法律翻译 | 平等与选择：金斯伯格作品中生育权的性别平等观

译者 | RBG选译小组

         朱哿 北京大学国际法学院 JD & JM

         鲁安妮 复旦大学LL.B.

         陈一昕 中国政法大学LL.B.

         何汛 对外经济贸易大学本科

         崔程新 湖南大学LL.B.

         刘燕霖 中国人民大学 LL.B.

审稿 | 何兰子夜 宾夕法尼亚大学 ML

         俞悠悠 国际关系学院本科

         程子珊 USC LL.M.

         Peipei Luo 布里斯托大学

         Ellen Chen(Cornell LL.M.)

         田雅琦 青岛大学本科

编辑 | 王冰子 烟台大学本科

         于杰 上海对外经贸大学本科

责编｜戚琳颖 大连海事大学本科

Equality and choice: sex equality perspectives on reproductive rights in the work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg

平等与选择：金斯伯格作品中生育权的性别平等观

“My mother told me two things constantly. One was to be a lady, and the other was to be independent. The study of law was unusual for my generation. For most girls growing up in the Forties, the most important degree was not your B.A. but your M.R.S.”—— Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Not only the sex discrimination cases, but the cases on contraception, abortion, and illegitimacy as well, present various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to play in society. Are women to have the opportunity to participate in full partnership with men in the nation’s social, political, and economic life? This is a constitutional issue, ... surely one of the most important in this final quarter of the twentieth century.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 1978

不仅性别歧视案件，而且避孕、堕胎、非婚生子女等等案件，都不约而同地从不同角度呈现出同一个问题：女性在社会中发挥的作用。女性是否有机会在一国的社会、政治和经济生活中与男性充分合作？这是一个宪法问题……而且一定是二十世纪末的最重要的问题之一。

——金斯伯格，1978年。

This brief essay explores the sex-equality perspective on reproductive rights that Ruth Bader Ginsburg has articulated over four decades as lawyer, law professor, judge, and Justice. Throughout her career, Ginsburg has viewed laws that deprive women of control over whether and when they bear children as raising questions of equality, as well as liberty and privacy. Ginsburg and other feminists of the 1970s argued that, given the social organization of caregiving work, the state may not deprive women of control over the decision to become mothers without depriving them of equal citizenship.

本文探讨了金斯伯格四十年来作为律师、法学教授、法官（judge）和大法官（Justice）所阐述的生育权中蕴含的性别平等观。在其职业生涯中，金斯伯格始终认为，剥夺女性对是否生育、何时生育的控制权的法律会引发平等、自由和隐私等问题。金斯伯格和20世纪70年代的其他女权主义者认为，鉴于护理工作的社会分配，国家若剥夺女性对决定是否成为母亲的控制权，也会剥夺她们身为公民的平等权。

（图片来源于网络）

Over the decades, United States constitutional law has slowly responded to Ginsburg and the movement she helped lead, initially resisting sex-equality claims for reproductive choice, and then partly internalizing these values. Sex-equality reasoning about reproduction now informs the constitutional law of abortion and shapes legislated approaches to pregnancy discrimination, yet plays little role in doctrines protecting women’s access to contraception. Sex equality reasoning about reproduction is at the center of the Court’s holding in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that Congress had power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), yet is wholly absent in the plurality and concurring opinions in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland that Congress lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the self-care provisions of the FMLA--a judgment from which Justice Ginsburg dissented passionately and at length.

几十年来，美国宪法对金斯伯格和她所领导的运动作出了缓慢的回应，从最初抵制生育选择的性别平等主张，而后部分地将这些价值内化。当前，有关生育的性别平等说理为堕胎的宪法性法律提供了依据，并塑造了应对孕妇歧视的立法路径，但在保护妇女获得避孕药具的理论中作用微乎其微。在内华达州人力资源部诉希布斯案（Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs）中，有关生育的性别平等说理是法院裁决的核心。法院认为，国会有权根据第十四修正案制定《家庭和医疗休假法》（Family and Medical Leave Act，FMLA）中的家庭休假条款。然而，在科尔曼诉马里兰州上诉法院一案（Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland）的多数意见和协同意见中，却完全没有提及有关生育的性别平等说理。法院认为，国会无权根据第十四修正案制定《家庭和医疗休假法》的自我照顾条款（self-care provisions），金斯伯格法官始终对这一判决表示强烈反对。

I. As an ACLU Lawyer: Struck v. Secretary of Defenses

一、作为美国公民自由联盟（American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU）的律师：斯特拉克诉国防部长案（Struck v. Secretary of Defenses）

From the beginning, Justice Ginsburg understood government regulation of women’s reproductive choices as presenting core questions of sex equality. One of Ginsburg’s earliest Supreme Court briefs for the ACLU, filed in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, advanced the cause of a woman who had been forcibly discharged from the Air Force because she was pregnant. Under then-prevailing government policy, new mothers could not serve in the armed services, while new fathers could; a pregnant service woman could avoid discharge only if she aborted the pregnancy.

从一开始，金斯伯格大法官就认为政府对女性生育选择的规制涉及性别平等的核心问题。金斯伯格最早为美国公民自由联盟提交的最高法院案情摘要（Supreme Court brief）之一，是在斯特拉克诉国防部长一案中，为一名因怀孕而被强行开除出空军的女性辩护。根据当时的政策，新晋妈妈不能在军队服役，而新晋爸爸则可以；怀孕的女性军官只有流产或堕胎，才能避免被军队开除。

As Justice Ginsburg recently recalled:

[T]he ACLU had taken on, along with Struck, several other cases challenging the rule, then maintained by all the Armed Forces, requiring pregnant service members to choose between abortion and ouster from the military. But Captain Struck’s case was our frontrunner. We aimed to present the issue of reproductive choice through her eyes and experience. Captain Struck chose birth, but her Government made that choice a mandatory ground for discharge.

