Leaders | The manufacturing delusion

社论│制造兴国幻觉

Leaders | The manufacturing delusion

社论│制造兴国幻觉

Subsidies and protection for manufacturing will harm the world economy

对制造业的补贴和保护会破坏世界经济

Reshaping the world’s supply chains comes at a great cost

重塑世界供应链代价巨大

Politicians have always been captivated by manufacturing, but rarely has their desire to make things been as zealous as it is today. In the West they are doling out enormous subsidies to manufacturers, especially chipmakers and those behind green technologies, such as batteries. They say they are fighting climate change, enhancing national security and correcting for four decades of globalisation during which workers suffered and growth slowed. In the emerging world, governments hope that subsidies can secure a foothold in supply chains as worried Westerners move production out of China.

一直以来，政治家都对制造业兴致盎然，但此等制造热情从未如今日这般高涨。西方国家为制造商发放大量补贴，尤其是向芯片制造商和电池等绿色科技的上下游厂商。他们说自己在对抗气候变化，维护国家安全，纠正四十多年来工人受苦、经济增长放缓的全球化进程。而随着西方国家出于某些顾虑将生产移出中国，新兴国家的政府希望通过补贴在供应链上获得一席之地。

The sums being spent are vast, and growing. Since they were signed into law, the estimated ten-year cost of America’s green subsidies has risen by at least two-thirds, and is likely to pass $1trn. The Biden administration has also expanded the eligibility for chipmaking subsidies. In June Germany increased its handout to Intel to build a chip plant, from €6.8bn ($7.6bn) to €9.9bn. India’s central government is subsidising a Micron factory in Gujarat to “assemble and test” chips, spending an amount equal to a quarter of its annual budget for higher education. Eventually, Britain’s opposition Labour Party wants to lavish £28bn ($36bn) a year on green handouts which, as a share of gdp, would be nearly ten times more than America’s.

拨款数目巨大而且持续增长。自补贴写入法律以来，美国十年绿色补贴的估算成本已经增长至少三分之二，很有可能突破一万亿美元。拜登政府也放宽了芯片制造补贴的领取资格。六月，德国加大拨款力度支持英特尔建立芯片工厂，从68亿欧元（合76亿美元）追加至99亿欧元。印度中央政府补贴美光（Micron）工厂在古吉拉特邦（Gujarat）“组装和测试”芯片，补贴金额相当于该国对高等教育全年预算的四分之一。英国反对党工党意欲以后每年豪掷280亿英镑（合360亿美元）作为绿色补贴，其金额占英国GDP的比重将超出美国对应比重近十倍。

An industrial arms race is under way. America welcomes it, saying the world needs green technologies and a diversified supply of chips. It is true that an ocean of public money is bound to accelerate the green transition and reshape supply chains in ways that should increase the security of democracies. Alas, the accompanying economic benefits being promised are an illusion. As we report this week, governments that subsidise and protect manufacturing are more likely to harm their economies than help them.

一场工业军备竞赛就此展开。美国乐在其中，称世界需要绿色科技和多源芯片供应。的确，大量公共资金的投入必将加速绿色转型，重塑供应链，进而促进民主国家的安全。然而，预期的附加经济利益难以实现。正如本周的报告所示，各国政府对制造业发放补贴、加以保护，结果很可能是破环经济发展而非助力。

In ideal conditions, promoting manufacturing can add to innovation and growth. Towards the end of the 20th century South Korea and Taiwan caught up with the West thanks to the careful promotion of manufacturing exports. In industries like planemaking the enormous costs of entry and uncertain future demand can justify support for new firms, as when Europe backed Airbus in the 1970s. Likewise, targeted help can boost national security.

在理想情况下，发展制造业可以助力创新、促进经济增长。20世纪末，韩国和中国台湾省对推动制造业出口进行了精心规划，迎头赶上了西方国家。在飞机制造业等行业中，市场进入成本高昂，未来需求具有不确定性，因此为新企业提供支持合情合理（20世纪70年代，空客Airbus就是这样得到欧洲支持的）。同样，具有针对性的支持措施还有助于加强国家安全。

But today’s schemes are likely either to fail or to prove needlessly costly. Countries subsidising chips and batteries are not pursuing catch-up growth but fighting over cutting-edge technology. The market for electric vehicles and batteries is unlikely to become an Airbus-Boeing style duopoly. In the 1980s protectionists argued that Japan would dominate the strategically vital semiconductor industry, owing to its subsidised mastery of memory-chip making. It did not turn out that way.

