法律翻译 | 轴辐类算法共谋的认定——以Meyer v. Kalanick案为例

     译者| Eleanor，人大法硕

     一审| LYJ NUS LLM

     二审| 胡婧卓 UCLA LLM

     编辑| 徐睿晨 北京外国语大学本科

             于杰 上海对外经贸大学本科

     责编| 王有蓉 中国政法大学硕士

引言

在人工智能时代，传统反垄断法理论中的“共谋”行为也衍生出了新兴形态——人工智能算法共谋，即利用人工智能算法技术，从事对市场竞争产生影响的协同行为。算法共谋理论的提出者Ariel Ezrachi教授提出了四类算法共谋，即信使类共谋、轴辐类共谋、预测类共谋及自主类共谋。

其中，轴辐类共谋（hub-and-spoke conspiracy）由轴心经营者（hub）和轮缘经营者（spoke）组成，同时包含了轴心经营者与轮缘经营者之间达成的纵向共谋、轮缘经营者之间达成的横向共谋。在算法技术的加持之下，轴辐类算法共谋主要体现为市场中无数参与主体同时使用同一定价算法，定价算法最终确定的价格就将成为市场价格；而这个定价算法的开发者则是共谋的轴心。在该过程中，参与主体之间不再进行市场竞争；若算法最终确定的价格高于自由竞争状态下产生的价格，则所有参与主体可共同享有该种模式带来的利益。

轴辐类共谋最典型的案件是美国的Meyer v. Kalanick案（后Uber公司加入，成为共同被告），本文即结合该案例对该类算法共谋的原理与认定方式进行简要介绍。

案件背景

2015年12月16日，原告Spencer Meyer代表自己及其他Uber用户，根据《谢尔曼法》和纽约州的《唐纳利法》，对被告Uber公司的首席执行官兼联合创始人Travis Kalanick提起了推定成立的集体诉讼，指控其共谋非法操纵价格。原告主张，Kalanick在经营Uber公司的过程中与Uber司机合谋，利用Uber的定价算法确定乘车费用，从而限制了司机之间的价格竞争，损害了Uber乘客的利益。被告请求驳回原告请求。

判决结果

(1) user adequately pleaded horizontal antitrust conspiracy;

(2) user adequately pleaded vertical price-fixing conspiracy;

(3) user adequately pleaded relevant market;

(4) user adequately pleaded adverse effects in relevant market; and

(5) user was not equitably estopped from pursuing class action suit, and user did not waive right to proceed through that mechanism.

Motion denied.

（1）原告充分论证了被告行为构成横向垄断共谋；

（2）原告充分论证了被告行为构成纵向价格垄断共谋；

（3）原告关于相关市场的界定成立；

（4）原告充分论证了被告行为在相关市场中产生的不利影响；

（5）原告有权提起集体诉讼，且并未放弃该种维权方式。

动议被拒绝。

法院观点（节译）

Through the Uber App, users can request private drivers to pick them up and drive them to their desired location. Uber facilitates payment of the fare by charging the user’s credit card or other payment information on file. Uber collects a percentage of the fare as a software licensing fee and remits the remainder to the driver. Drivers using the Uber app do not compete on price, and cannot negotiate fares with drivers for rides. Instead, drivers charge the fares set by the Uber algorithm. Though Uber claims to allow drivers to depart downward from the fare set by the algorithm, there is no practical mechanism by which drivers can do so. Uber’s ‘‘surge pricing’’ model, designed by Mr. Kalanick, permits fares to rise up to ten times the standard fare during times of high demand. Plaintiff alleges that the drivers have a ‘‘common motive to conspire’’ because adhering to Uber’s pricing algorithm can yield supra-competitive prices, and that if the drivers were acting independently instead of in concert, ‘‘some significant portion’’ would not agree to follow the Uber pricing algorithm.

（原告主张）通过Uber应用，用户可以请求私人司机为其提供接送服务。Uber通过用户的信用卡或其他支付途径收取车费。其中，Uber会扣取一定比例作为软件许可费，而剩余部分将归属于司机。通过Uber应用提供服务的司机之间不存在价格竞争，且（乘客）不能自行与司机协商车费；司机收取的车费数额由Uber算法确定。虽然Uber声称其允许司机基于算法确定的数额下调车费，但其并未在应用中设计相应的操作机制。另外，Kalanick先生所设计的Uber“激增定价（surge pricing）”模式，允许在乘车需求量大时将车费数额提高到标准数额的十倍。原告主张，司机们具有“共谋动机”，因为Uber定价算法可以产生超竞争价格，如果并非所有司机都同意采用该种机制，有司机选择独立行动，则相当一部分司机将不会同意采用Uber的定价算法。

