法律翻译｜《哥大商法评论》第2014卷第3期目录+摘要

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2023-08-05 09:08

译者 | 黎琦西南政法大学法律硕士

审稿 | 刘寅西南政法大学

李梓源英国布里斯托大学LL.M.

编辑 | 向芯雨西南交通大学

詹远 Gary UNSW J.D.

责编 | 王有蓉中国政法大学

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2014 No. 3

On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending

关于要求上市公司披露政治支出

Abstract

Mandatory disclosure is a central feature of securities regulation in the United States, yet there is little agreement about how to determine precisely what public companies should be required to disclose. This lack of consensus explains much of the disagreement about whether the Securities and Exchange Commission should require public companies to disclose political spending.

强制披露是美国证券监管的一个核心特征。然而，如何准确认定哪些信息是上市公司所必须披露的，几乎没有统一认识。由于缺乏共识，导致在证券交易委员会是否应当要求上市公司披露政治支出的问题上分歧巨大。

To resolve the political spending disclosure debate I therefore begin by considering the more general question of how to evaluate any proposed mandatory disclosure requirement. I show why the presumption should be against adding a new disclosure requirement, and then identify the kinds of evidence that should be sufficient to overcome this presumption. Applying this new analytic framework to the political spending disclosure debate—and basing this analysis in part on previously unpublished empirical findings—shows that public companies should not be required to disclose political spending.

因此，为了解决政治支出披露的争论，我首先要思考一个更普遍的问题，即如何评价任何拟议的强制披露要求。我将说明为什么这一假定应该反对新增披露要求，再确认足以推翻该假定的证据种类。在政治支出披露的争论中引入该新的分析准则，以前期未发表的实证调查中的部分分析为依据，笔者得出的结论是上市公司不应要求披露政治支出。

The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party Transactions

美国证券交易委员会和法院

对关联方交易的合作监管

Abstract

A transaction between a corporation and its director or officer (a “related party transaction”) presents conflicts of interest that could harm, or alternatively, could also benefit the corporation. To sort beneficial related party transactions from detrimental ones, the current legal regime relies on both ex ante screening and ex post litigation. Disclosure plays an essential role in both stages. Based on a set of hand-collected data on actual disclosures from Fortune top fifty companies, this Article casts doubt on the effectiveness of the current regulation of related party transactions. The ambiguity of the federal securities regulations leaves too much room for manipulation. An approving committee of each company exercises considerable discretion not only over which proposed transactions to approve, but also over which transactions to disclose to its shareholders and what information to include in the disclosures. In the context of state corporate law, uncertainty exists in fiduciary duty of loyalty litigation regarding when and whether a court should bypass the fairness test and apply the business judgment rule to a related party transaction that satisfies certain safe harbor conditions, such as approval by disinterested directors. This Article proposes a fix by linking the strategic disclosure problem to the question of the applicable standard of review in fiduciary duty of loyalty litigation. To that end, the court should consider a disclosure under federal securities law as a strong signal of fairness of the disclosed transaction and be more willing to apply the business judgment rule rather than the fairness test in state duty of loyalty litigation. Potential benefits of the proposal include creating better incentives to disclose related party transactions, giving litigants more predictable rules, and allowing for richer accumulation of disclosure data over time, thus providing better guidance to companies and market participants in distinguishing between beneficial and harmful related party transactions.

公司与其董事或高级职员（即“关联交易”）间的交易所造成的利益冲突对公司各有利弊。为甄别有利的关联交易，现行法律制度采用事前筛选和事后诉讼两种手段，披露在这两个阶段都发挥了关键作用。通过分析人工收集的《财富》杂志前50强公司的实际披露数据，本文对关联交易现行监管的有效性提出了质疑。联邦证券法规模棱两可的规定为弄虚作假留下了可乘之机。每家公司的批准委员会不仅对批准哪些拟议交易行使相当大的自由裁量权，而且对向股东披露哪些交易以及披露中应包含哪些信息行使相当大的自由裁量权。在州公司法的背景下，信托忠实义务诉讼存在着不确定性，即法院何时以及是否应当绕开公平检验法，将商业判断规则适用于符合一定避风港条款（如无利益关系的董事批准）的关联交易。本文把战略披露问题和信托忠实义务诉讼的适用审查标准问题联系起来，提出一个权宜之计。为此，法院应当把联邦证券法规定的披露视为披露交易公平的强烈信号，并且在州忠实义务诉讼中应更倾向于适用商业判断规则而非公平检验法。该提议的潜在好处在于为披露关联交易创造更有效的激励机制，为诉讼当事人提供更多且可预测的规则，实现披露数据逐渐的、充分的积累，最终为公司和市场参与人甄别有利和有害的关联交易提供更准确的指引。

The Systemic Risk Paradox

系统性风险矛盾

Abstract

Consolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk. Recently, banks have seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures, prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses, which facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products. These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal. Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other.