（图片来源于网络）

正如金斯伯格大法官最近回忆的那样：

美国公民自由联盟接手了包括斯特拉克案在内的几个案件，向当时所有武装部队（Armed Forces）都固守的规则——要求怀孕的军官在堕胎和被开除军籍之间做出选择——发起挑战。斯特拉克上尉一案是其中的领跑者。我们致力于通过她的视角和个人经历来展示生育选择的问题。斯特拉克上尉选择了生育，但政府却将她的此种选择作为退伍的强制性理由。

Ginsburg’s merits brief challenged Struck’s exclusion from military service on equal protection and due process privacy grounds. Ultimately, the government would change its policy with the aim of mooting Struck’s case.

Ginsburg’s 1972 brief argued that Struck’s discharge for pregnancy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The brief appeals to several conceptually distinct understandings of equality, which together interact to produce a compelling argument for sex equality in the regulation of women’s reproductive choices:

金斯伯格于1972年撰写的辩护状认为，斯特拉克因怀孕而被军队开除，违反了平等保护条款（the Equal Protection Clause）。该辩护状呼吁对平等作几种概念上各不相同的理解，这些理解相互作用，为在协调女性生育选择方面的性别平等提供了令人信服的论据：

A. The familiar demand for equal treatment: In the Struck brief, Ginsburg argued that mandatory discharge from the military for mothers-to-be, but not fathers-to-be, enforced a double standard in matters of sex and family roles. As the brief wryly observed, unlike women in the Air Force, “[m]en in the Air Force are not constrained to avoid the pleasures and responsibilities of procreation and parenthood.”

A. 常见的平等待遇要求：在斯特拉克案中，金斯伯格认为，强制“准妈妈”退伍，而不强制“准爸爸”退伍，在性别和家庭角色方面实行了双重标准。正如辩护状讽刺地指出的，与空军中的女性不同，“空军中的男性不受约束，并未被迫避开生育和为人父母的快乐与责任”。

B. The anti-stereotyping principle: Ginsburg’s equal protection argument objected to different treatment, and something more. It challenged (1) government imposition of (2) traditional, stereotypical sex roles on men and women. Ginsburg argued, “Mandatory pregnancy discharge reinforces societal pressure [on women] to relinquish career aspirations for a hearth-centered existence.” Air Force policy enforced the “discredited notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” As the quoted passages illustrate, the brief’s challenge to state-imposed sex roles was especially concerned with legal imposition of the breadwinner/caregiver family roles historically associated with the separate spheres tradition.

B.反刻板印象（anti-stereotyping）原则：金斯伯格的平等保护主张（equal protection argument）不仅反对不同待遇，还包含其他内容。该主张对（1）政府强加的（2）传统的、刻板的性别角色观念提出了挑战。金斯伯格认为，“强制性解雇孕妇增加了妇女的社会压力，使其被迫放弃职业抱负而选择以家庭为中心的生活”。空军政策推行了一种“令人怀疑的观念”，即“怀孕的妇女不适合工作，而应当被限制在家中等待分娩，而后致力于照顾孩子。”正如引文所表明的那样，该辩护状对国家强加的性别角色提出了挑战，特别关注法律强加的养家糊口者（breadwinner）与照顾者（caregiver）的家庭角色，这些角色在历史上与性别分工（separate spheres）的传统息息相关。

C. The anti-subordination principle: The Struck brief characterized the harm of government-imposed sex roles in the language of subordination. Ginsburg argued that the law's “[p]resumably well-meaning exaltation of women's unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society." The harm described here is dignitary as well as material: the law denies women the capacity to lead autonomous self-governing lives, and instead imposes on women, as a group, a dependent subordinate status.

C. 反从属原则：斯特拉克案(Struck v. Secretary of Defense)用表示从属关系的语言描述了由政府强加的性别角色的危害。金斯伯格认为，法律对女性在生育过程中独特角色的善意推崇实际上否定了女性发展个人才能和能力的平等机会，并迫使她们接受社会中的依赖和从属地位。这里所描述的危害既是尊严上的，也是实质性的：法律剥夺了女性独立自主生活的能力，还强加给女性群体一种依赖性的从属地位。

（图片来源于网络）

Another groundbreaking aspect of the Struck brief is the way it connects liberty and equality. Most simply, the brief connects liberty and equality in challenging the Air Force policy by appealing to the equal protection and substantive due process components of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. But the brief does not simply challenge the Air Force policy on two different constitutional grounds; it shows how each constitutional concern implicates the other. The brief demonstrates how practices that deny women equal treatment limit their freedom, and how practices that constrain women's liberty deny women equality. A recurring theme of the brief is that laws that stereotype--that constrain women's freedom in the choice of social roles--deprive women of equal citizenship. In so arguing, Ginsburg was giving early and especially forceful legal expression to equality arguments for reproductive rights advanced by feminists as they joined the campaign in the early 1970s to repeal abortion restrictions.