Plaintiff further claims that the drivers ‘‘have had many opportunities to meet and enforce their commitment to the unlawful agreement.’’ Plaintiff alleges that Uber holds meetings with potential drivers when Mr. Kalanick and his subordinates decide to offer Uber App services in a new geographic location. Uber also organizes events for its drivers to get together, such as a picnic in September 2015 in Oregon with over 150 drivers and their families in attendance, and other ‘‘partner appreciation’’ events in places including New York City. Uber provides drivers with information regarding upcoming events likely to create high demand for transportation and informs the drivers what their increased earnings might have been if they had logged on to the Uber App during busy periods. Moreover, plaintiff alleges, in September 2014 drivers using the Uber App in New York City colluded with one another to negotiate the reinstitution of higher fares for riders using UberBLACK and UberSUV services (certain Uber car service ‘‘experiences’’). Mr. Kalanick, as Uber’s CEO, directed or ratified negotiations between Uber and these drivers, and Uber ultimately agreed to raise fares.

原告进一步主张，司机们“有很多机会来履行其对非法协议的承诺”。原告称，当Kalanick及其下属决定在一个新地区提供Uber服务时，Uber会与将来可能成为司机的潜在人选进行会面。Uber还为其司机举办活动，如2015年9月在俄勒冈州举行的野餐会，有150多名司机及其家人参加，以及在纽约市等地举行的其他“合作伙伴感谢”活动。若近期有某些活动将产生大量运输需求，则Uber会及时向司机们提供相关信息，并告知司机，若其于交通繁忙时期登录Uber应用，他们可能会增加多少收入。此外，原告还主张，2014年9月，纽约市的Uber司机进行共谋，对使用UberBLACK和UberSUV服务（拥有某些Uber特别服务“经历”）的乘客重新适用高额收费标准。Kalanick作为Uber的首席执行官，引导或批准了Uber与上述司机们的谈判，Uber最终也同意提高收费标准。

图片来源于网络

As to market definition, plaintiff alleges that Uber competes in the ‘‘relatively new mobile app-generated ride-share service market,’’ of which Uber has an approximately 80% market share. Uber’s chief competitor in this market, Lyft, has only a 20% market share, and a third competitor, Sidecar, left the market at the end of 2015. Although, plaintiff contends, neither taxis nor traditional cars for hire are reasonable substitutes for mobile app-generated ride-share service, Uber’s own experts have suggested that in certain cities in the U.S., Uber captures 50% to 70% of business customers in the combined market of taxis, cars for hire, and mobile-app generated ride-share services.

至于相关市场界定，原告主张Uber在“相对较新的移动端共享乘车服务市场”中开展竞争，并在该市场中占有约80%的市场份额。Uber在该市场中的主要竞争对手Lyft只有约20%的市场份额，另一位竞争对手Sidecar在2015年底离开了上述市场。虽然原告认为，出租车服务或传统上的汽车租赁服务均非移动端共享乘车服务的合理替代品，但Uber自身聘请的专家辩称，在美国的某些城市，Uber在出租车服务、汽车租赁服务和移动端共享乘车服务的综合市场中获取了50%到70%的商业客户。

Plaintiff claims to sue on behalf of the following class: ‘‘all persons in the United States who, on one or more occasions, have used the Uber App to obtain rides from uber driver-partners and paid fares for their rides set by the Uber pricing algorithm,’’ with certain exclusions, such as Mr. Kalanick. Plaintiff also identifies a ‘‘subclass’’ of riders who have paid fares based on surge pricing. Plaintiff alleges that he and the putative class have suffered antitrust injury because, were it not for Mr. Kalanick’s conspiracy to fix the fares charged by Uber drivers, drivers would have competed on price and Uber’s fares would have been ‘‘substantially lower.’’ Plaintiff also contends that Mr. Kalanick’s design has reduced output and that, as ‘‘independent studies have shown,’’ the effect of surge pricing is to lower demand so that prices remain artificially high. Based on these allegations, plaintiff claims that Mr. Kalanick has violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Donnelly Act, New York General Business Law § 340.

