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如何在21世纪发财致富? | 经济学人财经(文章很长,请多点耐心)

如何在21世纪发财致富? | 经济学人财经(文章很长,请多点耐心)

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写在前面

思维导图作者:

May Li,男,我要去追逐心中的太阳,还要继续努力的亚古兽


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精读|翻译|词组

How to get rich in the 21st century

如何在21世纪发财致富

英文部分选自经济学人20240106期财经板块

Finance and economics | Paths to prosperity

财经 | 走向繁荣之路


How to get rich in the 21st century

如何在21世纪发财致富


The race to become the next economic superpower

成为下一个经济超级大国的竞赛


By 2050 there will be a new crop of economic powers—if things go to plan. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, wants his country’s gdp per person to surpass the World Bank’s high-income threshold three years before then. Indonesia’s leaders reckon that they have until the mid-century mark, when an ageing population will start to drag on growth, to catch up with rich countries. The middle of the century is also the ultimate finale for many of Muhammad bin Salman’s “Vision 2030” reforms. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince wants to transform his country from an oil producer into a diversified economy. Other smaller countries, including Chile, Ethiopia and Malaysia, have schemes of their own.


如果一切按计划进行,到2050年将出现一批新的经济强国。印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪(Narendra Modi)希望本国的人均GDP能在2047年跨过世界银行的高收入门槛。印尼领导人认为,鉴于本世纪中叶起人口老龄化将开始拖累经济增长,印尼必须在那之前赶上富裕国家。本世纪中叶也是穆罕默德··萨勒曼(Muhammad bin Salman)的愿景2030”中大部分改革计划的最终期限。沙特阿拉伯王储希望将自己的国家从石油生产国转变为多元发展的经济体。其他较小的国家,比如智利、埃塞俄比亚和马来西亚,也有自己的计划。


注释:
1. World Bank’s high-income threshold:根据世界银行的定义,人均国民总收入超过某个标准的经济体,称为高收入经济体。此标准在2021年为12,695美元。
2. Muhammad bin Salman沙特阿拉伯王储
首相。穆罕默德王子提出沙特愿景2030财政改革计划,推动国营石油公司公开募股,将股票收益投资采矿业、风力和太阳能等产业。预计在2030年,将沙国10%的主要电力来源转移到可再生能源。愿景2030”也提出开放教育、医疗等私有产业,鼓励旅游业发展,更打算突破宗教禁忌发展娱乐产业,计划包括755项国家级交通项目,更希望打造出媲美拉斯维加斯的娱乐大城,兴建主题乐园及野生动物园等等,让大众能够在国内度假,促进国内消费。


These vary widely, but all have something in common: breathtaking ambition. India’s officials think that gdp growth of 8% a year will be required to meet Mr Modi’s goal—1.5 percentage points more than the country has managed on average over the past three decades. Indonesia will need growth of 7% a year, up from an average of 4.6% over the same period. Saudi Arabia’s non-oil economy will have to grow by 9% a year, up from an average of 2.8%. Although 2023 was a good year for all three, none experienced growth at this sort of pace. Very few countries have maintained such growth for five years, let alone for 30.


这些计划千差万别,但有一个共同点:雄心万丈,令人惊叹。印度官员认为,要实现莫迪的目标,GDP年增长率需达8%,比过去三十年的平均增速还要高1.5个百分点。印尼需要每年增长7%,而过去三十年的平均增速为4.6%。沙特阿拉伯的非石油经济每年需要增长9%,而过去三十年的平均增速为2.8%。尽管对这三个国家来说,2023年是个好年景,但依然无一国实现这种增速。很少有国家能连续五年保持这样的增长速度,更别说三十年了。


Nor is there an obvious recipe for runaway growth. To boost prosperity, economists typically prescribe liberalising reforms of the sort that have been advanced by the imf and the World Bank since the 1980s under the label of the “Washington consensus”. Among the most widely adopted are sober fiscal policies and steady exchange rates. Today technocrats urge looser competition rules and the privatisation of state-owned firms. Yet these proposals are ultimately concerned with removing barriers to growth, rather than supercharging it. Indeed, William Easterly of New York University has calculated that, even among the 52 countries which had policies most consistent with the Washington consensus, gdp growth only averaged 2% a year from 1980 to 1998. Mr Modi and Prince Muhammad are unwilling to wait—they want to develop, fast.


