经济学人商业 || 公司治理

Corporate governance

公司治理

Out with the proxies

赶走代理人

America’s shareholder advisers come under fire

美国的股东顾问受到抨击

注：

come under fire: = be under fire , to be criticized severely for sth you have done 受到严厉批评；遭到猛烈批判. 来枚栗子The health minister has come under fire from all sides. 卫生部长遭到来自各方的猛烈批评。fire 的另一个常用短语，fuel to the fire 火上浇油，再来枚栗子The decision to raise tariffs on imports will only add fuel to the fire.上调进口关税的决定只会火上浇油。（出自金山词霸）

Proxy advisory services used to be an obscure feature of corporate America. No longer. These geeky outfits, which review mountains of proposals put forward by shareholders on topics ranging from mergers and executive pay to climate change and diversity, then issue recommendations, can sway how their clients vote. Given that most are big institutional investors with clout, this advice matters. Earlier this year analysts at Credit Suisse, an investment bank, predicted that proxy advisers’ counsel would decide the fate of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s mammoth $74bn bid for Celgene, a rival drugmaker.

代理顾问服务曾是美国企业一个鲜为人知的特点。时过境迁，现在这些智力超群的团队会审查股东提出的大量提案，涉及的话题包括并购，高管薪酬，气候变化和多样性，而后提出建议，这些建议往往能够左右客户的投票。考虑到客户大多数都是有影响力的大型机构投资者，这些建议分量很重。今年早些时候，一位瑞信（Credit Suisse，瑞士信贷银行股份有限公司，简称瑞信）的分析师预测，代理顾问的建议将决定百时美施贵宝公司（Bristol-Myers Squibb）是否会以高达740亿美元的金额收购竞争对手新基制药（Celgene）。

Big institutional investors like Capital Group and Fidelity have in-house teams to deal with such matters. But most funds rely on outside advisers. Two of them dominate the business. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), owned by Genstar, an American private-equity firm, provides proxy recommendations on over 40,000 shareholder meetings in more than 100 countries each year. Glass Lewis informs some 20,000 votes in 100 countries. It is owned by two Canadian asset managers. Between them, ISS and Glass Lewis control 97% of America’s proxy-advice market.

像资本集团（Capital Group）和富达（Fidelity）这样的大型机构投资者都有自己的团队来处理此类事宜。但是其他大多数基金还是依赖外面的顾问。其中两家代理顾问服务公司在行业中处于主导地位。一家为美国私募股权公司Genstar旗下的机构股东服务公司(ISS)，其每年为100多个国家的4万多场股东会议提供代理建议。另外一家代理顾问公司Glass Lewis则在100个国家提供了约2万次的投票相关咨询。Glass Lewis由两家加拿大资产管理公司共有。 这两大代理公司控制了97%的美国代理顾问服务市场。

Their client base has boomed. In 1950 institutions held only 10% of American shares. By 2018 it was close to 80%. As shareholder activism has grown in America, so have proxy battles—from 270 campaigns in 2012 to over 300 this year. Proliferating passive investment funds, led by Vanguard, are keenly handing their voting rights over to proxy advisers.

代理顾问公司的客户群蓬勃发展。1950年，金融机构仅持有10%的美国股票，而2018年这个数字已接近80%。随着股东积极主义（shareholder activism）在美国的发展，代理战争也是不断升级—从2012年的270场到今年的300多场。先锋集团(Vanguard)为首的被动投资基金正异常踊跃地将投票权交给代理顾问。

注:

1.Shareholder activism: Shareholder activism is a way that shareholders can influence a corporation's behavior by exercising their rights as partial owners. Classes of shares allow for distinct voting privileges, in addition to dividend entitlements.

2.Vanguard,美国先锋集团，前身为成立于1929年的威灵顿基金，现为世界上第二大基金管理公司，管理全世界3700多亿美元资产，拥有1000多万名客户。

Zombie apocalypse

僵尸启示录

Business lobbies have had enough. “We have been concerned about proxy advisory firms for some time,” says Tom Quaadman of the US Chamber of Commerce. He argues that they lack transparency and have “significant” conflicts of interest arising from their consulting divisions, which advise companies on improving corporate governance. A report from the chamber last year bemoaned an onslaught of “zombie proposals”, which come up repeatedly—and repeatedly fail to win a majority of votes.