原告代表以下群体起诉：“在美国境内一个或多个场合使用Uber、从Uber司机处获取乘车服务，且其乘车费用由Uber定价算法确定的人”，但如Kalanick等人将被排除在外。原告还在用户群体中确定了一个“子类”，即根据激增定价模式支付车费的乘客。原告称，其与推定成立的原告诉讼集体遭受了垄断行为的侵害，因为若非Kalanick共谋操纵Uber车费定价，司机们会进行价格竞争，Uber车费就会“大幅降低”。原告还主张，Kalanick设计的定价模式减少了服务提供量，而且正如“独立研究表明”，激增定价可以产生降低需求的效果，通过人为方式将价格维持于高位。基于以上理由，原告主张Kalanick违反了《谢尔曼法》和《唐纳利法》。

图片来源于网络

[1] The Sherman Act prohibits ‘‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.’’ 15 U.S.C. § 1. ‘‘[A] plaintiff claiming a § 1 violation must first establish a combination or some form of concerted action between at least two legally distinct economic entities.’’ ‘‘If a § 1 plaintiff establishes the existence of an illegal contract or combination, it must then proceed to demonstrate that the agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade either per se or under the rule of reason.’’

[1] 《谢尔曼法》禁止“任何合同，组合使用信托或其他方式，或共谋，限制贸易或商业”。“若原告主张某行为违反该法，则其必须首先证明至少有两个在法律上相互独立的经济实体之间存在某种一致行为。”“若原告证明了非法合同或非法组合方式的存在，继而，其应当证明该合意本身（per se）或根据合理原则（rule of reason）构成了不合理的贸易限制。”

[2, 3] ‘‘Conduct considered illegal per se is invoked only in a limited class of cases, where a defendant’s actions are so plainly harmful to competition and so obviously lacking in any redeeming pro-competitive values that they are conclusively presumed illegal without further examination.’’ By contrast, ‘‘most anti-trust claims are analyzed under a ‘rule of reason,’ according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’’

[2, 3] “‘本身被认定为非法行为’这一理由仅在少量案件中被援引，在这些案件中，被告行为明显对竞争有害，并且明显不可能促进竞争，以至于无需进一步审查即可推定其违法。”相比之下，“大多数反垄断诉情根据‘合理原则’进行分析，根据该规则，事实认定者必须认定被质疑的做法是否对竞争施加了不合理的限制，在认定时可以考虑多种因素，包括相关业务的具体信息、限制实施前后的情况以及限制行为的历史、本质和效果等。”

[4] Antitrust law also distinguishes between vertical and horizontal price restraints. ‘‘Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at different levels of distribution as vertical restraints.’’ ‘‘Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices,’’ while, at least in the context of resale price maintenance, ‘‘[v]ertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.’’ In the instant case, the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately pled both a horizontal and a vertical conspiracy.

[4] 反垄断法还区分了纵向和横向的价格限制。“传统上，通过竞争者之间的协议而施加的限制被称为横向限制；通过不同层级公司之间的协议而施加的限制则被称为纵向限制。”“‘本身被认定为非法行为’的限制包括竞争者之间为操纵价格而订立的横向协议。不过，至少在转售价格维持的情况下，“纵向价格限制应根据合理原则来判断。在本案中，本院认为原告已经充分地论证了横向和纵向共谋。

图片来源于网络

[5] As to the horizontal conspiracy, plaintiff alleges that Uber drivers agree to participate in a conspiracy among themselves when they assent to the terms of Uber’s written agreement (the ‘‘Driver Terms’’) and accept riders using the Uber App. In doing so, plaintiff indicates, drivers agree to collect fares through the Uber App, which sets fares for all Uber drivers according to the Uber pricing algorithm, Uber drivers forgo competition in which they would otherwise have engaged because they ‘‘are guaranteed that other Uber drivers will not undercut them on price.’’ Without the assurance that all drivers will charge the price set by Uber, plaintiff contends, adopting Uber’s pricing algorithm would often not be in an individual driver’s best interest, since not competing with other Uber drivers on price may result in lost business opportunities. The capacity to generate ‘‘supra-competitive prices’’ through agreement to the Uber pricing algorithm thus provides, according to plaintiff, a ‘‘common motive to conspire’’ on the part of Uber drivers. Plaintiff also draws on its allegations about meetings among Uber drivers and the ‘‘September 2014 conspiracy,’’ in which Uber agreed to reinstitute higher fares after negotiations with drivers, to bolster its claim of a horizontal conspiracy.