快速发展也没有显而易见的诀窍。为了促进繁荣,经济学家通常主张自由化改革,比如上世纪八十年代以来国际货币基金组织和世界银行根据华盛顿共识所推动的一系列改革。被采纳最多的就有稳健的财政政策和稳定的汇率。现下,技术官僚们敦促放宽竞争规则,私有化国营企业。然而,究其根本,这些提议聚焦的是消除阻碍增长的因素,而不是直接促进增长。事实上,根据纽约大学的威廉·伊斯特利(William Easterly)的计算,1980年至1998年间,所推行的政策最贴近华盛顿共识的52个国家GDP年均增速也只有2%。莫迪和穆罕默德亲王都不愿意等待——他们要发展,而且要快。


注释:

1. Washington consensus: 华盛顿共识是1989年所出现的一整套针对拉丁美洲和东欧国家新自由主义政治经济学理论,不少评论指此共识是美国作为支配欧洲和拉丁美洲经济的手段。1989年,陷于债务危机拉美国家急需进行国内经济改革。美国国际经济研究所邀请国际货币基金组织IMF)、世界银行WBG)、美洲开发银行美国财政部的研究人员以及拉美国家代表在华盛顿召开了一个研讨会,旨在为拉美国家经济改革提供方案和对策。前彼得森国际经济研究所经济学家约翰·威廉森执笔写了《华盛顿共识》,系统地提出指导拉美经济改革的各项主张,包括实行紧缩政策防止通货膨胀、削减公共福利开支、金融和贸易自由化、统一汇率、取消对外资自由流动的各种障碍以及国有企业私有化、取消政府对企业的管制等,得到世界银行的支持。威廉姆森对拉美国家的国内经济改革提出了已与上述各机构达成共识的十条政策措施,由于国际机构的总部和美国财政部都在华盛顿,加之会议在华盛顿召开,因此这一共识被称作华盛顿共识。在威廉姆森看来,由于这些思想秉承了亚当·斯密自由竞争的经济思想,与西方自由主义传统一脉相承。后来人们将这些观点称之为新自由主义的政策宣言。体现华盛顿共识的政策主张,曾由国际货币基金组织、世界银行等国际组织在发展中国家推动,其后果引起极大争议。在次贷危机全球信贷危机愈演愈烈背景下的2009年二十国集团伦敦峰会上,英国首相戈登·布朗旧有的华盛顿共识已经终结


The aim is to achieve the sort of meteoric growth that East Asian countries managed in the 1970s and 1980s. As globalisation spread, they made the most of large and cheap workforces, gaining an edge in markets for cars (Japan), electronics (South Korea) and pharmaceuticals (Singapore). Industries were built behind protectionist walls, which restricted imports, then thrived when trade with the rest of the world was encouraged. Foreign companies later brought the know-how and capital required to churn out more complex and profitable goods, increasing productivity.


他们的目标是要实现东亚国家在上世纪七八十年代取得的飞速增长。随着全球化的蔓延,东亚国家充分利用大量廉价劳动力,在汽车(日本)、电子产品(韩国)和制药(新加坡)市场赢得优势。各种产业在限制进口的保护主义围墙里建立起来,并随着全球贸易的兴起而蓬勃发展。后来,外国公司带来了快速生产更复杂、更赚钱商品所需的技术和资本,进一步提高了生产力


注释:

1. meteoricIf you usemeteoric when you are describing someone's career, you mean that they achieved success very quickly. (职业)迅速成功的

2. churn outTochurn out something means to produce large quantities of it very quickly. 快速大量生产


Little surprise, then, that leaders across the developing world remain enthusiastic about manufacturing. In 2015 Mr Modi announced plans to increase industry’s share of Indian gdp to 25%, from 16%. “Sell anywhere, but make in India,” he urged business leaders. Cambodia hopes to double the exports of its factories, excluding clothing, by 2025. Kenya wants to see its manufacturing sector grow by 15% a year.


因此,发展中国家的领导人对制造业的热情始终高涨也就不足为奇了。2015年,莫迪宣布计划,要将工业在印度GDP中的比重从16%提高到25%。他呼吁商界领袖们全球销售,印度制造。柬埔寨希望到2025年,除服装外的工厂出口额能翻一番。肯尼亚则希望其制造业每年增长15%


There is a snag, however. Industrialisation is even more difficult to induce than it was 40 or 50 years ago. As a result of technological advances, fewer workers than ever are needed to produce, say, a pair of socks. In India five times fewer workers were required to operate a factory in 2007 than in 1980. Across the world, industry now runs on skill and capital, which rich countries have in abundance, and less on labour, meaning that a large, cheap workforce no longer offers much of a route to economic development. Mr Modi and others therefore have a new game plan: they want to leap ahead to cutting-edge manufacturing. Why bother stitching socks when you can etch semiconductors?


