法律翻译 | 美国联邦第二巡回法院针对中美维C跨国反垄断诉讼的发回重审判决
译者 | 倪芷若 中国政法大学
一审 | 陈飞越 爱丁堡 LL.M.
二审 | 曾梓栩 外交学院本科
编辑 | 李建云 湖南师范大学本科
责编 | 王有蓉 中国政法大学
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., No. 13-4791 (2d Cir. 2021)
美国联邦第二巡回法院
针对中美维C跨国反垄断诉讼的发回重审判决
目录
一、案情背景与裁判结果
二、争议焦点
三、法院多数意见说理
四、法院异议意见
五、美国学者观点
（一）Theoretical Problems 理论问题
（二）Practical Problems 实践问题
Reference
原文链接：https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4791/13-4791-2021-08-10.html
一、案情背景与裁判结果
For more than half a century, China has been a leading producer and exporter of Vitamin C. In the 1970s, as China began to move into the competitive international economy under the general direction of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government implemented various export controls to gain a competitive edge over other producers of Vitamin C on the international market. In the intervening years, the Chinese government continued to develop policies to retain its domestic producers’ competitive advantage. In the 1990s, for example, following a price war between producers in China, the Chinese government facilitated industry-wide consolidation and implemented regulations to control the prices of Vitamin C exports. By 2001, Chinese suppliers had captured 60% of the global Vitamin C market.
半个多世纪以来，中国一直是维生素C（以下简称“维C”）的主要生产国和出口国。20世纪70年代，在共产党的领导下，中国企业开始进入充满竞争的国际经济市场。中国政府实施了一系列出口管制措施，以帮助国内企业在国际市场中获得比外国维C生产商更强的竞争优势。在此期间，政府继续通过制定政策来维持国内生产商的竞争力。例如，在20世纪90年代，政府在生产商间的价格战之后加速了行业整合，并逐步施行控制维C出口价格的行政法规。截至2001年，中国的维C供应商规模已占据全球维C市场份额的60%。
Several years later, in 2005, plaintiffs filed this antitrust action. The original complaint named four defendants, all of which are entities incorporated under the laws of China: Hebei, Jiangsu Jiangshan Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (“Jiangshan”), Northeast Pharmaceutical Group Co. Ltd. (“Northeast”), and Weisheng Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (“Weisheng”) (together, “defendants”). The plaintiffs later added as a defendant Hebei’s holding company, NCPG.
几年过后，也就是在2005年，本案原告提起了一场跨国反垄断诉讼。最初的起诉书列出了四名被告，均为根据中国法成立的公司法人：河北维尔康制药有限公司（下称“河北公司”）、江苏江山制药有限公司（下称“江山公司”）、东北制药集团有限责任公司（下称“东北公司”）、石家庄制药集团维生药业有限公司（下称“维生公司”）（以上合称 "被告"）。原告在之后将河北公司的控股人华北制药股份有限公司也增列为被告。
In the district court, the defendants moved to dismiss based on the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and principles of international comity. In an historic act—the first official appearance by the Chinese government in a U.S. court—China’s Ministry of Commerce (the “Ministry”) filed an amicus curiae brief and several other submissions in support of the motion to dismiss. The district court rejected all three grounds for dismissal and denied the motion so as to permit discovery with respect to the defendants’ assertion that the Chinese government compelled the actions constituting the basis of the antitrust violations. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (David G. Trager, Judge). The district court subsequently denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or, alternatively, a motion for a determination of foreign law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Brian M. Cogan, Judge).
