判例译析 | 原告违法抗辩限制规则之“依赖原则”

译者  |  胡月奕 清华大学J.M. candidate

一审  |  汪晨涵 复旦大学法律硕士

二审  |  peipei Bristol LL.M.

编辑  |  王冰子 烟台大学本科

责编  |  戚琳颖 大连海事大学

Tinsley Appellant v. Milligan Respondent

判决日期：1993年6月24日

案号：[1994] 1 A.C. 340

原告Tinsley和被告Milligan共同出资购买了一栋房产用于同居。她们把房子用作旅馆，这一合营行为为她们提供了大部分的收入。双方同意成为该房产的受益共有人，但产权登记在Tinsley一人名下，这样Milligan就可以进行从社保机构处骗取社保福利，该欺诈行为获得了Tinsley的完全知情同意。后双方关系破裂，Tinsley提出诉讼，因房产产权完整归属于Tinsley而主张驱逐Milligan；Milligan反诉要求法院下达房屋出售令，并宣布该房产是由Tinsley为两人利益以信托方式持有的，两人在该信托中的受益份额相等。

Caerphilly县法院Hywel ap Robert法官于1990年7月26日作出判决，驳回了原告向被告Kathleen Milligan提出的占有该房产的要求，并对被告提出的反诉作出裁决，宣布原告确以信托方式为被告和原告持有相同份额的房产，并下令依照Milligan的主张出售该房产。1991年7月30日，上诉法院驳回了原告Tinsley提出的上诉请求。原告Tinsley对上诉法院的判决提出上诉，该案最终递交至英国最高司法机构上议院。上议院五个大法官以三票反对（Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle，Lord Lowry，Lord Browne-Wilkinson）两票赞成（Lord Keith of Kinkel，Lord Goff of Chieveley），驳回了Tinsley的请求。

（图片源自网络）

Whether the claim of the respondent to an interest in the property in question is defeated by reason of frauds practised on the Department of Social Security.

被告Milligan对涉案财产权益的主张是否会因其对社会保障部的欺诈行为而无效？

（1）何谓归复信托（Resulting Trusts）

归复信托属于默示信托的一种。委托人并未明确表达成立信托的意思（intention），但是其在进行财产转移时并未完全放弃财产权益，在此情况下法院会施加一个信托，以将该财产“归复”给委托人。归复信托又分为假定的归复信托（Presumed Resulting Trusts）和自动的归复信托（Automatic Resulting Trusts）。前者主要发生在两种情形下：一、委托人自愿转让财产，二、委托人以他人名义购买财产。本案所涉的即是第二种情形；后者往往出现在一项信托因标的物不确定、未能满足信托的形式要件等原因被宣布无效时（如委托人为其子设立一项信托，条件是儿子年满25岁时信托成立，但其子在22岁时不幸死亡，这时信托财产会自动归复给委托人[1]）。

（2）求助于衡平法者自身必须清白（He who comes into equity must come with clean hand）

Lord Goff of Chieveley在本案中对本原则论述如下：

The reason why the court of equity will not assist the claimant to recover his property or to assert his interest in it has been variously stated. It is sometimes said that it is because he has not come to equity with clean hands.

衡平法院不协助索赔人追回其财产或不主张其在财产中的权益之原因众说纷纭。有人说，这是因为索赔人来衡平法庭时没有带着一双“清洁的手”[2]。

据此可知，在衡平法庭，原告的违法行为可被作为否定其诉讼请求的一项抗辩事由，但该抗辩的适用也可能会造成对原告明显不公的结果。因此，“如何限制该抗辩的适用，妥当平衡作为侵权人的被告与涉嫌违法的原告之间的利益就变得极为关键”[3]，本案即就此问题展开讨论并确立规则。

（图片源自网络）

I agree with the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Goff of Chieveley, that the consequences of being a party to an illegal transaction cannot depend, as the majority in the Court of Appeal held, on such an imponderable factor as the extent to which the public conscience would be affronted by recognising rights created by illegal transactions. However, I have the misfortune to disagree with him as to the correct principle to be applied in a case where equitable property rights are acquired as a result of an illegal transaction.

我同意我高贵而博学的朋友Chieveley地区Goff大法官的发言，即不能像上诉法院的多数人所认为的那样，让非法交易一方的后果取决于“承认非法交易所产生的权利会在多大程度上冒犯公众良知”这样一个无法估量的因素[4]。然而，很遗憾，在对因非法交易而获得衡平法所有权时应适用何种正确的原则这一问题上，我不赞同他的观点。

Neither at law nor in equity will the court enforce an illegal contract which has been partially, but not fully, performed. However, it does not follow that all acts done under a partially performed contract are of no effect. In particular it is now clearly established that at law (as opposed to in equity), property in goods or land can pass under, or pursuant to, such a contract. If so, the rights of the owner of the legal title thereby acquired will be enforced, provided that the plaintiff can establish such title without pleading or leading evidence of the illegality.