该案的另一突破是它将自由和平等联系起来的方式。最简单的体现是其法庭陈述通过呼吁第五修正案的正当程序条款中的平等保护和实质性正当程序部分，将自由和平等结合，来挑战美国空军政策。但这份诉状并非简单地用两种不同的宪法理由来挑战美国空军的政策，而是展现了每个宪法问题是如何关联到其他宪法问题的。该陈述论证了限制女性平等待遇的做法是如何限制她们的自由权的，以及约束女性自由的做法是如何否定女性平等权的。法庭陈述中反复出现的主题是，限制女性选择社会角色自由的陈规定型的法律剥夺了女性的平等公民权。在这样的争论中，金斯伯格对女权主义者在20世纪70年代初参与废除堕胎限制的运动中倡导的平等生育权观点进行了早期且非常有力的合法论述。

II. Over the Decades: As a Professor and Judge

二、几十年来：作为一名教授和法官

Ginsburg's 1972 brief in Struck opened themes she would pursue as an advocate, as a professor, as an appellate judge, and as a Supreme Court justice. From the very beginning, Ginsburg saw regulation constraining women's reproductive choices as presenting equal protection questions. And from the very beginning, the United States Supreme Court resisted the claims of the women's movement that the regulation of women's reproductive lives should be analyzed in an equal protection framework. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled in Geduldig v. Aiello (a movement case litigated by Wendy Williams) that exclusion of pregnancy from a comprehensive disability benefits program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not necessarily “discrimination based upon gender as such.” Professor Ginsburg objected, in exasperation, in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: “Is the answer that pregnancy can't happen to man, therefore pregnancy classifications can't discriminate on the basis of sex? Or because they affect women exclusively do pregnancy classifications merit particularly careful inspection?” She then emphasized: “Discussed at length in Appellees' brief were the stereotypical attitudes and generalizations about sex roles in society underlying disadvantageous job-related treatment of pregnant women.”

金斯伯格1972年在斯特拉克案中的法庭陈述开启了她作为社会提倡者、教授、上诉法官和美国最高法院大法官所追求的主旋律。从一开始，金斯伯格就认为限制女性生育选择的法规会带来平等保护问题。同时，美国最高法院在一开始就抵制女性运动的主张，即应在平等保护框架内分析关于女性生育生活的法规。1974年，最高法院在盖德尔迪格诉艾洛案(Geduldig v. Aiello)案（由温迪·威廉姆斯提起诉讼的平权运动案件）中裁定，将怀孕排除在综合残疾福利计划之外并不违反平等保护条款，因为基于怀孕的区别对待不一定是“基于性别的歧视”。金斯伯格教授在1975年的《最高法院评论》中愤怒地表示反对道：“难道答案不是因为怀孕不会发生在男性身上，所以对怀孕分类不能基于性别进行区别对待？还是因为它们只影响女性，所以对怀孕分类应该受到特别仔细地审查？” 她还强调：“在被上诉人法庭陈述中大量讨论的社会上对性别角色的刻板印象和泛论构成了对孕妇的工作相关不利待遇的基础”。

In a series of papers published in 1978 after Kenneth Karst's groundbreaking Harvard Law Review Foreword, Professor Ginsburg further raised the stakes, insisting that the Court was misapprehending the sex-role logic of laws that excluded pregnant employees from work and that criminalized women's access to contraception and abortion:

在肯尼斯·卡斯特开创性的《哈佛法律评论》前言之后，金斯伯格教授在1978年发表的一系列文章中进一步表达了自己的观点，坚称最高法院错误地理解了法律中的性别角色逻辑，因为这些法律将怀孕雇员排除在工作之外，并且将女性获得避孕和堕胎的权利定为犯罪。

The High Court has not yet perceived the full dimension of current controversy surrounding gender-based discrimination.... Not only the Sex discrimination cases, but the cases on contraception, abortion, and illegitimacy as well, present various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to play in society. Are women to have the.opportunity.to participate in full partnership with men in the nation's social, political, and economic life? This is ad constitutional issue, Professor Karst underscored, surely one of the most important in this final quarter of the twentieth century.

（图片来源于网络）

最高法院尚未意识到目前围绕性别歧视争议的全部层面....不仅是性别歧视案件，还有关于避孕、堕胎和非婚生育的案件，都呈现出一个单一问题的不同面貌：女性在社会中应扮演的角色。女性是否有机会在国家的社会、政治和经济生活中与男性充分协作？卡斯特教授强调，这是一个宪法问题，也无疑是二十世纪最后四分之一时间里最重要的问题之一。

Ginsburg was concerned about the Court's failure to recognize that there was textual authority for the movement's constitutional claims--the Court's failure to base its decisions about contraception and abortion on the Equal Protection Clause. But she was also concerned about the Court's grasp of the social concerns at stake in the regulation of contraception and abortion, the Court's inability to appreciate that laws criminalizing contraception and abortion define the roles women are to play in society.

金斯伯格对最高法院没有认可该运动在宪法上的诉求具有文本权利感到担忧，因为最高法院没有将其关于避孕和堕胎的裁决建立在平等保护条款的基础上。她也担心最高法院在避孕和堕胎监管这类利益攸关的社会问题中的理解力，因为其无法理解将避孕和堕胎定为犯罪的法律定义了女性在社会中应扮演的角色。

Professor Ginsburg continued: Unlike Professor Karst, the Supreme Court either does not see, or is unwilling to acknowledge, all of these cases as part and parcel of a single large issue. Precedent to date generally places explicit gender-based differentials, illegitimacy, pregnancy, and abortion in separate cubbyholes. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, the 1973 abortion decisions, for example, barely mention women's rights. They are not tied to equal protection or equal rights theory. Rather, the Supreme Court anchored stringent review to concepts of personal privacy or autonomy derived from the due process guarantee. Prof. Laurence Tribe pointed out that nothing in the Supreme Court analysis in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolion tumed on the sex specific impact of abortion restrictions. A broader frame for these decisions might have made it more difficult for the Court to rule, as it did stunningly in June 1977, that neither the Constitution nor federal statute requires medicaid reimbursement for elective abortions.