然而,这里有一个小问题。与4050年前相比,工业化变得更加困难。由于技术进步,生产一双袜子等产品所需要的工人比以往任何时候都要少。在印度,2007年运营一座工厂所需的工人数量是1980年的五分之一。如今,全球范围内,工业更依赖于发达国家大量拥有的技术和资本,而非劳动力,这意味着大规模的廉价劳动力不再是经济发展的捷径。因此,莫迪和其他领导人制定了一个全新的战略计划:他们想向尖端制造业跃进。如果你能蚀刻半导体,为什么还要去费力缝袜子呢?


注释:

1.snagAsnag is a small problem or disadvantage. 小问题; 小挫折

2.etchIf a line or patternis etched into a surface, it is cut into the surface by means of acid or a sharp tool. You can also say that a surface is etched with a line or pattern. 蚀刻; 凿刻


This “extraordinary obsession with making stuff right on the technological frontier”, as a former adviser to the Indian government puts it, sometimes leads to old-fashioned protectionism. Indian companies may be welcome to sell anywhere, but Mr Modi wants Indians to buy Indian. He has announced import bans on everything from laptops to weapons.


正如一位印度政府前顾问所言,极度痴迷于尖端科技制造有时会导致迂腐的保护主义。莫迪或许并不在意印度公司的产品卖到哪里,但他希望印度人购买本国产品。他已对下到笔记本电脑,上到武器装备的一系列产品下达了进口禁令。


But not all the protectionism is old-fashioned. Since the last outbreak in India, in the 1970s, subsidies and tax breaks have mostly replaced import bans and licensing. Back then every investment above a certain threshold had to be cleared by a civil servant. Now senior officials are under orders from Mr Modi to drum up $100bn-worth of investment a year, and the prime minister has declared luring chipmakers to be among his main economic goals. “Production-linked incentives” give tax breaks for each computer or missile made in the country, as well as for other high-tech products. In 2023 such subsidies carried a bill of $45bn, or 1.2% of gdp, up from $8bn or so when the scheme was launched three years earlier. Similarly, Malaysia is offering handouts to firms that establish cloud-computing operations, and helps with the cost of factories set up in the country. Kenya is building five tax-free industrial parks, which will be ready in 2030, and has plans for another 20.


不过,并非所有保护主义都很迂腐。印度上一次保护主义大爆发是在七十年代,之后,补贴和税收减免已基本取代进口禁令和许可证。当时,每项超出特定门槛的投资都必须获得公务员的批准。如今,莫迪命令其手下的高级官员每年招徕1000亿美元的投资,并宣布引进芯片制造商是自己主要的经济目标。生产相关激励措施为在本国生产的电脑或导弹及其他高科技产品提供税收减免优惠。2023年,该类补贴费用达450亿美元,占GDP1.2%,而3年前该措施实施时仅为80亿美元左右。同样地,马来西亚正向发展云计算业务的公司提供补贴,并帮助降低在该国建厂的成本。肯尼亚正在建设5个免税工业园区,预计2030年完工,且计划再建20个。

 

In some places, there has been early success. Cambodia’s manufacturing sector produced three percentage points more of the country’s gdp last year than it did five years ago. Firms that are looking to diversify from China have been lured by low costs, subsidies for high-tech manufacturing and state investment. Elsewhere, though, things are proving harder. In India manufacturing has stayed steady as a share of gdp—Mr Modi is not going to hit his 25% target by next year. Big names like Apple and Tesla have put their brands on a factory or two, but show little desire to make the sort of investments they once lavished on China, which offers superior infrastructure and a better-educated workforce.


