” to ask whether the defendant "deserves mercy beyond a reasonable doubt" or "more-likely-than-not deserves it" because moral questions are not “factual.” Instead, moral determinations are highly subjective "value calls" to which concepts of doubt and certainty do not intelligibly apply.

道德和价值判断会影响量刑结果。例如，“永久不可矫正”通常是判处青少年终身监禁且不得假释的前提条件；对“加重处罚因素多于减轻处罚因素”的认定结果，决定了被告是否被判处死刑。这种使被告受到特别刑罚的道德判断，是否应该遵循一定的证据标准？正如最高法院最近在Kansas v. Carr案中提出的，许多法院 "抽象地、不参照我们的判决案例法"来决定这个问题。根据这些法院的说法，考虑被告“在排除合理怀疑的情况下值得宽赦”还是“更有可能不值得宽赦”是毫无意义的，因为道德问题并非“事实”。相反，道德判断是具有高度主观性的“价值呼吁”，怀疑和确定性的概念并不适用于此。

Implicit in these rulings is a controversial view of the nature of moral judgment. This Article traces the contours of the view and argues that it is out of step with the way the broader public thinks about morality and fails to address the issues defendants have raised. Courts should avoid wading into such controversial waters for two reasons. First, the judiciary has historically maintained neutrality on issues of significant public concern. Second, even if moral determinations are not factual, applying a standard of proof to at least some moral decisions at sentencing would change the outcome of the sentencers deliberations and improve the legitimacy of the legal system. For the reasonableness of doubt depends on context, and moral questions—“Are you certain the defendant deserves death?”—make salient the stakes relative to which a person should decide what to believe about ordinary empirical matters. On the resulting view, reasonable doubt in the final moral analysis is not just intelligible, but essential for correcting a bias in the structure of the bifurcated criminal trial that systematically disadvantages defendants: the tendency for de-contextualized "factual findings" in the guilt phase to control outcomes at sentencing.

这些裁决中隐含着对道德判断性质的争议性观点。本文描绘了这一观点的框架，即认为法官与公众的道德观念有所差异，未能解决被告提出的问题。法院应该避免涉入这种有争议的领域，原因有二。第一，司法机关历来在公众关注的重大问题上保持中立。第二，即使道德判断不是事实，但对一些道德判断适用证明标准也会改变量刑结果，并提高制度的合法性。怀疑的合理性取决于情境，而“被告应该被判死刑吗？”这样的道德问题，则突出了在特定情境下个人对普通经验事实判断的利害关系。因此，在量刑的最终道德分析中适用合理怀疑标准，不仅是可以理解的，而且对于纠正各阶段刑事审判结构中的偏见至关重要。这种偏见会以系统性的方式使被告人处于劣势地位：脱离情境的“事实查明”会在定罪阶段控制量刑结果的趋势。

（图片源于网络）

02

Regulating for Energy Justice

能源正义规制

作者：GABRIEL CHAN

ALEXANDRA B. KLASS

In this Article, we explore and critique the foundational norms that shape federal and state energy regulation and suggest pathways for reform that can incorporate principles of “energy justice.” These energy justice principles—developed in academic scholarship and social movements—include the equitable distribution of costs and benefits of the energy system, equitable participation and representation in energy decisionmaking, and restorative justice for structurally marginalized groups. 

本文探究和批判了形塑联邦和州能源规制的基础规范，并提出了可以融贯“能源正义”诸原则的改革路径。能源正义诸原则形成于学术研究和社会运动之中，包括能源系统成本和收益的公平分配、能源决策中的平等参与权和代表机制，以及结构性边缘群体的恢复性正义。

While new legislation, particularly at the state level, is critical to the effort to advance energy justice, our focus here is on regulators ability to implement reforms now using their existing authority to advance the public interest and establish just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, charges, and practices. Throughout the Article, we challenge the longstanding narrative that utility regulators are engaged solely in a technical ratemaking exercise in setting utility rates. We argue that rate setting is and always has been social policy implemented within a legislative framework designed to promote the public interest. As we explain, when regulators and advocates expressly recognize this fact, it creates new opportunities for the regulatory system to achieve energy justice goals. 