金融行业的合并不仅对竞争构成威胁，还提高了系统风险。近期，银行业既出现了引人关注的兼并活动，也出现了轰轰烈烈的倒闭潮，这引发了一连串监管部门的响应。然而，清算所促进了证券和衍生产品交易，发生在清算所之间的合并未受到严格审查。类似于清算所这样的非银行中介机构可以视为中介，他们征收保证金，确保买卖双方有足够的财力完成交易。因此，清算所的存在降低了买卖双方直接接触下的信用风险。

Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce credit risk, but they heighten systemic risk since the collapse of one such entity threatens the entire financial system. While regulators have tackled the systemic risks posed by large banks, the systemic risks of these nonbank intermediaries have received less attention. In fact, financial reform has spurred clearinghouse growth and consolidation.

然而，现实困境是，尽管大型清算所的存在可降低信用风险，这类实体一旦倒闭会威胁到整个金融系统，反过来又加重了系统性风险。监管方虽然已经解决了大型银行造成的系统性风险，但非银行中介机构的系统性风险却鲜有人关注。事实上，金融改革刺激了清算所的增长与合并。

This Article examines the paradoxical treatment of regulators toward the systemic risks of clearinghouses and banks. It explores two fundamental questions: Why does the paradox exist, and who benefits from it? This Article borrows from antitrust to offer a framework for ensuring that the entities that control a large clearinghouse (large, heavily regulated banks) do not abuse that clearinghouse’s market dominance.

本文就监管机构针对清算所和银行的系统性风险所采取相互矛盾的处理方式进行了剖析，并探讨出两个根本性的问题：即为什么会存在这种矛盾？谁因此而受益？借鉴反垄断法，本文提出一个参照标准，以保证控制大型清算所的实体（即受到严格监管的大型银行）不滥用市场支配地位。

（图片来源于网络）

Speaking Up: The Challenges to Section 501(c)(3)’s Political Activities Prohibition in a Post-Citizens

United World

公开披露表达：在后公民联合世界中对

第501(c)(3)条[1]政治活动禁令的挑战

Abstract

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, there is still one type of corporation that cannot engage in political speech: the nonprofit corporation. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code prevents nonprofit corporations that hold tax-exempt status from participating in “any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for political office.” But recent events show a growing call to reform this provision, referred to as the political activities prohibition. These events include new First Amendment developments, charities allegedly flouting the prohibition in recent elections, the 2013 IRS targeting scandal, and finally a notice of proposed rulemaking promulgated by the IRS and the Treasury Department in 2013 that could change the political activity regulations for both section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) organizations.

在最高法院对公民联合会诉联邦选举委员会一案作出裁决后，仍有一类公司不得参与政治言论：即非营利公司。《国内税收法》第501(c)(3)条禁止享有免税身份的非营利公司参与“支持或反对政治候选人的任何政治活动”。然而近期发生的事件表明了要求修改该禁令条款的呼声越来越高。相关事件包括新《第一修正案》的发展、慈善团体在近期选举中涉嫌藐视禁令、2013年美国国税局（IRS）的目标丑闻以及2013年美国国税局（IRS）和财政局（the Treasury Department）发布的一则拟议规则制定通知，可能改变第501(c)(3)条和501(c)(4)条的政治活动规则。

This Note responds to these recent events and discusses the purpose and structure of the political activities prohibition, both within section 501(c)(3) and in connection with section 501(c)(4). The Note then examines different constitutional challenges to the political activities prohibition, including First Amendment and selective prosecution challenges stemming from the IRS’ alleged haphazard enforcement of the prohibition.This Note concludes that the political activities prohibition should not be eliminated, but advocates implementing several laws and agency policies to ensure even enforcement of the prohibition.

该文件对近期发生的事件作了回应，并对第501(c)(3)条范围内及与501(c)(4)条相关的政治活动禁令的目的和结构进行讨论，随后还研究了针对该禁令提出的各种宪法挑战，包括第一修正案以及因美国财政局被控随意执法而引发的歧视性诉讼。该文件的结论是，不应当废除政治活动禁令，但主张执行多项法律和机构政策，以确保禁令的正确实施。

Intrastate Crowdfunding

州内众筹

Abstract

Crowdfunding is the practice of raising small amounts of money from a large number of people over the Internet. Until now, businesses trying to raise capital over crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter have solicited contributions by offering rewards instead of a possible return, which allows them to avoid federal securities laws. However, after proposed SEC rules are finalized, it will be legal for issuers to sell securities–such as equities and interest-bearing debt–over crowdfunding platforms without incurring the expense of registration.

众筹是指通过互联网上面向公众筹集小额资金的行为。时至今日，在众筹网站上筹集资金的企业，如Kickstarter，已经在以提供奖励而非回报的方式来征集捐款，这使它们能够规避联邦证券法。不过，拟议的证券交易委员会（SEC）规则通过以后，发行人通过众筹平台出售如股票和有息债务的证券将是合法且免缴注册费的。

The new federal crowdfunding exemption has been the subject of considerable debate and anticipation in both the media and scholarly literature. However, securities-based crowdfunding is already legal in several states so long as the issuers offer and sell securities only to in-state residents. This Note engages in the first sustained comparison of the state and federal exemptions. It claims that although the state exemptions offer issuers access to a smaller pool of potential investors, they present a viable, lower-cost alternative to the federal exemption because they subject issuers to significantly fewer regulatory expenses. It further claims that in spite of their less stringent requirements, certain features of the state exemptions can help to promote investor protection by encouraging the participation of large investors. This Note concludes by offering four recommendations for improving both the state and federal laws, in each case urging that the exemptions draw on the best aspects of one another.