一些国家已初步尝到胜利的果实。去年,柬埔寨制造业占GDP的比重比5年前高了3个百分点。低成本、高科技制造业补贴和国家投资等优势吸引了许多希望降低对中国依赖程度的企业。然而,在另一些国家,情况则不甚理想。印度制造业占比GDP的比例一成不变——莫迪25%的目标明年怕是无法达成。苹果和特斯拉等知名企业投资建设了一两个工厂,但不怎么乐意像当初在中国那样大举投资,因为中国有着更优越的基础设施,劳动力受教育程度也更高。


The danger is that, in seeking to attract high-tech manufacturing, countries end up repeating past disasters. From 1960 to 1991 manufacturing’s share of Indian gdp doubled. But when protective barriers were removed in the 1990s, nothing was cheap enough to export to the rest of the world. The risk is especially great this time around since Mr Modi sees manufacturing as being synonymous with “self-reliance”—or India’s ability to produce everything that it needs, especially the tech that goes into weapons. Along with Indonesia and Turkey, India is one of a group of countries that view getting rich as route to a stronger geopolitical position, increasing the chance of misdirected investment.


危险之处在于,为吸引高科技制造业,这些国家最终可能会重蹈覆辙。19601991年间,印度制造业占GDP的比例翻了一番。但九十年代保护性壁垒消除后,没有什么印度制造的产品廉价到能出口至世界其他地方。莫迪将制造业等同于自力更生,希望印度能生产一切所需物品,特别是用于武器的技术。因此,这一次的风险尤其之大。和印度尼西亚、土耳其等国家一样,印度认为民殷国富能带来更强大的地缘政治地位,而这增大了投资失误的可能性。


Green thumb

园艺大师


These drawbacks to both basic manufacturing and attempts to leap ahead are helping convince some countries to try another approach: attracting industries that use their natural resources, especially the metals and minerals powering the green transition. Governments in Latin America are keen. So are the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. But it is Indonesia that is leading the way, and doing so with striking heavy-handedness. Since 2020 the country has banned exports of bauxite and nickel, of which it produces 7% and 22% of global supply. Officials hope that by keeping a tight grip they can get refiners to move to the country. They then want to repeat the trick, persuading each stage of the supply chain to follow, until Indonesian workers are making everything from battery components to wind turbines.


一些在基础制造业和跨越式发展上碰了壁的国家试图走另一条道路:引诱那些利用其自然资源,特别是推动绿色转型的金属和矿物的产业。拉美国家的政府都热衷于此。刚果(金)和津巴布韦也不例外。不过,处于领先地位的是行事强硬、引人注目的印度尼西亚。2020年以来,印尼已禁止出口铝土矿和镍(其产量分别占全球供应量的7%22%)。官员们希望严控出口能促使冶炼企业迁至印尼。然后,他们希望依法炮制,说服供应链每一环的企业都搬迁至此,直到从电池组件到风力涡轮机的一系列产品都出自印度尼西亚工人之手。


Officials are also offering carrots, in the form of both cash and facilities. Indonesia is in the midst of an infrastructure boom: spending between 2020 to 2024 ought to reach $400bn, over 50% more a year than in 2014. This includes funding for at least 27 multibillion-dollar industrial parks, including the Kalimantan Park, constructed on 13,000 hectares of former Bornean rainforest at a cost of $129bn. Other countries are also offering sweeteners. Firms that want to install solar panels in Brazil will receive subsidies to also build them there. Bolivia nationalised its lithium industry, but its new state-owned conglomerates will be permitted to enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies.


官员们还在以现金和设施的形式提供甜头。印度尼西亚正处于基础设施建设繁荣期:2020年到2024年,年均投资预计达到800亿美元,比2014年高出50%。这包括投资至少27个数十亿美元的工业园区,其中包括耗资1290亿美元、占用了13000公顷婆罗洲雨林的加里曼丹工业园。其他国家同样提供激励措施。在巴西,政府向想要安装太阳能电池板的公司发放补贴,鼓励他们在巴西制造这些太阳能电池板。玻利维亚的锂产业已经实现国有化,但依然允许新成立的国营巨头与中国公司成立合资企业。


This approach—of trying to scale the energy supply chain—has little precedent. The world’s oiliest countries mostly ship their crude abroad. Indeed, more than 40% of global refining capacity can be found in America, China, India and Japan. Saudi Arabia refines less than a quarter of what it produces; Saudi Aramco, its state oil giant, refines in northern China. Experiments with export bans have mostly been in simpler commodities, such as timber in Ghana and tea in Tanzania. By contrast, obtaining nickel pure enough to be used in electric vehicles from Indonesia’s supply is ferociously complex, notes Matt Geiger of mjg Capital, a hedge fund. Doing so requires three different types of factory, and the nickel must then pass through several more before it enters a car.