金斯伯格教授继续道：与卡斯特教授不同的是，最高法院要么不认为，要么不愿意承认所有这些案件都是一个单一的大问题的重要组成部分。迄今为止，判例通常将明确基于性别的差异、非婚生育、怀孕和堕胎分别放在不同的隔层中。例如，1973年“罗诉韦德”和“多伊诉博尔顿”的堕胎案裁决几乎没有提到女性权利。它们与平等保护或平等权利理论无关。相反，最高法院将源自正当程序保障的个人隐私或自主权概念作为了严格审查的依据。劳伦斯·特莱布教授指出，在罗伊诉韦德案(Roe v. Wade)和多伊诉博尔顿案(Doe v. Bolion)案中，最高法院的分析中没有任何内容涉及堕胎限制对特定性别的影响。一个基于这些裁决案的更广泛的框架可能会使最高法院更难作出决定，正如它在1977年6月作出的令人震惊地裁决，即宪法和联邦法规都不要求为非必要的堕胎支付医疗报销费用。

In the Tulane Law Review later that year, she observed: Eventually, the Court may take abortion, pregnancy, out-of-wedlock birth, and explicit gender-based differentials out of the separate cubbyholes in which they now rest, acknowledge the practical interrelationships, and treat these matters as part and parcel of a single, large, sex equality issue. That synthesis perhaps depends on clearer directions from the political arena, but it seems a likely candidate for 1980’s development.

在同年晚些时候的《杜兰大学法律评论》中，她（金斯伯格）指出：最终，最高法院可能会将堕胎、怀孕、非婚生育和明确基于性别的差异从它们现在所处的不同隔层中拿出来，承认它们之间的实际相互关系，并将这些问题作为一个单一的、大型的性别平等问题的重要组成部分。这种整合也许取决于来自政治领域更明确的指引，但它似乎只是20世纪80年代发展的一个可能候选方向。

But something else happened instead, dynamics that Susan Faludi memorably termed "backlash." By the late 1970s, evangelical Protestants began to join conservative Catholics in attacking Roe. These and other developments led Phyllis Schlafly to focus her campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) on the claim that the ERA would constitutionalize abortion and same-sex marriage. In response, many feminist advocates sought to disassociate abortion and equality during the last years of the ratification campaign-a strategy that Professor Ginsburg appears at least indirectly to have supported.

但相反，发生了其他事情，苏珊·法鲁迪（Susan Faludi）令人难忘地称之为“逆潮”。到1970年代末，福音派新教徒加入保守的天主教徒攻击罗伊。这些和其他事态的发展导致菲利斯·施拉弗莱（Phyllis Schlafly）将反对《平等权利修正案》（ERA）的运动重点放在声称ERA将使堕胎和同性婚姻宪法化上。作为回应，许多女权主义倡导者在批准运动的最后几年里试图将堕胎和平等分开——金斯伯格教授似乎至少间接支持这一策略。

（图片来源于网络）

In 1980, the year of Ginsburg's nomination by President Carter to the federal bench, Ronald Reagan was elected on a Republican platform that promised to appoint judges "who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." (Note how the platform attacks the ERA and abortion and associates "pro-family"and "prolife"values.) The time for ratification of the ERA expired and through twelve years of conservative governance, the composition of the federal bench began fatefully to change.

1980年，也就是金斯伯格被卡特总统提名为联邦法官的那一年，罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）根据共和党的纲领当选，该纲领承诺任命“尊重传统家庭价值观和无辜人类生命神圣性”的法官。（注意该纲领是如何攻击ERA和堕胎，并将“家庭至上”和 “生命权利至上”价值观联系起来的。）批准ERA的时间期满，通过十二年的保守治理，联邦法官的组成开始发生决定性的变化。

As a sitting federal judge in the 1980s and 1990s, Ginsburg lamented the Court's failure to ground the abortion right in sex equality. As she put it in 1985:

作为20世纪80年代和90年代的一名现任联邦法官，金斯伯格对法院未能将堕胎权建立在性别平等的基础上表示遗憾。正如她在1985年所说的那样：

[T]he Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion's concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective. I understand the view that for political reasons the reproductive autonomy controversy should be isolated from the general debate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and men. I expect, however, that organized and determined opposing efforts to inform and persuade the public on the abortion issue will continue through the 1980s. In that process there will be opportunities for elaborating in public forums the equal-regard conception of women's claims to reproductive choice uncoerced and unsteered by government.

我认为，法院的“罗伊”立场被削弱了，因为该意见集中在医学上认可的自主权理念上，而排除了基于宪法的性别平等观点。我理解这种观点，即出于政治原因，生殖自主权的争论应与关于男女平等权利、责任和机会的一般性辩论隔离开来。然而，我预计，有组织的、坚定的反对派努力向公众宣传和说服堕胎问题这一行为将持续到1980年代。在这一过程中，将有机会在公共论坛上阐述妇女在不受政府胁迫和支配的情况下对生殖选择的要求的平等概念。

With prospects for renewing the ERA campaign receding, feminists became more vocal in advancing equality arguments for reproductive freedom.While discussing the Struck case during her Supreme Court confirmation hearing in 1993, Judge Ginsburg was asked by Senator Hank Brown whether the equality reasoning extended to abortion, as well. Ginsburg answered:

随着恢复ERA运动的前景越来越渺茫，女权主义者在推进生殖自由的平等主张方面变得更加直言不讳。1993年，金斯伯格法官在最高法院确认听证会上讨论斯特拉克罢工案时，被参议员汉克·布朗（Hank Brown）问及平等的理由是否也延伸至堕胎。金斯伯格回答说：

[Y]ou asked me about my thinking about equal protection versus individual autonomy, and my answer to you is it's both. This is something central to a woman's life, to her dignity. It's a decision that she must make for herself. And when Government controls that decision for her, she's being treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her own choices.

你问我关于平等保护和个人自主的想法，我的回答是两者兼而有之。这是对妇女生活和尊严至关重要的事情。这是她必须为自己做出的决定。当政府为她做这个决定时，她就被视为不足以对自己的选择负完全责任的成年人。

（图片来源于网络）

III. Reproductive Rights in the Supreme Court

三、最高法院中的生殖权利

Has United States law responded to the equality claims for reproductive rights that Justice Ginsburg and the United States women's movement have been making since the early 1970s? Roe scarcely acknowledges feminist arguments of the era. The feminist arguments associating abortion and sex equality are more legible in the campaign against the ERA, where opponents invoked the association as reason to oppose ratification.