在美国地区法院审理本案过程中，被告根据外国主权强制原则、国家行为原则和国际礼让原则提出了驳回起诉的申请动议。这是一个历史性时刻：中国政府官员首次在美国法院正式出庭。代表政府的中国商务部 （以下简称“商务部”）向地区法院提交了一份作为“法庭之友”的意见书及其他文件，以支持被告的申请动议。地区法院在2008年否决了被告主张的全部三个理由，并拒绝支持该动议，这是为了进一步调查被告关于“垄断行为隶属中国政府强制要求”之主张（原判决未提及具体判决日期，译者自行补充，参见Reference第1条）。随后，地区法院又在2011年拒绝了被告提出的即决审判动议，亦或其依据美国《联邦民事诉讼规则》第44.1条规定的申请外国法作为本案适用法律的动议（参见Reference第2条）。
（图片来源于网络）
In denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court again rejected application of the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, which it appeared to equate with the true conflict inquiry under an international comity analysis. The district court also concluded that there was no bar to the exercise of its jurisdiction due to international comity principles. After the district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Jiangshan settled the claims against it for $10.5 million. Jury trial began on February 25, 2013. On the eve of the jury’s deliberations, Weisheng settled for $22.5 million and Northeast for $500,000. On March 14, 2013, the jury returned its verdict, finding the remaining defendants—Hebei and NCPG—liable in the amount of $54.1 million. After accounting for the settlement amounts and attorneys’ fees, the district court entered a trebled damages award of $147,831,471.03 plus interest from the date of judgment, as well as a permanent injunction against future anticompetitive behavior. The district court denied Hebei and NCPG’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 1:06-md-1738, 2013 WL 6191945 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2013).
在拒绝被告的即决审判动议时，地区法院再次拒绝适用国家行为原则和外国主权强制原则，这似乎将外国主权强制原则与国际礼让原则中的“真正冲突”要求画上等号。地区法院还得出结论：在国际礼让原则下，不存在阻碍其管辖权行使之情形。在被告的即决审判动议被驳回后，江山公司支付1050万美元与原告达成了和解。2013年2月25日，陪审团对本案进行审判。在陪审团审议前夕，维生公司以2250万美元，东北公司以50万美元分别与原告达成和解。2013年3月14日，陪审团作出裁决，认定其余被告，即河北公司与华北制药股份有限公司应承担5410万美元的赔偿责任。在考虑了和解金额与律师费后，地区法院作出了要求被告支付三倍赔偿（1.47亿美元）及支付自判决之日起计算的利息的判决，并签发了要求被告禁止在未来实施任何反竞争行为的永久禁令。地区法院还根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第50（b）条规定，驳回了河北公司和华北制药股份有限公司重新提起的关于判决之动议。
In that ruling, the district court stated that it “stands by and reaffirms its prior rulings that Chinese law did not compel defendants to engage in antitrust violations, [and] that the doctrines of act of state and international comity do not bar plaintiffs’ suit.”
在该判决中，地区法院表示，其“坚持并重申其先前的裁决，即中国法律没有强迫被告从事垄断行为，且国家行为原则和国际礼让原则并不妨碍原告提起的本案诉讼。”
This Court reversed, finding that the district court erred, or “abused its discretion,” by failing to abstain on international comity grounds in light of the Ministry’s submissions showing a true conflict between U.S. antitrust law and Chinese export regulations for Vitamin C. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016). In doing so, we held that when a foreign government directly participates in U.S. court proceedings by providing an official representation regarding the proper interpretation of its laws, the U.S. court is bound to defer to that interpretation so long as it is reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court then reversed, holding that our Court gave too much deference to the Ministry’s submissions, and remanded for us to carefully consider the Ministry’s views without giving them dispositive effect. Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1873.
2016年9月20日（参见Reference第4条），本院（以下指“联邦第二巡回法院”）推翻了地区法院原判，认为该判决是错误的，或者说地区法院“滥用了自由裁量权”。因为商务部提交的意见显示，美国反垄断法和中国的维C出口法规之间确实存在冲突。而地区法院并未以国际礼让原则为由对被告行为进行豁免。在此过程中，本院认为，当外国政府提供了关于外国法律恰当的官方解释，并以此直接参与美国法院诉讼时，美国法院必须在合理情况下尊重该解释。随后，在2018年6月14日（参见Reference第5条），最高法院撤销了本院判决，认为该判决对商务部的意见给予了过多尊重，并将该案发回重审，要求我们仔细考虑商务部的意见，但不将其意见作为决定性考虑因素。
（图片来源于网络）
二、争议焦点
The central issue we address is whether the district court should have dismissed this antitrust action for reasons of international comity.