这种攀爬能源供应链的方法鲜有先例。世界上石油资源最丰富的国家大多将直接出口原油。实际上,美国、中国、印度和日本占全球炼油能力的 40% 以上。沙特阿拉伯的炼油量不到其产油量的四分之一,其国家石油公司(Saudi Aramco,简称沙特阿美)在中国北方投资建立了炼油厂。出口禁令通常适用于较为基础的大宗商品,如加纳的木材和坦桑尼亚的茶叶。对冲基金MJG Capital的马特·盖革(Matt Geiger)指出,相较而言,从印度尼西亚获取足以用于电动汽车生产的高纯度镍则非常复杂。要做到这一点,需要三种类型的工厂,而且镍在用于汽车前还必须经过好几道工序。


补充资料:

1.澎湃新闻《沙特阿美投资东北,总投资超八百亿元的中沙合作炼化工程开工》

https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1761711385332261735&wfr=spider&for=pc

2.加纳出口限制清单

https://gra.gov.gh/customs/export-restrictions-and-prohibitions/

3.坦桑尼亚禁止出口散装未加工茶叶

http://repository.businessinsightz.org/handle/20.500.12018/1726?show=full 


Fossil fuels have made parts of the Gulf rich, but almost every industry in the world constantly guzzles oil. There is no guarantee that the bonanza from green metals will be anywhere near as large. Batteries only need replacing every few years. Officials at the International Energy Agency, a global body, reckon that pay-offs from green commodities will peak in the next few years, after which they will taper off. Moreover, technological development could suddenly reduce appetite for certain metals (say, if another type of battery chemistry becomes dominant).


化石燃料让部分海湾国家发家致富,因为世界上几乎所有行业都在不断消耗石油。而绿色金属能带来的财运怕是与石油相去甚远。电池每隔几年才要更换一次。据国际能源署(International Energy Agency)官员估计,投资绿色大宗商品的回报将会在未来几年达到顶峰,之后会逐渐减少。此外,技术发展可能会使某种金属的需求突然降低(比如说,如果另一种电池异军突起)。


注释:

1.由于全球追求清洁能源转型,催生了一类新的大宗商品“green commodity”,它们生产方式清洁,最终不影响生态环境。结合文中提到的green metal,此处更多的指用于风能、太阳能等清洁能源发电的铝、钴、锂、镍、铜等金属材料。

补充资料

McKinsey - The new imperative for green commodities

https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/the-new-imperative-for-green-commodities


Meanwhile, fossil-fuel beneficiaries are trying another strategy altogether: to reinvent the entrepot. The Gulf wants to be where the world does business, welcoming trade from all corners of the globe and providing shelter from geopolitical tensions, particularly between America and China. By 2050 the world should have reached net-zero emissions. Although the Gulf is rich, its economies are still developing. Local workforces are less skilled than those in Malaysia, yet receive wages comparable to those in Spain. This makes foreign workers essential. In Saudi Arabia they account for three-quarters of the total labour force.


与此同时,海湾地区正在尝试另一种策略:重塑转口贸易。海湾地区希望成为世界贸易中心,喜迎八方来客,成为紧张的地缘政治局势(尤其是中美之间的摩擦)之外的一方乐土。2050年,全球应该已经实现净零排放。尽管海湾地区富得流油,但其经济仍在发展。当地劳动力论技能不如马来西亚,论工资却与西班牙不相上下,因此外籍劳工必不可少。沙特阿拉伯外籍劳工人数占劳动力市场的四分之三。


The United Arab Emirates (uae) was one of the first countries in the region to diversify. It has focused on industries, such as shipping and tourism, that may help to facilitate other business, as well as on high-tech industries, such as artificial intelligence (ai) and chemicals. Abu Dhabi is already home to outposts of the Louvre and New York University, and has plans to make money from space travel for tourists. Qatar is building Education City, a campus that will cost $6.5bn and sprawl across 1,500 hectares, working a bit like an industrial park for universities, hosting the branches of ten, including Northwestern and University College London.