美国法律是否对金斯伯格法官和美国妇女运动自1970年代初以来提出的生殖权利平等主张作出了回应？罗伊几乎不承认那个时代的女权主义观点。将堕胎和性别平等联系起来的女权主义观点在反对ERA的运动中更为明显，反对者援引这种联系作为反对批准的理由。

Yet by the 1980s, the Supreme Court decisions concerning abortion quietly began to incorporate feminist equality claims for reproductive rights. In 1986, Justice Blackmun concluded Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists by rejecting legislation seeking to narrow the abortion right, writing:

然而，到了20世纪80年代，最高法院有关堕胎的裁决悄悄地开始纳入女权主义者对生殖权利的平等要求。1986年，布莱克蒙大法官（justice blackmun）在索恩伯勒诉美国产科妇科医师大学案（Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists）中，拒绝了寻求缩小堕胎权的立法，并写道：

Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision— with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.

很少有决定比女性的决定更私人、更私密，或更基本的个人尊严和自主性，在医生的指导下，在罗伊案规定的范围内是否终止妊娠。妇女自由作出选择的权利是根本性的。我们认为，任何其他结果都不足以保护我们的法律平等保障所有人的自由领域的核心部分。

In the last words of his opinion, Justice Blackman emphasized that the abortion right concerned equality as well as autonomy: women's equal freedom with men to be self-governing.

布莱克蒙大法官（justice blackmun）在其意见的最后一句话中强调，堕胎权涉及平等和自主权：妇女与男子享有平等的自治自由。

In the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, (43) the Court reaffirmed, while significantly narrowing, the abortion right, in a decision that repeatedly reasoned about the abortion right as respecting women's equality.

在最高法院1992年对宾夕法尼亚州东南部计划生育协会诉凯西案的判决中，（43）法院重申了堕胎权，同时大大缩小了堕胎权的范围。该判决反复推理，认为堕胎权是对妇女平等的尊重。

（图片来源于网络）

The portion of the plurality opinion attributed to Justice Kennedy invoked dignity to explain why the Constitution protects decisions regarding family life: "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." (44) Kennedy explained that the State could not impose "its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture." (45) This is a sex equality understanding of dignity, resonant with themes that Ginsburg as a lawyer, professor, judge, and Justice wove through the Court's equal protection sex discrimination cases. The joint opinion recognized that "the ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." (46) The joint opinion's invalidation of spousal notification requirements similarly invoked sex equality principles, which it associated with freedom from laws enforcing traditional gender roles in the family. (47) As I have elsewhere written, the joint opinion expressed "constitutional limitations on abortion laws in the language of its equal protection sex discrimination opinions, illuminating liberty concerns at the heart of the sex equality cases in the very act of recognizing equality concerns at the root of the liberty cases." (48)

多数意见中肯尼迪大法官的部分援引尊严来解释为什么宪法保护有关家庭生活的决定："这些事项涉及一个人一生中可能做出的最亲密和个人的选择，是对个人尊严和自主权至关重要的选择，是第十四修正案所保护的自由的核心。" (44) 肯尼迪解释说，国家不能把 "它自己对妇女角色的看法强加于个人，无论这种看法在我们的历史和文化过程中是多么的主导"。(45）这是对尊严的性别平等的理解，与金斯伯格作为律师、教授、法官和大法官在法院的平等保护性别歧视案件中编织的主题产生共鸣。联合意见承认："妇女平等参与国家经济和社会生活的能力因其控制自己的生殖生活的能力而得到促进"。(46) 联合意见对配偶通知要求的无效性也同样援引了性别平等原则，它将其与免于执行家庭中传统性别角色的法律联系起来。(47) 正如我在其他地方写的那样，联合意见表达了 "对堕胎法的宪法限制在其平等保护的性别歧视意见的语言中，在承认作为自由案件根源的平等问题的行为中，阐明了作为性别平等案件核心的自由问题。" (48)

Despite the sex equality reasoning threading through Casey's due process analysis, the Court

has never done what Justice Ginsburg imagined: taken "abortion, pregnancy, out-of-wedlock  birth, and explicit gender-based differentials out of the separate cubbyholes in which they now  rest, acknowledge[d] the practical interrelationships, and treat[ed] these matters as part and parcel of a single, large, sex equality issue." (49)

尽管在凯西案的正当程序分析中贯穿了性别平等的推理，但法院从未像金斯伯格法官想象的那样：将 "堕胎、怀孕、婚外生育和明确的基于性别的差异从它们现在所处的独立的间隔里拿出来，承认实际的相互关系，并将这些事项作为单一的、大型的、性别平等问题的一部分和组成部分来处理。" (49)

That was terrain for Justice Ginsburg to cross in her 2007 dissent, joined by three other Justices, in Gonzales v. Carhart, (50) the so-called partial birth abortion ban case. Justice Ginsburg quoted Casey's sex equality reasoning in her Gonzales v. Carhart dissent. (51) But she went even further. Where Casev drew upon the conceptual framework of the sex equality argument for abortion rights--that government cannot use the power of the state to enforce traditional sex roles on women--Justice Ginsburg's Carhart dissent cited key equal protection sex discrimination precedents, including decisions she litigated and wrote, fusing the normative power of equality arguments with the textual authority of the Equal Protection Clause. (52)