虽然新立法，特别是州一级的立法对促进能源正义多有助益，但本文重点关注规制机构的改革能力，即利用其现有权力促进公共利益，并建立公正、合理且无歧视的费率、收费和惯例。按照长期以来的说法，在制定公用事业费率时，规制机构仅参与技术性制定，本文对此提出质疑。我们认为，公用事业费率是而且长期以来一直是在立法框架内实施的，旨在促进公共利益的社会政策。当规制机构和倡导者清楚认知这一事实，便为规制体系实现能源正义目标创造了新机会。

Through our reexamination of energy system governance, we evaluate new approaches to advance the public interest and set just and reasonable rates for energy consumers. These new approaches consider system benefits as well as costs, enhance universal and affordable access to utility service, alleviate income constraints on residential energy consumption as an economic development tool, increase equitable access to distributed energy resources such as energy efficiency upgrades and rooftop solar, and enhance procedural justice in ratemaking proceedings. We argue that over the long run, these pathways to a more just energy system align the interests of all system stakeholders by creating community wealth and collective prosperity.

通过重新检视能源体系的治理工作，本文评估了促进公共利益，设置公正合理费率的新路径。这些新路径考虑了系统效益与成本，提高了公用事业服务的普遍性和可负担性，缓解了作为经济发展工具的、对居民能源消费的收入限制，增加了对分布式能源（如能源效率升级和屋顶太阳能）的公平获取，并加强了费率制定程序中的程序正义。从长远来看，这些路径通过创造社区财富和集体繁荣，调整系统中所有利害关系者的利益，从而构建一个更公平的能源体系。

（图片源于网络）

Implementing the Hague Judgments Convention

执行《海牙判决公约》

作者：CONNOR J. CARDOSO

A specter is haunting The Hague—the specter of American federalism. On July 2, 2019, the Hague Conference on Private International Law finalized the Hague Judgments Convention. The Convention seeks to establish a global floor for judgment recognition and promote seamless recognition and enforcement of judgments between signatories. Although virtually all observers in the United States recognize the value and importance of ratifying the Convention, stakeholders cannot agree on how to implement it: by federal statute or by uniform state law. Proponents of a so-called "cooperative federalism" approach to implementation, principally led by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), have previously derailed U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (COCA) by insisting that principles of federalism required implementation through uniform state law. This argument is wrong as a matter of doctrine and policy. It is time to put it to rest once and for all.

一个美国联邦主义的幽灵在海牙游荡。2019年7月2日，海牙国际私法会议（HHCH）通过了《海牙判决公约》（Hague Judgments Convention，以下简称“《公约》”）。《公约》致力于构建判决承认的全球性平台，促进判决在缔约国之间顺畅承认与执行。尽管所有美国的观察者都认识到批准《公约》的价值与重要性，但利益相关者在如何执行《公约》的问题上无法达成一致：通过联邦法律还是统一的州法律。主要由统一法律委员会（Uniform Law Commission，“ULC”）领导的所谓“合作联邦主义”的支持者曾通过坚持主张联邦制原则需要通过统一的州法实施，阻挠了美国对《海牙选择法院协议公约》 (COCA，Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements) 的批准。这一观点在理论和政策上都是错误的，彻底纠正这种观点正当其时。

This Note is the first piece of scholarship to squarely address the "cooperative federalism" argument as applied to the Hague Judgments Convention. It makes two principal arguments. First, it identifies the principles that ought to guide the implementation of a treaty on foreign judgments recognition and concludes that federal implementing legislation optimizes these interests. Implementation primarily by uniform state law is inferior and poses serious disadvantages. Second, the ULCs primary legal objection to the implementation proposal for the COCA outlined by the State Department—that the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins prohibits federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction from applying federal rules of decision prescribed by federal statute—was meritless in 2012, and it is meritless now. If any objections remain to implementing the Judgments Convention by federal statute, they are about turf and ideology. To the extent that the relevant stakeholders want to accommodate those political objections, this Note concludes by briefly outlining areas for compromise.

本文是首篇直接研究适用于《海牙判决公约》的“合作联邦主义”论点的学术研究。本文有两个主要论点。第一，确定了指导国外判决承认条约执行的原则，并得出结论，通过联邦法律执行《公约》能够优化利益。通过统一州法律执行则存在劣势，并会带来严重的弊端。第二，对于美国国务院提出的《海牙选择法院协议公约》（COCA）执行建议，统一法律委员会（ULC）的主要反对意见是，根据Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins案确立的规则，行使异籍管辖权的联邦法院不得适用联邦法律规定的联邦裁决规则，这在彼时和当下都是毫无理由的。对于通过联邦法律执行《公约》，反对意见都是基于势力范围与意识形态问题。在利益相关者希望接纳这些政治反对意见的情况下，本文最后简述了可以妥协的领域。

原文链接：

https://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-97-number-5/