商业游说团体已经受够了这种情况。美国商会的汤姆•夸曼（Tom Quaadman）表示，“我们关注代理顾问服务公司有一段时间了”。他认为这些公司缺乏透明度，而且他们的咨询部门由于建议企业改善公司治理而存在“重大”的利益冲突。去年，美国商会的一份报告抱怨“僵尸提案”大量出现——这些提案被反复提交，却从未能赢得多数选票。

In August America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ruled that voting recommendations made by the advisers amounted to “solicitations” under proxy rules, a higher regulatory standard than the firms faced before. They would, for instance, have to prove compliance with anti-fraud provisions. ISS filed a lawsuit in response. On November 5th the  SEC proposed more rule changes, “to improve the accuracy and transparency of proxy voting advice”. Among other things, these would raise the minimum share of votes required for shareholder proposals to succeed and let target firms review proxy recommendations twice before investors see them.

8月，美国证监会（SEC）裁定，顾问的投票建议等同于“征集股东投票委托书”的行为，与之前规定相比，新规定对代理顾问公司更加严苛。比如，他们必须要证明其行为符合反欺诈条款。ISS提起诉讼作为回应。11月5日，美国证监会拟议变更更多规则，以求提高代理投票建议的准确性及透明度。新规会提高股东提案通过所需最少投票数的门槛，且要求代理顾问公司在将代理建议呈递给投资者之前反复审核。

注：Proxy solicitation: Attempt by a group to obtain the authorization of other members to vote on their behalf in an organizational ballot. In corporate settings, a proxy solicitation is usually accompanied by a 'proxy statement.'

Corporate groups are cock-a-hoop. The National Association of Manufacturers, one of those spearheading the proxy war, declared that the proposal was “a significant victory” that “sets up reasonable guardrails” on the proxy process. Joseph Grundfest of Stanford Law School sees nothing wrong with giving firms the chance to challenge the factual basis of recommendations: “As long as ISS is accurate in everything it does, it has no additional legal liability.”

公司集团得意洋洋。作为代理之争的急先锋，全美制造商协会（the National Association of Manufacturers）表示，该提案是一次“重大的胜利”，在代理过程中“建立了合理的防护栏”。斯坦福法学院的约瑟夫·格伦德费斯特（Joseph Grundfest）认为，给公司提供机会挑战代理建议的事实基础并无不妥之处: “只要ISS所做皆准确无误，则不会承担额外的法律责任”。

注：

cock-a-hoop: ~ (about/at/over sth) (informal) very pleased and excited, especially about achieving sth, 兴高采的 ，得意洋洋的,不常用在名词前。来枚栗子：She’s cock-aa-hoop about getting the job. 她因得到这份工作而洋洋得意。

Nonsense, say critics of the new provisions, who liken them to slapping a tax on advice critical of management. Charles Elson of the University of Delaware argues the  SEC proposal is “a punitive solution looking for a problem”. He believes that business chambers’ claims of vast numbers of errors in proxy recommendations are overblown. It is telling that few of the proxy advisory firms’ institutional clients, who would be most affected by erroneous or conflicted advice, are complaining.

新规则的批评者则表示这简直是一派胡言，他们将其比作对批判管理的意见强制加税。特拉华大学（the University of Delaware）的查尔斯·埃尔森(Charles Elson)则认为SEC的提案是“没事找事的惩罚性措施”。他认为商会所说的代理建议存在诸多错误言过其实。显而易见，错误或者矛盾的建议对代理顾问服务公司的机构客户影响最大,但几乎没有客户有诸如此类的抱怨。

On the contrary. “The goal of the co-ordinated, corporate-funded campaigns…is to make it harder and more expensive for institutional investors to get the expert advice they need to hold executives accountable,” says the Council of Institutional Investors, which represents funds with $4trn in assets under management. Chris Ailman of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, which has $242bn in assets, fears a return to “egregious management behaviour”. “People have forgotten Enron and WorldCom,” he warns, referring to two huge corporate-fraud scandals in the early 2000s.