这是金斯伯格大法官在2007年冈萨雷斯诉卡哈特（Gonzales v. Carhart）案（50）中提出的异议，其他三位大法官也加入了该案，即所谓的禁止部分出生的堕胎案。金斯伯格法官在冈萨雷斯诉卡哈特案的反对意见中引用了凯西的性别平等推理。(51) 但她走得更远。凯西案借鉴了堕胎权的性平等论证的概念框架——政府不能利用国家权力对妇女强制执行传统的性别角色——金斯伯格大法官在卡哈特案的异议中引用了关键的平等保护性歧视先例，包括她提起诉讼和撰写的裁决，将平等论证的规范力量与平等保护条款的文本权威融合起来。(52)

The Court's liberal Justices have now begun to reason about abortion by appeal to the authority of the Equal Protection Clause; the question is whether Justice Kennedy might ever be moved to do so. James Bopp, Jr., (53) longtime lawyer for the National Right to Life Committee (and architect of Citizens United (54)), has urged anti-abortion advocates to challenge Roe incrementally and cautioned against pressing personhood amendments; in Bopp's view a constitutional challenge to a personhood amendment might provide the occasion for Justice Kennedy to endorse Justice Ginsburg's understanding of the abortion right. (55) In a strategy memo to the anti-abortion movement, Bopp warned:

法院的自由派大法官现在已经开始通过诉诸平等保护条款的权威来推理堕胎问题，问题是肯尼迪大法官是否有可能被打动而这样做。小詹姆斯·博普（James Bopp),（53) 他是全国生命权委员会的长期律师（也是 "联合公民"（54）的设计师），其敦促反堕胎倡导者逐步挑战罗伊，并告诫不要催促人格修正案；在博普看来，对人格修正案的宪法挑战可能为肯尼迪法官提供机会，支持金斯伯格法官对堕胎权的理解。(55)在给反堕胎运动的战略备忘录中，博普警告说：

But if the U.S. Supreme Court, as presently constituted, were to actually accept a case challenging the declared constitutional right to abortion, there is the potential danger that the Court might actually make things worse than they presently are. The majority might abandon its current "substantive due process" analysis (i.e., reading "fundamental" rights into the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement without due process) in favor of what Justice Ginsberg [sic] has long advocated--an "equal protection" analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the dissent, written by Justice Ginsberg [sic], in fact did so. See id. at 1641 (Ginsberg, [sic] J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) ("[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.") ... A law prohibiting abortion would force Justice Kennedy to vote to strike down the law, giving Justice Ginsberg [sic] the opportunity to rewrite the justification for the right to abortion for the Court. This is highly unlikely in a case that decides the  constitutionality of such things as PBA bans, parental involvement laws, women's right to-know laws, waiting periods, and other legislative acts that do not prohibit abortion in any way, since Justice Kennedy is likely to approve such laws. (56)

但是，如果美国最高法院按照目前的构成，实际接受一个挑战已宣布的宪法规定的堕胎权的案件，就会有潜在的危险，即法院实际上可能使事情变得比现在更糟糕。大多数人可能会放弃目前的 "实质性正当程序 "分析（即把 "基本 "权利理解为第十四修正案所保障的 "自由"，反对未经正当程序的侵犯），而选择金斯伯格法官[原文如此]长期倡导的--第十四修正案规定的 "平等保护 "分析。在Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)一案中，由Ginsberg （原文如此）法官撰写的反对意见实际上就是如此。见同上，第1641页（金斯伯格（原文如此）大法官，与史蒂文斯、索特和布雷耶大法官一起）（"对堕胎程序的不当限制的法律挑战并不寻求维护某种普遍的隐私概念；相反，它们的核心是妇女决定其人生道路的自主权，从而享有平等的公民地位。" ... 禁止堕胎的法律将迫使肯尼迪大法官投票否决该法律，使金斯伯格（原文如此）大法官有机会为法院重写堕胎权的理由。在一个决定诸如PBA禁令、父母参与法、妇女知情权法、等待期以及其他不以任何方式禁止堕胎的立法行为是否符合宪法的案件中，这种可能性很小，因为肯尼迪法官很可能会批准这些法律。(56)

（图片来源于网络）

Like Justice Ginsburg, James Bopp believes that an abortion right expressly and textually  anchored in the Equal Protection Clause would be much harder to disentrench.

与金斯伯格大法官一样，詹姆斯·博普认为，从文本上明确固定在平等保护条款中的堕胎权将更难被削弱。

IV. Sex-Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Regulation Today

四、 当前关于生殖管理的性别平等观点

Over the last several decades, the anti-stereotyping understanding of equality that informed Ginsburg's work as an advocate, academic, and judge has increasingly come to guide Supreme Court decisions about the regulation of reproduction* As we have seen, Casey drew on anti-stereotyping concepts to restate and reaffirm substantive due process doctrines that protect women's freedom to make decisions about whether to carry a pregnancy to term. (57) Even as contest narrows the abortion right; United States constitutional law remains distinctive in its concern to protect women's role-autonomy in making decisions about  motherhood. (58) And, after three decades of litigation under the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment (PDA), the exclusion of pregnant women from employment is regularly analyzed on sex-equality and sex-stereotyping grounds. PDA case law has in turn begun to shape constitutional understandings of pregnancy in the workplace. (59)

在过去的几十年里，金斯伯格作为倡导者、学者和法官，对平等的反定型理解越来越多地指导着最高法院关于生殖监管的决定，正如我们所看到的，凯西利用反定型概念重申了实质性的正当程序理论，保护妇女自由决定是否怀胎十月。(57) 即使在竞争中缩小了堕胎权；美国宪法仍然在关注保护妇女在做出有关母亲身份的决定时的角色自主权方面具有独特性。(58）而且，在根据《怀孕歧视修正案》（PDA）进行了三十年的诉讼后，人们经常以性别平等和性别陈规定型观念为由，分析将孕妇排除在就业之外的问题。《怀孕歧视修正案》的判例法反过来又开始形成对工作场所中怀孕的宪法理解。(59)

That said, courts still cannot decide whether the restriction of contraceptive benefits raises a problem of sex discrimination under Title VII, and if so, why. The only sustained account of pregnancy-related discrimination as unconstitutional sex discrimination that the Court has provided appears in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs  where the Court upheld Congress's power to enact the family-care provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of Hibbs's holding that Congress had power to enact the FMLA's family leave provisions to remedy equal protection violations is the recognition that stereotyping of "women when they are mothers and mothers-to-be" plays a central role in discrimination against women at work.