[5] 关于横向共谋，原告主张，当Uber司机同意Uber书面协议的条款（下文简称“司机条款”）并接受使用Uber应用的乘客时，他们相当于同意了参与司机之间的共谋。原告表示，此时司机同意通过Uber应用收取费用，而Uber应用会基于其定价算法为所有Uber司机确定费用数额。在原告看来，Uber司机放弃了他们本会参与的竞争，因为Uber的定价算法可以“保证其他Uber司机不会比其出价更低”。原告认为，如果不能保证所有司机都按照Uber确定的价格收费，采用Uber定价算法往往无法实现个别司机的利益最大化，因为若某司机不与其他司机进行价格竞争，则其可能失去某些商业机会。因此，原告主张，Uber司机们“共同的共谋动机”是同意采用Uber定价算法，进而获取“超竞争价格”。原告还强调了其关于Uber司机会面的指控和“2014年9月共谋”的指控，以支持其关于横向共谋的主张。在原告看来，被告Kalanick作为价格垄断共谋行为的组织者应当承担责任。

Defendant Kalanick argues, however, that the drivers’ agreement to Uber’s Driver Terms evinces no horizontal agreement among drivers themselves, as distinct from vertical agreements between each driver and Uber. According to Mr. Kalanick, drivers’ individual decisions to enter into contractual arrangements with Uber constitute mere independent action that is insufficient to support plaintiff’s claim of a conspiracy. Defendant asserts that the most ‘‘natural’’ explanation for drivers’ conduct is that each driver ‘‘independently decided it was in his or her best interest to enter a vertical agreement with Uber,’’ and doing so could be in a driver’s best interest because, for example, Uber matches riders with drivers and processes payment. In defendant’s view, the fact that ‘‘a condition of [the agreement with Uber] was that the driver-partner agree to use Uber’s pricing algorithm’’ does not diminish the independence of drivers’ decisions.

然而，被告Kalanick认为，司机们同意司机条款的行为表明司机之间没有横向协议，因为前述横向协议与每个司机分别与Uber签订的纵向协议有所不同。根据Kalanick的说法，司机与Uber订立合同的个人行为仅构成独立行动，不构成原告主张的“共谋”。被告主张，对司机行为最“自然”的解释是，每个司机“独立做出了决定，认为其与Uber签订纵向协议有利于实现其个人的利益最大化”，司机与Uber签订纵向协议的确有利于实现其个人利益最大化，比如，Uber提供乘客与司机的匹配服务，且帮助双方处理支付事项。被告认为，“（与Uber订立协议）的条件之一是司机同意使用Uber的定价算法”这一事实并不会削弱司机决定的独立性。

The Court, however, is not persuaded to dismiss plaintiff’s horizontal conspiracy claim. In Interstate Circuit v. United States, the Supreme Court held that competing movie distributors had unlawfully restrained trade when they each agreed to a theater operator’s terms, including price restrictions, as indicated in a letter addressed to all the distributors. For an illegal conspiracy to exist, the Supreme Court stated:

It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it … Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.

Much more recently, the Second Circuit stated:

[C]ourts have long recognized the existence of ‘‘hub-and-spoke’’ conspiracies in which an entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘‘hub,’’ coordinates an agreement among competitors at a different level, the ‘‘spokes.’’ These arrangements consist of both vertical agreements between the hub and each spoke and a horizontal agreement among the spokes to adhere to the [hub’s] terms, often because the spokes would not have gone along with [the vertical agreements] except on the understanding that the other [spokes] were agreeing to the same thing.

但是，本院不认为应当据此驳回原告关于横向共谋的主张。在Interstate Circuit v. United States案中，最高法院认为，当分发给所有发行商的信函使彼此竞争的电影发行商各自与影院经营者达成协议，且协议中包括价格限制的内容，此时应当认定他们非法限制了贸易。在论证存在非法共谋时，最高法院指出：

“竞争者之间没有事先约定，但都接受邀请共同参与了一项计划，其必然导致州际贸易受到限制，这就足以认定构成《谢尔曼法》下的非法共谋。”

最近，第二巡回法院指出：

“长期以来，法院已经认识到轴辐类共谋的存在。在该种共谋中，‘枢纽’处于市场结构的一个层次，‘辐条’即处于市场结构的不同层次的竞争者，枢纽负责协调辐条之间的协议。前述协议既包括枢纽与各辐条之间的纵向协议，也包括辐条之间基于（枢纽与各辐条订立的纵向）协议的横向协议。通常来说，除非得知其他辐条也同意该纵向协议，否则某辐条自身不会单独同意该纵向协议。

In this case, plaintiff has alleged that drivers agree with Uber to charge certain fares with the clear understanding that all other Uber drivers are agreeing to charge the same fares. These agreements are organized and facilitated by defendant Kalanick, who as at least an occasional Uber driver, is also a member of the horizontal conspiracy.