无论是在普通法还是衡平法上，法院都不会强制执行尚未完全履行的非法契约。然而，这并不意味着依据部分履行的非法契约所做出的所有行为都无效。尤其是现已清晰规定，在（与衡平法相对的）普通法中，货物或土地上的财产可以根据或依据此类契约转让，在这种情况下，如果原告可以在无需为违法行为提出抗辩或在证据中披露的情况下确立该所有权，则将强制执行由此类契约获得的法定所有权人的权利。

The position at law is further illustrated by Ferret v. Hill (1854) 15 C.B. 207 where A, with intent to use premises as a brothel, took a lease from B. B, having discovered that the premises were being used as a brothel, ejected A. A was held entitled to maintain ejectment against B notwithstanding that A entered into the lease for an illegal purpose.

Ferret v.Hill（1854）这一案件进一步说明了普通法（对此问题）的立场。当事人A从B处取得租约，并意图将该租赁场所用作妓院，B发现该租赁场所被用作妓院后将A驱逐。法院认为尽管A是出于非法目的签订的租约，A仍有权主张对B的逐出租地之诉。

……From these authorities the following propositions emerge: (1) property in chattels and land can pass under a contract which is illegal and therefore would have been unenforceable as a contract; (2) a plaintiff can at law enforce property rights so acquired provided that he does not need to rely on the illegal contract for any purpose other than providing the basis of his claim to a property right; (3) it is irrelevant that the illegality of the underlying agreement was either pleaded or emerged in evidence: if the plaintiff has acquired legal title under the illegal contract that is enough.

（……Lord Browne-Wilkinson又援引了Taylor v. Chester及Alexander v. Rayson）这些先例提出了以下主张：（1）动产和地产可以根据非法且因此不可被强制执行的契约而被转让；（2） 在普通法中，原告可以强制执行如此获得的所有权，只要他除了提供财产权主张基础之外，不需要用非法契约于其他目的；（3）作为基础的契约，其非法性是否被提出抗辩，或在证据中被披露出来（对于所有权的取得）是无关紧要的：只要原告根据非法契约取得了普通法上的所有权就足够了。

I have stressed the common law rules as to the impact of illegality on the acquisition and enforcement of property rights because it is the appellant’s contention that different principles apply in equity. In particular it is said that equity will not aid Miss Milligan to assert, establish or enforce an equitable, as opposed to a legal, proprietary interest since she was a party to the fraud on the D.S.S. The house was put in the name of Miss Tinsley alone (instead of joint names) to facilitate the fraud. Therefore, it is said, Miss Milligan does not come to equity with clean hands: consequently, equity will not aid her.

我强调了在普通法中，非法性对取得和执行所有权之影响的规则，是因为上诉人Tinsley女士主张在衡平法中（对待非法性之于取得及执行所有权问题）需适用不同的规则。特别是，有说法称衡平法不会帮助Milligan女士主张、确立或执行衡平法而非普通法上的权益，因为她是欺诈社会保障部的一方，出于欺诈的目的，标的房屋仅以Tinsley女士的名义（而非联名的方式）进行登记，因此Milligan女士来衡平法庭时没有带着一双“清洁的手”[5]。

（图片源自网络）

In my judgment to draw such distinctions between property rights enforceable at law and those which require the intervention of equity would be surprising. More than 100 years has elapsed since the administration of law and equity became fused. The reality of the matter is that, in 1993, English law has one single law of property made up of legal and equitable interests. Although for historical reasons legal estates and equitable estates have differing incidents, the person owning either type of estate has a right of property, a right in rem not merely a right in personam. If the law is that a party is entitled to enforce a property right acquired under an illegal transaction, in my judgment the same rule ought to apply to any property right so acquired, whether such right is legal or equitable.

在我看来，在可依普通法执行的所有权和需要衡平法介入的所有权之间做出这样的区分是令人惊讶的。自从普通法和衡平法融合以来，已经过去了100多年。而现实情况是，直到1993年，英国法律仅有一部由普通法及衡平法上的权益共同组成的财产法。尽管由于历史原因，普通法上的不动产权益和衡平法上的不动产权益有不同的附随条件，但拥有任何一种不动产的人都有一个所有权——一个对物权（可理解为“对世权”）而非仅是对人权。如果在普通法中一方有权执行自非法交易中取得的所有权，那么我认为同样的规则应该适用于任何自非法交易获得的所有权，无论这种权利是普通法上的还是衡平法上的。

In the present case, Miss Milligan claims under a resulting or implied trust. The court below have found, and it is not now disputed, that apart from the question of illegality Miss Milligan would have been entitled in equity to a half share in the house in accordance with the principles exemplified in Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886; Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch. 638 and Lloyds Bank Plc. v. Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107. The creation of such an equitable interest does not depend upon a contractual obligation but on a common intention acted upon by the parties to their detriment. It is a development of the old law of resulting trust under which, where two parties have provided the purchase money to buy a property which is conveyed into the name of one of them alone, the latter is presumed to hold the property on a resulting trust for both parties in shares proportionate to their contributions to the purchase price.