换言之，法院仍然不能决定限制避孕福利是否会引发《民权法案》（Civil Rights Act of 1964）第七章规定的性别歧视问题，如果是，那么原因何在？法院仅在内华达州人力资源部诉希布斯案（Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs）中持续解释了为何将怀孕相关歧视视为违宪的性别歧视。在该案中，法院支持国会根据宪法第十四修正案第五节有权颁布《家庭医疗休假法》（FMLA）的家庭护理条款。希布斯案认为国会有权颁布FMLA的家事假条款以补救违反平等保护的行为，其核心是承认“作为母亲和准母亲的女性”的刻板印象在针对女性的职场歧视中起着中心作用。

Hibbs represents a crucial development in the Court's equal protection sex discrimination jurisprudence precisely because Hibbs recognizes pregnancy as a key locus of sex stereotyping directed against women who "are mothers or mother-to-be" (and does not simply treat pregnancy as a ground of "real difference" between the sexes). Hibbs opens the door to a new generation of equal protection cases arising out of stereotypes about, or animus against, women who "are mothers or mothers-to-be." In the wake of Hibbs, the Court can read Geduldig more narrowly--and accurately--as allowing courts to find that under the Equal Protection Clause, certain acts of discrimination relating to pregnancy are discrimination on the basis of sex. Hibbs' understanding of discrimination--focused on young women who are or who are about to become mothers--was painstakingly forged through decades of litigation under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and in conflicts over the Court's privacy and equal protection cases.

希布斯案代表了法院平等保护性别歧视判例的一个重要发展，正是因为希布斯案承认怀孕是“作为母亲或准母亲”的女性刻板印象的一个关键因素（而不是简单地将怀孕作为两性之间“真正差异”的理由）。希布斯为新一代平等保护案件打开了大门，这些案件源于对“母亲或准母亲”的女性的成见或敌意。在希布斯案之后，法院可以更仔细、更准确地解读Geduldig案，即允许法院认定，根据平等保护条款，与怀孕有关的某些歧视行为是基于性别的歧视。希布斯对歧视的理解侧重于作为母亲或准母亲的年轻女性，是通过几十年来根据《怀孕歧视法案》(Pregnancy Discrimination Act)进行的诉讼以及在法院的隐私和平等保护案件的冲突中艰难形成的。

（图片来源于网络）

But Hibbs's understanding of the dynamics of sex stereotyping is conspicuously absent in the Court's recent ruling in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland that Congress lacked power under Section Five to enact the medical leave provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act--a decision from which Justice Ginsburg forcefully dissented. Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of the Court, voted to deny Section Five enforcement power for the medical leave provision, asserting that Congress had failed to document how providing sick-leave deterred or remedied sex discriminatory state action. In a lengthy account of the deliberations shaping design of the FMLA, Justice Ginsburg demonstrated that the genderneutral self-care and family-care provisions of the statute advanced Congress's goal of integrating work and family by means that would alleviate rather than exacerbate discrimination against women.

但在最近最高法院对科尔曼诉马里兰州上诉法院(Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland)一案的裁决中，明显缺失希布斯案对性别刻板印象的动态理解。该裁决认为，国会在《家庭医疗休假法》(Family Medical Leave Act)第五节下无权制定医疗休假条款，对此，金斯伯格大法官强烈反对。肯尼迪大法官代表法院多数法官，投票否决了第五节关于病假条款的执法权，认为国会未能记录提供病假是如何阻止或补救国家性别歧视行为的。在一篇描述FMLA审议过程的长文中，金斯伯格大法官证明，该法规中不区分性别的自我护理和家庭护理的条款推进了国会的目标，即通过减轻而不是加剧对女性的歧视来实现工作和家庭的融合。

As Justice Ginsburg showed, Congress heard testimony that adding self-care leave to the statute would serve these ends in at least two ways. Requiring employers to provide employees self-care leave would provide female employees pregnancy-related leave, while "ward[ing] off the unconstitutional discrimination [Congress] believed would attend a pregnancy-only leave requirement." Further, adding self-care leave would balance the Act's gender-neutral family leave provisions, which employers might view as protecting women's leave, with a form of leave employers would expect employees of both sexes to use, thereby diminishing the risk that the employers would view the new federal legislation as guaranteeing leave to women only. "By reducing an employer's perceived incentive to avoid hiring women, [self-care leave] lessens the risk that the FMLA as a whole would give rise to the very sex discrimination that it was enacted to thwart." The Act's gender-neutral selfcare and family leave provisions worked together, Justice Ginsburg concluded:

正如金斯伯格大法官所示，国会听取的证词表明，在法规中增加自我护理假至少可以从两个方面达到这些目的。要求雇主为员工提供自我护理假将为女性员工提供与怀孕有关的假期，同时避免了国会所认为的仅要求怀孕假所带来的违宪歧视。此外，增加自我护理假将平衡《家庭医疗休假法》中不区分性别的家事假条款(雇主可能认为这是保护女性的假期)和雇主希望男女雇员都能使用的假期形式之间的关系，从而减少雇主将新的联邦立法视为只保证女性休假的风险。通过减少雇主避免雇用女性的理由，自我护理假减少了整个FMLA引发性别歧视的风险，而这正是制定它的目的。金斯伯格大法官总结说，该法不区分性别的自我护理条款和家事假条款共同发挥作用：