在本案中，原告主张，司机们同意采用Uber的定价算法来确定应当收取的车费，并清楚地了解到其他所有Uber司机都同意收取相等车费。上述合意由被告Kalanick组织和促成，由于Kalanick偶尔也从事Uber司机的工作，故其也参与了横向共谋。

On a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Given this standard, the Court finds that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a conspiracy in which drivers sign up for Uber precisely ‘‘on the understanding that the other [drivers] were agreeing to the same’’ pricing algorithm, and in which drivers’ agreements with Uber would ‘‘be against their own interests were they acting independently.’’ Further, drivers’ ability to benefit from reduced price competition with other drivers by agreeing to Uber’s Driver Terms plausibly constitutes ‘‘a common motive to conspire.’’ The fact that drivers may also, in signing up for Uber, seek to benefit from other services that Uber provides, such as connecting riders to drivers and processing payment, is not to the contrary. Of course, whether plaintiff’s allegations are in fact accurate is a different matter, to be left to the fact-finding process.

对于驳回动议，本院应当明确所有有利于原告的合理推论。虑及该标准，本院认为原告已经充分论证了共谋行为。在该共谋行为中，司机正是“在了解到其他（司机）同意采用同一‘定价算法’的情况下才注册了Uber；且“若Uber司机独立行事，结果将违背其自身利益”。此外，若司机同意Uber的司机条款，则司机之间的价格竞争就会减弱，司机个人便能从中获益，这足以构成“共谋的动机”。司机注册Uber时可能也希望从Uber提供的其他服务中获益，如乘客-司机匹配服务、车费支付服务，但该事实与前述论证并不冲突。当然，原告提及的事实是否属实是另一个问题，尚待事实调查确认。

[6] The Court’s conclusion that plaintiff has alleged a plausible horizontal conspiracy is bolstered by plaintiff’s other allegations concerning agreement among drivers. Plaintiff, as noted supra, contends that Uber organizes events for drivers to get together, and, more importantly, that Mr. Kalanick agreed to raise fares following drivers’ efforts to negotiate higher rates in September 2014. While it is true that these allegations about agreements among drivers reaching even beyond acceptance of Uber’s Driver Terms are not extensive, nonetheless, they provide additional support for a horizontal conspiracy, and plaintiff need not present a direct, ‘‘smoking gun’’ evidence of a conspiracy, particularly at the pleading stage.

[6] 本院认为，原告已经充分论证了其存在横向共谋的主张，且原告关于司机之间合意的指控亦可支持该主张。如上所述，原告认为Uber为司机们组织了聚会活动，更重要的是，2014年9月司机们提出重新适用高额收费标准后，Kalanick同意了该请求。虽然原告并未就上述关于“司机之间的合意并不仅限于司机个体都同意了Uber司机条款”的指控展开详细的论证，但是这些指控为横向共谋提供了额外的证据。原告不需要针对共谋的指控提供直接、确切的证据，尤其是在起诉阶段。

[7] More basically, it is well to remember that a Sherman Act conspiracy is but one form of conspiracy, a concept that is as ancient as it is broad. It is fundamental to the law of conspiracy that the agreements that form the essence of the misconduct are not to be judged by technical niceties but by practical realities. Sophisticated conspirators often reach their agreements as much by the wink and the nod as by explicit agreement, and the implicit agreement may be far more potent, and sinister, just by virtue of being implicit. Recently, for example, in United States v. Ulbricht, the Government alleged that defendant Ulbricht had organized an online marketplace for illicit goods and services called Silk Road. In ruling on motions in limine in Ulbricht, Judge Forrest rejected the defense’s argument that transactions among Silk Road’s users gave rise to ‘‘only buy-sell relationships and not conspiratorial behavior’’ or, at most, to ‘‘a multitude of discrete conspiracies.’’ Instead, Judge Forrest noted that the Government charged the defendant with sitting ‘‘atop an overarching single conspiracy, which included all vendors who sold any type of narcotics on Silk Road at any time.’’ In the instant case, Uber’s digitally decentralized nature does not prevent the App from constituting a ‘‘marketplace’’ through which Mr. Kalanick organized a horizontal conspiracy among drivers.

图片来源于网络

[7] 更重要的是，应当认识到《谢尔曼法》中的共谋只是共谋的一种形式，共谋这一概念由来已久且内涵广泛。共谋理论的基本原则是，某种合意本质上是否构成非法行为，不应拘泥于法律规定的字面含义，而应结合实质判断。狡猾的共谋者往往通过眨眼和点头来达成他们的协议，该类行为的效果同明示订立协议并无二致；甚至默示订立的协议可能效力更为确定，也更具恶 意。例如，最近在United States v. Ulbricht案中，政府指控被告Ulbricht组织了一个名为“丝绸之路”的非法商品、服务网络交易市场。审理过程中，Forrest法官驳回了被告的以下主张：丝绸之路用户之间的交易只构成“买卖关系，而不构成共谋行为”，或者退一步说，最多也只产生了“众多各不相关的共谋”。然而，Forrest法官指出，政府指控被告构成“概括的同一共谋，该行为的主体包括任何时候在丝绸之路网站上出售任何类型致幻毒品的供应商”。本案中，Uber的数字化、去中心化本质并不妨碍其构成一个“市场”，使得Kalanick能够通过该应用在司机之间组织出一种横向共谋。