本院要解决的核心问题是，地区法院是否应当基于国际礼让原则驳回原告的反垄断诉求。
三、法院多数意见说理
As a general matter, international comity “takes into account the interests of the United States, the interests of the foreign state, and those mutual interests the family of nations have in just and efficiently functioning rules of international law.” To determine whether international comity principles require dismissal of a lawsuit, we apply a multi–factor balancing test.
一般来说，国际礼让原则“考虑到美国的利益、外国的利益、以及各国在国际法公正高效运行的规则方面所拥有的共同利益。”为了确定国际礼让原则是否可以作为驳回反垄断诉讼的依据，本院采用了一个多因素平衡测试。
In applying this multi-factor balancing test, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s explanation in Hartford Fire that, to warrant dismissal on the basis of international comity, the two countries’ legal demands must be irreconcilable. 509 U.S. at 799 (explaining that “[n]o conflict exists...where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.” In other words, there must be a “true conflict” between U.S. law and that of the foreign nation to warrant dismissal of a claim pursuant to international comity.
在应用这一多因素平衡测试时，本院留意到联邦最高法院在Hartford Fire案中所给出的解释，即如果要以国际礼让为基础驳回反垄断诉求，那么两个国家的法律要求必须是不可调和的。该案判决解释道：“如果受两个国家管制的情况下可以同时遵守两国法律，冲突则不存在”。换句话说，美国法与外国法之间必须存在 "真实冲突"，才能保证当事人依据国际礼让驳回反垄断诉求。
In its discussion of international comity, the Court in Hartford Fire made no mention of sovereign compulsion or the coercive nature of sanctions available under foreign law, instead focusing entirely on whether foreign law, taken at face value, “requires [the defendants] to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States.” A false equivalency of FSC and true conflict analysis would convert the “degree of conflict with foreign law” factor into the be-all and end-all of the international comity analysis, rendering mere surplusage much of that longstanding doctrine.
在讨论国际礼让时，最高法院在Hartford Fire案中并未提及外国主权强制原则，或是外国法规定的处罚本身的强制属性，而是完全从表面上来关注外国法是否要求被告以美国法禁止的某种方式行事。将外国主权强制原则与“真实冲突”分析错误地等同起来，会导致“与外国法律的冲突程度”变成国际礼让原则的主要甚至全部考虑因素，使得这一长期存在的原则在很大程度上成为多余的原则。
Accordingly, our discussion of international comity does not feature consideration of the threat of compulsive sanctions. Instead, we look to the laws of each country in turn to determine whether, taking those laws at face value, a true conflict exists.
因此，我们对国际礼让原则的讨论并没有考虑外国法律强制处罚所带来的威胁。相反，本院通过考察本案中每个国家的法律，从这些法律的表面价值来确定其是否存在真实冲突。
“Price–fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price–fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). Thus, if Chinese law required defendants to enter into horizontal price–fixing agreements, “compliance with the laws of both countries [would be] impossible” and there would be a true conflict.
“两个或更多的竞争者之间的价格协议，也就是所谓的横向价格协议，属于本身违法的协议安排。”因此，如果中国法律要求被告达成横向价格固定协议，那么“同时遵守两个国家的法律将是不可能的”，这就存在两国法律的真实冲突。
Taking Chinese law at face value, and having given careful consideration to the Ministry’s statements about what the applicable laws required, we conclude that defendants were required to engage in price-fixing conduct violative of U.S. antitrust law. Furthermore, because Chinese law “require[d]” the defendants “to act in [a] fashion prohibited by the law of the United States” in their role as leading Vitamin C export firms, it was impossible for them to “comply with the laws of both” countries.