（图片来源于网络）

Essential to its design, Congress assiduously avoided a legislative package that, overall, was or would be seen as geared to women only. Congress thereby reduced employers' incentives to prefer men over women, advanced women's economic opportunities, and laid the foundation for more egalitarian relationship at home and at work. The self-care provision is a key part of that endeavor, and, in my view, a valid exercise of congressional power under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

在设计上至关重要的是，国会竭力避免制定一个在整体上被视为或将被视为只针对女性的立法方案。因此，国会减少了雇主更愿意选择男职工的理由，增加了女性的经济机会，并为在家庭和工作中建立更平等的关系奠定了基础。自我护理条款是这一努力的关键，而且在我看来，这是国会根据宪法第十四修正案第五节有效行使的权力。

The understanding of sex discrimination that Justice Ginsburg recognized in the design of the FMLA has animated her own work for decades. On this understanding, discrimination arises out of the interplay of real and imputed role conflicts. Employment is understood as inconsistent with pregnancy and caregiving responsibilities, and women are viewed as likely to become pregnant and engage in primary caregiving. Persisting role conflicts between caregiving and breadwinning and persisting sex-differentiated role expectations for men and women continuously interact to fuel sex stereotyping. Law can entrench the role conflicts and sex-differentiated role expectations that have long fueled sex stereotyping--or law can support individuals and households in making their own choices about the coordination of work and family.

金斯伯格大法官在设计《家庭和医疗休假法》（下称FMLA）时所认同的对性别歧视的理解，在几十年中一直激励着她自己的工作。根据这种理解，性别歧视产生于现实角色与预设角色的相互冲突。参加工作被认为无法与怀孕和照料孩子的责任兼容，女性也常常被视为有可能怀孕并担负主要照料职责的一方。照料后代和养家糊口之间持续存在的角色冲突，以及对男性和女性的性别角色的不同预期，都助长关于性别的刻板印象。法律可以维护这些长期以来助长性别刻板印象的因素——当然，法律也可以为人们对于协调工作和家庭所做出的选择提供支持。

Justice Ginsburg made sense of the self-care provisions of the FMLA in light of these understandings. She understood the FMLA's self-care provisions as part of a set of leave protections that Congress enacted in an effort to support men and women in making their own choices about the coordination of work and family in a form that would disrupt rather than entrench sex-stereotypical conflicts and expectations--and so alleviate rather than exacerbate discrimination against women. Given her understanding of the dynamics of sex discrimination, Justice Ginsburg well appreciated why Congress made self-care leave available for all—rather than offering pregnancy leave to women only. Universal benefits break would down actual conflicts between work and family without triggering historic assumptions about sex roles. Targeted benefits, by contrast, might exacerbate employers' longstanding disposition to discriminate against young women in the workforce as unreliable or expensive hires because they are presumed to be "mothers or mothers-to-be." Justice Ginsburg reasoned about the concerns, aspirations, and commitments animating the FMLA's design in terms the plurality seems not to have found sufficiently intelligible even to address.

金斯伯格大法官正是基于这样的想法来理解FMLA中的自我照护（self-care）条款。她将FMLA的自我照护条款理解为国会颁布的一套休假保护措施的一部分，以支持男性和女性在协调工作和家庭的问题上做出自己的选择，其形式将破坏而非巩固与刻板印象相关的性别角色冲突和期望，从而缓解而非加剧对女性的歧视。鉴于她对性别歧视的理解，金斯伯格大法官非常理解为什么国会让所有人都能够享受这种自我照护的假期，而不是只向妇女提供孕假。更加普遍的福利假期会消解工作和家庭之间的实际冲突，而不会牵扯到关于性别角色的假设。相比之下，有针对性的福利可能会加剧雇主长期以来对年轻女性的歧视，因为她们会被看作“母亲/准母亲”，所以会被当作不可靠的或是雇佣成本高昂的员工。金斯伯格大法官清晰论述启发FMLA法案设计的问题关切、灵感来源和法案为解决问题做出的承诺，而多数人似乎还没有足够的理解力以表述其中的含义。

（图片来源于网络）

Conclusion

结论

From time to time, courts and the general public view laws depriving women of control over contraception, abortion, and pregnancy as presenting questions of equal citizenship for women. Indeed we have recently witnessed conservative efforts to reassert traditional controls on women's reproductive lives colloquially termed a "war on women." But today, as several decades ago, courts and the nation often do not grasp the relationships. Thirty-five years ago, Professor Ginsburg observed:

法院和公众时常将剥夺女性对避孕、堕胎和怀孕的控制权的法律视为女性的平等公民权问题。事实上，我们近期的确看到了保守派为重新确立对女性生育问题的控制所做的努力——俗称“对妇女的战争”（war on women）。73但如今，就像几十年前一样，法院和国家往往没有准确地把握这些关系。三十五年前，仍在教书的金斯伯格教授已经指出：

Eventually, the Court may take abortion, pregnancy, out-of-wedlock birth, and explicit gender-based differentials out of the separate cubbyholes in which they now rest, acknowledge the practical interrelationships, and treat these matters as part and parcel of a single, large, sex equality issue. That synthesis perhaps depends on clearer directions from the political arena, but it seems a likely candidate for 1980's development.

In 2012, we are still waiting.

最终，法院可能会把堕胎、怀孕、非婚生子女和明确基于性别的差别对待等问题从它们如今所处的相互分离的领域中拿出来，承认它们之间实际存在的相互关系，并把这些事项作为单一的、大型的性别平等问题的一部分来处理。这种综合也许取决于政治大环境中更明确的导向，但它似乎是80年代政治发展的一个可能方向。

2012年，我们仍在等待。