Defendant argues, however, that plaintiff’s alleged conspiracy is ‘‘wildly implausible’’ and ‘‘physically impossible,’’ since it involves agreement ‘‘among hundreds of thousands of independent transportation providers all across the United States.’’ Yet as plaintiff’s counsel pointed out at oral argument, the capacity to orchestrate such an agreement is the ‘‘genius’’ of Mr. Kalanick and his company, which, through the magic of smartphone technology, can invite hundreds of thousands of drivers in far-flung locations to agree to Uber’s terms. The advancement of technological means for the orchestration of large-scale price-fixing conspiracies need not leave antitrust law behind. The fact that Uber goes to such lengths to portray itself - one might even say disguise itself - as the mere purveyor of an ‘‘app’’ cannot shield it from the consequences of its operating as much more.

然而，被告认为，原告所称的共谋是“无稽之谈”且“没有现实的可能性”，因为它包括了“全美数十万独立的运输服务提供者之间的合意”。然而，正如原告律师在口头辩论中指出的，协调该种合意的能力正是Kalanick与其公司的“天才”之处。借助于智能手机技术，他们可以与遥远地区的数十万名司机达成协议。技术手段的进步使得大规模的价格垄断共谋得以实现，但这并不意味着反垄断法已被遗忘。Uber不遗余力地将自身描绘成——甚至可以说是伪装成——仅是一个“应用”的提供者，但这一事实并不能使其免于承担其运作的后果。

Recent jurisprudence on vertical resale price maintenance agreements does not, as defendant would have it, undermine plaintiff’s claim of an illegal horizontal agreement. In Leegin, the Supreme Court held that resale price maintenance agreements - e.g., a retailer’s agreement with a manufacturer not to discount the manufacturer’s goods beneath a certain price - are to be judged by the rule of reason, unlike horizontal agreements to fix prices, which are per se illegal. The Court cited various ‘‘procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance,’’ and concluded that although this practice may also have anti- competitive effects, the rule of reason is the best approach to distinguishing resale price maintenance agreements that violate the antitrust laws from those that do not.

最近关于纵向转售价格维持协议的判例，并非如被告所认为的那样削弱了原告关于非法横向协议的主张。在Leegin案中，最高法院认为，转售价格维持协议——例如，零售商与制造商所达成的限制特定商品价格下限的协议——应根据合理原则进行判断，这与横向协议不同，后者情形下固定价格行为本身就是非法的。法院援引了制造商维持转售价格可以带来的多种好处，并得出结论：尽管该种做法可能具有反竞争效果，但合理原则是确定转售价格维持协议是否违反反垄断法的最佳标准。

Here, unlike in Leegin, Uber is not selling anything to drivers that is then resold to riders. Moreover, the justifications for rule of reason treatment of resale price maintenance agreements offered in Leegin are not directly applicable to the instant case. In particular, the Court’s attention has not been drawn to concerns about free-riding Uber drivers, or to efforts that Uber drivers could make to promote the App that will be under-provided if Uber does not set a pricing algorithm. While Mr. Kalanick asserts that Uber’s pricing algorithm facilitates its market entry as a new brand, this observation - which is fairly conclusory - does not rule out a horizontal conspiracy among Uber drivers, facilitated by Mr. Kalanick both as Uber’s CEO and as a driver himself. The Court therefore finds that plaintiff has adequately pleaded a horizontal antitrust conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

本案与Leegin案的不同之处在于，Uber并未向司机出售标的，继而转卖给乘客。此外，Leegin案中对转售价格维持协议利用合理原则进行分析的理由并不直接适用于本案。特别是，本院并不认为本案中存在Uber司机搭便车的问题，也不认为如果Uber不采用定价算法，Uber司机为推广应用程序所做的努力将被低估。虽然Kalanick先生主张Uber的定价算法有利于其作为一个全新品牌打入市场，这一观点相当有说服力，但并不足以排除Uber司机之间的横向共谋，而Kalanick作为Uber的首席执行官和司机，也为该种共谋的达成提供了便利。因此，本院认为，原告已经充分论证了《谢尔曼法》第1条规定的横向反垄断共谋。