在本案中，Milligan女士根据一项默示信托提出索赔请求。下级法院在审理本案时已经认定，而且在本庭也没有争议的是，除了非法性的问题，根据Gissing v. Gissing [1971]、 Grant v. Edwards [1986]和Lloyds Bank Plc. v. Rosset [1991] 中所体现的原则，Milligan小姐在衡平法上有权获得该房屋一半的份额。这种衡平法权益的产生并不取决于合同义务，而是取决于双方当事人为了损害（社会保障部利益）而采取的共同意图。它是归复信托旧有法则的发展，根据该法则，如果双方提供了购买房地产的资金，而该房地产被转让到其中一方的名下，则后者被推定为以归复信托的方式为两方持有该房地产，（双方在该信托中持有的）份额与他们购入房地产时的出资贡献成正比。

The carrying out of the illegal purpose cannot, by itself, destroy the pre-existing equitable interest. The doctrine of locus poenitentiae therefore demonstrates that the effect of illegality is not to prevent a proprietary interest in equity from arising or to produce a forfeiture of such right: the effect is to render the equitable interest unenforceable in certain circumstances. The effect of illegality is not substantive but procedural. The question therefore is, 'In what circumstances will equity refuse to enforce equitable rights which undoubtedly exist.”

实施非法目的本身并不能破坏预先存在的衡平法权益，“悬崖勒马”[6]原则[7]表明：违法行为不会阻却衡平法所有权利益的产生，也不会导致对该种权利的剥夺，其效果是使衡平法利益在某些情况下无法执行。非法性的影响是程序性的而非实质性的。因此问题是 “在什么情况下，衡平法会拒绝执行必然存在的衡平法权利？”

（图片源自网络）

The fusion of law and equity has led the courts to adopt a single rule (applicable both at law and in equity) as to the circumstances in which the court will enforce property interests acquired in pursuance of an illegal transaction, viz., the Bowmakers rule [1945] K.B. 65. A party to an illegality can recover by virtue of a legal or equitable property interest if, but only if, he can establish his title without relying on his own illegality. In cases where the presumption of advancement applies, the plaintiff is faced with the presumption of gift and therefore cannot claim under a resulting trust unless and until he has rebutted that presumption of gift: for those purposes the plaintiff does have to rely on the underlying illegality and therefore fails.

普通法和衡平法的融合导致法院采用了一个可同时适用于普通法和衡平法的单一规则，即Bowmakers规则[8]，用以说明法院在何种情况下会强制执行根据非法交易取得的财产利益：有非法行为的一方可以追回其在普通法或衡平法上的财产利益，但前提是只有在其可以不依赖自己的非法行为来确定其所有权。在适用“预付款”推定[9]的案件中，原告被推定其交出的“预付款”是一笔赠与，除非原告反驳了赠与的意图推定，否则不能根据“预付款”产生的归复信托提出索赔请求。因此，就提出索赔请求这一目的而言，原告确实必须依赖其行为的非法性，并将会败诉。[10]

I therefore reach the conclusion that, although there is no case overruling the wide principle stated by Lord Eldon, as the law has developed the equitable principle has become elided into the common law rule. In my judgment the time has come to decide clearly that the rule is the same whether a plaintiff founds himself on a legal or equitable title: he is entitled to recover if he is not forced to plead or rely on the illegality, even if it emerges that the title on which he relied was acquired in the course of carrying through an illegal transaction.

因此，我得出的结论是，尽管没有先例去推翻Eldon大法官所述的宽泛衡平法原则[11]，但随着法律的发展，衡平法原则已被掩盖在普通法规则之中。根据我的判断，现在是时候清楚地作出决定：无论原告是否基于普通法或衡平法上的所有权，规则都是一样的——如果当事人没有被迫作出抗辩或依赖非法性（来进行诉讼），他就有权收回财产，即使他（收回财产时）所依赖的所有权是在进行非法交易的过程中取得的。

As applied in the present case, that principle would operate as follows. Miss Milligan established a resulting trust by showing that she had contributed to the purchase price of the house and that there was common understanding between her and Miss Tinsley that they owned the house equally. She had no need to allege or prove why the house was conveyed into the name of Miss Tinsley alone, since that fact was irrelevant to her claim: it was enough to show that the house was in fact vested in Miss Tinsley alone. The illegality only emerged at all because Miss Tinsley sought to raise it. Having proved these facts, Miss Milligan had raised a presumption of resulting trust. There was no evidence to rebut that presumption. Therefore Miss Milligan should succeed.

在本案中，该原则的适用情况如下：Milligan女士通过证明她对房子的购买做出了贡献，并且她和Tinsley女士之间对她们平等地拥有这座房子存在共识，从而由此建立了一个归复信托。Milligan女士没有必要陈述或证明为什么房子被转到了Tinsley女士一个人的名下，因为该事实与她的主张无关：只要证明房子实际上是归属于Tinsley女士一个人就足够了。非法性问题的出现只是因为Tinsley女士试图提出它。在证明了上述事实后，Milligan女士提出了一个假定的归复信托，而没有证据可以反驳这一假定，据此Milligan女士应该胜诉。

注释

判决原文：http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs6/tinsley.html