新的联邦众筹豁免成为新闻媒体和学术文献中广泛讨论和预期的主题。然而，基于证券的众筹在几个州已经是合法的，只要发行人只向州内居民提供和销售证券。该文件首次对州和联邦豁免进行持续性的比较。文件声称，尽管州豁免使发行人获得较小的潜在投资者规模，但其切实可行且成本低，足以替代联邦豁免。在此情形下，发行人的监管成本更低。文件还称，尽管要求不那么严格，但州豁免的某些特征则通过鼓励大型投资商的参与来促进投资者保护。该文件最后提出了四项完善州和联邦法律的建议，认为在每种情况下都敦促充分利用彼此的豁免优势。

（图片来源于网络）

Member FMIC: Credit-Risk Sharing Within and Without an FMIC-Based Housing Finance System

FMIC成员：基于联邦抵押保险公司（FMIC）的住房金融系统内外的信用风险分担

Abstract

Everyone agrees that the current chapter in the life of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should end. Less clear is what comes next.

所有人都认为房利美和房地美不应该继续存在。但是接下来的事情尚未得知。

Starting in the latter half of 2013, the Senate Banking Committee has explored legislation that would transform the economic and regulatory landscape of housing finance in the United States. S. 1217, the Senate Proposal introduced last summer by Senators Bob Corker (R-TN) and Mark Warner (D-VA), and revised this year by Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Ranking Member Mike Crapo (R-ID), seeks to replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, with a “Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation” (“FMIC”), an explicit government guarantor of conforming U.S. mortgages. The Senate Proposal would maintain a strong federal presence in housing finance but would require that private capital, through risk-sharing mechanisms, absorb the first 10% of losses. Although the proposal is unlikely to pass Congress in the gridlocked 2014 election season, it carries substantial bipartisan support going into the next Congress.

自2013年下半年起，参议院银行委员会已经着手探索相关立法，以改变美国住房金融的经济和监管形势。去年夏天，参议员Senators Bob Corker和Mark Warner将S1217号参议院提案提交讨论。今年，银行委员会主席Tim Johnson (D-SD)和资深议员Mike Crapo (R-ID)又对其进行了修订，旨在以联邦抵押贷款保险公司（“FMIC”，一家符合美国抵押的适格政府担保人）替代房地美和房利美及其监管机构联邦住房金融局（the Federal Housing Finance Agency）。参议院提案将在住房金融领域产生巨大影响，但是按照风险共担机制，私人资本必须承担前10%的损失。尽管2014年的选举季已经陷入僵局，该提案不太可能获国会通过，但它在进入下届国会中获得了两党的大力支持。

This Note explores the Senate Proposal, focusing closely on two crucial features of the proposed regulatory operation of the FMIC system: the credit-risk sharing mechanisms that the FMIC would employ and the supervision and legal duties of market participants both inside and outside the FMIC apparatus. Primarily, this Note concludes that credit-linked note deal structures provide the most efficient and prudentially safe and sound method of transferring first-loss credit risk from the FMIC to private parties. Secondarily, this Note concludes that the Senate Proposal should also include features to hasten the return of the purely private-label securitization market, such as the placement of an enhanced legal duty on private-label securitization trustees. These conclusions address broad housing finance concepts and will remain germane to the debate no matter the fate of the Banking Committee’s proposed legislation.

该文件探讨了参议院提案，密切关注联邦抵押保险公司(FMIC)系统拟议监管运作的两个重要特征：联邦抵押保险公司(FMIC)采用的信用风险分担机制及其内外市场参与者的监管和法律责任。首先，本文件认定，信贷挂钩票据交易安排为首次损失的信用风险从联邦抵押保险公司(FMIC)转移给私人提供了最有效、最审慎和最稳妥的方式。其次，该文件认定，参议院提案也应当包括加速完全自有品牌证券化市场回归的内容，例如对自有品牌证券化受托人加重法律责任。这些结论提及了广泛的住房金融概念，且无论银行委员会拟议立法走向何方，都将与之争论密切相关。

（图片来源于网络）

注释：

[1] 第501（c）（3）条是《美国国内税收法典》（IRC）的一部分，是非营利组织的特定税种，符合第501（c）（3）条要求的组织免征联邦所得税。一般来说，有三类组织可能符合IRC第501（c）（3）条中概述的税务类别：慈善组织、教会和宗教组织以及私人基金会。虽然符合第501（c）（3）条要求的组织可以免除联邦所得税，但禁止利用其活动实质性地影响立法，包括参加任何支持或反对某一政治候选人的竞选活动。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/issue/view/87

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