[8] As to plaintiff’s claim of a vertical conspiracy, a threshold question is whether plaintiff has alleged a vertical conspiracy in the Amended Complaint, which defendant denies. Although plaintiff’s allegations of a vertical conspiracy are much more sparse than his contentions about a horizontal conspiracy, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint adequately pleads a vertical conspiracy between each driver and Mr. Kalanick.6 In particular, plaintiff alleges that ‘‘[a]ll of the independent driver-partners have agreed to charge the fares set by Uber’s pricing algorithm,’’ and that Mr. Kalanick designed this business model. The Amended Complaint also includes several allegations that would be pertinent to a rule of reason, vertical price-fixing theory. Under the Sherman Act count, plaintiff states that the ‘‘unlawful arrangement consists of a series of agreements between Kalanick and each of the Uber driver-partners, as well as a conscious commitment among the Uber driver-partners to the common scheme of adopting the Uber pricing algorithm…’’ Plaintiff claims that Mr. Kalanick is per se liable as organizer of the conspiracy and as an occasional Uber driver, and then states that ‘‘[i]n the alternative, Kalanick is also liable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act under a ‘quick look’ or ‘rule of reason’ analysis.’’ In the Court’s view, these allegations of legal theory, when coupled with the allegations of pertinent facts, are sufficient to plead a vertical conspiracy theory.

[8] 至于原告有关纵向共谋的指控，前提性的问题是原告是否在修正后的起诉书中提出了有关纵向共谋的指控。被告对此做出否定回答。虽然原告指控纵向共谋的内容相较其指控横向共谋少得多，但本院认为，修正后的起诉书充分论证了每个司机与Kalanick之间达成的纵向共谋。特别是，原告主张“所有的独立司机都同意采用Uber的定价算法确定其收取的车费”，而Kalanick设计了这种商业模式。修正后的起诉书还包括有关合理原则、纵向价格垄断理论的几项指控。原告在基于《谢尔曼法》的指控中主张，“非法行为包括Kalanick和每个Uber司机之间达成的一系列协议，以及Uber司机之间对共同采用Uber定价算法的有意识的认可。原告主张，Kalanick作为共谋的组织者及偶尔从事工作的Uber司机，本身就应承担法律责任，进而指出“作为替代的论证思路，基于‘快速审查’或‘合理原则’理论进行分析，Kalanick也应根据《谢尔曼法》第1条承担责任。”本院认为，这些基于法律理论的指控，与结合事实进行论述的指控结合起来，就足以进行纵向共谋的论证。

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The question, then, is whether this theory is plausible under a ‘‘rule of reason’’ analysis. Under this analysis, ‘‘plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.’’ ‘‘To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an alleged product market must bear a rational relation to the methodology courts prescribe to define a market for antitrust purposes - analysis of the interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand, and it must be plausible.’’

随之而来的问题是，根据“合理原则”分析，这一观点是否合理。在该种分析思路之下，“原告有初始责任证明被质疑的行为对相关市场的整体竞争产生了实际的不利影响。”“若想避免被驳回请求的结果，在界定产品市场时必须合理运用反垄断法语境下定义市场的方法——分析产品用途可互换性、分析需求的交叉弹性，且分析过程应当具有说服力。”

[9] As to market definition, plaintiff defines the relevant market as the ‘‘mobile app-generated ride-share service market.’’ Plaintiff alleges that Uber has an approximately 80% market share in the United States in this market; Uber’s chief competitor Lyft has nearly a 20% market share; and a third competitor, Sidecar, left the market at the end of 2015. Plaintiff then explains that traditional taxi service is not a reasonable substitute for Uber, since, for example, rides generated by a mobile app can be arranged at the push of a button and tracked on riders’ mobile phones; riders need not carry cash or a credit card, or, upon arrival, spend time paying for the ride; and riders can rate drivers and see some information on them before entering the vehicle. Indeed, plaintiff claims, Uber has itself stated that it does not view taxis as ride-sharing competition.

[9] 至于市场的定义，原告将相关市场定义为“移动端共享乘车服务市场”。原告主张，在该领域的美国市场中，Uber占有约80%的市场份额；Uber的主要竞争对手Lyft占有近20%的市场份额；另一位竞争对手Sidecar于2015年底离开了该市场。原告随后解释，传统的出租车服务并非Uber服务的合理替代品，因为例如，使用移动应用打车可以在用户按下按钮时进行安排，并在用户手机上进行跟踪；乘客无需携带现金或信用卡，也无需在到达后花时间支付乘车费用；乘客可在进入车辆之前对司机进行评分，并获取他们的部分信息。事实上，原告称，Uber自身也曾表示并不认为出租车是共享出行的竞争对手。

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Plaintiff also alleges that traditional cars for hire are not reasonable substitutes, since they generally need to be scheduled in advance for prearranged locations. However, plaintiff nevertheless contends that ‘‘Uber has obtained a significant share of business in the combined markets of taxis, cars for hire, and mobile-app generated ride-share services,’’ and that Uber’s own experts have suggested that in some U.S. cities, Uber has 50% to 70% of business customers ‘‘among all types of rides,’’ which seems to refer to these combined markets.

