The Saudi attacks

沙特（石油工业的心脏地带）遭受了一系列袭击

Abqaiq the powder keg

中东火药桶布盖格已被引爆，大战一触即发！

注：

1.powder keg

a situation or a place that could easily become extremely dangerous

2.Abqaiq：布盖格炼油厂位于沙特首都利雅得东北方向大约330公里，由油气巨头沙特阿美公司运营。按照这家国有企业的说法，布盖格炼油厂是“世界最大的原油净化工厂”，处理原油能力达每天700万桶。

Nobody wants a war in the Middle East.That is why Iranian aggression needs a tough response

没有人想在中东挑起战争，这就是伊朗的侵略需要作出强烈回应的原因。

注：这里会对That is why Iranian aggression needs a tough response有疑问，看完正文或者网页版标题就秒懂了，结合正文对伊朗的侵略作出强烈回应的原因有二

1.让伊朗意识到侵略是有代价

2.让伊朗能够回到和核谈判桌上

所以这也是小编为什么推荐大家订阅经济学人阅读网页版的原因之一，其他原因如下：

1.主副标题以及摘要与app版以及pdf版中的不同

2.网页版中有很多超链接，会有其他相关联的文章加深理解

3.消失了的评论区，曾经每篇文章都有comments，而且是来自全世界人民的自由评论，可以听听大家的一些想法，现在没有了

To reduce its climate risks, the world needs to curtail its production of oil. But there was nothing risk-reducing about the strike >article). It was a bigger loss to world markets than that brought about by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. That aggression led to a march on Baghdad by 35 countries. The strike last weekend was not an invasion; but an attack that reduces global oil supply by 6% is everybody’s business. Even if Saudi Arabia fulfills its pledge to restore output by the end of September, supplies from the world’s largest oil exporter are now vulnerable.

为缓解气候危机，全球石油产量需要削减。但像9月14号攻击沙特油田设施这种行为绝不会起到缓解危机的作用。阿比克（Abqaiq）和库赖（Khurais）两处油田设施遭受无人机和导弹袭击，致使沙特每日减产570万桶石油。此次袭击相比于1991年萨达姆·胡赛因（Saddam Hussein）入侵科威特，对世界石油市场造成的伤害更大。当年的入侵最终导致35个国家联合出兵巴格达（即海湾战争）。上周末的袭击虽称不上入侵，但却让全球石油供给量减少了6%，如此便与众人休戚相关了。即便沙特阿拉伯履行承诺于九月底恢复石油产量，这个全球最大石油出口国的供应目前也很脆弱。

Houthi rebels fighting Saudi Arabia in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack. They are backed byike Pompeo, the secretary of state, has called it “an act of war”. The details matter, but do not change the question: how to curb the aggression of Iran and its proxies?

在也门与沙特作战的胡塞武装声称对袭击负责。这支武装力量背后有伊朗支持，使用伊朗的武器。美方可能掌握证据证明此次袭击来自伊朗。美国国务卿麦克·蓬佩奥称之为“战争行为”。 追究细节很重要，但千万不能转移话题：如何遏制伊朗及其代理人的攻击？

Among the causes of this crisis lie two terrible mistakes. The first is Saudi Arabia’s four-year war in Yemen—not just a moral disaster but a strategic one, too. Over 90,000 people have died in the fighting and almost as many children under five from famine and disease. Far from defeating the Houthis, it has turned them into dangerous foes; far from severing their loose links with Saudi Arabia’s sworn enemy, Iran, it has strengthened them.

造成这场危机的原因中有两个可怕的错误。错误之一：沙特阿拉伯在也门的四年战争，不仅是一场道德灾难，还是一场战略性灾难。超过9万人在战争中死去，几乎相同数目的五岁以下的孩童也因饥荒和疾病失去生命。也门内战中，沙特非但没能打败胡塞武装，反而使其成为极其危险的仇敌；非但没能切断他们同沙特死敌伊朗松散的联系，反而加强了他们之间的联系。

The second blunder was the Trump administration’s withdrawal last year from the deal to limit Iran’s nuclear programme. America switched to a policy of “maximum pressure”: sanctions designed to cause Iranians to rebel against the mullahs or to force Iran meekly back to the negotiating table. Predictably, however, maximum pressure has strengthened the hardliners, who reject talks with America. One reason President Donald Trump ditched the nuclear accord was because it failed to restrain Iran’s regional aggression, yet if Iran was behind Saturday’s attack, it shows that the regime is more belligerent than ever.

错误之二：去年特朗普政府退出了旨在限制伊朗核项目的伊核协议，转而采取“最大压力”的政策：通过制裁让伊朗政权崩溃，或让其乖乖重返谈判桌。然而，“最大压力”政策适得其反，强硬派拒绝与美协商。特朗普退出伊核协议理由之一是伊核协议未能阻止伊朗的地区侵略。如果伊朗是沙特油田袭击事件的幕后黑手，可见伊朗政权比以往更加好战。

Over everything hangs the spectre of yet another Middle Eastern conflict. That poses a dilemma. With its back to the wall, Iran may meet any retaliation by striking even harder. But unless Iran sees that aggression carries a cost, it will be emboldened to use force again. That, sooner or later, also leads towards war.