结合中国法的表面价值，并仔细考虑商务部关于适用法律要求的声明后，我们得出结论，被告被要求从事违反美国反垄断法的价格固定行为。此外，由于中国法律“要求”被告在作为维C供应商进行产品出口时“以美国法律禁止的方式行事”，因此，他们不可能同时“遵守两个国家的法律”。
四、法院异议意见
International comity is a careful balancing act. It requires “taking into account the interests of the United States, the interests of the foreign state, and those mutual interests the family of nations have in just and efficiently functioning rules of international law.” Accordingly, “when there is a conflict, a court should seek a reasonable accommodation that reconciles the central concerns of both sets of laws.” China’s purpose in enacting the PVC regime, as characterized by the Ministry, was to “transition from a state controlled economy” as it entered the WTO and to avoid anti-dumping sanctions.
国际礼让是一种谨慎的平衡行为。它要求“考虑到美国的利益、外国的利益、以及各国在国际法公正高效运行的规则方面所拥有的共同利益。”因此，“当出现冲突时，法院应寻求合理的解释，以调和两套不同法律各自所关注的核心问题。”中国制定预核签章制度（Price Verification and Chop，PVC）的目的，正如中国商务部所言，是为了在加入WTO时 "完成从国家控制经济向市场经济的过渡"，并避免受到他国反倾销制裁的冲击。
The defendants could have complied with Chinese law and the Sherman Act by: (1) exercising their legal right to resign from the Subcommittee and not participating in any conspiracy to set prices, or (2) not colluding on prices above the minimum, the only price needed to receive a chop.
被告本可以通过以下方式同时遵守中国反垄断法与美国谢尔曼法（注：美国历史上第一部反垄断的联邦法案）：（1）行使他们的合法权利，退出维C出口“协调小组”，不参与任何横向价格固定的协议安排，或者（2）不在最低价格之上的价格区间内进行共谋，仅按照最低价格出口即可获得预核签章。
（图片来源于网络）
五、美国学者观点
美国地区法院以司法中心论来分析国际礼让原则可能产生理论与实际问题（Daniel A. Crane教授所持观点）
Theoretical Problems 理论问题
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The district court essentially held that the Chinese government is wrong about the interpretation of its own laws. At one level, there is nothing problematic about saying that a government can misinterpret its own laws. There are countless cases in which U.S. courts reject the U.S. government’s interpretation of U.S. law. Following Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” If the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC had ruled directly on point, it would seem obvious that its judgment unassailably embodied Chinese law. That did not happen here. One could imagine a regime in which only the pronouncements of foreign courts—not other branches of government—counted as conclusive on the meaning of foreign law. But there are two problems with applying such a judiciary-centric approach to international comity questions.
地区法院认为，中国政府对本国法律的解释是错误的。从某种程度上来说，主张一个政府错误地解释自己的法律并没有什么问题。有无数的案例表明，美国法院拒绝了本国政府对美国法的解释。在马伯里诉麦迪逊案之后，“解释法律的含义，显然是司法部门的职权范围和职责”。如果在中国的最高人民法院直接就这一问题作出裁决，那么很明显，它的判决无可置疑地体现了中国法律。但这种情况并没有实际发生。我们可以设想这样一种机制，即只有外国法院（而非政府相关部门）的声明，才算得上是对外国法律的结论性解释。但是，将这种以司法为中心的方法应用于处理关于国际礼让的纠纷时，可能会产生两个问题。
First, courts generally lack the ability to speak directly in a foreign judicial proceeding. To my knowledge, there is no analogue in international law for the practice followed by some federal and state courts of one court certifying a legal question to a different court. In the international sphere, when states speak to states they generally do so through the instrumentality of their executive branches. It would be unrealistic to follow domestic law institutional norms when managing the relationship of sovereign states.