相反，管理4万亿资产基金的机构投资者委员会（the Council of Institutional Investors）则表示，“这场共同协作且公司站台的代理之战，其目的是让机构投资者以更加困难成本更高的方式来获取专家意见，而这些意见在监督高管履行公司管理职责方面又不可或缺。”加利佛尼亚教师退休基金（the California State Teachers’ Retirement System，该机构拥有2420亿资产）的克里斯·埃尔曼（Chris Ailman）担心“恶性管理行为”卷土重来。他警告称，“大家都已经忘记安然和世通事件了”。上述两起事件是21世纪初两起特大公司欺诈丑闻。

Drew Chapman of Baker Botts, a law firm, sees the proposed rule changes as double-edged. More transparency should in principle benefit investors. But tougher solicitation rules may make it easier for a firm’s management to sue the proxy firms over advice it does not like—possibly discouraging them from being overly critical.

贝克鲍茨律师事务所（Baker Botts）的德鲁·查普曼（Drew Chapman）则认为，新规则似一把双刃剑。高透明度道理上会惠及投资者。但高标准的征集股东投票委托书可能会让公司的管理层轻易就采取诉讼手段起诉其不满意的代理顾问公司，从而导致代理公司不敢发表过于激进的批判性意见。

The SEC’s proposal now enters a 60-day comment period. The regulator is expected to make a final ruling early next year. The advisory firms may then challenge it in court. That could stretch the fight out by months, or even years.

美国证监会的提案现在已进入为期60天的意见征集期。监管机构预计在明年早些时候给出最终的准行规则。部分代理顾问公司也许会通过法律途径去质疑新规则。整个进程因此会拖慢数月，甚至数年。

Another outcome is possible. The SEC could instead modify the proposal to soften its sharp edges. This would push proxy firms to be more transparent, especially about possible conflicts of interest, but without burdening them with costly new regulations and reporting requirements. Robert Jackson, a dissenting commissioner on the  SEC(and rare regulator with deep expertise in data analytics), makes the economic case for finesse.

当然也可能出现另一种结果。美国证监会也许会修改提案中争议较大的内容，这将促使代理公司更加透明，尤其可能会存在利益冲突的情况下，但又不用成本高昂的新法规和报告要求给他们增加负担。美国证监会反对票的委员罗伯特·杰克逊（Robert Jackson）（是数据分析领域内为数不多专业知识深厚的监管者）的研究完善了这一提案。

Mr Jackson’s research suggests that bosses are right to complain about nuisance proposals. Shareholder votes put forward by “gadflies”—the ten most prolific submitters in any given year—coincided with declines in returns at American target firms in the months following a shareholder meeting. However, listed American firms which faced non-gadfly proposals outperformed the market by 5% one year after the shareholder meeting at which they were presented was held.

杰克逊的研究证实老板有理由抱怨惹人讨厌的提议。讨人厌的十大谏客（任意年度十个最积极的意见专家）的提议若被采纳，目标公司的收益在股东大会之后的几个月会有明显下降。反之，没有上十大谏客意见书的上市公司在股东大会之后一年内，其股票的表现则会跑赢市场5%。 

注：

The term “Corporate Gadfly” refers to an activist investor who ardently advocates for change through the use of shareholder proposals. They are also usually distinctive for their practice of attending shareholder meetings to vociferously grill management.

http://theshareholderactivist.com/shareholder-activism-spotlight/what-is-a-corporate-gadfly/

That implies that any final SEC ruling should put off gadflies, but not other proposals that would keep managements honest. Doing this will not be easy. But the SEC can surely do better than its current suggestions. These seem overly kind to managers—and, in Mr Jackson’s words, “swat at a gadfly with a sledgehammer”.

这一效应表明，无论美国证监会最终采取何种规定，都应阻止讨人厌的谏客，但也不能妨害其他实现公司诚信管理的提议。虽然知易行难，但我们有理由相信美国证监会能够提出比目前更好的提案。目前的提案似乎对公司管理者过分友好——用杰克逊的话来说就是“杀鸡焉用牛刀”。

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