阿拉伯联合酋长国是该地区最早追求多元化发展的国家之一。其关注的重点产业不仅包括航运和旅游业等可以帮助促进其他行业发展的行业,还包括人工智能和化工产业等高科技行业。阿联酋已经修建了阿布扎比卢浮宫和纽约大学分校,还计划通过太空旅行赚钱。卡塔尔正在建设教育城,校园将耗资65亿美元,占地1500公顷,有点像为诸多大学打造的工业园区,容纳包括西北大学和伦敦大学学院在内的10所大学的分校。


Others in the Gulf are also getting involved. Saudi Arabia hopes to see flows of foreign investment increase to 5.7% of gdp in 2030, up from 0.7% in 2022, and is spending fabulous amounts of money in pursuit of this ambition. The Public Investment Fund has disbursed $1.3trn in the country over the past decade—more than is forecast to be unleashed by the Inflation Reduction Act, President Joe Biden’s industrial policy in America. The fund is shelling out on everything from football teams and petrochemical plants to entirely new cities. Industrial policy has never been conducted on such a scale. Dani Rodrik of Harvard University and Nathaniel Lane of the University of Oxford reckon that China spent 1.5% of gdp on its own efforts in 2019. Last year Saudi Arabia disbursed sums equivalent to 20% of gdp.


海湾地区的其他国家也紧随其后加入进来。沙特阿拉伯希望到2030年外商投资总额达到GDP5.7%2022年这一数字为0.7%),并且为了达成这一目标不惜投入巨资。过去十年中,其公共投资基金已支出1.3万亿美元,比《通货膨胀削减法案》——美国总统拜登的产业政策——预计投入的资金还要多。从足球队、石化厂到全新的城市,该基金四处撒币。如此大规模的产业政策前所未有:据哈佛大学的丹尼·罗德里克(Dani Rodrik)和牛津大学的纳撒尼尔·兰恩(Nathaniel Lane)估计,2019年中国的产业政策支出为GDP1.5%,而去年沙特阿拉伯花掉了GDP20%


Everyone’s a winner

猪都能飞


The problem with throwing around quite so much money is that it becomes difficult to see what is working and what is not. Manufacturers in Oman, making products from aluminium to ammonia, can obtain a factory rent-free at one of the country’s new industrial parks, buy materials with generous grants and pay their workers’ wages by borrowing cheaply from shareholders, which usually include the government. They can even draw on export subsidies to sell abroad at a lower cost. How is it possible to tell which comapanies will outlast all this cash, and which ones would collapse without it?


四处撒币的问题是很难判断撒在哪儿是有效的,哪些是无效的。阿曼的工厂生产从铝到氨的各种产品。它们可以在该国新建的工业园区内免费租赁厂房,拿着慷慨的补助购买原材料,还可以通过向股东(通常包括政府)低息借款来支付工人工资。它们甚至可以利用出口补贴,以较低的成本销往国外。如何才能知道,一旦失去这些支持,哪些企业能够长久生存,哪些又会岌岌可危?


One thing is already painfully clear. The private sector is yet to take off in the Gulf. Almost 80% of all non-oil economic growth in the past five years in Saudi Arabia has come from government spending. Although an impressive 35% of Saudi Arabian women are now in the labour force, up from 20% in 2018, overall workforce-participation rates across the rest of the Gulf remain low. Researchers at Harvard have found that legislation introduced in 2011, which stipulated Saudis should make up a set portion of a firm’s headcount—for instance, 6% of all workers in green tech and 20% in insurance—decreased productivity and did nothing to move the needle on private employment.


一个惨痛的现实已经摆在眼前:私营企业在海湾国家还尚未起飞。过去五年,沙特阿拉伯几乎80%的非石油经济增长来自政府支出。尽管沙特在促进女性就业方面成绩斐然,女性就业比例已经从2018年的20%提升至35%,但其他海湾国家的女性就业率还很低。2011年,沙特推行政策要求企业必须雇佣一定比例的沙特籍员工,比如绿色技术行业中沙特籍员工要达到6%,保险行业要达到20%。哈佛大学的研究人员发现,这一政策不仅降低了生产力,还对改善私营企业就业毫无帮助。


注释:

Move the needleto cause a noticeable change in something. 推动事情明显进展

Source: https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/move+the+needle

延申阅读:

《沙特公布新制度促进就业本地化》

http://eg.mofcom.gov.cn/article/qyhz/ab/201108/20110807705931.shtml


Ultimately, a few countries will make it to high-income status. Perhaps the uae’s spending on ai will pay off. Perhaps new tech will make the world more dependent on nickel, to Indonesia’s advantage. India’s population is too young for growth to stagnate entirely. But the three strategies employed by countries looking to get rich—leaping to high-tech manufacturing, exploiting the green transition and reinventing the entrepot—all represent gambles, and expensive ones at that. Even at this early stage, a few lessons can be drawn.