首先，一国法院通常缺乏在外国司法程序中直接进行发声的能力。据我所知，一些联邦和州法院所遵循的做法，如一个法院向另一法院确认一个法律解释问题，在国际法中是没有类似情形的。在国际领域，国与国之间通常借助各自行政部门的解释权来进行对话。在处理主权国家关系时，要求遵循某一国国内法制度规范是不现实的。
Second, it would be presumptuous to apply Marbury reasoning to foreign nations, many of whom do not share the American penchant for judicial supremacy on matters of legal interpretation. I can offer no opinion on whether MOFCOM’s interpretation of Chinese trade law is normatively conclusive in China, or whether a Chinese court has the authority to overrule it. As a practical matter, however, it seems likely that companies operating in China experience MOFCOM’s interpretations of Chinese law as authoritative. Indeed, the same is true of companies operating in regulated industries in the United States, where agency decision making is accorded substantial deference by courts, and hence is often functionally conclusive. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously described law as a prediction of what courts will do. Holmes, however, was writing in the common law tradition, before the rise of the administrative state. In the administrative state both home and abroad, it would be more accurate to say that law is a prediction of what regulators will do.
其次，将马伯里诉麦迪逊案的规则应用于国际法是不讲道理的，因为许多国家在法律解释问题上并不像美国那样在法律解释问题上倾向于司法至上。对于商务部关于中国贸易法的解释在中国是否具有规范性的决定意义，又或是中国法院是否有权否定商务部解释，我无法提供任何意见。然而，作为一个现实的猜想，在中国经营的公司似乎可能将商务部对中国法律的解释视作权威。事实上在美国，对于那些受管制行业内的公司也是如此，法院对政府监管机构的决策给予了很高的尊重，因此政府的解释往往具备功能上的结论性。奥利弗·温德尔·霍姆斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes）有句名言：法律是对法院所做行为的预测。但是，霍姆斯是在普通法传统语境下得出的该结论，并且是在行政国家兴起之前。而对于那些域内外的行政国家或地区，法律更准确地说，是一种对行政监管机构行为的预测。
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Practical Problems 实践问题
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Holding that U.S. courts can second guess the highest administrative authority of a foreign state on interpretations of that state’s law would raise serious practical problems. Most obviously, it would create difficulties for the regulated entities, who face the possibility of being told by a foreign regulator that they must do x and then being told by a U.S. court that the foreign regulator misunderstood its own domestic law and that they should not have done x.
如果认为美国法院可以擅自推断外国最高行政机构对该国法律的解释，将会产生严重的实践问题。最显而易见的是，美国法院的做法将给被监管实体带来许多麻烦，他们有可能被母国监管机构告知必须遵守的法律要求，随后又被美国法院判定，母国监管机构误解了其国内法律，他们不应该遵守自己国家的相关法律。
At a minimum, an entity that follows the command of a foreign regulator should have a good faith reliance defense to charges that it acted improperly—a defense allowed under U.S. domestic law. If such a good faith defense would be allowed, why allow a challenge to the foreign regulator’s interpretation of its own law for purposes of the comity doctrine? The ultimate question is whether an entity that complies with a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws should be held liable under U.S. antitrust law. Whether we call it comity or good faith reliance, the result should be no liability.
至少，遵循外国监管机构命令的实体应当享有善意依赖其本国法律的辩护权，以免受到对其不当行为的指控——这是在美国国内法下允许的辩护规则。如果这样的善意辩护权被允许存在，为什么法院还要探讨国际礼让原则，并挑战外国监管机构对其自身法律的解释呢？这里的核心问题是，遵循外国政府对其自身法律的解释的实体是否应在美国反垄断法体系下承担责任。无论我们称之为国际礼让原则还是善意依赖，结果都应该是：被监管实体不承担责任。
Reference
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