一切都笼罩着另一场中东冲突的阴影之下。这造成了一种两难境地。由于伊朗已走投无路，它可能会采取更激烈的形式打击报复。除非伊朗意识到侵略是有代价的，否则它会大胆再次使用武力，这迟早也会引发战争。

注：
yet: could, might, may, etc. do sth ~ used to say that sth could, might, etc. happen in the future, even though it seems unlikely  (表示将来可能发生，尽管现在似乎没有可能)早晚，总有一天

Consider the cost of recent Western restraint. In May Iran hit four tankers in the United Arab Emirates; in June it struck two more tankers in the Strait of Hormuz; later it took down an American drone. Mr Trump was prepared to retaliate only after that last aggression—and even then he pulled back at the last minute. The attack on September 14th was vastly more consequential. The president has said that America is “locked and loaded”. In Tehran they are watching to see whether he is all talk, as they are in Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and in countries whose security depends on the idea that America will turn up.

想想最近西方的克制所付出的代价。五月，伊朗袭击了阿联酋的四艘油轮；六月，另外两艘油轮在霍尔木兹海峡遇袭；随后，美国一架无人机遭伊朗击落。特朗普原本准备在伊朗击落无人机后进行军事报复，但最后一刻还是取消了报复计划。9月14日的袭击影响更大，特朗普表态，美国已经“做好了战斗准备”。伊朗当权者正观察特朗普是否又在虚张声势，同样，来自中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜以及其他依靠美国保障安全的国家当权者们也在静观其变。

If any nuclear negotiations are to succeed, Iran must pay a price for Abqaiq. America wants a more sweeping agreement than the original one, but only the pragmatic faction in Tehran, weakened by America’s approach, will make such a deal. While Iran can hit out again, the hardliners will have a veto over any talks. If America is seen as a paper tiger, they will be able to argue that Iran need not give much ground. On the contrary, they will say that their country should pile pressure on America by accelerating its nuclear programme. America and its allies therefore need to convince Iran that it cannot use violence to get its way.

即使任何核协议将达成，伊朗也必须为阿比克袭击付出代价。美国想要一个更全面的协议，但是只有与德黑兰的务实派（已被美国的退出削弱了力量）协商，才能达成这样的协议。伊朗再次强烈批评美国，强硬派将对任何谈判拥有否决权。如果美国被视为纸老虎，他们将能够辩称，伊朗不需要做出太多让步。相反，他们会说，他们的国家应该通过加速核计划向美国施加压力。因此，美国及其盟友需要让伊朗相信，伊朗不能使用暴力达到目的。

The first stage of a response is to establish precisely where Saturday’s attack originated and who planned it. America must share this publicly, partly because Mr Trump’s word alone does not carry weight, but also to build a coalition and help stifle the objections of Iran’s apologists. Evidence against Iran could pave the way for new sanctions. Mr Trump has promised more—though America is already doing pretty much all it can. He should be backed by the Europeans, who need to understand that peace depends on deterring Iran, and China, which imports over 9m b/d of oil, much of it from the Middle East.

回击的第一阶段是准确查明周六的袭击来源和幕后策划者。美国必须公开信息，不仅是因为特朗普的言论没有分量，而且还因为需要建立一个联盟，帮助遏制伊朗辩护者的的反对声。对伊朗不利的证据可能为其带来新一轮制裁。特朗普承诺会有更多的制裁措施，尽管美国已尽其所能。特朗普应该得到欧洲人的支持，他们需要明白，和平依赖于威慑伊朗和中国。中国每天进口逾900万桶石油，其中大部分来自中东。

That is not all. If the Abqaiq attack is the work of Iran’s revolutionary guards, they should face direct consequences. That involves covert operations, by cyber-units that can disrupt their communications and finances; and air strikes on guard units outside Iran in Syria. Ideally, these would be carried out by a coalition, but if need be, America and Saudi Arabia should act alone. The risk of escalation should not be ignored, but Iran does not want all-out war any more than Saudi Arabia and America do. Israel frequently launches air strikes against Iranian targets in Syria and Iraq without provoking an Iranian escalation.

除此之外。如果阿比克袭击是伊朗革命卫队所为，他们应该直面后果。这包括网络的隐秘攻击，破坏他们的通讯和金融系统;以及对叙利亚境内伊朗境外警卫部队的空袭。理想情况下，这些任务将由一个联盟来完成，但如果需要，美国和沙特阿拉伯应该单独行动。局势升级的风险不应被忽视，但伊朗并不比沙特阿拉伯和美国更希望爆发全面战争。以色列经常对伊朗在叙利亚和伊拉克的目标发动空袭，但没有引起伊朗危机的升级。

A show of force is part of the way back to nuclear talks—and to repairing those two terrible mistakes. Saudi Arabia’s allies must press it to sue for peace in Yemen. And America needs to signal to Iran that it will be reasonable in re-establishing the bargain embodied in the nuclear deal. If it demands that Iran surrenders everything, the Middle East will get nothing but more misery.  

展示武力是为了恢复核谈判，也是为了修补以上两个严重错误。沙特阿拉伯的盟友必须施加压力为也门争取和平。美国需要向伊朗发出信号，表明美国会重新考虑伊朗的合理诉求。如果美国要求伊朗完全屈服，中东只会得到更多的苦难。