最终,一些国家将跻身高收入国家行列。也许阿联酋在人工智能领域的投入能够得到回报,也许新技术会让镍更加抢手,从而利好印尼。印度的人口非常年轻,因此经济增长不会完全停滞。尽管如此,这些国家谋求发展采取的三大策略:跨越式发展高新技术制造业、推进绿色转型、重塑转口贸易——都是一种赌博,且赌注高昂。即便好戏才刚开场,但我们仍可从中总结出一些经验教训。


The first is that the state is now much more active in economic development than at any point in recent decades. Somehow an economy must evolve from agrarian poverty to diversified industries that can compete with rivals in countries which have been rich for centuries. To do so requires infrastructure, research and state expertise. It may also require lending at below market rates. This means that a certain amount of state involvement in the process is inevitable, and that policymakers will have to pick some winners. Even so, governments are now intervening much more frequently. Many have lost patience with the Washington consensus. The benefits of its most straightforward reforms, such as independent central banks and ministries stuffed with professional economists, have already been reaped; the institutions that once enforced it (namely, the imf and World Bank) are shadows of their former selves.


首先,国家比近几十年来任何时候都要更加积极地推动经济发展。某种程度上,一个经济体必须脱离贫困的农业社会,培育出多元化的产业,才能够与已经积累了数百年财富的国家抗衡。要做到这一点,需要基础设施、科学研究和治理能力。或许还需要以比市场更低的的利率发放贷款。这意味经济发展的过程中,政府一定程度的介入是不可避免的,政策制定者也不得不让一些人先富起来。即便如此,各国政府的干预愈发频繁。许多国家对华盛顿共识已经失去耐心。华盛顿共识最直接的改革,如独立的中央银行、塞满经济学家的政府部门等都已开花结果,而曾经推行华盛顿共识的机构(即国际货币基金组织和世界银行),却今不如昔。


注释:

1.a shadow of your former selfsomeone or something that is not as strong, powerful大不如前

Source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/shadow-of-former-self#google_vignette


Today policymakers in the developing world take cues from China and South Korea. Few recall their own country’s interventionist follies. In the 1960s and 1970s it was not just those in East Asia that were enthusiastically experimenting with industrial policy; many in Africa were as well. For the best part of a decade, the two regions grew at a similar pace. Yet from the mid-1970s it became apparent that policymakers in Africa had made the wrong bets. A debt crisis kicked off a decade known as the “African tragedy”, in which the continent’s economies shrank by 0.6% a year on average. Later, in the 2000s, Saudi officials unsuccessfully spent big to foster a petrochemical industry, forgetting that shipping oil abroad was cheaper than paying people to work at home.


如今,发展中国家的政策制定者纷纷借鉴中国、韩国的经验。很少有谁会想起自己国家干预经济时做过的蠢事。上世纪六七十年代,不仅东亚国家热衷尝试产业政策,不少非洲国家也是如此。在近十年的时间里,东亚和非洲的增长速度相近。然而,显而易见的是,从七十年代中期开始,非洲的执政者下错了赌注。一场债务危机开启了长达十年的非洲悲剧。期间,非洲大陆的经济平均每年萎缩0.6%。此后,在本世纪第一个十年里,沙特政府也经历了失败,他们斥巨资建设本国的石油化工业,却忘了本地劳工的薪水要比原油出口的成本高得多。


A spanner in the works

前路坎坷


The second is that the stakes are high. Most countries have sunk enormous sums into pursuing their chosen path. For the smaller economies, such as Cambodia or Kenya, the result could be a financial crisis if things go wrong. In Ethiopia, this has already happened, with debt default accompanying civil war. Even bigger countries, such as India and Indonesia, will not be able to afford a second stab at development. The bill from their current efforts, should they fail, and the cost of ageing populations will leave them short of fiscal space. Wealthier countries are constrained, too, albeit by another resource: time. Saudi Arabia needs to develop before demand for its oil drops off, or else there will be few ways to sustain its citizens.