原告还声称，传统的汽车租赁服务也不是合理的替代品，因为该类服务通常需要根据预先确定的地点提前预约时间。不过，原告认为，“Uber在出租车服务、汽车租赁服务、移动端共享乘车服务的综合市场中占有了相当大的市场份额，”Uber自身聘请的也专家认为，在某些美国城市，Uber在“所有类型的乘车服务中”占有了“50%到70%的商业客户。“所有类型的乘车服务”，似乎指的就是前述的综合市场。

Defendant contests plaintiff’s proposed market definition, arguing that plaintiff provides inadequate justification for the exclusion not just of taxis and car services, but also of public transit such as subways and buses, personal vehicle use, and walking. In defendant’s view, ‘‘[e]ach of these alternatives is a clear substitute for the services provided by driver-partners.’’

被告质疑了原告提出的市场定义，认为原告的理由不充分。因为其不仅排除了出租车服务和汽车租赁服务，还排除了地铁和巴士等公共交通方式，私家车使用以及步行方式。在被告看来，“前述替代方案中的任一项明显均为Uber服务的替代品"。

[10] One could argue this either way (and defendant’s attorneys are encouraged to hereinafter walk from their offices to the courthouse to put their theory to the test). But for present purposes, plaintiff has provided plausible explanations for its proposed market definition, and the accuracy of these explanations may be tested through discovery and, if necessary, trial. ‘‘Market definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry [and] courts [therefore] hesitate to grant motions to dismiss for failure to plead a relevant product market.’’ Plaintiff’s allegation that Uber - an industry member - recognizes that it does not compete with taxis, also deserves consideration. The Court finds that plaintiff has pleaded a plausible relevant product market.

[10] 被告当然可以以上述理由争辩（且本院也鼓励被告律师从办公室步行至法院，以实践验证他们的观点）。但就目前而言，原告已为其提出的市场定义提供了充分的解释，前述解释是否属实可以通过证据开示程序验证，必要时亦可通过审判确认。“市场定义是一个与事实密切相关的问题，因此，当原告未能充分论证相关产品市场的界定时，本院倾向于驳回其请求。原告主张Uber——作为行业竞争者之一——认为其自身不与出租车竞争，这一理由也值得纳入考虑。本院认定，原告已经充分地论证了其关于相关产品市场的界定。

[11] The Court further finds that plaintiff has adequately pleaded adverse effects in the relevant market. Specifically, plaintiff pleads that ‘‘Kalanick’s actions have further restrained competition by decreasing output,’’; ‘‘Uber’s market position has already helped force Sidecar out of the marketplace,’’; ‘‘Uber’s dominant position and considerable name recognition has also made it difficult for potential competitors to enter the market-place.’’

[11] 本院还认为，原告已经充分论证了被告行为在相关市场中造成的不利影响。具体而言，原告认为“Kalanick通过减少服务提供量进一步限制了竞争”；“Uber的市场地位迫使Sidecar退出市场”；“Uber的主导地位及其高知名度也使得潜在竞争对手难以进入市场”。

Defendant counters that Uber provides many pro-competitive benefits, and also disputes the conclusions that plaintiff purports to draw from the cited studies. See Def. Letter. Defendant’s counter-assertions, while certainly well worth a fact-finder’s consideration, do not persuade the Court to grant a motion to dismiss. The Court hence determines that plaintiff has plausibly pleaded adverse effects in the relevant market. Consequently, the Court finds that plaintiff has presented a plausible claim of a vertical conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

被告反驳说，Uber也提供了诸多促进竞争的益处，并质疑了原告试图从其引用的研究中得出的结论。被告的反驳虽然很值得事实调查部门加以考虑，但并不能说服法院驳回原告请求。法院认为原告对相关市场的不利影响进行了充分论证。因此，本院认为，原告充分论证了其基于《谢尔曼法》第1条所规定的纵向共谋的主张。

For these reasons, the Court denies defendant Kalanick’s motion to dismiss.

基于这些原因，本院驳回被告Kalanick的请求。

原文来源：Case 1:15-cv-09796-JSR