然而现实是，目前的计划很可能要么失败，要么证明是高成本、没必要的举措。一些国家为芯片和电池行业提供补贴，并不旨在促进追赶型经济增长，而是在争夺尖端技术。比如，电动汽车和电池市场就不太可能像飞机制造业一样形成空客和波音两家公司双头垄断的局面。20世纪80年代，贸易保护主义者称，通过补贴助力攻克存储芯片制造工艺，日本有望主导具有重要战略意义的半导体产业。但结局并非如此。

Duplicating production reduces specialisation, raising costs and hitting economic growth. Some analysts expect the price of a chip produced in Texas to be 30% higher than one made in Taiwan. The Biden administration is belatedly seeking ways to open up its electric-vehicle subsidies to carmakers from friendly countries. But most of the “Buy American” requirements are written into laws that may be all but impossible to amend. And they are being copied. A decade ago about 9,000 protectionist measures were in place worldwide, reckons Global Trade Alert, a charity. Today there are around 35,000.

重复生产会降低专业化程度，从而增加成本，影响经济增长。一些分析人士预计，生产于美国德州的芯片价格可能会比中国台湾制造的芯片高出30%。拜登政府正在不断寻求途径，让友好国家的汽车制造商也能享有美国的电动汽车补贴，但此举为时已晚。绝大多数关于“买美国货（Buy American）”的要求都已入编法律，而且修改这些法律几乎不可能。其他国家也正纷纷效仿这些做法。据全球贸易预警（Global Trade Alert）这一慈善机构估计，十年前全球约有9000项保护主义措施，而这一数字现已上升至约35000项。

European leaders think they must match America or face catastrophic deindustrialisation. They have forgotten the logic of comparative advantage, which guarantees that countries will always have something to export, no matter how many cheques foreign governments write or how productive their trading partners become. Denmark has no car industry to speak of, but GDP per person is 11% higher than in Germany. Even the benefits to workers are overstated, because manufacturing jobs no longer pay a premium over comparable service work.

欧洲国家的领导者认为自己必须赶上美国，否则就会面临灾难性的去工业化，但他们忘了比较优势逻辑，也就是说，不论其他国家政府发放多少补贴，也不论它们的贸易伙伴生产力多高，一个国家总会有可出口的产品。丹麦并无汽车业可言，但人均GDP却比德国高出11%。即便在工人收益方面，制造业工作也被高估了，因为相关工作与相应服务业工作对比，已不再享有工资溢价优势。

The potential for the manufacturing obsession to backfire is enormous. The state of New York spent nearly $1bn building a solar-panel factory which Tesla pays $1 a year to rent. The idea was to create a manufacturing hub but the project has returned only 54 cents in benefits per dollar spent; according to the Wall Street Journal, the only new nearby business is a coffee shop. India’s attempt to boost its mobile-phone industry appears to have brought mainly low-value assembly work. The lesson from South Korea is that national champions must be exposed to global competition and allowed to fail. The temptation today will be to protect them, come what may.

对制造业过分痴迷，结果极有可能会适得其反。纽约州耗费将近10亿美元建造太阳能电池板工厂，而特斯拉每年仅需为其支付1美元租金。这一计划的初衷是打造制造业中心，但项目每1美元单位投资回报率仅为54美分；据《华尔街日报》消息，项目附近除一家咖啡馆外再无任何新增商业设施。印度试图发展智能手机产业，最后主要承揽的似乎只是低附加值的装配业务。从韩国方面得到的教训则是，国内巨头必须要参与国际竞争，要给它们失败试错的机会。但如今面临的危险是，不管发生什么，国家都倾向为这些公司提供保护。

America says it wants a “small yard and a high fence”. For national security, in particular, access to vital technologies is worth paying for. Yet unless policymakers are clear about the dangers of subsidies, the fenced-in yard will only get bigger. However well-intentioned those doling out money today, their successors are likely to be less focused and more lobbied. Governments are not wrong to pursue good jobs, the green transition or national security. But if they succumb to the manufacturing delusion, they will leave their countries worse off. 

美国希望实施“小院高墙”战略。尤其是对国家安全而言，获取关键技术是值得投入的。但除非政策制定者清楚补贴所带来的风险，否则小院只会越扩越大。不论如今发放补贴的人意图如何美好，未来继任者也很可能让补贴失去针对性，更易受到政治游说的影响。政府创造好工作、促进绿色转型或加强国家安全的意图都没有错，但要是他们深陷制造兴国的幻觉而无法自拔，将让自己的国家坠入更加糟糕的境况。

Zy，没啥新鲜的，想做一个好译员

Alfredo，清纯男高体验卡仅剩几个月到期

Jessie，女，翻译界林黛玉，想被人叫大佬

Cecilia，2023生活得贵妇一点

Constance，痛终有时，爱必将至

Harold，一笔二口，寄蜉蝣于天地，渺沧海之一粟

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