其次,追求发展的风险不低。沿着自己选择的发展道路,大多数国家不惜血本、投下重金。对柬埔寨、肯尼亚这类体量较小的经济体来说,一旦出现问题,便可能爆发经济危机。内战与债务违约问题交织的埃塞俄比亚就已经尝到了苦果。即便对于印度、印尼这些较大的经济体而言,他们也没有能力在发展上再赌一把。如果这些国家现在的努力失败,失败的代价和老龄化人口的成本将把他们推向财政赤字。富裕一些国家也受到限制,只不过这个限制来源于时间。沙特阿拉伯需要在石油需求下降之前加紧发展,否则将难以维持其国民的生计。


注释:

1.Put/throw a spanner in the works: to cause something to not go as planned捣乱;扰乱计划;从中作梗

Source: 

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/put-throw-a-spanner-in-the-works

2.take a stab: to attempt (to do) something; to take a turn trying (to do) something. 尝试做某事

Sourcehttps://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/taking+a+stab


The third is that the manner in which countries grow is changing. According to work by Mr Rodrik, manufacturing has been the only type of work where poor countries have improved their productivity at a faster rate than rich countries, and so caught up. Modern industry may not offer the same benefit. Rather than spending time attempting to make factory processes marginally more efficient, workers in countries trying to get rich increasingly mine green metals (working in an industry with notoriously low productivity), serve tourists (another low-productivity sector) and assemble electronics (rather than making more complex components). All this means that the race to get rich in the 21st century will be more gruelling than the one in the 20th century.


再者,各国的经济增长方式正在变化。罗德里克的研究指出,一直以来,若要以快于富裕国家的速度提升生产力,并籍此赶上富裕国家,穷国能依靠的只有制造业。然而,现代工业并不会提供同样的便利。奋起直追的后发国家工人们不再花时间一点一点提高工厂的生产效率,而是越来越多转向绿色金属开采(这是一个出了名的低生产力行业)、服务游客(这是另一个低生产力的行业)和组装电子器件(而不是制造更复杂的产品)。这些增长方式都意味着,21 世纪的致富竞赛将比 20 世纪更加艰难。


翻译组:

Ellie,女,金融硕士,经济学人粉丝

Snowy,厨艺初级的新闻民工,啥都学点儿

Vivifang,女,外币债券交易员,满眼都是鲍威尔。

Humi,女,学习财经的金融小白,不负韶华,平视世界

Summer,女,QE在职,梦想能仗走天涯 翻译/音乐 /健康


校对组:

Ithil,胡辣汤爱好者

Alexis, Less is more

Eva,寻路中,偶尔怀念,时常向前


3



感想


本周感想:

Cleo,男,学习不停,思考不止,努力成为审慎却乐观的深入思考者

本文在分析不同发展中国家在追求经济高速发展路上所作出的计划与举措后得出来了21 世纪的致富竞赛将比 20 世纪更加艰难的结论。拿中国举例,中国在结束了抗美援朝以及越南战争后,抓住时间窗口我们迎来了改革开放,加入了WTO,连接到了环球市场。此后,依靠着我国稳定的政治格局以及社会结构,无论是外商投资还是出口贸易都迎来了质的发展,后来分税制改革促进的房地产市场发展也为经济进步带来了源源不断的推动力。好风凭借力,送我上青云,但是风停了之后呢? 在经济高速发展的进程中,一切问题都是发展的问题,但经济发展放缓后,发展本身就是问题。商品出口在海外市场经济衰退后使得出口收入下降但产能过剩,往期的投资周转率大幅下跌,利用低息负债撬动的大兴房产也在贷款价格上升后使得房地产元气大损,老百姓浸润在房地产价格下降,股票等资本市场增长低迷的环境中自然也就开始缩减开支,想尽办法清偿债务,这又导致了国内商品循环受阻,产业发展环境低迷的情况,这就是往期高增长下,所显露出来的部分内部问题。 如果我们来看海合会成员国家,无论是阿联酋和沙特,石油资源无疑在其快速发展的道路上起到了关键作用,但值得注意的是,无论是迪拜还是沙特,他们都在想办法脱离只靠石油谋求发展的道路。从开放离岸金融中心,再到大兴土木制造港口,中东明确了想要借助石油达到各个产业持续发展的决心,虽然不提现在收效如何,但无论是从ADIA(阿布扎比投资局),PIF(沙特公共投资基金)的投资布局中均能看出,这几个主权基金都在向独立产业发展作出战略上的支持。 高速增长往往是每一个公民喜闻乐见的,在高速增长的时刻,贫富差异,当下的资产回报率往往并不是很大的问题,但在高速增长的同时,快速分配的财富导致的社会问题以及高杠杆上的资产导致的投资回报率骤跌等现象,往往需要在风停之后,才得以显现。在这个高度全球化刚刚实施不到一个世纪的星球,大家都在内外部的合作中找到更加灵活但相对独立的解决方案,毕竟经济的保全封底,就是插上门来大家依旧可以小康。


4



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